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Nitroba University Case
5th Nov 2019

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Preliminary

- 1) I am Claire Fei whose address is 123 real street, Sydney, in the State of New South Wales.
- 2) I have graduated from an Australian High School in New South Wales and have gained a Higher School Certificate (HSC).
- 3) I am in my third and final year of studying at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, currently undertaking a Bachelor of Science (Computer Science) with a major in Computer Security.
- 4) I am currently undertaking a course run by Ajoy Ghosh called Digital Forensics (course code COMP6445) whom has taught postgraduate law, engineering and information technology students in various Australian and international universities and is a Certified Professional (CP) by the Australian Computer Society.
- 5) I have taken many other courses of interest including Extended Security Engineering and Cyber Security, Security Assessment (COMP6441) and Web Application and Security (COMP6443).
- 6) I am currently working at an EduTech company called School Bytes as a Full Stack Developer.

Instructions and Scope of this report

- 1) A teacher in the Chemistry Department, Lily Tuckrige (Tuckrige), claims to be receiving harassing emails, suspected to be coming from her Chemistry 109 class in which she is teaching this Summer.
- 2) Evidence of these emails, send to her personal account lilytuckrige@yahoo.com has been received by the system administrator, along with header information revealing an IP originating from a Nitroba share-room with a public wifi.
- 3) Nitroba has placed a network sniffer on the ethernet port and hence all network traffic and packets are logged.
- 4) I have been instructed to undertake technical analysis of the results of the network sniffing to determine if one of the students in the class was responsible for the harassing email and if so, which of the students are responsible.
- 5) My technical analysis must discover the email's sender and in the process, create contemporaneous notes and record any data files.
- 6) I must demonstrate the reliability of my conclusion by showing an alternate solution/tools to arrive at the same result.

Summary of Findings and Opinions

- 1) The offender had a search history containing incriminating evidence relevant to the case including "i want to harass my teacher".
- 2) On the same device, and at a similar time to this search, the willselfdestruct website was accessed the day before Lily Tuckrige received the offending email.
- 3) On the same device, and at a similar time, the gmail account "jcoach@gmail.com" was accessed.

- 4) Based on the balance of probabilities, containing the evidence above, and the probability that only Johnny Coach has access to his email account “jcoach@gmail.com”, Johnny Coach is the sender of the harassing email to Lily Tuckrige.

Body of Report

1) After receiving the forensic copy, the first step is to create and verify the hash of the copy. This can be done by creating an MD5 hash of the file by running the command shown below.

```
[Claires-MacBook-Pro:Downloads claire.fei$ md5sum nitroba.pcap
9981827f11968773ff815e39f5458ec8 nitroba.pcap]
```

The md5 algorithm creates a “digital fingerprint” by converting the data from a “larger” file into a shorter string. Hence, if the data in the file is unchanged, the same string should be produced if the same md5 algorithm is run across the data thus allowing us to verify the integrity of the file.

First Solution - Provided Solution

2) The first step in analysing the provided “.pcap” file is to use tcpflow to create the network flow. The provided pcap file is a representation of all network exchanged and the data stored in a file. We use the command “tcpflow -r nitroba.pcap -o nitroba-netflows” to direct the network analysis done by the program tcpflow into a directory (folder).

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba# tcpflow -r nitroba.pcap -o nitroba-netflows/
reportfilename: nitroba-netflows//report.xml
```

3) Next, we want to navigate into the folder by using the command “cd nitroba-netflow”. We will use the tool grep to assist us with finding data more quickly. Grep is a way for a user to do a basic text search and is the equivalent of user typing something into the search bar in Google to narrow down results.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba# cd nitroba-netflows/
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# grep -l "will self destruct" *
069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.35984
069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.35984c1
069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.36046
069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.36046c1
```

The result of using the grep command is that it will “streams”. These data streams are a sequence of signals transmitted and received by devices in order to transmit information/data.

4) Since these streams were the ones that contained the text “will self destruct”, they will most likely contain interesting information. As such, we will want to view what is contained within these streams by using the command “cat”. The cat command allows us to view the contents of a file. Notice that the words “anonymous email” are all common among all three streams.

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```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# cat 069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.35984
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 07:24:05 GMT
Server: Apache
Pragma: No-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=0FB2AD5FEEF73F78A1D0A5492813C761; Path=/
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

1ff8

<html>
<head>
    <meta name="Description" content="Secure, anonymous email and messaging for sensitive data. Send a self-destructing email to a friend, client or colleague." />
    <meta name="KeyWords" content="secure anonymous self destruct email message page, will self destruct email message, secret secure anonymous email message." />
    <title>FREE secure anonymous E-mail to a friend, client or colleague: WillSelfDestruct</title>
</head>
```

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# cat 069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.36046
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 07:24:45 GMT
Server: Apache
Pragma: No-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=C0AC3EC4944A8C88D98B7A8020B12492; Path=/
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

1ff8

<html>
<head>
    <meta name="Description" content="Secure, anonymous email and messaging for sensitive data. Send a self-destructing email to a friend, client or colleague." />
    <meta name="KeyWords" content="secure anonymous self destruct email message page, will self destruct email message, secret secure anonymous email message." />
    <title>FREE secure anonymous E-mail to a friend, client or colleague: WillSelfDestruct</title>
</head>
<body>
<center>
    <style media="print" type="text/css">
        #body {
            display: none;
        }
    </style>
```

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# cat 069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.36046c1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date:Tue, 22 Jul 2008 07:24:45 GMT
Server: Apache
Pragma: No-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT
Set-Cookie: JSESSIONID=C0AC3EC4944A8C88D98B7A8020B12492; Path=/
Content-Type: text/html;charset=ISO-8859-1
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

1ff8

<html>
<head>
    <meta name="Description" content="Secure, anonymous email and messaging for sensitive data. Send a self-destructing email to a friend, client or colleague." />
    <meta name="KeyWords" content="secure anonymous self destruct email message page, will self destruct email message, secret secure anonymous E-mail message," />
    <title>FREE secure anonymous E-mail to a friend, client or colleague: WillSelfDestruct</title>
</head>
<body>
<center>
    <style media="print" type="text/css">
        #body {
```

- 5) Hence, we will want to use the grep tool again to search for streams of transmitted data containing the words “anonymous email” in order to find more relevant evidence. Notice that there is only one new and different result from the previous grep search.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# grep -l "anonymous email" *
069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.35984
069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.35984c1
069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.36046
069.025.094.022.00080-192.168.015.004.36046c1
069.080.225.091.00080-192.168.015.004.35848
069.080.225.091.00080-192.168.015.004.35848c1
```

- 6) We will now investigate this newly identified stream of data by using the cat command again to view the contents in text form. One interesting thing noticed in the contents of this stream is the email with the address “sendanonymousemail”

```
069.080.225.091.00080-192.168.015.004.35848
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# cat 069.080.225.091.00080-192.168.015.004.35848
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 07:21:37 GMT
Server: Apache/1.3.37 (Unix) PHP/4.4.4 with Suhosin-Patch
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.4.4
Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/html

d9c
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<title>Send Anonymous Email</title>
<link href="style.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">

<script type="text/JavaScript">
<!--
function MM_findObj(n, d) { //v4.01
    var p,i,x; if(!d) d=document; if((p=n.indexOf("?"))>0&&parent.frames.length) {
        d=parent.frames[n.substring(p+1)].document; n=n.substring(0,p);}
    if(!(x=d[n])&&d.all) x=d.all[n]; for (i=0;!x&&i<d.forms.length;i++) x=d.forms[i][n];
    for(i=0;!x&&d.layers&&i<d.layers.length;i++) x=MM_findObj(n,d.layers[i].document);
    if(!x && d.getElementById) x=d.getElementById(n); return x;
}

<strong>
Your IP Address is 70.134.91.12
so don't do anything illegal.</strong>I
f you send death threats, abuse, slander or anything illegal we WILL publish your IP address and block you from
this site.</strong> <br>
<br>
Abusers can be reported <a href="mailto:sendanonymousemail@gmail.com"
here</a>.<br>
<br>
Please read our <a href="terms.php" target="_blank">terms
of use</a>.
<td width="54%" valign="top"><form action="send.php" method="post">
<table width="350" height="260" align="center" cellpadding=0 cellspacing=3 bgcolor="#EFEF
EF">
<tr valign=top>
<td align=center nowrap><span class="middle"><strong>Send
Anonymous Email </strong><br>
```

- 7) We will further search for evidence by using the email address we found as the new text to search for within the network streams.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# grep -l "sendanonymousemail" *
069.080.225.091.00080-192.168.015.004.35848
069.080.225.091.00080-192.168.015.004.35848c1
069.080.225.091.00080-192.168.015.004.35876
069.080.225.091.00080-192.168.015.004.35876c1
192.168.015.004.35798-074.125.019.104.00080
192.168.015.004.35798-074.125.019.104.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35848-069.080.225.091.00080
192.168.015.004.35848-069.080.225.091.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35850-069.080.225.091.00080
192.168.015.004.35850-069.080.225.091.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35852-074.125.019.167.00080
192.168.015.004.35852-074.125.019.167.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35854-074.125.019.167.00080
192.168.015.004.35854-074.125.019.167.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35856-067.015.076.053.00080
192.168.015.004.35856-067.015.076.053.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35876-069.080.225.091.00080
192.168.015.004.35876-069.080.225.091.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35878-074.125.019.167.00080
192.168.015.004.35878-074.125.019.167.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35880-074.125.019.167.00080
192.168.015.004.35880-074.125.019.167.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35882-067.015.076.053.00080
192.168.015.004.35882-067.015.076.053.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35886-067.015.076.053.00080
192.168.015.004.35886-067.015.076.053.00080c1
```

8) Using the cat command on each of these will show you the contents of data transmitted in each of the network streams. The one that we took particular notice of is the stream “192.168.015.004.35876-069.080.225.091.00080”. We can clearly see that this is the stream that transmitted the data for the harassing email, as indicated by the contents circled in red below containing the message “your class stinks” etc.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# cat 192.168.015.004.35876-069.080.225.091.00080
POST /send.php HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, */
Referer: http://www.sendanonymousemail.net/
Accept-Language: en-us
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.sendanonymousemail.net
Content-Length: 275
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie: PHPSESSID=762adba03236142cc305f6a20aaffa

email=lilytuckrige@yahoo.com&sender=the_whole_world_is_watching@nitroba.org&subject=Your+class+stinks&message=hy+do+you+persist+in+teaching+a+boring+class%3F%0D%0A%0D%0AWe+don%27t+like+it.%0D%0A%0D%0AWe+don%27t+like+you.%0D%0A%0D%0A&security_code=xkpmkb&submit=++SEND%21++GET /CaptchaSecurityImages.php?width=100&height=40&character=5 HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
Referer: http://www.sendanonymousemail.net/
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: www.sendanonymousemail.net
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cookie: PHPSESSID=762adba03236142cc305f6a20aaffa
```

9) From the name of the stream (the first few blocks of numbers), we know that the IP address “192.168.015.004” is a suspicious and interesting place to look. An IP address is a numerical label of each device connected to a network and hence may help us identify the suspicious device and hence user. We can narrow down the search by checking User-Agents of data transmissions that have interacted with this IP address. User-Agents are a way of identifying the operating system and browser of a user to the web server from which they are requesting information. We can use the grep search tool to find the User-Agents of the stream that we were looking at in step 8.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# grep -a User-Agent 192.168.015.004.35876-069.080.225.091.00080
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
```

10) Using the results from above, we can see that the user agents are the same, suggesting the same software (e.g browser - internet explorer 6.0) and device was used. Hence we can do a reverse search to see if we can find all the streams where the device and software is consistent - since the perpetrator may change locations hence changing their IP address (numerical label to their device assigned by the network). Notice that on the right hand side of the command we specify “> user-agent-list”. This tells the command to place it’s output into a file called “user-agent-list”.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# grep -l 'Mozilla/4.0 .compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1
.' * > user-agent-list
```

11) The next step is crucial in figuring out who the attacker is. Currently we are only getting the message that the browser sends to the web server (i.e the html we saw), however, we actually want the response. In order to find the matching response for each of the streams, we want to swap the source and destination around. Currently, we have it in the format of (source_ip-destination_ip). To swap it around and hence find the response streams, we can execute the command below.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# awk -F- '{print $2, "-", $1}' user-agent-list | sed 's/ //g' >
user-agent-rev
```

The results will now be stored in a file called “user-agent-rev”

12) Now that we have a list of the responses, we can use the cat command to view the contents of each of the streams. Notice that a lot of these files contain random information that either may not be interpreted, or does not seem relevant to the investigation.

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```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# cat 012.129.210.046.00080-192.168.015.004.36076
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 06:05:18 GMT
Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0
P3P: policyref=http://www.eyeblast.com/p3p/Eyeblast-served-p3p2.xml,CP="NOI DEVa OUR BUS UNI"
X-Powered-By: ASP.NET
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-type: text/html
Expires: Sun, 05-Jun-2005 22:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
Set-Cookie: A2=3Su7582r02WG0000g410eB3Lq0582l06E00000820weB; expires=Thu, 31-Dec-2037 22:00:00 GMT; domain=.serving-sys.com; path=/
Cache-control: no-cache
Set-Cookie: B2=2b3y0g410eB25ge0820weB; expires=Thu, 31-Dec-2037 22:00:00 GMT; domain=.serving-sys.com; path=/
Cache-control: no-cache
Set-Cookie: C3=0dyu820weB0000g00_0dMag410eB0000001_; expires=Thu, 31-Dec-2037 22:00:00 GMT; domain=.serving-sys.com; path=/
Cache-control: no-cache
Set-Cookie: D3=0dyu03rz820weB0dMa002wg410eB; expires=Thu, 31-Dec-2037 22:00:00 GMT; domain=.serving-sys.com; path=/
Cache-control: no-cache
Set-Cookie: eyeblast=BWVal=&BWDate=&debuglevel=&FLV=6.088&RES=0&WMPV=9; expires=Thu, 31-Dec-2037 22:00:00 GMT; domain=bs.serving-sys.com; path=/
Cache-control: no-cache
Content-Length: 0
```

After viewing all these streams, we notice that there are two in particular that contain suspicious and convicting information, namely “074.125.019.104.00080-192.168.015.004.35796” and “074.125.019.104.00080-192.168.015.004.35798” which contain the email address of a student.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# cat 074.125.019.104.00080-192.168.015.004.35796 | head -n 20
HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
Set-Cookie: CAL=DQAAAG4AAAAyprUKisFp1wFlwiwIIZowqnpAerq-KS7yto_wd6bxSPzzEXHl0StDzuPdNyy_n_poTb_5cy60flk7HqznK3Q
MZYVK0v0dzSPDiLSkyWSL0UzIpYhnj94aV1D-RTdxjidUFLo32SWCI7EULqR4C0;Domain=www.google.com;Path=/calendar;Expires=
Wed, 06-Aug-2008 06:01:08 GMT
Location: http://www.google.com/calendar/render?utm_campaign=en&utm_source=en-ha-na-us-bk&utm_medium=ha&utm_ter
m=google+calendar
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Content-Encoding: gzip
Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 06:01:08 GMT
Expires: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 06:01:08 GMT
Cache-Control: private, max-age=0
Content-Length: 237
Server: GFE/1.3

mPJ0000+B/0F00T0n0
] 07%g!00wq00000000k00w0T00000060000w-0w0z+00
?0eF000G0/00*00qr0u0y00 0i0V0900000=0000000H100#.00000z0`000>l0b000\000,000
E0UA3%.00000000
PROE
0%NH0/[D8HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, max-age=0, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Fri, 01 Jan 1990 00:00:00 GMT
Set-Cookie: secid=708511d04431b1dbce35563e903f2854; Path=/calendar
Set-Cookie: OL_SESSION=jcoachj@gmail.com-cal
```

- 13)** The files found in step 12 indicate that a user has logged in via gmail and since gmail requires a password, based on the balance of probabilities that the person who knows the password is the one logged in and hence constructed the crime, we can suspect that the perpetrator is Johnny Coach (Coach) since the email is aliased under his name "jcoachj@gmail.com". We can do a grep text search on this email to find other services that Coach has accessed whilst logged in to his email.

```
root@kali:~/Documents/nitroba/nitroba-netflows# grep -l jcoachj@gmail.com *
074.125.019.104.00080-192.168.015.004.35796
074.125.019.104.00080-192.168.015.004.35796c1
074.125.019.104.00080-192.168.015.004.35798
074.125.019.104.00080-192.168.015.004.35798c1
192.168.015.004.35796-074.125.019.104.00080
192.168.015.004.35796-074.125.019.104.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35798-074.125.019.104.00080
192.168.015.004.35798-074.125.019.104.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35804-074.125.019.017.00080
192.168.015.004.35804-074.125.019.017.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35824-074.125.019.017.00080
192.168.015.004.35824-074.125.019.017.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35826-209.085.201.189.00080
192.168.015.004.35826-209.085.201.189.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35828-209.085.201.189.00080
192.168.015.004.35828-209.085.201.189.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35832-074.125.019.017.00080
192.168.015.004.35832-074.125.019.017.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35834-074.125.019.017.00080
192.168.015.004.35834-074.125.019.017.00080c1
192.168.015.004.35846-074.125.019.104.00080
192.168.015.004.35846-074.125.019.104.00080c1
```

- 14)** Hence the conclusion is that Coach was the one that send the offending and harassing emails.

Alternate Solution - Wireshark (for reliability)

2) Firstly, using “tcp contains <keyword>” which acts as a search functionality for web requests containing keywords, I searched for keywords such as teacher. Then looking at each web requests, it is clear that a user was searching for information on the internet such as “I want to harass my teacher”, “I go to jail for harassing my teacher”, “how to annoy people” and “send anonymous email”. Notice that both of these are originating from the same IP address (numerical label of each device connected to a network and hence identity) and has the same User-Agent which allows you to identify the device. In this case, it seems the user searching for harassment methods and consequences was on a Windows computer using internet explorer 6.0.

The screenshot shows the Wireshark interface with a search filter applied: "tcp contains \"teacher\"". The results list several HTTP requests from the source IP 192.168.15.4 to various destinations, all containing the word "teacher" in their URLs or headers. One specific request is highlighted with a red box, showing its full details:

```

Referer: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=sending+anonymous+mail\r\n
Accept-Language: en-us\r\n
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)\r\n
Host: www.google.com\r\n
Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n
[truncated]Cookie: SS=Q=c2VuZGluZyBhbmc9ueW1vdXMgbWFpbA; PREF=ID=8fc081df5e738a3c:TM=1210743469:LM=1210743469:S=PiBsyJkS6cu-UE...
\r\n
[Full request URI: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=i+want+to+harass+my+teacher]

```

The bottom pane shows the raw hex and ASCII representation of the selected request. The ASCII dump includes the full URL and query parameters, such as "http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=i+want+to+harass+my+teacher".

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tcp contains "teacher"

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
743..	14820.731971	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.104	HTTP	724	GET /search?hl=en&q=i+want+to+harass+my+teacher HTTP/1.1
746..	14826.800916	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.104	HTTP	706	GET /url/?sa=T&ct=res&cd=1+url=http%3A%2F%2Fanswers.yahoo.com%2Fquestion%2F
746..	14827.042458	192.168.15.4	209.73.187.220	HTTP	481	GET /question/index?id=20080605160229A5xnfshow=7 HTTP/1.1
+ 749..	14845.565305	192.168.15.4	209.73.187.220	HTTP	1130	GET /search/search_result;_ylt=A9FJu140d4VIL50ANivD7BR.;_ylv=3?p=can+I+go+
749..	14847.349214	192.168.15.4	69.22.167.248	HTTP	446	GET /us.yimg.com/i/geo/advan/spacer.gif HTTP/1.1
749..	14847.351877	192.168.15.4	69.22.167.248	HTTP	445	GET /us.yimg.com/i/us/sch/gr/mhask.gif HTTP/1.1
749..	14847.355653	192.168.15.4	209.73.191.242	HTTP	436	GET /a/i/us/sch/gr/bggreydiag.gif HTTP/1.1
749..	14847.377356	192.168.15.4	209.73.191.242	HTTP	437	GET /a/i/us/sch/gr/bggreendiag.gif HTTP/1.1

Accept-Language: en-us\r\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)\r\nHost: answers.yahoo.com\r\nConnection: Keep-Alive\r\n► [truncated]Cookie: B=drcsgu548ataoe&b=3&s=2p; answers=rPr8rsb2YDe6N_jmMp5o.r1Pj5AuJpZht7_utIiCPH92P1P0sxuh47xltosUK2mwAUQPNFikrt6AHs9cx846SRMxNF4.Injde76\r\n[Full request URI: http://answers.yahoo.com/search/search_result;_ylt=A9FJu140d4VIL50ANivD7BR.;_ylv=3?p=can+I+go+to+jail+for+harassing+my+teacher%3F]\r\n[HTTP request 1/1]\r\n[Response in frame: 749351]

0000	00 1d d9 e4 ff 00	17 f2 e2 c0 ce 08 00 45 00	...0...E-
0010	04 58 c6 9d 40 00	3f 06 14 30 c0 a8 0f 04	d1 49	X-@ ? 0 ..I
0020	bb dc 8b 42 00 50	15 3c 92 17 9e fd	fc 75 80 18	..B-P-< ..u-
0030	ff ff 8a ee 00 00	01 01 08 0a 26	63 12 42 8a&c- B-
0040	42 c3 47 45 54 20	2f 73 65 61 72 63	68 72 73 65	B-GET /s earch/se
0050	61 72 63 68 5f 72	65 73 75 6c 74 3b	5f 79 67 74	arch_res ult;_ylt
0060	3d 41 39 46 4a 75	69 34 4f 64 34	56 49 4c 35 51	=A9FJu14 0d4VIL5Q
0070	41 4e 69 76 44 37	42 52 2e 3b 5f	79 6c 76 3d 33	ANivD7BR ;_ylv=3
0080	3f 7d 3d 63 61 6e	2b 49 2b 67 6f	2b 74 6f 2b 6a	?p=can+I+go+to+j
0090	61 69 6c 2b 66 72	2b 68 61 72 61	73 73 69 6e	ail+for+ harassin
00a0	67 2b 6d 79 2b	74 65 61 63 68	65 72 25 33 46	g+my+tea cher%3F

3) Next, looking at internet usage that contains the offending website “willselfdestruct”, we can see that it also originates from the same IP as the previous offending internet searches suggesting the user wants to harass a teacher and also has the same User-Agent.

tcp contains "willselfdestruct"

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
8...	15156.433365	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.33	HTTP	746	GET /?zi=1/XJ&sdn=email&cdn=compute&tm=17&gps=101_1829_788_511&f=00&su=p284.9.336.ip_p504.1.336.ip_tt=4&bts=1&zu=http%3A//www.willselfdestruct.com
8...	15156.453742	208.185.127.33	192.168.15.4	TCP	110	[TCP Previous segment not captured] 80 → 35962 [ACK] Seq=2413 Ack=1479 Win=8
8...	15156.456617	208.185.127.33	192.168.15.4	TCP	1466	[TCP Fast Retransmission] 80 → 35962 [ACK] Seq=1005 Ack=1479 Win=8190 Len=14
8...	15156.473994	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.40	HTTP	793	GET /gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=email&cdn=compute&tm=17&gps=101_1829.
8...	15156.520527	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.40	HTTP	1118	GET /gi/dynamic/zoffsitetopad.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=email&cdn=compute&tm=17&gps=10
8...	15156.662329	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.35	HTTP	842	GET /6/j/b.txt?s=email HTTP/1.1
8...	15156.703578	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.35	HTTP	840	GET /6/g/email/b/b.js HTTP/1.1
8...	15156.730593	192.168.15.4	69.25.94.22	HTTP	596	GET /secure/submit HTTP/1.1

▼ Hypertext Transfer Protocol

> GET /?zi=1/XJ&sdn=email&cdn=compute&tm=17&gps=101_1829_788_511&f=00&su=p284.9.336.ip_p504.1.336.ip_tt=4&bts=1&zu=http%3A//www.willselfdestruct.com

Accept: */*\r\n

Referer: http://email.about.com/od/anonymousemailservices/gr/will_self_destr.htm\r\n

Accept-Language: en-us\r\n

Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)\r\n

Host: clk.about.com\r\n

Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n

0010 02 d8 94 ad 40 00 3f 06 84 eb c0 a8 0f 04 d0 b9 .! z-P-2 .n-LFUP.

0020 7f 21 8c 7a 00 50 b3 32 fc 6e 10 4c 45 50 18 .-j .GE T /?zi=1

0030 fd 00 6a 18 00 47 45 54 20 2f 3f 7a 69 30 31 .-j .GE T /?zi=1

0040 2f 58 4a 26 73 64 68 3d 65 6d 61 69 6c 26 63 64 /XJ&sdn= email&cd

0050 6e 3d 63 6f 6d 70 75 74 65 26 74 6d 3d 31 37 26 n=compute e8tn=17&

0060 67 70 73 3d 31 30 5f 31 38 32 39 5f 37 38 38 gps=101_1829_788

0070 f5 35 31 31 26 66 3d 30 38 26 73 75 3d 70 38 38 _511&f=0 0&su=p28

0080 34 2e 39 2e 33 33 36 2e 69 70 5f 70 35 30 34 2e 4.9.336. ip_p504.

0090 31 2e 33 33 36 2e 69 70 5f 26 74 74 3d 34 26 62 1.336.ip_tt=4&bts=1&zu=htt

00a0 74 3d 31 26 62 74 73 3d 31 26 74 75 3d 68 74 74 t=16bts= 16zu=htt

00b0 70 25 33 41 2f 2f 77 77 2e 77 69 6c 73 65 p%3A//w.w.willse

Header checksum (ip.checksum), 2 bytes

Packets: 94410 - Displayed: 53 (0.1%)

Profile: Default

4) Using the two filters “chat” and “gmail”, you can find multiple instances of gmail that has been accessed under the name “jcoach@gmail.com” which is suggestive that Johnny Coach was the

one who sent the harassment emails since he also logged in and used his email under the same IP.

The Wireshark interface displays two separate network captures. The top capture, titled 'nitroba.pcap', shows traffic for a 'chat' search query. The bottom capture, also titled 'nitroba.pcap', shows traffic for a 'gmail' search query. Both captures include a search bar at the top with the query 'http.user_agent matches "Mozilla/4.0" and ip.src == 192.168.15.4 and tcp contains "chat"' or 'gmail'. The packet list view shows numerous HTTP requests from the source IP 192.168.15.4 to various destinations, primarily 74.125.19.17. The 'Info' column reveals detailed cookie information for each request, such as 'Cookie pair: S=gmail=L5hb7hJ9B97n6StWA4FvA:...'. The bottom capture also includes truncated cookie information for the 'gmail' search.

- 5) We then go to the “view” tab in wireshark, go to “time display format” and set it to show “Date and Time of Day” and repeat the searches done previously. In the “Time” column where it displays the time that each packet was sent, and hence when each search request to the internet was made, we can see that the time the willselfdestruct website was accessed is similar

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to when the email account "jcoach@gmail.com" was accessed and the incriminating searches such as "can I go to jail for harassing my teacher" was done.

nitroba.pcap

http.user_agent matches "Mozilla/4.0" and ip.src == 192.168.15.4 and tcp contains "willselfdestruct"

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:43.528643	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.33	HTTP	746	GET /?zi=1/XJ&sdn=email&cdn=compute&tm=17&gps=101_1829_788_5118
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:43.569272	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.40	HTTP	793	GET /gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=email&cdn=compute&tm=17
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:43.615843	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.40	HTTP	1118	GET /gi/dynamic/zoffssitetopad.htm?zi=1/XJ&sdn=email&cdn=compute
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:43.757607	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.35	HTTP	842	GET /6/j\$/.txt?s=email HTTP/1.1
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:43.798856	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.35	HTTP	840	GET /6/g/email/b.js HTTP/1.1
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:43.825871	192.168.15.4	69.25.94.22	HTTP	596	GET /secure/submit HTTP/1.1
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:43.848398	192.168.15.4	208.185.127.35	HTTP	836	GET /f/l/g/f1.gif HTTP/1.1
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:43.869763	192.168.15.4	64.236.76.160	HTTP	800	GET /rtx/r.js?cmd=ADNS&i=11775&x=2&v=3.12&cb=50904 HTTP/1.1

▼ Hypertext Transfer Protocol

```

> GET /?zi=1/XJ&sdn=email&cdn=compute&tm=17&gps=101_1829_788_511&f=0&su=p284.9.336.ip_p504.1.336.ip_.tt=4&bts=1&zu=http%3A//www.willselfdestruct.com/s
Accept: */*
Referer: http://email.about.com/od/anonymousemailservices/gr/will_self_destr.htm\r\n
Accept-Language: en-us\r\n
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)\r\n
Host: clk.about.com\r\n
Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n

```

```

0230 33 3b 2b 7a 46 44 3d 38 37 4d 33 30 38 37 30 33 ; zFD=8 7M308703
0240 31 30 3b 30 30 33 30 31 3b 20 7a 52 66 3d 31 3b 10800301 ; zRF=1;
0250 20 67 73 3d 65 6d 61 69 6c 3b 20 63 73 63 3d 31 gs=mai l; jsc=1
0260 33 3b 2b 7a 44 6f 74 3d 31 3b 20 41 4e 58 44 3d ; zDot= 1; ANXD=
0270 78 3b 20 54 44 61 74 61 3d 3b 20 54 49 44 3d 33 x; TData =; TID=3
0280 66 67 32 30 6f 61 31 34 38 61 75 31 6e 3b 20 41 fg200a14 8auIn A
0290 78 44 61 74 61 3d 3b 20 41 78 78 64 3d 31 3b 20 xData=; Axhd=1;
02a0 75 70 3d 38 37 4d 36 33 59 36 46 6b 57 41 30 up=87M63 Y60OKWA0
02b0 35 35 3d 20 75 70 73 3d 38 37 46 36 33 59 30 556; up=87M63Y0
02c0 36 4f 6b 57 41 30 35 35 38 3b 20 74 47 54 3d 38 60KWA055 6; zGT=8
02d0 37 4d 3b 30 31 3b 20 7a 47 54 4c 3d 38 37 4d 30 7M001; z GTL=87M0

```

A name/value HTTP cookie pair (http.cookie_pair), 21 bytes

Packets: 94410 - Displayed: 33 (0.0%)

Profile: Default

nitroba.pcap

http.user_agent matches "Mozilla/4.0" and ip.src == 192.168.15.4 and tcp contains "chat"

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
7..	2008-07-22 16:01:12.953546	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.17	HTTP	1285	GET /mail/im/emotisprites/brokenheart0.png HTTP/1.1
7..	2008-07-22 16:01:12.977406	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.17	HTTP	1279	GET /mail/im/emotisprites/kissx0.png HTTP/1.1
7..	2008-07-22 16:01:13.174407	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.17	HTTP	1282	GET /mail/im/emotisprites/kissstar0.png HTTP/1.1
7..	2008-07-22 16:01:13.198203	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.17	HTTP	1282	GET /mail/im/emotisprites/mustache0.png HTTP/1.1
7..	2008-07-22 16:01:13.385129	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.17	HTTP	1278	GET /mail/im/emotisprites/robot.png HTTP/1.1
7..	2008-07-22 16:01:13.407773	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.17	HTTP	1277	GET /mail/im/emotisprites/pig0.png HTTP/1.1
8..	2008-07-22 16:03:02.386299	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.17	HTTP	1405	GET /mail/?ui=1&ik=@0610acb&view=tls&search=inbox&start=0&tlt=
8..	2008-07-22 16:04:55.380722	192.168.15.4	74.125.19.17	HTTP	1366	GET /mail/channel/bind?at=xn3j32oktf2a0q6oa3k9sfr6d09yzf&ui=1&

Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n

Cookie pair: GX=DQAAAG8AAAAm2oWBlqM60qoQ5w2jVJ-zHIfuyAQ3GUkvcv4N9vQ6lwLuPvMCm1Jhmlm9_P3qZbyTwkIWDo5cnuJHuMxyS03a5_HduyckaYw0o-HSktrUCM8z2caT1oC7NMWn

Cookie pair: S=gmail=LShb7tHHJB9B97n6StWA4FvA:gmail_yj=OoenmU7qTeuQ1dsN3B1kg:gmpoxy=6uatNcZZmB8:gmpoxy_yj=FRV17zyWh8:gmpoxy_yj_sub=bzgoW0bARA

Cookie pair: GMAIL_At=xn3j32oktf2a0q6oa3k9sfr6d09yzf

Cookie pair: gmailchat=jcoach@gmail.com/475090

Cookie pair: PREF=ID=8fc0081df5e738a3c:TM=1210743469;LM=1216706486;GM=1:S=vvxetHX0oIXNyR8Zj

Cookie pair: NID=13=tJ7ltEc6z121h4BP_IPyV0gGhi4LcZoJcjAf7l-9JQ2AeoB8owGNJNjt0p7T5tuskkNgEKMRAn9P49vI4Easp6NpBuJWaDr5pEv4yh6XE0UboY5r3KgJSFshpsI-TfmV

Cookie pair: __utmx=173272373.00000983192309928271:2;

Cookie pair: __utmx=173272373.00000983192309928271:1216706401:2592000

```

0370 34 37 35 30 39 30 3b 20 50 52 45 46 3d 49 44 3d 475090; PREF=ID=
0380 38 66 63 30 38 31 64 66 35 65 37 33 38 61 33 63 8fc081df 5e738a3c
0390 3a 54 44 3d 31 32 31 30 37 34 33 34 36 39 3a 4c :TM=1210743469:L
03a0 4d 3d 31 32 31 36 37 30 36 34 38 36 3a 47 4d 3d M=121670 6486:GM=
03b0 31 3a 53 3d 76 76 78 65 48 58 30 6f 49 58 44 79 1:S=vvxet HX0oIXNy
03c0 52 38 55 6a 3b 20 4e 49 4d 31 33 3d 74 47 34 R8Zj; NI D=13=t17
03d0 4c 74 45 63 36 7a 31 32 69 48 34 42 58 5f 49 50 LtEc6z121h4BP_IP
03e0 79 56 30 67 47 68 69 34 61 4c 63 5a 6f 4a 63 6a yV0gGhi4 alcZoJcj
03f0 41 66 37 6c 2d 39 4a 51 32 41 65 6f 44 38 6f 57 Af71-930 2AeoB8ow
0400 47 39 44 4a 74 4f 70 37 54 35 74 75 73 6b 6b 4e G9NJt0p7 T5tuskkN
0410 67 45 4b 4b 52 41 6e 39 50 34 39 76 49 34 45 61 gEKMRAn9 P49vI4Ea


```

A name/value HTTP cookie pair (http.cookie_pair), 76 bytes


Packets: 94410 - Displayed: 89 (0.1%)


Profile: Default

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6) Lastly, if we access the Ethernet Source tab, which displays information about the device used, we can see that the MAC address, highlighted in a red box in the images below, are the same when accessing the email and the willselfdestruct website. MAC addresses are unique identifiers used to differentiate one device from another when on a network/ the internet. As such, we can link the usage of the site willselfdestruct to the use of Johnny Coach's email definitively, as IP addresses can be shared amongst many devices but MAC addresses are unique to each device.





7) Hence, on the balance of the probability that only Johnny Coach has access to his email address, and the fact that we can link the usage of the device to the usage of emails both based on device, software (web browser e.g internet explorer) and time, we can conclude that Johnny Coach was the one that sent the offending and harassing emails.

Limitations

- 1) Time - we were given approximately 6 weeks to complete this task on top of workload containing other things amongst this case study. As such, the investigation may not be as thorough.
- 2) Instructions - as this is a civil case and a search warrant was not obtained, we were unable to seize the suspect's devices to further prove that he was the one who sent the harassing emails to Tuckrige. Hence this report relies on the balance of probabilities, acceptable in civil cases, as opposed to "beyond reasonable doubt"

Declaration

- 1) I have read and understood the *Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 - Schedule 7 - Expert Witness Code of Conduct* and agree to be bound by its terms.
- 2) My opinions expressed in this report is based wholly or substantially on my specialised knowledge referred to in this report.
- 3) I have made all enquiries that I believe are desirable and appropriate and no matters of significance which I regard as relevant have, to my knowledge, been withheld in this report.

Part 1B - Reflection Activity

1) *What question(s) would you ask of your supervisor to ascertain that the PCAP file you have been asked to examine has been legally obtained (assume Nitroba is within NSW)?*

In regards to this question, I will assume that legally obtained not only means that the evidence itself has been taken whilst compliant with the laws but also, it's admissibility in Court has been considered. Questions I would ask include:

- “Do you own or have you leased the network on which you have sniffed?” This is an important question as you can only legally sniff networks on which you owned/ have leased. Otherwise it would be considered “tapping” which is an illegal act.
- “Have you received or been granted permission by the owners of the network?” This would be asked if the previous question has been answered by a “no” since you would require permission to tap or tamper with other people’s networks.
- “Is the network configured to be readily accessible to the general public? E.g unencrypted, etc.” This question would be asked as it is legal to intercept connections that are publicly available.
- “Was the packet sniffing used for diagnostic purposes to ensure the efficient and effective maintenance of networks or to detect misuse?” This question should be asked as if the original intention of installing a network sniffer was to troubleshoot then it may be legal.
- “Have you received a search warrant clearance from the courts or some other form of higher authority or clearance such as a subpoena?” This question should be asked as the network sniffing may have been legally obtained if a valid warrant has been approved by the courts.

2) *What would you do differently if this were a criminal case e.g Tuckrige complained to Police instead of the University,?*

If this were a criminal case instead, there would have to be a formal procedure that should be followed. This involves the steps in prosecution including Investigation, Brief Assessment/ Decision to Charge, Charging or Commencing a Proceedings, Committal Proceeding, Hearing, Trial, Sentencing and Appeals. When dealing with a criminal case, one must appeal to the Courts or other parties of power for the authorisation of a search warrant and in that case, an investigator may forcibly seize any devices related to the crime at hand. However, as the current case is a civil case, no devices were taken into custody, and the Nitroba University themselves deemed network sniffing the ideal choice of tool in order to find incrimination evidence.

Furthermore, more substantial, thorough and incrimination evidence may be formed in the case of a criminal case (e.g seizing of laptops and checking search histories, fingerprints, etc.) as the standard of proof on the prosecution must be “beyond reasonable doubt”, however in a civil case such as the current, it lies on the balance of probability and hence the current evidence should suffice. Hence we are able to convict Coach on the basis of the balance of probability that since gmail requires a password and he was seen interacting on the IP address multiple times, that it was Coach that sent the harassing emails. This would not be an admissible conclusion in a criminal investigation. Lastly, in a criminal case the standard of information required is often higher and stricter procedures must be followed in order to maintain

admissibility although the evidence in both a criminal and civil case must ideally be deemed admissible, authentic, reliable, valid and credible. However, in contrast, in a civil case such as the Nitroba case, since the initial process of electronic discovery is enough to escalate the case to court (e.g screenshots of emails showing harassment) and hence the investigations in this report may be less formal than one that would require a criminal investigation.

References (for Part 1B)

Antwi-Boasiako, A. and Venter, H. (2017). A Model for Digital Evidence Admissibility Assessment. *Advances in Digital Forensics XIII*, pp.23–38.

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KKIENERM (2019). Cybercrime Module 6 Key Issues: Digital Evidence Admissibility, accessed 27 October 2019,
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Part 2 - Extended Question

Section 146 of the Evidence Act states that “[evidence] that is produced completely or partly by a device or process that is tendered by a party who asserts that, in producing the document or thing, the device or process has produced a particular outcome”. Paragraph 2 of Section 146 also states that “if it is reasonably open to find that the device or process is one that, or is of a kind that, if properly used, ordinarily produces that outcome, it is presumed … that, in producing the document or thing on the occasion in question, the device or process produced that outcome”. As such, many argue as Section 146 of the Evidence Act permits, believe that police may rely on tools such as Cellebrite UFED, XRY and Autopsy to assist in the collection of digital evidence, without the need for and as a replacement to digital expert testimonies as this would allow Police to cope with the operational pace of serious criminal investigations and the volume of work. However, the contrary is in fact true, and this is just a simple misinterpretation and manipulation of the views of the existing scenarios which has the negative impact of unreasonably shifting the burden of proof on the defendant. and as will be discussed later, the training required in order to ensure police are at a capable standard of interpreting auto-generated reports ultimately creates the same burden on taxpayers. Lastly, according to the Australian Crime Prevention Department states that mobile phone ownership has been increasing rapidly and between 2000 to 2010, the number of telephone services in operation has increased two-fold. As a result of mobile evidence being largely involved in crimes due to the recent influx of mobile usage, relying on section 146 unreasonably shifts the burden of proof to the defendant as the onus of proof is on the party seeking to establish the unreliability of evidence produced by a process, machine or device.

The first issue we will examine is the reliability and costs of replacing forensic experts with tools. In this case, we have chosen to examine Cellebrite's Universal Forensic Extraction Device (UFED) which is the most widely acclaimed and recognised mobile forensic tool as of 2019, having won two Presidential awards in 2018 for the 10th year in a row. Cellebrite's UFED is a tool compatible with over 2500 mobile devices and allows automated report generation as well as the ability to unlock any most modern devices and extract files, gain access to third party app data, chat conversations, downloads, deleted content and other forms of data from such mobile devices. Although this allows for automated mobile device cracking and report generation, the acquisition and maintenance of these devices are large. For example, in June 2019, Cellbrite made a contract with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for approximately \$30 to \$35 million USD for “accessories licenses, training and support services” regarding the Cellebrite UFED tool for one year with the option to extend the contract up to 5 years for additional costs. For cost comparison, the official Parliament of Australia website states that in 2016-17 “\$20.4 million AUD was invested over four years to increase the Australian Federal Police’s capability to combat cybercrime, as part of a broader package to implement the revised Cyber Security Strategy released in April 2016” and in 2018-19, “The Department of Parliamentary Services was allocated \$9 million over four years to establish a Cyber Security Operations Centre for Parliament House”. Evidently, the large difference in money for using the UFED tool in comparison to the maintenance and construction of new measures for cyber

security must be obtained from a source and hence becomes a large burden on the taxpayer. Furthermore, although reports by NIST CFTT (National Institute of Standards and Framework's Cybersecurity Framework) conclude that "Cellebrite's UFED performed consistently well during testing" and that "Connectivity issues between the UFED and phones tester were rare" it was stated that there were cases where "UFED only had difficulty connecting to certain GSM phones that did not contain a SIM card, and these issues most likely could be remedied by creating a cloned SIM card". However, in this case, there is a level of digital expertise required in the solution proposed, expertise of which ordinary police would not have knowledge of and hence may cause negligence in evidence handling thus emphasising the need for digital forensic experts. Lastly, outsourcing to one external and centralised company such as Cellebrite as opposed to using internal digital forensic experts within the Australian Federal Police force or outsourcing to independent companies poses a major security risk in itself. It was reported that on 12th January 2017 900GB of confidential data was stolen from Cellebrite's external servers including evidence files from seized mobile phones and logs from Cellebrite devices. To further this point, there was a scandal early 2019 UFED devices that have been used by federal agencies such as the police, FBI or Immigration and Customs Enforcement, were being sold on ebay for between \$100 to \$1000 USD without wiping them and instead of returning them to Cellebrite for proper decommissioning. This occurrence that could have been avoided if the current forensic outsourcing methods were used as opposed to trusting a big corporation's new and unknown tooling and also concurrently emphasises the lack of digital knowledge by police and hence supports that digital forensic experts are crucial and their roles should not be substituted by police.

Advocates for the idea of replacing the role of digital forensic experts with standard police suggest that it is the only way police can cope with the operational pace of serious criminal investigations and volume of work. However, this is conflicting and incorrect. This proposition places high liability on the police force, causing distractions from their important roles in gathering much of the physical evidence in often dangerous environments and hence a greater burden. An article by The Guardian states that "police are trampling over vital forensic evidence, are under-trained, and often do not know what they are looking for" a statement that puts emphasis on the inability for police to do the same work that digital forensic experts do due to lack of qualification and training. A specialist in discover forensics, Dr Jan Collie states in 2018 that "A lot of police stations have [mobile phone extraction kiosks] where they put a mobile phone in and press a couple of buttons, but it's not enough analysis. A police officer who has been trained for about a day can use the equipment. He can click it in and handle the buttons, [but] often they spoil the evidence by mishandling. It's like they have trodden on the evidence... they are not trained to do it" further stressing the amount of work that would have to be put in for police to be able to handle digital forensic evidence properly. In 2019, there was a London rape trial case that produced an unfair verdict, after police failed to recover photographs from a mobile phone after investigation for a year and a half that would have presented very clear evidence for the prosecution. Similarly, another child sexual assault case in December was abandoned after evidence from the defendant's phone was handed over late as the case was about to go to trial. As a result, a child rapist was cleared at court due to the lack of evidence.

These are just a few examples of cases where police were entrusted to handle digital evidence as opposed to requesting assistance from a forensic expert and as a result of malpractice and insufficient qualifications, court cases were mishandling, ultimately creating a burden on the police in the public eye for their mistakes. These mistakes could have been avoided if the police outsourced to digital forensic experts as opposed to handling work that they do not have expertise in themselves, as forensic experts could cope with the handling of digital evidence faster, more thoroughly and properly as it is what they have been trained in. Lastly, people may argue that with the introduction of new tools such as the Cellebrite UFED, this mishandling of evidence via the lack of evidence and slow turnover rate would not be an issue. However, there still lies the problem in the lack of expertise in police in their ability to properly interpret the evidence created by these auto-generating tools that may create reports containing evidence. For example, the 2010 case concerning George De La Cruz (De La Cruz) and Julie Ann Gonzalez (Gonzalez) in the Texas is a classic example of this where the police were led astray on a misleading trail due to their inability to process digital evidence. In this case, De La Cruz portrayed his wife as having ran away through posting misleading messages on social media indicating she had done so on her phone after he had murdered her due to anger at a potential divorce. It was not until 3 years later, with the aid of digital forensic experts that they found out that De La Cruz had been the man behind the crime, hence accentuating the need for the digital forensic expert role.

Finally, replacing experts with police is a harmful idea as it introduces a large bias which ultimately places a large responsibility to procure proof on the defendant as opposed to the prosecutor. The failure to produce accurate and reliable evidence by the prosecutor threatens the fairness of a court case trial. Furthermore, the inability for police to understand terminology in the field of digital expertise may also hinder the jury's perspective and understanding of the trial at hand. For example, a simple concept such as hashing images may not be understood by police and although may be done automatically by the automated tooling, the lack of understanding by the police may as a result lead to police being unable to confidently and properly explain the process of evidence acquisition to the jury and hence lead to scepticism or even inadmissibility of evidence. Furthermore, police spending on forensics in England has halved in the last 10 years leading to many news headlines emphasising the negative consequences including "Police forensic science at 'breaking point', warn peers", "Justice system at 'breaking point' over digital evidence", "Forensic Science in Crisis" or even "Police mishandling digital evidence, forensic experts warn". This is a great example of the detriments to the legal system that removing and replacing digital forensic experts with police would cause, ultimately burdening society and the credibility of its legal system.

Overall, police can not replace digital forensic experts and the many benefits outlined by supporters of this idea are misinformed in their ideas. Replacing experts with police does not ease the pace of investigations as requiring police to learn how to interpret reports from automated tooling can cause lengthy delays in prosecuting serious crimes themselves and can cause legal issues as police are not reasonable necessarily interpreters of these reports, and shifts the burden of proof unfairly towards the defendant and is ultimately creates a burden on

the taxpayer. Arguing that police and digital forensic experts are both under the category of law enforcement and hence labelling them as interchangeable is an unreasonable assumption and would be the equivalent of replacing lawyers, who are also law enforcers, with police under the argument of relieving the volume of work from police, an absurd idea. Digital forensic experts play an important role in ensuring a fair trial and aid police in their investigations, by releasing them of the burden of having to deal with the realm of digital evidence, allowing them to focus on the criminal investigations at hand and hence also alleviating the obligations of taxpayers and liability on the police.

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