Repository navigation
v1.9.0
Security
Closes seven externally reported cross-group authorization issues and hardens the class they belong to. In each case a caller-supplied identifier could reach a resource the caller was not entitled to:
- Agent deployment —
mcp_servers,memory_ids,a2a_agentsand the code-interpreter role are now checked against the caller's group before being attached, on create and redeploy. - Invocation — a caller can no longer name another group's authorizer credential or MCP connector.
- Registry — submit, approve, reject, delete and update now require access to the underlying resource. Approval gates deployment and catalog visibility, so stamping a record is treated as a write to it.
- IAM execution roles — a role must be registered and in the caller's group before it can be attached.
- Identity providers — discovery endpoints must be
https://, checked when stored, when served, and again in the browser. - SSRF —
0.0.0.0/8and the IPv6 metadata address are refused alongside loopback. Private addresses remain reachable, since VPC-internal MCP servers are a supported case. - Approval policies — human-in-the-loop policies are now enforced for Google ADK agents, which previously ignored them while Strands honoured them.
Also, after review: secrets are no longer stored in the database, AWS errors are scrubbed before logging, and secret paths are kept out of logs entirely.
Removed
- Loom can no longer create, modify or delete IAM roles or policies. Execution roles are provisioned outside Loom from
shared/iac/role.yamland registered under Security → Roles. The policy-document builders were removed too, so there is no dormant capability. - Permission requests are gone — model, routes, UI and table. The feature existed only to have Loom apply statements to a role.
Hardening
Structural tests now enforce the invariants rather than relying on review: every primary-key bind is group-checked, the group rule exists in exactly one place, secret paths are built only in reviewed modules, the fail-closed guarantee is asserted on every route shape including listings, no IAM write call can reappear, no secret-bearing database column can be added, and no server-supplied URL reaches the browser unchecked.
⚠️ Breaking changes
role_arnis required on deploy and redeploy, and must name a registered role in your group. Agents whose role Loom created automatically will not redeploy until that role is registered.- Integrations no longer grant IAM permissions. Adding an S3, Lambda or DynamoDB integration records configuration only; add the statement to your role stack.
- Permission-request endpoints removed, and role registration is import-only (
mode,role_name,policy_documentare gone from create;policy_documentfrom update). - Agent and memory listings show only your own group, and untagged resources are hidden from everyone but super-admins.
credential_idon invoke requires a group-accessible authorizer. Untagged authorizer configs fail closed — this one surfaces at invoke time, not at upgrade.- OIDC discovery endpoints must be
https://. A provider advertisinghttp://will stop being served to the login page. - ADK agents now pause on gated tools. Nothing errors; tool calls that previously ran inline will wait for approval.
- Moving an MCP server's
endpoint_urlor an A2A agent'sbase_urlclears its stored credential. Re-enter it against the new host, or supply it in the same request. security:readno longer mints credential tokens — grantsecurity:writeto principals that need to.
Upgrade steps
Order matters here:
Before upgrading
- Tag every resource with
loom:group— especially authorizer configs, which are the most likely to be untagged and which breakcredential_idinvocations when they are (breaking change 5). - Deploy a role stack from
shared/iac/role.yamlfor each application prefix, then register each role under Security → Roles and tag it (breaking changes 1 and 2).
After upgrading
3. python -m scripts.migrate_oauth2_secrets --apply — moves MCP and A2A OAuth2 client secrets out of the database into Secrets Manager. Optional but recommended; the application migrates lazily on first use otherwise.
4. python -m scripts.drop_permission_requests --apply — drops the now-unused table. Destroys request history.
Stats
72 files changed, 3,921 insertions, 2,026 deletions. 1,030 backend tests, 136 ADK tests.