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v1.9.0

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@heeki heeki released this 07 Oct 22:33
· 62 commits to main since this release

Security

Closes seven externally reported cross-group authorization issues and hardens the class they belong to. In each case a caller-supplied identifier could reach a resource the caller was not entitled to:

  • Agent deployment — mcp_servers, memory_ids, a2a_agents and the code-interpreter role are now checked against the caller's group before being attached, on create and redeploy.
  • Invocation — a caller can no longer name another group's authorizer credential or MCP connector.
  • Registry — submit, approve, reject, delete and update now require access to the underlying resource. Approval gates deployment and catalog visibility, so stamping a record is treated as a write to it.
  • IAM execution roles — a role must be registered and in the caller's group before it can be attached.
  • Identity providers — discovery endpoints must be https://, checked when stored, when served, and again in the browser.
  • SSRF — 0.0.0.0/8 and the IPv6 metadata address are refused alongside loopback. Private addresses remain reachable, since VPC-internal MCP servers are a supported case.
  • Approval policies — human-in-the-loop policies are now enforced for Google ADK agents, which previously ignored them while Strands honoured them.

Also, after review: secrets are no longer stored in the database, AWS errors are scrubbed before logging, and secret paths are kept out of logs entirely.

Removed

  • Loom can no longer create, modify or delete IAM roles or policies. Execution roles are provisioned outside Loom from shared/iac/role.yaml and registered under Security → Roles. The policy-document builders were removed too, so there is no dormant capability.
  • Permission requests are gone — model, routes, UI and table. The feature existed only to have Loom apply statements to a role.

Hardening

Structural tests now enforce the invariants rather than relying on review: every primary-key bind is group-checked, the group rule exists in exactly one place, secret paths are built only in reviewed modules, the fail-closed guarantee is asserted on every route shape including listings, no IAM write call can reappear, no secret-bearing database column can be added, and no server-supplied URL reaches the browser unchecked.

⚠️ Breaking changes

  1. role_arn is required on deploy and redeploy, and must name a registered role in your group. Agents whose role Loom created automatically will not redeploy until that role is registered.
  2. Integrations no longer grant IAM permissions. Adding an S3, Lambda or DynamoDB integration records configuration only; add the statement to your role stack.
  3. Permission-request endpoints removed, and role registration is import-only (mode, role_name, policy_document are gone from create; policy_document from update).
  4. Agent and memory listings show only your own group, and untagged resources are hidden from everyone but super-admins.
  5. credential_id on invoke requires a group-accessible authorizer. Untagged authorizer configs fail closed — this one surfaces at invoke time, not at upgrade.
  6. OIDC discovery endpoints must be https://. A provider advertising http:// will stop being served to the login page.
  7. ADK agents now pause on gated tools. Nothing errors; tool calls that previously ran inline will wait for approval.
  8. Moving an MCP server's endpoint_url or an A2A agent's base_url clears its stored credential. Re-enter it against the new host, or supply it in the same request.
  9. security:read no longer mints credential tokens — grant security:write to principals that need to.

Upgrade steps

Order matters here:

Before upgrading

  1. Tag every resource with loom:group — especially authorizer configs, which are the most likely to be untagged and which break credential_id invocations when they are (breaking change 5).
  2. Deploy a role stack from shared/iac/role.yaml for each application prefix, then register each role under Security → Roles and tag it (breaking changes 1 and 2).

After upgrading
3. python -m scripts.migrate_oauth2_secrets --apply — moves MCP and A2A OAuth2 client secrets out of the database into Secrets Manager. Optional but recommended; the application migrates lazily on first use otherwise.
4. python -m scripts.drop_permission_requests --apply — drops the now-unused table. Destroys request history.

Stats

72 files changed, 3,921 insertions, 2,026 deletions. 1,030 backend tests, 136 ADK tests.