



Threshold FHE for Blockchains

How to get confidential shared state

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Does zero-knowledge solve ALL privacy problems for blockchains?




**Zero-knowledge is NOT the full
solution to blockchain privacy**


Blockchains are Public State Machines

State Machines

Transition function computes $(st_{i+1}, output_i) = f(st_i, input_i)$



Blockchains




Smart Contracts

```
Contract LiquidityPool {  
    uint public reserveX, reserveY;  
    function swapXtoY( ... ) public  
    {  
        ...  
    }  
}
```


ZK State Updates (Zexe / Aleo / Mina zkApps)

Consensus updates st_0 to st_1 **only if π is valid**,
i.e. $V_f(st_0, st_1, output_0, \pi) = 1$.




Problem: ZK Updates leads to Race Conditions


ZK Application State



User transactions



Only one state update can be performed.



ZKP smart contracts do not support **shared application state** due to race conditions



“ZK Uniswap” does not give privacy



research



Why you can't build a private uniswap with ZKPs

Privacy



barryWhiteHat

1 Jul '20

Intro

A Note on Privacy in Constant Function Market Makers

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But ZK-SNARKs cannot hold private state that nobody knows.
- Vitalik Buterin, “Some ways to use ZK-SNARKs for privacy” June. 2022

Best of both worlds?

Replicated on-chain
BFT-type trust

No privacy
Shared state

ZK off-chain
External trust

Private inputs
No shared state

```
graph TD; A[Replicated on-chain  
BFT-type trust  
No privacy  
Shared state] --> D[Private input to confidential shared state]; B[ZK off-chain  
External trust  
Private inputs  
No shared state] --> D;
```

Private input to confidential shared state





Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) to the rescue

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)

$Kg \rightarrow (pk, dk)$

Fixing any circuit C



Requires
decryption key
 dk

Done by
(Require

Single point of authority
to decrypt data

Threshold Fully Homomorphic Encryption (thFHE)


$Kg \rightarrow (pk, [dk_1, \dots, dk_n])$

m

C

$C(m)$

Fixing any circuit C



Enc

$Enc(m)$

$Eval(C, \cdot)$

$Enc(C(m))$

Dec


Requires k out of $[dk_1, \dots, dk_n]$

Done by
(Requires pk)

Validator i holds a dk_i


Third type of computation: Confidential On-chain

Magical On-chain Confidential Computing Apparatus




Can compute any function and selectively release information

PESCA: Privacy-Enhancing Smart-Contract Architecture



PESCA in a Nutshell

- **FHE** is slow and expensive
- **ZK** private state is well understood
- **Shared** confidential state (CFMM reservee) **FHE**
- **Private** user state (token balances) **ZK**
- **Connect** via **threshold decryption**



Two applications:

- Sequentially-settled darkpool (privacy-preserving CFMM)
- First-price privacy-preserving auction

Thank you! & Final Remarks

- **Privacy** is important puzzle-piece to mainstream adoption
- **Privacy beyond anonymity** is possible with **FHE**
- **PESCA** extends on the Penumbra state model to **FHE**

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