



Exploiting Inattention & Optimism in DAOs

How I stole from a DAO using standard governance tools
(and how to protect yourself)

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Logos DAO, Metagov



Section 1



Proof of Inattention



Real Exploits



Protecting you & your DAOs



Attention is the most scarce resource in DAOs. Design your governance tooling accordingly.

Optimistic consensus relies on people paying attention 🙄

⚡ **SafeSnap** relies on **Reality.ETH**, a Q&A oracle with bonded answers

👹 **Moloch DAOs** use *lazy consensus* and have no minimum quorum for proposals to pass*

*but they do need to be sponsored by a member

Reality.ETH is a Q&A Oracle

Many DAOs use Reality.ETH to make **off-chain** votes executable **on-chain**

Did the DAO vote to pay me \$20k DAI?



1. Ask the question

Question details

Did the Snapshot proposal with the id
0xa62b0eeb1ae9ec5e7415e3af6a8145a4aac90b3ac13efi297b4defi833290b5
pass the execution of the array of Module transactions that have the hash
0x526a1e55b64581d35a371a218a93ce23642f832303d1d8a0224ecfe026674b?
The hash is the keccak of the concatenation of the individual EIP-712 hashes of
the Module transactions. If this question was asked before the Snapshot
proposal was resolved it should ALWAYS be resolved to INVALID! The proposal
must also adhere to the requirements laid out in the document referenced in the
daorequirements record of the ENS name associated with this DAO.

Posted in "DAO proposal" on Oct 4, 2022

Reward: 0 ETH [+ Add Reward](#) Last bond: 1 ETH

This question uses an arbitrator that does not allow you to request arbitration through this app.
This may mean you need to ask it to arbitrate by some other method. Alternatively it may mean it cannot do
arbitration at all, and whoever posts the highest bond will be considered correct.

Deadline: in 6 days

Current Answer

Yes
23 hours ago

Do you want to correct this answer?

Select the Answer

Bond (ETH): 2

2. Answer the question


0x22a07ce3d9561722bd04c8ad33488691c37c6bff

Contract 0x1c511d88ba898b4d9cd9113d13b9c360a02fcea1

From 0x0a147ddf0817a... To 0x22a07ce3d9561... For 19,420.69 (\$19,459.53) Dai Stableco... (DAI)

3. Execute

Reality.ETH can execute transactions on a Gnosis Safe through a Zodiac Module ✨



Multisig Owners Choose the Configuration

Timeout - Duration during which answers can be submitted

Cooldown - Optional duration after Oracle finalization, before execution

Expiration - Optional duration during which finalized answer can be executed


Bond - Minimum bond for answer to be accepted

Arbitrator - Optional 3rd party that can settle Oracle disputes

Question Template - How should questions look to Reality.ETH dApp users



Scenario 1 - Happy Path



Timeout - Duration during which answers can be submitted

Cooldown - Duration after Oracle finalization, before execution

Expiration - Duration during which finalized answer can be executed




Scenario 2: Dishonest Oracle



An attacker can pose a **non-existent proposal** as a question to Reality.ETH, and submit a **fraudulent** answer by putting down a bond in ETH




Scenario 2: Dishonest Oracle - **Override**



An **honest** person can override the malicious answer and **claim** the bonded ETH



Scenario 2: Dishonest Oracle - Arbitration



An **arbitrator** can step in to override the malicious answer (IF one is configured)



Scenario 2: Dishonest Oracle - **Veto**



Multisig owners can **veto** the malicious answer during **cooldown** (if it is configured)

Misconfiguration can make exploits **trivial**

Timeout - Too short of a timeout can make it hard to catch malicious transactions

Cooldown - 0 second cooldown removes veto period

Bond - Low minimum bond makes it cheap to try and exploit

Arbitrator - Absent arbitrator removes final safeguards

Vetoer - Absent or negligent multisig signers remove veto safeguard

We will see examples of ALL of these misconfigurations in mainnet exploits (coming up next...)



Section 2



Real Exploits



How I exploited a DAO and how others are attacking them as we speak

\$100Ms of DAO treasuries are at risk of inattention attacks



Gnosis


Mar 16, 2021 · 4 min read · Listen



Gnosis Safe Module: SafeSnap Bug Bounty

Earn over \$54,000 for finding a bug in the HoneyPotDAO with SafeSnap enabled.

000011001000101011
000110010001010111
0101111001111001
010001010111100001



Exploiting the SafeSnap HoneyPot

Gnosis set up a bug bounty for the Reality.ETH module in Spring 2021 and it sat dormant for over a year

<https://etherscan.io/address/0x0a147ddf0817ade664eb9cb343d96a21ed857d11>



Isaac 🦊🦊 | (🍷, 🍷) @isaacpatka · 5/24/22

Replying to @isaacpatka @gnosisSafe and 3 others

On the Etherscan page for the module I was able to call 'addProposal' with a transaction I crafted locally

etherscan.io/address/0x1c51...

This transaction would have sent me ~20k DAI from the safe if it was approved

1. addProposal

The nonce used for the question by this function is always 0

Function to add a proposal that should be considered for execution

proposalId (string)

nothingtoseehere

Id that should identify the proposal uniquely

txHashes (bytes32[])

[0x9f033cd0fe1086d9ec3e83149211ca3c2ff669b6b7667b18ba4ae8db6a6ad8be]

EIP-712 hashes of the transactions that should be executed

Write

View your transaction



Crafting the Exploit



Isaac 🦊🦊 | (🍷, 🍷) @isaacpatka · 5/24/22

Upon creating the transaction it automatically posted a question to reality.eth here: [reality.eth](https://reality.eth.link/app/#!/question...) here: [reality.eth](https://reality.eth.link/app/#!/question...)

I answered the question 'YES' with a bond of 0.1 ETH

reality.eth

Main Ethereum Network

Chains How It Works My Account

Question details

Did the Snapshop proposal with the id nothingtoseehere in the 0xdao.eth space pass the execution of the array of Module transactions that have the hash 0xa8a52ce25917b58df3bb8401b2e01395823300539ada76dbec7cf354b and does it meet the requirements of the document referenced in the daorequirements record at 0xdao.eth? The hash is the keccak of the concatenation of the individual EIP-712 hashes of the Module transactions. If this question was asked before the Snapshot proposal was resolved it should ALWAYS be resolved to INVALID!

Posted in "DAO proposal" on May 23, 2022

Reward: 0 ETH

Last bond: 0.05 ETH

This question uses an arbitrator that does not allow you to request arbitration through this app. This may mean you need to ask it to arbitrate by some other method. Alternatively it may mean it cannot do arbitration at all, and whoever posts the highest bond will be considered correct.

Deadline: in 1 day

Current Answer

Yes

1 hour ago

Do you want to correct this answer?

Select the Answer

Bond (ETH)

0.1

Post

Before November 1st, 23:59 UTC, Will Cryptoadz' Avg. Floor Price be Higher than Bored Apes Yacht Club's Avg. Floor

Posted 7 months ago

Reward: 0 ETH



Defenders take notice



Auryn.eth
@auryn_macmillan

#nothingtoseehere

#	Name	Type	Data
0	proposalId	string	nothingtoseehere
1	txHashes	bytes32[]	0x9f033cd0fe1086d9ec3e83149211ca3c2ff669b6b7667b18ba4ae8db6a6ad8be

13:42 · 5/24/22 · [Twitter Web App](#)



mkoeppelmann 5:36 PM

potentially someone is trying to drain the honey DAO. cc [@Auryn](#)



Auryn.eth
@auryn_macmillan

dao.eth is actually just a mutlisig controlled by [@koeppeImann](#), [@rimeissner](#), and myself. So first step is to invalidate the proposal.

Notice the proposal ID, "nothingtoseehere"

gnosis-safe.io/app/eth:0x0a14...

Interact with:



Honey DAO SafeSnap

eth:0x1c511d88ba898b4D9cd9113D13B9c360a02Fcea1

MARK PROPOSAL AS INVALID

proposalId(string):	nothingtoseehere
txHashes(bytes32[]):	[0x9f033cd0fe1086d9ec3e831... Show More]

13:42 · 5/24/22 · [Twitter Web App](#)

3 Likes



“Is anyone available to sign this transaction?”



Isaac 🦊🦊 | (🍷,🍷) @isaacpatka · 5/27/22

Successfully drained 19420.69 **\$DAI** from the 🍷
The multisig signers were not able to veto the proposal in time

[@GnosisGuild](#) let me know if you'd like this **\$DAI** back...
etherscan.io/tx/0xc13084ad8...

Transaction Builder

markProposalAsInvalid

3 days ago

1 out of 2

Needs confirmation

act with:

Honey DAO SafeSnap

eth:0x1c511d88ba898b4D9c9d9113D1389c360a02Fce1

PROPOSAL AS INVALID

osalld(string): nothingtoseehere

shes(bytes32[]): [0x9f033cd0fe1086d9ec3e831... [Show More](#)]

txHash:

0x85dfd5a3...3d3c2de3

ed:

May 24, 2022 - 4:19:57 AM

ted:

n/a

[anced Details](#)

Created

Confirmations (1 of 2)

eth:0x53bc...9f6A

Hide all

Execution

Can be executed once the threshold is hed

Confirm



But it was too late

This exploit was successful because...

Arbitration could not be requested

Cooldown was a short 24hr and the vetoers were AFK

No one else on Reality.ETH was paying attention

Then it started happening for real...



Ali Nuraldin | opium.team | 

@Ali_run

1/

We at [@OpiumNetwork](#) have just detected another attack on the [@GnosisGuild](#) Reality module (DAOModule).

At 28 Sep 21:12 UTC, our monitoring systems detected a new proposal on the Opium Network DAO.

Share and help finding the owners of these safes and pass them the info

8:13 PM · Sep 28, 2022 · Twitter Web App

While monitoring their own Gnosis Safe & Reality module, the Opium Network team discovered a series of fraudulent transactions attacking DAO treasuries




Attack 1 - easy target

The attacker found a DAO with a Reality module configured with just **24hr** cooldowns, little activity, and **no minimum bond**

They stole **7.5 ETH** after putting down a 0.01 ETH bond

× Question details

 Did the Snapshot proposal with the id dead in the lollidao.eth space pass the execution of the array of Module transactions that have the hash `0xb46405b98c9dd4c29156ded30eaa55f0aa91b14b848f7693e767e60652b35116` and does it meet the requirements of the document referenced in the `daorequirements` record at lollidao.eth? The hash is the keccak of the concatenation of the individual EIP-712 hashes of the Module transactions. If this question was asked before the Snapshot proposal was resolved it should **ALWAYS** be resolved to **INVALID!**
Posted in "DAO proposal" on Sept 28, 2022

Resolved: 1 week ago

Last bond: 0.01 ETH

● Final Answer

Yes

1 week ago

[0x84d3656163005ecdec0339b502068fc8e520feb1](#) (GnosisGuild DAOModule Exploiter) 

 Contract [0x8f9036732b9aa9b82d8f35e54b71faeb2f573e2f](#)  

 TRANSFER 7.5 Ether From [0x7eae370e6a76407c3955a2f0...](#) To → [GnosisGuild DAOModul...](#)



Attacks 2-7+

The attacker used the 7.5 ETH bond to place fraudulent answers in at least 6 other DAOs

They primarily targeted NFT collections including SZNS

💡 The SZNS team had 7 day voting periods & 1 ETH minimum bonds so the attacker was limited in how many they could attempt

I was able to thwart the attack by overriding their answer, but if the attacker was more highly capitalized it would have been harder to defend

ETH		All contracts	
Open		Upcoming	Resolved
🗨	Did the Snapshot proposal with the id dead pass the execution of the array of Module transactions that have the hash...	No	Change this answer
	Closing in 10 hours Reward: 0 ETH	Bond: 2 ETH	
	Did the Snapshot proposal with the id dead pass the execution of the array of Module transactions that have the hash...	No	Change this answer
	Closing in 10 hours Reward: 0 ETH	Bond: 2 ETH	
🗨	Did the Snapshot proposal with the id dead pass the execution of the array of Module transactions that have the hash...	No	Change this answer
	Closing in 11 hours Reward: 0 ETH	Bond: 2 ETH	
	Did the Snapshot proposal with the id dead pass the execution of the array of Module transactions that have the hash...	No	Change this answer
	Closing in 10 hours Reward: 0 ETH	Bond: 2 ETH	
🗨	Did the Snapshot proposal with the id 0xa62b0eebe1ae9ec5e7415e3af6a8145a4aac90b3ac13ef1297b4de	Yes	Change this answer
	Closing in 5 days Reward: 0 ETH	Bond: 1 ETH	

\$100Ms of DAO treasuries
are at risk of
inattention attacks



We need more **monitoring infrastructure** for DAO treasuries & governance tooling



We need **configuration audits**, just as much as we need smart contract audits

Attacks like this are
only going to start
happening **more frequently**



Section 3



Protecting you & your DAOs



10 Steps to keep your DAO Safe:


- 1) Make a resiliency & continuity plan
- 2) Keep track of who has administrative controls over smart contracts (ideally 0 or limited multisigs)
- 3) Set up monitoring infrastructure
 - a) Etherscan alerts, OpenZeppelin Sentry
- 4) Leverage automation tools to **pause** contracts if exploit conditions are detected
 - a) OpenZeppelin Defender
- 5) Use simulation tools to check what proposals are going to change **before** you execute them
 - a) Tenderly
- 6) Conduct regular configuration audits, especially focusing on new tools that can execute proposals
- 7) Minimize cross-chain communication
 - a) It's *always* the bridges that get hacked
- 8) Implement spending limits & transaction guards on Safe treasuries
- 9) Use hardware wallets & never back up your seed phrase online (including password managers)
- 10) Use on-call shifts to track availability of multisig signers

Regularly **Audit** your
DAO's tooling stack
and set up robust
monitoring
infrastructure

Reach out to LOGOS DAO &
isaac@logos.xyz

Composable governance tooling
make DAOs **powerful** but requires
careful configuration





Thank you!

Isaac Patka

Co-summoner, Logos DAO

isaac@logos.xyz



@isaacpatka