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This is a security release. It closes five reported vulnerabilities: a critical flaw in how extensions were loaded that let a disabled extension's code run anyway, three stored cross-site scripting bugs reachable through assessment fields, assessment type names, and the application title, and the use of AES in ECB mode with a fixed salt for secrets at rest. The assessment queue now lets Team and All Assessments users widen it beyond their own work with an "Only my assessments" checkbox. Alongside those fixes the front end moves from jQuery 2 to jQuery 3.7 with matching Bootstrap and DataTables updates, and the report and extension upload paths gain a defence-in-depth check on the file they read. No database migration is required, and existing encrypted settings keep working and are upgraded to the new format the next time they are saved.
🎉 🚀 Upgrades 🎉 🚀
Security fixes
Each item references the GitHub Security Advisory filed against this repository. CVE identifiers are assigned when the advisories are published.
Extension code no longer runs unless the extension is enabled for that event (GHSA-c7pw-8jq2-3w5p, critical). Reported by nakleh21. Every installed extension's JAR was loaded into the JVM before the enabled flag was checked, so a static initializer or constructor in an uploaded JAR executed even while the extension sat disabled in the App Store. Extensions are now filtered on both the global enabled flag and the per-event flag before any class loading happens. Uploaded JARs are also validated before they are accepted: they must carry a manifest with Title, Author, Version and URL and register at least one META-INF/services/com.faction.extender.* service, and a JAR that fails those checks is rejected with a clear error instead of a server fault. Install, update, enable and disable of extensions are now written to the audit log with the extension name, version and hash. Extensions remain privileged code by design; this change removes the path where disabled code still ran.
Stored XSS through vulnerability fields in peer review (GHSA-7ccc-jcf2-74x7, high). Reported by AmeerTheInteger and ZuhaibT. The peer review Track Changes page loads each field into a rich-text editor, which reads the textarea value and injects it as HTML, so output encoding alone could not protect reviewers. The peer review notes fields on vulnerabilities and assessment summaries are now sanitized when set, the same way description, recommendation and details already were, and the Track Changes page encodes every field it renders. Because the page rebuilds each vulnerability through those setters on display, notes stored before this release are neutralized too. Track-changes markup is preserved.
Stored XSS through the assessment type name (GHSA-24pw-q8mq-fr4m, high). Reported by nakleh21 and pablochiquis97. Type names were rendered unencoded in the Report Designer and template upload pages. Those pages now encode the name, and creating or renaming an assessment type rejects values containing < or >.
Stored XSS through the application title settings (GHSA-cc9w-74qj-jcrw, high). Reported by nakleh21. Both the bold and secondary titles set under Admin were rendered raw in the header of every authenticated page. The header now encodes them, and the update action rejects HTML and requires both values.
AES in ECB mode with a constant salt for stored secrets (GHSA-2xjc-855g-24f3, medium). Reported by EhsanFir of Digit Institute. SMTP and LDAP passwords, API keys, keystores and report passwords are now encrypted with AES-256-GCM using a fresh random salt and IV per value, so identical secrets no longer produce identical ciphertext and tampered values are rejected. Values written by earlier releases are still read through a legacy path and are rewritten in the new format the next time they are saved. The key is still derived from FACTION_SECRET_KEY, which must not change.
Assessment queue respects the Team and All Assessments access levels
Users whose Access Level (Admin > Users) is Team Assessments or All Assessments can now see beyond their own work in the assessment queue and in the app/name search. Before this release only managers could, even though opening an assessment directly already honoured the access level. The queue still opens on your own assessments: these users get an "Only my assessments" checkbox in the filter box, checked by default, and untick it to show everything their access level allows. The choice is kept while you change status and date filters. Managers see the full queue as before, with no checkbox; Only Assessments Owned by User is unchanged. The "(Manager View)" banner at the top of the queue now appears only on a manager's unrestricted queue; it used to follow the engagement permission, so it showed for some users whose queue was limited to their own work. (#151)
Upload handling
The extension upload and update actions and the report upload action now verify that the file handed to them really lives in the servlet's upload temp directory before reading it. Struts already controls where uploads land, so this is defence in depth; it also closes the corresponding static-analysis findings.
Front-end library refresh
jQuery moves from 2.1.4 to 3.7.1 with jQuery Migrate 3.6 loaded alongside it, Bootstrap from 3.3.4 to 3.4.1 (3.3 refuses to run on jQuery 3), and DataTables from 1.10.7 to 1.13.11. Bootstrap 3.4 also sanitizes HTML in tooltips and popovers by default. A headless pass over every navigation page of the built application showed no JavaScript errors and no deprecated-API warnings from Migrate; table sorting and search, modals, and form validation behave as before. The AJAX error handlers in the CMS, footer and shared scripts moved from the removed .error() to .fail().
Static analysis hygiene
The repository now ships a CodeQL configuration that excludes vendored and generated front-end code, and its workflows declare least-privilege permissions. This does not change the shipped application.
🐛 Bugfixes 🐛
- A rejected extension upload now shows the reason in an error dialog; previously it logged a placeholder to the browser console and left the page waiting.
- Installing or updating an extension clears the preview held in the session afterwards, so a stale preview can no longer be installed by a later request.
- The hot reload log task in the mise config used the removed
docker-composebinary; it now callsdocker compose.
🧰 Internal / Test infrastructure
- New unit tests:
CryptoTests(GCM round trip, uniqueness, tamper rejection, legacy ECB read),NotesXssSanitizationTest,UploadedFileGuardTest. - The README now points at the Faction 2.0 release information.
Upgrade notes
- Database migration: not required. Encrypted settings are read in the old format and rewritten in the new one on their next save.
- Configuration: no new variables.
FACTION_SECRET_KEYmust remain the same value it was before the upgrade or previously stored secrets cannot be decrypted. - Extensions: JARs without a manifest Title, Author, Version and URL, or without a
META-INF/services/com.faction.extender.*registration, can no longer be uploaded. Already-installed extensions are unaffected, but a disabled extension's code no longer runs. - Titles and assessment types: values containing
<or>are rejected on save. Existing values are encoded on display rather than rewritten. - API: all existing endpoints continue to work unchanged.
🙏 Thanks
These fixes exist because security researchers took the time to find, reproduce and responsibly report the problems. Thank you to:
- @nakleh21 for the extension loading flaw (GHSA-c7pw-8jq2-3w5p), with a working proof of concept, and for both the assessment type name and application title stored XSS reports (GHSA-24pw-q8mq-fr4m, GHSA-cc9w-74qj-jcrw).
- @pablochiquis97 for the assessment type name stored XSS (GHSA-24pw-q8mq-fr4m).
- @AmeerTheInteger and @ZuhaibT for the stored XSS through vulnerability fields in peer review (GHSA-7ccc-jcf2-74x7).
- @EhsanFir of Digit Institute for the review of the at-rest encryption that led to the move to AES-GCM (GHSA-2xjc-855g-24f3).
If you find a security issue in FACTION, please report it privately through this repository's Security tab so it can be fixed before details are public.