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Literature Repository on Farm Safety Net & Agricultural Risk Management
This curated collection gathers essential literature from our libraries, serving as a comprehensive resource on farm safety nets and agricultural risk management. It features seminal works, cutting-edge research, and influential publications that delve into the economic, statistical, and policy dimensions of safeguarding agricultural operations. Whether you are exploring theoretical frameworks, historical perspectives, or practical applications, this repository offers an invaluable starting point for advancing understanding in the field.
Disclaimer: Please note that these reference lists are based on our historical literature gatherings from both past and ongoing research. They do not constitute an endorsement of any specific work, and we acknowledge that there are many other relevant publications that may not be included here. This list was generated from our reference manager databases and reflects our individual research interests and collection efforts.
This list will be periodically updated as new literature is discovered, and suggestions are welcome to help enrich this resource.
This list compiles foundational and contemporary literature that focuses specifically on the evolution and impact of the US farm safety net. It includes government policies, historical shifts, and economic analyses that highlight the structure of farm support programs in the United States.
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Co-authored by contributors
- Baldwin K., D. Turner, and F. Tsiboe. 2024. Recent Developments in Ad Hoc Assistance Programs for Agricultural Producers. EIB-278, USDA-ERS.
- Baldwin K., et. al. U.S. Agricultural Policy Review. 2021, 2022, 2023; EIB, USDA-ERS.
- Hagerman, A.D., et al. 2025. Mitigating Structural Inequities in U.S. Agricultural Risk Management. JAAE, January, 1–28.
- Turner, D., et al. 2023. Federal Programs for Agricultural Risk Management. EIB-259, USDA-ERS.
- Tsiboe, F. 2024. 2022 Census of Agriculture: Crop and Livestock Insurance Payouts per Recipient Were Higher in the Great Plains and Mountain Regions. USDA-ERS Charts of Note.
- Economic Research Service [ERS]. 2022. Crop Insurance at a Glance..
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Co-authored by others
- Azzam, A., C. Walters, and T. Kaus. 2021. Does Subsidized Crop Insurance Affect Farm Industry Structure? Lessons from the U.S. JPM, July.
- Barnaby, G.A. and Levi A. Russell. 2016. Crop Insurance Will Be at the Center of the 2019 Farm Bill Debate. Choices, Quarter 3.
- Belasco, E.J. 2020. WAEA Presidential Address: Moving Agricultural Policy Forward: Or, There and Back Again. JARE 45 (3): 397–409.
- Coble, K.H., and B.J. Barnett. 2013. Why Do We Subsidize Crop Insurance? AJAE 95 (2): 498–504.
- Congressional Budget Office [CBO]. Options for Reducing the Deficit. 2017, 2018, 2020.
- Congressional Research Service [CRS]. 2018. Federal Crop Insurance: Program Overview for the 115th Congress.
- Congressional Research Service [CRS]. 2015. Proposals to Reduce Premium Subsidies for Federal Crop Insurance.
- Glauber, J.W. 2004. Crop Insurance Reconsidered. AJAE 86 (5): 1179–95.
- Glauber, J.W. 2013. The Growth Of The Federal Crop Insurance Program, 1990–2011. AJAE 95 (2): 482–88.
- Goodwin, B.K. 2001. U.S. Farm Safety Nets and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act. CJAE 49 (4): 543–55.
- Goodwin, B.K. and V.H. Smith. 2013. What Harm Is Done By Subsidizing Crop Insurance? AJAE 95 (2): 489–97.
- Knight, T.O. and K.H. Coble. 1997. Survey of U.S. Multiple Peril Crop Insurance Literature since 1980. RAE 19 (1): 128.
- Kramer, R.A. 1983. Federal Crop Insurance 1938-1982. AH 57 (2): 181–200.
- Lusk, J.L. 2017. Distributional Effects of Crop Insurance Subsidies. AEPP 39 (1): 1–15.
- Mahul, O. and C.J. Stutley. 2010. Government Support to Agricultural Insurance.
- Smith, V.H. and J.W. Glauber. 2012. Agricultural Insurance in Developed Countries: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going? AEPP 34 (3): 363–90.
- Smith, V.H., J.W. Glauber, and B.K. Goodwin. 2017. Time to Reform the US Federal Agricultural Insurance Program. Agricultural Policy in Disarray Series Report. Washington, D.C.: AEI.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO]. 2014. Considerations in Reducing Federal Premium Subsidies. 2014.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO]. 2023. Crop Insurance: Update on Opportunities to Reduce Program Costs. GAO-24-106086.
Click to expand reference list
-
Co-authored by contributors
- Baldwin K., D. Turner, and F. Tsiboe. 2024. Recent Developments in Ad Hoc Assistance Programs for Agricultural Producers. EIB-278, USDA-ERS.
- Baldwin K., et. al. U.S. Agricultural Policy Review. 2021, 2022, 2023; EIB, USDA-ERS.
- Hagerman, A.D., et al. 2025. Mitigating Structural Inequities in U.S. Agricultural Risk Management. JAAE, January, 1–28.
- Turner, D., et al. 2023. Federal Programs for Agricultural Risk Management. EIB-259, USDA-ERS.
- Tsiboe, F. 2024. 2022 Census of Agriculture: Crop and Livestock Insurance Payouts per Recipient Were Higher in the Great Plains and Mountain Regions. USDA-ERS Charts of Note.
- Economic Research Service [ERS]. 2022. Crop Insurance at a Glance..
-
Co-authored by others
- Azzam, A., C. Walters, and T. Kaus. 2021. Does Subsidized Crop Insurance Affect Farm Industry Structure? Lessons from the U.S. JPM, July.
- Barnaby, G.A. and Levi A. Russell. 2016. Crop Insurance Will Be at the Center of the 2019 Farm Bill Debate. Choices, Quarter 3.
- Belasco, E.J. 2020. WAEA Presidential Address: Moving Agricultural Policy Forward: Or, There and Back Again. JARE 45 (3): 397–409.
- Coble, K.H., and B.J. Barnett. 2013. Why Do We Subsidize Crop Insurance? AJAE 95 (2): 498–504.
- Congressional Budget Office [CBO]. Options for Reducing the Deficit. 2017, 2018, 2020.
- Congressional Research Service [CRS]. 2018. Federal Crop Insurance: Program Overview for the 115th Congress.
- Congressional Research Service [CRS]. 2015. Proposals to Reduce Premium Subsidies for Federal Crop Insurance.
- Glauber, J.W. 2004. Crop Insurance Reconsidered. AJAE 86 (5): 1179–95.
- Glauber, J.W. 2013. The Growth Of The Federal Crop Insurance Program, 1990–2011. AJAE 95 (2): 482–88.
- Goodwin, B.K. 2001. U.S. Farm Safety Nets and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act. CJAE 49 (4): 543–55.
- Goodwin, B.K. and V.H. Smith. 2013. What Harm Is Done By Subsidizing Crop Insurance? AJAE 95 (2): 489–97.
- Knight, T.O. and K.H. Coble. 1997. Survey of U.S. Multiple Peril Crop Insurance Literature since 1980. RAE 19 (1): 128.
- Kramer, R.A. 1983. Federal Crop Insurance 1938-1982. AH 57 (2): 181–200.
- Lusk, J.L. 2017. Distributional Effects of Crop Insurance Subsidies. AEPP 39 (1): 1–15.
- Mahul, O. and C.J. Stutley. 2010. Government Support to Agricultural Insurance.
- Smith, V.H. and J.W. Glauber. 2012. Agricultural Insurance in Developed Countries: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going? AEPP 34 (3): 363–90.
- Smith, V.H., J.W. Glauber, and B.K. Goodwin. 2017. Time to Reform the US Federal Agricultural Insurance Program. Agricultural Policy in Disarray Series Report. Washington, D.C.: AEI.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO]. 2014. Considerations in Reducing Federal Premium Subsidies. 2014.
- U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO]. 2023. Crop Insurance: Update on Opportunities to Reduce Program Costs. GAO-24-106086.
Asymmetric information in agricultural insurance arises from two main phenomena: adverse selection and moral hazard.
Adverse Selection occurs when higher-risk individuals are more likely to seek insurance, resulting in a risk pool that is skewed toward those more likely to incur losses. In agriculture, farmers who face greater uncertainties—such as extreme weather variability or pest infestations—are more inclined to purchase insurance. This tendency can drive up premiums and may ultimately limit affordable coverage options for lower-risk farmers.
Moral Hazard" refers to the change in behavior that occurs when individuals are insulated from the full consequences of their risk due to insurance coverage. In the agricultural context, insured farmers might adopt riskier practices or scale back on risk mitigation efforts, knowing that losses will be partially or fully covered by their policies. This phenomenon has significant implications for the design and effectiveness of farm safety nets and agricultural insurance schemes.
Both adverse selection and moral hazard pose challenges to achieving efficient and equitable insurance markets in agriculture, prompting ongoing research into strategies for mitigating these issues.
Click to expand reference list
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Co-authored by contributors
- Tsiboe F., D. Turner, and J. Yu. 2025. Utilizing Large-Scale Insurance Datasets to Calibrate Sub-County Level Crop Yields. JRI. 92 (1): 139-165.
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Co-authored by others
- Babcock B.A., and D.A. Hennessy. 1996. Input Demand under Yield and Revenue Insurance. AJAE 78 (2): 416–27.
- Carter M.R., L. Cheng, and A. Sarris. 2016. Where and How Index Insurance Can Boost the Adoption of Improved Agricultural Technologies. JDE 118 59–71.
- Castro .M, et. al. 2023. The Effect of Crop Insurance in Ecuadorian Rice Farming: A Technical Efficiency Approach. AFR 83 (3): 478–97.
- Cawley J. and T. Philipson. 1999. An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance. AER 89 (4): 827–46.
- Chambers R.G. 1989. Insurability and Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance Markets. AJAE 71 (3): 604–16.
- Chiappori P.A. and B. Salanie. 2000. Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets. JPE 108 (1): 56–78.
- Coble K.H., et. al. 1997. An Expected‐Indemnity Approach to the Measurement of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance. AJAE 79 (1): 216–26.
- Comstock, Haden A. 2022. The Effects of Government Farm Support Programs on The Adoption of Farm Technology and Sustainable Production Practices. Thesis, Purdue University.
- Dionne G., C. Gouriéroux, and C. Vanasse. 1999. Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets..
- Dionne G., C. Gouriéroux, and C. Vanasse. 2001. Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment. JPE 109 (2): 444–53.
- Finkelstein A. and K. McGarry. 2006. Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market. AER 96 (4): 938–58.
- Foltz J.D., P. Useche, and B.L. Barham. 2013. Bundling Technology and Insurance: Packages versus Technology Traits. AJAE 95 (2): 346–52.
- Freudenreich H. and O. Mußhoff. 2018. Insurance for Technology Adoption: An Experimental Evaluation of Schemes and Subsidies with Maize Farmers in Mexico. JAE 69 (1): 96–120.
- Giannakas K., R. Schoney, and V. Tzouvelekas. 2001. Technical Efficiency, Technological Change and Output Growth of Wheat Farms in Saskatchewan. CJAE 49 (2): 135–52.
- He J., et. al. 2018. Advantageous Selection in Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence. JAE 69 (3): 646–68.
- Horowitz J.K. and E. Lichtenberg. 1993. Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Chemical Use in Agriculture. AJAE 75 (4): 926–35.
- Hou L., D.L.K. Hoag, and Y. Mu. 2011. Testing for Adverse Selection of Crop Insurance in Northern China. CAER 3 (4): 462–75.
- Just R.E., L. Calvin, and J. Quiggin. 1999. Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives. AJAE 81 (4): 834–49.
- Makki S.S. and A. Somwaru. 2001. Evidence of Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance Markets. JRI 68 (4): 685.
- McCarthy D. and O.S. Mitchell. 2010. International Adverse Selection in Life Insurance and Annuities.
- Meza D. and D.C. Webb. 2001. Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets. The RAND Journal of Economics 32 (2): 249.
- Mieno T., C.G. Walters, and L.E. Fulginiti. 2018. Input Use under Crop Insurance: The Role of Actual Production History. AJAE 100 (5): 1469–85.
- Park S., et. al. 2020. Contract Elements, Growing Conditions, and Anomalous Claims Behaviour in U.S. Crop Insurance. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 45 (1): 157–83.
- Quiggin J.C., G. Karagiannis, and J. Stanton. 1993. Crop Insurance and Crop Production: An Empirical Study Of Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection.
- Roberts M.J., N. Key, and E. O’Donoghue. 2006. Estimating the Extent of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance Using Administrative Data. RAE.
- Roll K.H. 2019. Moral Hazard: The Effect of Insurance on Risk and Efficiency. Agricultural Economics 50 (3): 367–75.
- Shaik S. 2013. Crop Insurance Adjusted Panel Data Envelopment Analysis Efficiency Measures. AJAE 95 (5): 1155–77.
- Smith V.H. and B.K. Goodwin. 2017. Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural Chemical Use. In The Economics of Agri-Environmental Policy.
- Tang Y., et. al. 2019. The Impact of Weather Index Insurance on Agricultural Technology Adoption Evidence from Field Economic Experiment in China. CAER 11 (4): 622–41.
- Walters C.G., et. al. 2015. Asymmetric Information and Profit Taking in Crop Insurance. AEPP 37 (1): 107–29.
- Woodard J.D., et. al. 2012. Government Insurance Program Design, Incentive Effects, and Technology Adoption: The Case of Skip‐Row Crop Insurance. AJAE 94 (4): 823–37.
- Wu S., B.K. Goodwin, and K. Coble. 2020. Moral Hazard and Subsidized Crop Insurance. Agricultural Economics 51 (1): 131–42.
- Yu J. and N.P. Hendricks. 2020. Input Use Decisions with Greater Information on Crop Conditions: Implications for Insurance Moral Hazard and the Environment. AJAE 102 (3): 826–45.
- Zhu X. and A.O Lansink. 2010. Impact of CAP Subsidies on Technical Efficiency of Crop Farms in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. JAE 61 (3): 545–64.
- Zubor-Nemes A., et. al. 2018. Farmers’ Responses to the Changes in Hungarian Agricultural Insurance System. AFR 78 (2): 275–88.
Click to expand reference list
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Co-authored by contributors
- Tsiboe F., D. Turner, and J. Yu. 2025. Utilizing Large-Scale Insurance Datasets to Calibrate Sub-County Level Crop Yields. JRI. 92 (1): 139-165.
-
Co-authored by others
- Babcock B.A., and D.A. Hennessy. 1996. Input Demand under Yield and Revenue Insurance. AJAE 78 (2): 416–27.
- Carter M.R., L. Cheng, and A. Sarris. 2016. Where and How Index Insurance Can Boost the Adoption of Improved Agricultural Technologies. JDE 118 59–71.
- Castro .M, et. al. 2023. The Effect of Crop Insurance in Ecuadorian Rice Farming: A Technical Efficiency Approach. AFR 83 (3): 478–97.
- Cawley J. and T. Philipson. 1999. An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance. AER 89 (4): 827–46.
- Chambers R.G. 1989. Insurability and Moral Hazard in Agricultural Insurance Markets. AJAE 71 (3): 604–16.
- Chiappori P.A. and B. Salanie. 2000. Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets. JPE 108 (1): 56–78.
- Coble K.H., et. al. 1997. An Expected‐Indemnity Approach to the Measurement of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance. AJAE 79 (1): 216–26.
- Comstock, Haden A. 2022. The Effects of Government Farm Support Programs on The Adoption of Farm Technology and Sustainable Production Practices. Thesis, Purdue University.
- Dionne G., C. Gouriéroux, and C. Vanasse. 1999. Evidence of Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance Markets..
- Dionne G., C. Gouriéroux, and C. Vanasse. 2001. Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment. JPE 109 (2): 444–53.
- Finkelstein A. and K. McGarry. 2006. Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market. AER 96 (4): 938–58.
- Foltz J.D., P. Useche, and B.L. Barham. 2013. Bundling Technology and Insurance: Packages versus Technology Traits. AJAE 95 (2): 346–52.
- Freudenreich H. and O. Mußhoff. 2018. Insurance for Technology Adoption: An Experimental Evaluation of Schemes and Subsidies with Maize Farmers in Mexico. JAE 69 (1): 96–120.
- Giannakas K., R. Schoney, and V. Tzouvelekas. 2001. Technical Efficiency, Technological Change and Output Growth of Wheat Farms in Saskatchewan. CJAE 49 (2): 135–52.
- He J., et. al. 2018. Advantageous Selection in Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence. JAE 69 (3): 646–68.
- Horowitz J.K. and E. Lichtenberg. 1993. Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Chemical Use in Agriculture. AJAE 75 (4): 926–35.
- Hou L., D.L.K. Hoag, and Y. Mu. 2011. Testing for Adverse Selection of Crop Insurance in Northern China. CAER 3 (4): 462–75.
- Just R.E., L. Calvin, and J. Quiggin. 1999. Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance: Actuarial and Asymmetric Information Incentives. AJAE 81 (4): 834–49.
- Makki S.S. and A. Somwaru. 2001. Evidence of Adverse Selection in Crop Insurance Markets. JRI 68 (4): 685.
- McCarthy D. and O.S. Mitchell. 2010. International Adverse Selection in Life Insurance and Annuities.
- Meza D. and D.C. Webb. 2001. Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets. The RAND Journal of Economics 32 (2): 249.
- Mieno T., C.G. Walters, and L.E. Fulginiti. 2018. Input Use under Crop Insurance: The Role of Actual Production History. AJAE 100 (5): 1469–85.
- Park S., et. al. 2020. Contract Elements, Growing Conditions, and Anomalous Claims Behaviour in U.S. Crop Insurance. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 45 (1): 157–83.
- Quiggin J.C., G. Karagiannis, and J. Stanton. 1993. Crop Insurance and Crop Production: An Empirical Study Of Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection.
- Roberts M.J., N. Key, and E. O’Donoghue. 2006. Estimating the Extent of Moral Hazard in Crop Insurance Using Administrative Data. RAE.
- Roll K.H. 2019. Moral Hazard: The Effect of Insurance on Risk and Efficiency. Agricultural Economics 50 (3): 367–75.
- Shaik S. 2013. Crop Insurance Adjusted Panel Data Envelopment Analysis Efficiency Measures. AJAE 95 (5): 1155–77.
- Smith V.H. and B.K. Goodwin. 2017. Crop Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Agricultural Chemical Use. In The Economics of Agri-Environmental Policy.
- Tang Y., et. al. 2019. The Impact of Weather Index Insurance on Agricultural Technology Adoption Evidence from Field Economic Experiment in China. CAER 11 (4): 622–41.
- Walters C.G., et. al. 2015. Asymmetric Information and Profit Taking in Crop Insurance. AEPP 37 (1): 107–29.
- Woodard J.D., et. al. 2012. Government Insurance Program Design, Incentive Effects, and Technology Adoption: The Case of Skip‐Row Crop Insurance. AJAE 94 (4): 823–37.
- Wu S., B.K. Goodwin, and K. Coble. 2020. Moral Hazard and Subsidized Crop Insurance. Agricultural Economics 51 (1): 131–42.
- Yu J. and N.P. Hendricks. 2020. Input Use Decisions with Greater Information on Crop Conditions: Implications for Insurance Moral Hazard and the Environment. AJAE 102 (3): 826–45.
- Zhu X. and A.O Lansink. 2010. Impact of CAP Subsidies on Technical Efficiency of Crop Farms in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. JAE 61 (3): 545–64.
- Zubor-Nemes A., et. al. 2018. Farmers’ Responses to the Changes in Hungarian Agricultural Insurance System. AFR 78 (2): 275–88.
Crop insurance demand refers to the level of uptake among farmers for crop insurance products. Factors influencing demand include premium affordability, perceived risk exposure, government subsidies, and overall market conditions. This section gathers literature that examines the drivers and barriers to the adoption of crop insurance.
Click to expand reference list
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Co-authored by contributors
- Tsiboe F. and D. Turner 2023. The Crop Insurance Demand Response to Premium Subsidies: Evidence from U.S. Agriculture. Food Policy 119:102505.
- Tsiboe F. and D. Turner 2023. Econometric Identification of Crop Insurance Participation.. ARER 52 (3): 476–797.
- Tsiboe F., D. Turner, and J. Yu. 2025. Utilizing Large-Scale Insurance Datasets to Calibrate Sub-County Level Crop Yields.JRI. 92 (1): 139-165.
- Tsiboe F. 2024. 2022 Census of Agriculture: More Cropland Covered by Crop Insurance. USDA-ERS Charts of Note
- Turner D. and F. Tsiboe. 2022. The Crop Insurance Demand Response to the Wildfire and Hurricane Indemnity Program Plus. AEPP 44 (3): 1273–92.
- Turner D. and F. Tsiboe. 2024. Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage Drive Increased Participation in Federal Crop Insurance Program. USDA-ERS Amber Waves.
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Co-authored by others
- Babcock B.A. and C.E. Hart. 2005. Influence of the Premium Subsidy on Farmers’ Crop Insurance Coverage Decisions. CARD 05-Wp393, Iowa State University.
- Barnett B.J., J.R. Skees, and J.D. Hourigan. 1990. Explaining Participation in Federal Crop Insurance. AAEA Meeting, August 5-8, Vancouver, Canada
- Belasco E.J., and K.B. Fuller. 2022. Who Buys Crop Insurance? Predictors of the Participation Gap between Organic and Conventional Farms. AEPP 44 (3): 1554–72.
- Bulut H. and D.A. Hennessy. 2021. Estimating Elasticities Via Market Share Impacts for Crop Insurance Coverage Options.
- Calvin L. 1990. Participation in the U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program. USDA-ERS
- Coble K.H., et. al. 1996. Modeling Farm‐Level Crop Insurance Demand with Panel Data. AJAE 78 (2): 439–47.
- Connor L., and A.L. Katchova. 2020. Crop Insurance Participation Rates and Asymmetric Effects on U.S. Corn and Soybean Yield Risk. JARE 45 (1): 1–19.
- Deryugina T. and B. Kirwan. 2018. Does The Samaritan's Dilemma Matter? Evidence From U.S. Agriculture. Economic Inquiry 56 (2): 983–1006.
- Du X., D.A. Hennessy, and H. Feng. 2014. A Natural Resource Theory of U.S. Crop Insurance Contract Choice. AJAE 96 (1): 232–52.
- Goodwin B.K. 1993. An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance. AJAE 75 (2): 425–34.
- Goodwin B.K. and T.L. Kastens. 1993. Adverse Selection, Disaster Relief, and the Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance. Contract Report for the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. 1993.
- Goodwin B.K. and R.M. Rejesus. 2008. Safety Nets or Trampolines? Federal Crop Insurance, Disaster Assistance, and the Farm Bill. JAAE 40 (2): 415–29.
- Goodwin B.K., M.L. Vandeveer, and J.L. Deal. 2004. An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Progam. AJAE 86 (4): 1058–77.
- Heerman K.E.R., et. al. 2016. Farmer Response to Crop Insurance Incentives under Heterogeneous Risk Management Strategies. 2016 AAEA Annual Meeting.
- Just R.E. and L.C. 1994. An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Participation in Crop Insurance. In Economics of Agricultural Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence, 205–52. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
- Maisashvili A., H.L. Bryant, and J.P.H. Jones. 2020. Implications of Alternative Crop Insurance Subsidies. JAAE 52 (2): 240–63.
- Niewuwoudt W.L. and J.B Bullock. 1985. The Demand for Crop Insurance. Agricultural Economics Report, University of Missouri-Columbia.
- O’Donoghue E. 2014. “The Effects of Premium Subsidies on Demand for Crop Insurance.” USDA-ERS ERR-196.
- Patrlck G.F. 1988. Mallee Wheat Farmers’ Demand for Crop And Rainfall Insurance. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 32 (1): 37–49.
- Paulson N., et. al. 2022. SCO and ECO Insurance Program Use. Farmdoc Daily 12 (118).
- Richards T.J. 2000. A Two-Stage Model of the Demand for Specialty Crop Insurance. JARE 25 (1): 177–94.
- Schnitkey G., et. al. 2024. Impacts of Higher Premium Support Rates on ECO Performance. Farmdoc Daily 14 (201).
- Serra T., B.K. Goodwin, and A.M. Featherstone. 2003. Modeling Changes in the U.S. Demand for Crop Insurance during the 1990s. AFR 63 (2): 109–25.
- Shaik S., et. al. 2008. Crop Revenue and Yield Insurance Demand: A Subjective Probability Approach. JAAE 40 (3): 757–66.
- Smith V.H. and A.E. Baquet. 1996. The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance: Evidence from Montana Wheat Farms. AJAE 78 (1): 189–201.
- Woodard J.D. and J. Yi. 2020. Estimation of Insurance Deductible Demand Under Endogenous Premium Rates. JRI 87 (2): 477–500.
- Yi J., H.L. Bryant, and J.W. Richardson. 2020. How Do Premium Subsidies Affect Crop Insurance Demand at Different Coverage Levels: The Case of Corn. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues and Practice.
- Yu J., A. Smith, and D.A. Sumner. 2018. Effects of Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies on Crop Acreage. AJAE 100 (1): 91–114.
- Yu J., D.A. Sumner, and H. Lee. 2021. Premium Rates and Selection in Specialty Crop Insurance Markets: Evidence from the Catastrophic Coverage Participation. Food Policy 101: 102079.
- Zulauf C., et. al. 2023. “The Importance of Insurance Unit in Crop Insurance Policy Debates.” Farmdoc Daily 13 (107).
Click to expand reference list
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Co-authored by contributors
- Tsiboe F. and D. Turner 2023. The Crop Insurance Demand Response to Premium Subsidies: Evidence from U.S. Agriculture. Food Policy 119:102505.
- Tsiboe F. and D. Turner 2023. Econometric Identification of Crop Insurance Participation.. ARER 52 (3): 476–797.
- Tsiboe F., D. Turner, and J. Yu. 2025. Utilizing Large-Scale Insurance Datasets to Calibrate Sub-County Level Crop Yields.JRI. 92 (1): 139-165.
- Tsiboe F. 2024. 2022 Census of Agriculture: More Cropland Covered by Crop Insurance. USDA-ERS Charts of Note
- Turner D. and F. Tsiboe. 2022. The Crop Insurance Demand Response to the Wildfire and Hurricane Indemnity Program Plus. AEPP 44 (3): 1273–92.
- Turner D. and F. Tsiboe. 2024. Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage Drive Increased Participation in Federal Crop Insurance Program. USDA-ERS Amber Waves.
-
Co-authored by others
- Babcock B.A. and C.E. Hart. 2005. Influence of the Premium Subsidy on Farmers’ Crop Insurance Coverage Decisions. CARD 05-Wp393, Iowa State University.
- Barnett B.J., J.R. Skees, and J.D. Hourigan. 1990. Explaining Participation in Federal Crop Insurance. AAEA Meeting, August 5-8, Vancouver, Canada
- Belasco E.J., and K.B. Fuller. 2022. Who Buys Crop Insurance? Predictors of the Participation Gap between Organic and Conventional Farms. AEPP 44 (3): 1554–72.
- Bulut H. and D.A. Hennessy. 2021. Estimating Elasticities Via Market Share Impacts for Crop Insurance Coverage Options.
- Calvin L. 1990. Participation in the U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program. USDA-ERS
- Coble K.H., et. al. 1996. Modeling Farm‐Level Crop Insurance Demand with Panel Data. AJAE 78 (2): 439–47.
- Connor L., and A.L. Katchova. 2020. Crop Insurance Participation Rates and Asymmetric Effects on U.S. Corn and Soybean Yield Risk. JARE 45 (1): 1–19.
- Deryugina T. and B. Kirwan. 2018. Does The Samaritan's Dilemma Matter? Evidence From U.S. Agriculture. Economic Inquiry 56 (2): 983–1006.
- Du X., D.A. Hennessy, and H. Feng. 2014. A Natural Resource Theory of U.S. Crop Insurance Contract Choice. AJAE 96 (1): 232–52.
- Goodwin B.K. 1993. An Empirical Analysis of the Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance. AJAE 75 (2): 425–34.
- Goodwin B.K. and T.L. Kastens. 1993. Adverse Selection, Disaster Relief, and the Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance. Contract Report for the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. 1993.
- Goodwin B.K. and R.M. Rejesus. 2008. Safety Nets or Trampolines? Federal Crop Insurance, Disaster Assistance, and the Farm Bill. JAAE 40 (2): 415–29.
- Goodwin B.K., M.L. Vandeveer, and J.L. Deal. 2004. An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Progam. AJAE 86 (4): 1058–77.
- Heerman K.E.R., et. al. 2016. Farmer Response to Crop Insurance Incentives under Heterogeneous Risk Management Strategies. 2016 AAEA Annual Meeting.
- Just R.E. and L.C. 1994. An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Participation in Crop Insurance. In Economics of Agricultural Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence, 205–52. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
- Maisashvili A., H.L. Bryant, and J.P.H. Jones. 2020. Implications of Alternative Crop Insurance Subsidies. JAAE 52 (2): 240–63.
- Niewuwoudt W.L. and J.B Bullock. 1985. The Demand for Crop Insurance. Agricultural Economics Report, University of Missouri-Columbia.
- O’Donoghue E. 2014. “The Effects of Premium Subsidies on Demand for Crop Insurance.” USDA-ERS ERR-196.
- Patrlck G.F. 1988. Mallee Wheat Farmers’ Demand for Crop And Rainfall Insurance. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics 32 (1): 37–49.
- Paulson N., et. al. 2022. SCO and ECO Insurance Program Use. Farmdoc Daily 12 (118).
- Richards T.J. 2000. A Two-Stage Model of the Demand for Specialty Crop Insurance. JARE 25 (1): 177–94.
- Schnitkey G., et. al. 2024. Impacts of Higher Premium Support Rates on ECO Performance. Farmdoc Daily 14 (201).
- Serra T., B.K. Goodwin, and A.M. Featherstone. 2003. Modeling Changes in the U.S. Demand for Crop Insurance during the 1990s. AFR 63 (2): 109–25.
- Shaik S., et. al. 2008. Crop Revenue and Yield Insurance Demand: A Subjective Probability Approach. JAAE 40 (3): 757–66.
- Smith V.H. and A.E. Baquet. 1996. The Demand for Multiple Peril Crop Insurance: Evidence from Montana Wheat Farms. AJAE 78 (1): 189–201.
- Woodard J.D. and J. Yi. 2020. Estimation of Insurance Deductible Demand Under Endogenous Premium Rates. JRI 87 (2): 477–500.
- Yi J., H.L. Bryant, and J.W. Richardson. 2020. How Do Premium Subsidies Affect Crop Insurance Demand at Different Coverage Levels: The Case of Corn. Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance: Issues and Practice.
- Yu J., A. Smith, and D.A. Sumner. 2018. Effects of Crop Insurance Premium Subsidies on Crop Acreage. AJAE 100 (1): 91–114.
- Yu J., D.A. Sumner, and H. Lee. 2021. Premium Rates and Selection in Specialty Crop Insurance Markets: Evidence from the Catastrophic Coverage Participation. Food Policy 101: 102079.
- Zulauf C., et. al. 2023. “The Importance of Insurance Unit in Crop Insurance Policy Debates.” Farmdoc Daily 13 (107).
Crop insurance rating involves evaluating various risk factors—such as historical yield variability, regional weather patterns, and pest or disease pressures—to determine appropriate premium levels. A well-calibrated rating system is essential to ensure that premiums are both affordable for farmers and sufficient to cover potential losses. The process typically combines statistical analysis with field-specific data to address the unique challenges faced by the agricultural sector.
Click to expand reference list
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Co-authored by contributors
- Tsiboe F. and J. Tack. 2022. Utilizing Topographic and Soil Features to Improve Rating for Farm‐Level Insurance Products. AJAE 104 (1): 52–69.
- Tsiboe F., J. Tack, and J. Yu. 2023. Farm-Level Evaluation of Area- and Agroclimatic-Based Index Insurance. JAAEA 2 (4): 616–33.
- Turner D, et. al. 2024. 2025. Actuarial Implications of Prevented Planting Coverage. AEPP 47 (1): 394-415.
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Co-authored by others
- Adhikari S., T.O. Knight, and E.J. Belasco. 2012. Evaluation of Crop Insurance Yield Guarantees and Producer Welfare with Upward-Trending Yields. ARER 41 (3): 367–76.
- Adhikari S., T.O. Knight, and E.J. Belasco. 2013. Yield Guarantees and the Producer Welfare Benefits of Crop Insurance. JARE 38 (1): 78–92.
- Carriquiry, Miguel A., Bruce A. Babcock, and Chad E. Hart. 2008. “Using a Farmer’s Beta for Improved Estimation of Expected Yields.” JARE 33 (1): 52–68.
- Coble K., et. al. 2020. Review of the Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Crop Insurance Program Indexing and Rating Methodology Final Report. Report to RMA by Sigma Agricultural Risk and Actuarial Services, LLC. 2020.
- Coble K., et. al. 2010. A Comprehensive Review of the RMA APH and COMBO Rating Methodology Final Report
- Goodwin B.K. 1994. Premium Rate Determination In The Federal Crop Insurance Program: What Do Averages Have To Say About Risk? JARE 19 (2): 382–95.
- Goodwin B.K. and A. Hungerford. 2015. “Copula‐Based Models of Systemic Risk in U.S. Agriculture: Implications for Crop Insurance and Reinsurance Contracts. AJAE 97 (3): 879–96.
- Harri A., et. al. 2011. Relaxing Heteroscedasticity Assumptions in Area-Yield Crop Insurance Rating. AJAE 93 (3): 707–17.
- Liu Y. and A.F Ramsey. 2023. Incorporating Historical Weather Information in Crop Insurance Rating. AJAE 105 (2): 546–75.
- Panyi A.F., et. al. 2020. Does Crop Yield Risk Differ across Soil Types? Evidence from Mississippi Variety Trials. 2020 SAEA Annual Meeting, Louisville, Kentucky
- Park E., B.W Brorsen, and A. Harri. 2019. Using Bayesian Kriging for Spatial Smoothing in Crop Insurance Rating. AJAE 101 (1): 330–51.
- Ramirez O.A., C.E. Carpio, and R.M. Rejesus. 2011. Can Crop Insurance Premiums Be Reliably Estimated? ARER 40 (1): 81–94.
- Rejesus R.M., et. al. 2015. Accounting for Weather Probabilities in Crop Insurance Rating. JARE 40 (2): 306–24.
- Seo H.S., et. al. 2017. Introduction of the Trend-Adjusted Crop Insurance Program: Participation- and Coverage-Level Responses. AFR
- Sherrick B.J., G.D. Schnitkey, and J.D. Woodward. 2014. Crop Insurance Loss Experience, Ratings Changes, and Impacts on Participants. AFR 74 (4): 443–63.
- Skees J.R. and M.R. Reed. 1986. Rate Making for Farm-Level Crop Insurance: Implications for Adverse Selection AJAE 68 (3): 653.
- Woodard J.D., et. al. 2012. A Spatial Econometric Analysis of Loss Experience in the U.S. Crop Insurance Program. JRI.
- Woodard J.D., B.J. Sherrick, and G.D. Schnitkey. 2011. Actuarial Impacts of Loss Cost Ratio Ratemaking in U.S. Crop Insurance Programs. JARE.
- Woodard J.D. and L.J. Verteramo‐Chiu. 2017. Efficiency Impacts of Utilizing Soil Data in the Pricing of the Federal Crop Insurance Program. AJAE 99 (3): 757–72.
Click to expand reference list
-
Co-authored by contributors
- Tsiboe F. and J. Tack. 2022. Utilizing Topographic and Soil Features to Improve Rating for Farm‐Level Insurance Products. AJAE 104 (1): 52–69.
- Tsiboe F., J. Tack, and J. Yu. 2023. Farm-Level Evaluation of Area- and Agroclimatic-Based Index Insurance. JAAEA 2 (4): 616–33.
- Turner D, et. al. 2024. 2025. Actuarial Implications of Prevented Planting Coverage. AEPP 47 (1): 394-415.
-
Co-authored by others
- Adhikari S., T.O. Knight, and E.J. Belasco. 2012. Evaluation of Crop Insurance Yield Guarantees and Producer Welfare with Upward-Trending Yields. ARER 41 (3): 367–76.
- Adhikari S., T.O. Knight, and E.J. Belasco. 2013. Yield Guarantees and the Producer Welfare Benefits of Crop Insurance. JARE 38 (1): 78–92.
- Carriquiry, Miguel A., Bruce A. Babcock, and Chad E. Hart. 2008. “Using a Farmer’s Beta for Improved Estimation of Expected Yields.” JARE 33 (1): 52–68.
- Coble K., et. al. 2020. Review of the Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Crop Insurance Program Indexing and Rating Methodology Final Report. Report to RMA by Sigma Agricultural Risk and Actuarial Services, LLC. 2020.
- Coble K., et. al. 2010. A Comprehensive Review of the RMA APH and COMBO Rating Methodology Final Report
- Goodwin B.K. 1994. Premium Rate Determination In The Federal Crop Insurance Program: What Do Averages Have To Say About Risk? JARE 19 (2): 382–95.
- Goodwin B.K. and A. Hungerford. 2015. “Copula‐Based Models of Systemic Risk in U.S. Agriculture: Implications for Crop Insurance and Reinsurance Contracts. AJAE 97 (3): 879–96.
- Harri A., et. al. 2011. Relaxing Heteroscedasticity Assumptions in Area-Yield Crop Insurance Rating. AJAE 93 (3): 707–17.
- Liu Y. and A.F Ramsey. 2023. Incorporating Historical Weather Information in Crop Insurance Rating. AJAE 105 (2): 546–75.
- Panyi A.F., et. al. 2020. Does Crop Yield Risk Differ across Soil Types? Evidence from Mississippi Variety Trials. 2020 SAEA Annual Meeting, Louisville, Kentucky
- Park E., B.W Brorsen, and A. Harri. 2019. Using Bayesian Kriging for Spatial Smoothing in Crop Insurance Rating. AJAE 101 (1): 330–51.
- Ramirez O.A., C.E. Carpio, and R.M. Rejesus. 2011. Can Crop Insurance Premiums Be Reliably Estimated? ARER 40 (1): 81–94.
- Rejesus R.M., et. al. 2015. Accounting for Weather Probabilities in Crop Insurance Rating. JARE 40 (2): 306–24.
- Seo H.S., et. al. 2017. Introduction of the Trend-Adjusted Crop Insurance Program: Participation- and Coverage-Level Responses. AFR
- Sherrick B.J., G.D. Schnitkey, and J.D. Woodward. 2014. Crop Insurance Loss Experience, Ratings Changes, and Impacts on Participants. AFR 74 (4): 443–63.
- Skees J.R. and M.R. Reed. 1986. Rate Making for Farm-Level Crop Insurance: Implications for Adverse Selection AJAE 68 (3): 653.
- Woodard J.D., et. al. 2012. A Spatial Econometric Analysis of Loss Experience in the U.S. Crop Insurance Program. JRI.
- Woodard J.D., B.J. Sherrick, and G.D. Schnitkey. 2011. Actuarial Impacts of Loss Cost Ratio Ratemaking in U.S. Crop Insurance Programs. JARE.
- Woodard J.D. and L.J. Verteramo‐Chiu. 2017. Efficiency Impacts of Utilizing Soil Data in the Pricing of the Federal Crop Insurance Program. AJAE 99 (3): 757–72.
Crop insurance schemes significantly influence the agricultural sector by affecting farm behavior, financial stability, and overall market dynamics. This section compiles literature that assesses both the benefits and potential unintended consequences of crop insurance programs, including impacts on production decisions and risk management practices.
Index insurance is an innovative risk management approach where payouts are triggered by predefined indices, such as rainfall levels or temperature thresholds, rather than individual loss assessments. This section gathers research on the design, effectiveness, and challenges of index-based insurance products in agriculture.
Click to expand reference list
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Co-authored by Tsiboe
- Tsiboe F., J. Tack, and J. Yu. 2023. Farm-Level Evaluation of Area- and Agroclimatic-Based Index Insurance. JAAEA 2 (4): 616–33.
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Co-authored by others
- Barnett B.J., C.B. Barrett, and J.R. Skees. 2008. Poverty Traps and Index-Based Risk Transfer Products. WD 36 (10): 1766–85.
- Barnett B.J., et. al. 2005. Is Area Yield Insurance Competitive with Farm Yield Insurance? JARE 30 (2): 285–301.
- Barnett B.J. and O. Mahul. 2007. Weather Index Insurance for Agriculture and Rural Areas in Lower‐Income Countries. AJAE 89 (5): 1241–47.
- Belasco, Eric J., Yuanshan Cheng, and Ted C. Schroeder. 2015. The Impact of Extreme Weather on Cattle Feeding Profits. JARE.
- Binswanger-Mkhize H.P. 2012. Is There Too Much Hype about Index-Based Agricultural Insurance? JDS 48 (2): 187–200.
- Bucheli J., T. Dalhaus, and R. Finger. 2021. The Optimal Drought Index for Designing Weather Index Insurance. ERAE 48 (3): 573–97.
- Bucheli J., T. Dalhaus, and R. Finger. 2022. Temperature Effects on Crop Yields in Heat Index Insurance. Food Policy 107 (February): 102214.
- Carter M., et. al. 2017. Index Insurance for Developing Country Agriculture: A Reassessment. Annual Review of Resource Economics 9 (1): 421–38.
- Chalise, Lekhnath, Keith H. Coble, Barry J. Barnett, and J. Corey Miller. 2017. Developing Area-Triggered Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance. JARE.
- Clarke D.J. 2016. A Theory of Rational Demand for Index Insurance. AEJ: Microeconomics 8 (1): 283–306.
- Coble K., et. al. 2020. Review of the Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Crop Insurance Program Indexing and Rating Methodology Final Report. Report to RMA by Sigma Agricultural Risk and Actuarial Services, LLC, 2020.
- Collier B.L., B. Barnett, and J. Skees. 2010. State of Knowledge Report — Data Requirements for the Design of Weather Index Insurance. 2010.
- Collier B.L. 2020. Strengthening Local Credit Markets Through Lender‐Level Index Insurance. JRI 87 (2): 319–49.
- Conradt S., R. Finger, and R. Bokusheva. 2015. Tailored to the Extremes: Quantile Regression for Index-Based Insurance Contract Design. Agricultural Economics 46 (4): 537–47.
- Conradt S., R. Finger, and M. Spörri. 2015. Flexible Weather Index-Based Insurance Design. Climate Risk Management 10: 106–17.
- Dalhaus T., B.J. Barnett, and R. Finger. 2020. Behavioral Weather Insurance: Applying Cumulative Prospect Theory to Agricultural Insurance Design under Narrow Framing. PLOS ONE 15 (5): e0232267.
- Dalhaus T., and R. Finger. 2016. Can Gridded Precipitation Data and Phenological Observations Reduce Basis Risk of Weather Index–Based Insurance? Weather, Climate, and Society 8 (4): 409–19.
- Dalhaus T., O. Musshoff, and R. Finger. 2018. Phenology Information Contributes to Reduce Temporal Basis Risk in Agricultural Weather Index Insurance. Scientific Reports 8 (1): 46.
- Elabed G., et. al. 2013. Managing Basis Risk with Multiscale Index Insurance. Agricultural Economics 44 (4–5): 419–31.
- Giné X., R. Townsend, and J. Vickery. 2008. Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India. The World Bank Economic Review 22 (3): 539–66.
- Jensen N. and C. Barrett. 2017. Agricultural Index Insurance for Development. AEPP 39 (2): 199–219.
- Jensen N.D., C.B. Barrett, and A.G. Mude. 2016. Index Insurance Quality and Basis Risk: Evidence from Northern Kenya. AJAE 98 (5): 1450–69.
- Keller J.B., and T.L. Saitone. 2022. Basis Risk in the Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage Insurance Program: Evidence from California. AJAE 104 (4): 1203–23.
- Kenduiywo B.K., et. al. 2021. Evaluating the Quality of Remote Sensing Products for Agricultural Index Insurance. PLOS ONE 16 (10): e0258215.
- Maestro T., et. al. 2016. Drought Index Insurance for the Central Valley Project in California. AEPP 38 (3): 521–45.
- Miranda M.J. and K. Farrin. 2012. Index Insurance for Developing Countries. AEPP 34 (3): 391–427.
- Shen Z. and M. Odening. 2013. Coping with Systemic Risk in Index-Based Crop Insurance. Agricultural Economics 44 (1): 1–13.
- Smith, Vincent H., and Joseph W. Glauber. 2012. Agricultural Insurance in Developed Countries: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going? AEPP 34 (3): 363–90.
- Tsay J.H. and N.D. Paulson. 2024. Quantifying Basis Risk Associated with Supplemental Area-Based Crop Insurance. AFR
- Turvey C.G. 2001. Weather Derivatives for Specific Event Risks in Agriculture. RAE 23 (2): 333–51.
- Vedenov D.V., and B.J. Barnett. 2004. Efficiency of Weather Derivatives as Primary Crop Insurance Instruments. JARE 29 (3): 387–403.
- Vroege W., et. al. 2021. Insuring Crops from Space: The Potential of Satellite-Retrieved Soil Moisture to Reduce Farmers’ Drought Risk Exposure. ERAE 48 (2): 266–314.
- Vroege W., T. Dalhaus, and R. Finger. 2019. Index Insurances for Grasslands – A Review for Europe and North-America. Agricultural Systems 168: 101–11.
- Yu J., et. al. 2019. Estimating the Basis Risk of Rainfall Index Insurance for Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage. JARE 44 (1): 179–193.
Click to expand reference list
-
Co-authored by Tsiboe
- Tsiboe F., J. Tack, and J. Yu. 2023. Farm-Level Evaluation of Area- and Agroclimatic-Based Index Insurance. JAAEA 2 (4): 616–33.
-
Co-authored by others
- Barnett B.J., C.B. Barrett, and J.R. Skees. 2008. Poverty Traps and Index-Based Risk Transfer Products. WD 36 (10): 1766–85.
- Barnett B.J., et. al. 2005. Is Area Yield Insurance Competitive with Farm Yield Insurance? JARE 30 (2): 285–301.
- Barnett B.J. and O. Mahul. 2007. Weather Index Insurance for Agriculture and Rural Areas in Lower‐Income Countries. AJAE 89 (5): 1241–47.
- Belasco, Eric J., Yuanshan Cheng, and Ted C. Schroeder. 2015. The Impact of Extreme Weather on Cattle Feeding Profits. JARE.
- Binswanger-Mkhize H.P. 2012. Is There Too Much Hype about Index-Based Agricultural Insurance? JDS 48 (2): 187–200.
- Bucheli J., T. Dalhaus, and R. Finger. 2021. The Optimal Drought Index for Designing Weather Index Insurance. ERAE 48 (3): 573–97.
- Bucheli J., T. Dalhaus, and R. Finger. 2022. Temperature Effects on Crop Yields in Heat Index Insurance. Food Policy 107 (February): 102214.
- Carter M., et. al. 2017. Index Insurance for Developing Country Agriculture: A Reassessment. Annual Review of Resource Economics 9 (1): 421–38.
- Chalise, Lekhnath, Keith H. Coble, Barry J. Barnett, and J. Corey Miller. 2017. Developing Area-Triggered Whole-Farm Revenue Insurance. JARE.
- Clarke D.J. 2016. A Theory of Rational Demand for Index Insurance. AEJ: Microeconomics 8 (1): 283–306.
- Coble K., et. al. 2020. Review of the Pasture, Rangeland, Forage Rainfall Index Crop Insurance Program Indexing and Rating Methodology Final Report. Report to RMA by Sigma Agricultural Risk and Actuarial Services, LLC, 2020.
- Collier B.L., B. Barnett, and J. Skees. 2010. State of Knowledge Report — Data Requirements for the Design of Weather Index Insurance. 2010.
- Collier B.L. 2020. Strengthening Local Credit Markets Through Lender‐Level Index Insurance. JRI 87 (2): 319–49.
- Conradt S., R. Finger, and R. Bokusheva. 2015. Tailored to the Extremes: Quantile Regression for Index-Based Insurance Contract Design. Agricultural Economics 46 (4): 537–47.
- Conradt S., R. Finger, and M. Spörri. 2015. Flexible Weather Index-Based Insurance Design. Climate Risk Management 10: 106–17.
- Dalhaus T., B.J. Barnett, and R. Finger. 2020. Behavioral Weather Insurance: Applying Cumulative Prospect Theory to Agricultural Insurance Design under Narrow Framing. PLOS ONE 15 (5): e0232267.
- Dalhaus T., and R. Finger. 2016. Can Gridded Precipitation Data and Phenological Observations Reduce Basis Risk of Weather Index–Based Insurance? Weather, Climate, and Society 8 (4): 409–19.
- Dalhaus T., O. Musshoff, and R. Finger. 2018. Phenology Information Contributes to Reduce Temporal Basis Risk in Agricultural Weather Index Insurance. Scientific Reports 8 (1): 46.
- Elabed G., et. al. 2013. Managing Basis Risk with Multiscale Index Insurance. Agricultural Economics 44 (4–5): 419–31.
- Giné X., R. Townsend, and J. Vickery. 2008. Patterns of Rainfall Insurance Participation in Rural India. The World Bank Economic Review 22 (3): 539–66.
- Jensen N. and C. Barrett. 2017. Agricultural Index Insurance for Development. AEPP 39 (2): 199–219.
- Jensen N.D., C.B. Barrett, and A.G. Mude. 2016. Index Insurance Quality and Basis Risk: Evidence from Northern Kenya. AJAE 98 (5): 1450–69.
- Keller J.B., and T.L. Saitone. 2022. Basis Risk in the Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage Insurance Program: Evidence from California. AJAE 104 (4): 1203–23.
- Kenduiywo B.K., et. al. 2021. Evaluating the Quality of Remote Sensing Products for Agricultural Index Insurance. PLOS ONE 16 (10): e0258215.
- Maestro T., et. al. 2016. Drought Index Insurance for the Central Valley Project in California. AEPP 38 (3): 521–45.
- Miranda M.J. and K. Farrin. 2012. Index Insurance for Developing Countries. AEPP 34 (3): 391–427.
- Shen Z. and M. Odening. 2013. Coping with Systemic Risk in Index-Based Crop Insurance. Agricultural Economics 44 (1): 1–13.
- Smith, Vincent H., and Joseph W. Glauber. 2012. Agricultural Insurance in Developed Countries: Where Have We Been and Where Are We Going? AEPP 34 (3): 363–90.
- Tsay J.H. and N.D. Paulson. 2024. Quantifying Basis Risk Associated with Supplemental Area-Based Crop Insurance. AFR
- Turvey C.G. 2001. Weather Derivatives for Specific Event Risks in Agriculture. RAE 23 (2): 333–51.
- Vedenov D.V., and B.J. Barnett. 2004. Efficiency of Weather Derivatives as Primary Crop Insurance Instruments. JARE 29 (3): 387–403.
- Vroege W., et. al. 2021. Insuring Crops from Space: The Potential of Satellite-Retrieved Soil Moisture to Reduce Farmers’ Drought Risk Exposure. ERAE 48 (2): 266–314.
- Vroege W., T. Dalhaus, and R. Finger. 2019. Index Insurances for Grasslands – A Review for Europe and North-America. Agricultural Systems 168: 101–11.
- Yu J., et. al. 2019. Estimating the Basis Risk of Rainfall Index Insurance for Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage. JARE 44 (1): 179–193.
Agent-based models simulate interactions among individual agents—such as farmers, insurers, and regulators—to analyze complex systems in agricultural economics. This section collects literature that employs agent-based modeling to explore policy impacts, market dynamics, and risk management strategies within the agricultural sector.
Click to expand reference list
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Co-authored by contributors
- Gaku S. and F. Tsiboe. 2024. Evaluation of Alternative Farm Safety Net Program Combination Strategies. AFR.
- Tsiboe F., et. al. 2025. Risk Reduction Impacts of Crop Insurance in the United States. AEPP forthcoming
- Tsiboe F., D. Turner, and J. Yu. 2025. Utilizing Large-Scale Insurance Datasets to Calibrate Sub-County Level Crop Yields. JRI. 92 (1): 139-165.
- Tsiboe F. and J. Tack. 2022. Utilizing Topographic and Soil Features to Improve Rating for Farm‐Level Insurance Products. AJAE 104 (1): 52–69.
- Tsiboe F., J. Tack, and J. Yu. 2023. Farm-Level Evaluation of Area- and Agroclimatic-Based Index Insurance. JAAEA 2 (4): 616–33.
-
Co-authored by others
- Biram H.D., et. al. 2022. Mitigating Price and Yield Risk Using Revenue Protection and Agriculture Risk Coverage. JAAE 54 (2): 319–33.
- Garrido A. and D. Zilberman. 2008. Revisiting the Demand for Agricultural Insurance: The Case of Spain. AFR.
- Luckstead J. and S. Devadoss. 2019. Implications of Commodity Programs and Crop Insurance Policies for Wheat Producers. JAAE 51 (02): 267–85.
- Maisashvili A., H.L. Bryant, and J.P.H. Jones. 2020. Implications of Alternative Crop Insurance Subsidies. JAAE 52 (2): 240–63.
- Maisashvili A., B. Fischer, and H.L. Bryant. 2023. Crop Insurance Implications of Permanently Authorizing the Emergency Relief Program. JAAE 55 (1): 171–93.
Click to expand reference list
-
Co-authored by contributors
- Gaku S. and F. Tsiboe. 2024. Evaluation of Alternative Farm Safety Net Program Combination Strategies. AFR.
- Tsiboe F., et. al. 2025. Risk Reduction Impacts of Crop Insurance in the United States. AEPP forthcoming
- Tsiboe F., D. Turner, and J. Yu. 2025. Utilizing Large-Scale Insurance Datasets to Calibrate Sub-County Level Crop Yields. JRI. 92 (1): 139-165.
- Tsiboe F. and J. Tack. 2022. Utilizing Topographic and Soil Features to Improve Rating for Farm‐Level Insurance Products. AJAE 104 (1): 52–69.
- Tsiboe F., J. Tack, and J. Yu. 2023. Farm-Level Evaluation of Area- and Agroclimatic-Based Index Insurance. JAAEA 2 (4): 616–33.
-
Co-authored by others
- Biram H.D., et. al. 2022. Mitigating Price and Yield Risk Using Revenue Protection and Agriculture Risk Coverage. JAAE 54 (2): 319–33.
- Garrido A. and D. Zilberman. 2008. Revisiting the Demand for Agricultural Insurance: The Case of Spain. AFR.
- Luckstead J. and S. Devadoss. 2019. Implications of Commodity Programs and Crop Insurance Policies for Wheat Producers. JAAE 51 (02): 267–85.
- Maisashvili A., H.L. Bryant, and J.P.H. Jones. 2020. Implications of Alternative Crop Insurance Subsidies. JAAE 52 (2): 240–63.
- Maisashvili A., B. Fischer, and H.L. Bryant. 2023. Crop Insurance Implications of Permanently Authorizing the Emergency Relief Program. JAAE 55 (1): 171–93.
Climate change introduces new challenges and uncertainties to agricultural production, influencing crop yields, weather patterns, and risk profiles. This section compiles research on the interplay between climate change and agricultural risk management, highlighting how shifting climatic conditions impact insurance models and farm safety nets.
Click to expand reference list
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Co-authored by contributors
- Turner D., et. al. 2024. Potential Budgetary Impacts of Climate Change on the Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage Insurance Plan. USDA-ERS EB 28
- Office Of Management and Budget. 2025. U.S. Department of Agriculture: Federal Crop Insurance Program’s Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage Insurance Plan.
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Co-authored by others
- Annan F. and W. Schlenker. 2015. Federal Crop Insurance and the Disincentive to Adapt to Extreme Heat. AER 105 (5): 262–66.
- Falco S.D., et. al.. 2014. Crop Insurance as a Strategy for Adapting to Climate Change. JAE 65 (2): 485–504.
- Janzen S.A., and M.R. Carter. 2019. After the Drought: The Impact of Microinsurance on Consumption Smoothing and Asset Protection. AJAE 101 (3): 651–71.
- Miao R. 2020. Climate, Insurance and Innovation: The Case of Drought and Innovations in Drought-Tolerant Traits in US Agriculture. ERAE 47 (5): 1826–60.
- Perry E.D., J. Yu, and J. Tack. 2020. Using Insurance Data to Quantify the Multidimensional Impacts of Warming Temperatures on Yield Risk. Nature Communications 11 (1): 4542.
- Tack J., K. Coble, and B. Barnett. 2018. Warming Temperatures Will Likely Induce Higher Premium Rates and Government Outlays for the U.S. Crop Insurance Program. Agricultural Economics 49 (5): 635–47.
- Wang R., R.M Rejesus, and S. Aglasan. 2021. Warming Temperatures, Yield Risk and Crop Insurance Participation. ERAE 48 (5): 1109–31.
Click to expand reference list
-
Co-authored by contributors
- Turner D., et. al. 2024. Potential Budgetary Impacts of Climate Change on the Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage Insurance Plan. USDA-ERS EB 28
- Office Of Management and Budget. 2025. U.S. Department of Agriculture: Federal Crop Insurance Program’s Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage Insurance Plan.
-
Co-authored by others
- Annan F. and W. Schlenker. 2015. Federal Crop Insurance and the Disincentive to Adapt to Extreme Heat. AER 105 (5): 262–66.
- Falco S.D., et. al.. 2014. Crop Insurance as a Strategy for Adapting to Climate Change. JAE 65 (2): 485–504.
- Janzen S.A., and M.R. Carter. 2019. After the Drought: The Impact of Microinsurance on Consumption Smoothing and Asset Protection. AJAE 101 (3): 651–71.
- Miao R. 2020. Climate, Insurance and Innovation: The Case of Drought and Innovations in Drought-Tolerant Traits in US Agriculture. ERAE 47 (5): 1826–60.
- Perry E.D., J. Yu, and J. Tack. 2020. Using Insurance Data to Quantify the Multidimensional Impacts of Warming Temperatures on Yield Risk. Nature Communications 11 (1): 4542.
- Tack J., K. Coble, and B. Barnett. 2018. Warming Temperatures Will Likely Induce Higher Premium Rates and Government Outlays for the U.S. Crop Insurance Program. Agricultural Economics 49 (5): 635–47.
- Wang R., R.M Rejesus, and S. Aglasan. 2021. Warming Temperatures, Yield Risk and Crop Insurance Participation. ERAE 48 (5): 1109–31.