

# Introduction to Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies and Smart Contracts (CS 765)


## Assignment 2

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
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Markov Chain: Selfish Mining



Markov Chain: Stubborn Mining

## Insights and Critique

The experimental datatable by varying parameters (*Adversary mining power*,  $\zeta = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75$ ) and their corresponding MPU\_adv and MPU\_overall are as follows:

SELFISH							STUBBORN						
Seed	Adv Gamma a	Adv Power	Eff fraction	MPU_Adv	MPU_overall	blockc hain length	Seed	Adv Gamma a	Adv Power	Eff fraction	MPU_Adv	MPU_overall	blockc hain length
0	0.25	0.3	0.227	0.555	0.759	66	0	0.25	0.3	0.1774	0.2683	0.5688	62
0	0.5	0.3	0.206	0.583	0.791	68	0	0.5	0.3	0.4426	0.675	0.61	61
0	0.75	0.3	0.358	0.76	0.716	53	0	0.75	0.3	0.5094	0.6279	0.552	53
20	0.25	0.3	0.2727	0.75	0.786	66	20	0.25	0.3	0.1034	0.1538	0.6042	58
20	0.5	0.3	0.19	0.57	0.775	62	20	0.5	0.3	0.1481	0.2353	0.6207	54
20	0.75	0.3	0.264	0.864	0.828	72	20	0.75	0.3	0.25	0.5172	0.6818	60
40	0.25	0.3	0.2154	0.5385	0.7386	65	40	0.25	0.3	0.44	0.714	0.65	67

40	0.5	0.3	0.338 2	0.884 6	0.8	68		40	0.5	0.3	0.228	0.351	0.606	57
40	0.75	0.3	0.388 9	0.823 5	0.742 3	72		40	0.75	0.3	0.271	0.363 6	0.584	59
60	0.25	0.3	0.333	0.75	0.783	54		60	0.25	0.3	0.286	0.516	0.644	56
60	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.889	0.723	60		60	0.5	0.3	0.261	0.45	0.645	69
60	0.75	0.3	0.28	0.75	0.762	64		60	0.75	0.3	0.298	0.567	0.633	57
SELFISH								STUBBORN						
Seed	Adv Gamm a	Adv Power	Eff fractio n	MPU_ Adv	MPU_ overall	blockc hain length		Seed	Adv Gamm a	Adv Power	Eff fractio n	MPU_ Adv	MPU_ overall	blockc hain length
0	0.5	0.1	0.06	0.5	0.902	83		0	0.5	0.1	0.925 9	0.980 3	0.586 9	54
0	0.5	0.3	0.206	0.583	0.791	68		0	0.5	0.3	0.442 6	0.675	0.61	61
0	0.5	0.5	0.89	0.894	0.534	47		0	0.5	0.5	0.927 3	0.962 3	0.604 4	55
0	0.5	0.7	1	0.673	0.764 7			0	0.5	0.7	0.957 4	1	0.534 1	47

## Selfish mining

It is expected and experimentally proven that  $MPU_{adv} > MPU_{overall}$  for higher values of  $\zeta$

### Effective fraction of Adversary's blocks in the main chain (Eff.)

As the mining power of the adversary increases, his fraction of blocks in the main chain (Eff.) increases. More mining power implies the adversary is able to elongate his chain at a faster pace without transitioning to state=0' and take a lead of more than 1 with high probability.

This fraction is seemingly more than his mining power which proves the effectiveness of the attack.

As  $\zeta$  increases, on average Eff. increases. As more honest peers are directly connected to the adversary, this attracts more honest miners to his chain and reduces the chances of being overtaken by the public chain completely. This ensures that even if he loses his private chain in state 0', he still manages to put some of his blocks into the accepted chain.

### MPU\_adv

As the mining power of the adversary increases,  $MPU_{adv}$  increases.

As  $\zeta$  increases, MPU\_adv increases.

## MPU\_overall

As mining power increases, MPU\_overall increases.

As  $\zeta$  increases, MPU\_overall fluctuates.

This is evident as more branching is visible when the public and private blocks are in parallel. This diverts the honest mining power to do useless work and buys adversary time to further elongate his private chain.

## Stubborn mining

### Effective fraction of Adversary's blocks in the main chain (Eff.)

As the mining power of the adversary increases, his fraction of blocks in the main chain (Eff.) increases.

As  $\zeta$  increases, on average Eff. increases.

## MPU\_adv

As the mining power of the adversary increases, MPU\_adv increases.

As  $\zeta$  increases, MPU\_adv increases.

## MPU\_overall

As mining power increases, MPU\_overall increases.

As  $\zeta$  increases, more branching is visible when the public and private blocks are in parallel. This decreases the MPU\_overall.

