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client-v0.3.0 — First Functional CAGE Client SDK

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@github-actions github-actions released this 13 Nov 01:59
· 87 commits to main since this release
23b8c39

Warning

Security Errata (2026-11-19 — GHSA-gc2v-v2jw-q499): Item 2 below overstated 0.3.0 verification coverage. In cage-client==0.3.0, ES256/EdDSA signature, expires_at, and subject.action_hash checks ran only on HTTP 200 ALLOW/NARROW envelopes — HTTP 403 DENIED (_handle_deny_response()), 202/409/422 fallback branches, and verify_verdict() did not verify envelope signatures. Upgrade to client-v0.4.0 (3feffdf6, #820, CC-04) together with a gateway that wraps HTTP 403 refusals in signed GovernanceEnvelopes.

Summary — First Functional cage-client Release

client-v0.3.0 (cage-client==0.3.0) is the first functional release of the standalone CAGE Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) client SDK (packages/cage-client/).

Required Three-Part Disclosure

  1. client-v0.1.0 and client-v0.2.0 never completed a call against a real gateway. Prior SDK releases were tested only against canned mock payloads and failed against the live CAGE Gateway wire contract (including defer_token vs. deferred_id deferral-ticket extraction and preview GovernanceEnvelope schema mismatches). Do not use 0.1.0 or 0.2.0.
  2. Envelope signature, freshness, and request-binding verification are now enforced fail-closed by default (#675). By default (verify_signature=True, verify_expiration=True, verify_subject=True), CageClient resolves signing keys strictly out-of-band by kid via {gateway_url}/governance/.well-known/jwks.json (JwksKeyResolver with bounded TTL and hard staleness eviction) or caller-pinned public_keys — never from embedded envelope keys — verifies ES256 (EC P-256) / EdDSA (Ed25519) signatures over RFC 8785 JCS canonical bytes, enforces strict JSON parsing (rejecting duplicate keys and NaN/Infinity), validates expires_at temporal freshness, and checks subject.action + subject.action_hash request binding before returning ALLOW or NARROW verdicts (note: DENY 403 and 202/409/422 paths were NOT signature-verified in 0.3.0; see Security Errata above and GHSA-gc2v-v2jw-q499). Disabling verification is rejected at startup in any non-dev/test CAGE_ENV posture.
  3. GovernanceEnvelope dropped subject.record_hash and governance_context.controls_satisfied (#676, EP-1). POST /governance/validate-action is a non-committing (DRY_RUN) preview that neither appends a decision record nor computes control satisfaction, so both preview fields were always unpopulated and have been removed from the GovernanceEnvelope schema (extra="forbid").

Installation

pip install https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine/releases/download/client-v0.3.0/cage_client-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl
# Or with LangGraph adapter extras from git:
pip install "cage-client[langgraph] @ git+https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine.git@client-v0.3.0#subdirectory=packages/cage-client"