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Releases
client-v0.4.0
What's Changed
- fix(healthcare)!: declare stub maturity, refused in enforcing postures by @lahlfors in #759
- feat(compliance): record Lula rating breakdown in Gate W runs by @lahlfors in #760
- docs(docs): restore full README reconciled against current code by @lahlfors in #761
- fix(compliance): re-rate hollowed Lula specs; gate rows on their Rego by @lahlfors in #762
- fix(governance)!: resolve CAGE_DEPLOYMENT_REGION in one reader by @lahlfors in #764
- fix(governance)!: enforce cold-store residency on bucket location by @lahlfors in #765
- fix(tests): close live tunnel and refuse GATEWAY_URL in hermetic runs by @lahlfors in #766
- feat(compliance)!: stamp deployment posture in batch attestations by @lahlfors in #767
- fix(governance)!: unify enforcing posture guards and hermetic ci gates by @lahlfors in #768
- docs(compliance): withdraw sbom cronjob claim and close poam-221 by @lahlfors in #769
- ci(governance): record every unreviewed merge and fail closed by @lahlfors in #773
- fix(security)!: stop exporting raw prompts and user ids to telemetry by @lahlfors in #774
- docs(compliance): withdraw ttm monitoring column and hold ra signing by @lahlfors in #770
- fix(compliance): delete g9 waiver and retract unperformed q1 sar by @lahlfors in #771
- docs(compliance): open poam-225 for raw prompt export and fix poam-159 by @lahlfors in #772
- docs(compliance): correct langfuse content and retention in oscal by @lahlfors in #775
- docs(infra): record #712/#713/#724 upgrade cost and recovery (UP-1) by @lahlfors in #778
- feat(gateway)!: enforce gateway-mediated durable checkpoint storage by @lahlfors in #779
- docs(compliance): rewrite pia store inventory; close POAM-2026-225/226 by @lahlfors in #780
- fix(governance)!: split WORM refusal retention from raw params by @lahlfors in #781
- fix(infra): admit trusted identities on gateway-canary HTTPRoute by @lahlfors in #782
- fix(infra): hash local mesh-policy templates in helm_release by @lahlfors in #783
- docs(compliance): close POAM-2026-225 and POAM-2026-226 after rollout by @lahlfors in #784
- docs(compliance): record POAM-2026-227 for gateway-canary lockout by @lahlfors in #785
- docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-228 for gateway-error denial confusion by @lahlfors in #786
- ci(tests): enforce gateway producer contracts on test fixtures by @lahlfors in #787
- docs(docs): add reasoning-discipline rule for control checks by @lahlfors in #792
- fix(gateway): harden inference proxy, rate limits, and server guards by @lahlfors in #789
- fix(infra): wire CAGE_DEPLOYMENT_REGION into gateway-canary by @lahlfors in #795
- docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-230: no alert reaches anyone by @lahlfors in #791
- fix(infra): harden GKE WIF, network policies, and container posture by @lahlfors in #788
- docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-231 and POAM-2026-232 by @lahlfors in #794
- docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-233 on infra failures as refusals by @lahlfors in #793
- fix(advisor): separate gateway transport errors from policy denials by @lahlfors in #790
- docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-234 on favourable-error bias by @lahlfors in #796
- fix(governance): harden kernel defer, crypto, FTRA, and warrant guards by @lahlfors in #798
- fix(governance)!: require ActuationReceipt.outcome and harden actuators by @lahlfors in #797
- fix(governance)!: harden sanitizers, snapshot binding, jcs, and quotas by @lahlfors in #801
- docs(compliance): note POAM-2026-232 Stage 2 activation and daily bound by @lahlfors in #802
- feat(ci): add shared measurement inventory and mechanism gate by @lahlfors in #804
- fix(compliance): correct Gate W contamination audit scope and AC-3 by @lahlfors in #805
- fix(governance)!: split OPA outages from signed policy refusals by @lahlfors in #803
- fix(compliance): enforce OSCAL census read-back gate by @lahlfors in #806
- fix(security)!: bind provider_06 evidence receipts to the evidence hash by @kitkatt7 in #799
- fix(infra): decouple app Memorystore auth from governance switches by @lahlfors in #807
- fix(infra): raise gateway-canary memory limit above plugin RSS by @lahlfors in #810
- fix(security)!: require signed actuator_03 receipts with a key manifest by @kitkatt7 in #808
- fix(security): require v0.3 signatures on live provider_05 artifacts by @kitkatt7 in #809
- fix(governance): reject ConsequenceToken at exact exp and rec_exp by @Johnbjoseph-cybersec in #777
- fix(security): redact grouped JCB, Diners and Discover 644-649 cards by @Johnbjoseph-cybersec in #763
- docs(compliance): withdraw POAM-2026-210 presence claim and open 236 by @lahlfors in #811
- fix(advisor)!: require service credentials outside /agent/query by @lahlfors in #813
- fix(gateway)!: build proxy responses from an egress allowlist by @lahlfors in #814
- fix(advisor)!: refuse asserted-principal override in enforcing posture by @lahlfors in #815
- docs(docs): update SECURITY.md and reconcile provider_07 README by @lahlfors in #816
- fix(governance)!: route redemption, stage, and feed outages to 503 by @lahlfors in #817
- fix(governance): wire reconciler replay defense and atomic sequence by @lahlfors in #818
- docs(compliance): close POAM-2026-238, record FA-2 drill, open 239 by @lahlfors in #819
- feat(gateway)!: sign 403 refusals and upgrade cage-client to v0.4.0 by @lahlfors in #820
New Contributors
- @Johnbjoseph-cybersec made their first contribution in #777
Full Changelog: conformance-v0.4.1...client-v0.4.0
conformance-v0.4.1
What's Changed
- feat(compliance): certify gate w 8956f50 and sync poam ledger by @lahlfors in #738
- fix(finance): send governed trade amount as broker notional, not qty by @kitkatt7 in #517
- fix(compliance): verify stream-ID ordering in custody verifier by @danofairanks in #739
- fix(advisor)!: bind conversation threads to requesting principal by @lahlfors in #740
- chore(ci): bump github-actions-all group with 3 action updates by @lahlfors in #741
- fix(governance): close cross-boundary tier and proxy bypasses by @lahlfors in #742
- docs(compliance): close POAM-2026-208 209 211 212 with red-green proof by @lahlfors in #744
- feat(ci): catch early-return narrowing and middleware guard fallthrough by @lahlfors in #745
- feat(gateway): add refusal-ratio alarm and synthetic mesh canary by @lahlfors in #746
- fix(compliance): fix POAM-2026-215 and add idle-trace OSCAL remarks by @lahlfors in #748
- fix(gateway)!: enforce fail-closed evidence commits on pass and seals by @lahlfors in #749
- ci(ci): run weekly partner schedule on provisioned sandboxes by @lahlfors in #750
- fix(infra): de-privilege default compute SA and close POAM-165 187 by @lahlfors in #751
- fix(governance): verify inner governed CER in provider_02 resolver by @lahlfors in #753
- test(tests): add over-the-wire conformance suite for actuator_03 by @lahlfors in #754
- fix(security)!: align actuator_01 receipt verifier to intent_hash by @lahlfors in #755
- feat(governance): add opt-in provider_01 v0.3 facts and receipt TTL by @lahlfors in #756
- fix(governance): align provider-01-v0.2 endpoint verifier to live wire by @lahlfors in #752
- fix(ci): match bare version string in publish-client-sdk smoke check by @lahlfors in #758
Full Changelog: gate-w-8956f505...conformance-v0.4.1
v4.1.0 — Cybernetic Governance Engine
Release Summary: Corrective verification and compliance-custody release backed by the matched-SHA two-project Gate W certification archive at commit
fa7721221d44a53d01def9d810dfbd01c96d4293(gs://<PROJECT_ID>-evidence-worm-staging/gate-w-certification/fa772122/,archive_manifest_sha256: 70513815ba2cfe7f57a1bf5d5106528cad5f605387307717569bd254e6551be4,compliance/gate_w_certification.json). Ships everything accumulated in[Unreleased]sincev4.0.0(cage-audit/3.0stream invariants, live repository-ruleset verification,CAGE_INFERENCE_BACKEND, ValkeyAOFpersistence, model-free kernel/install isolation) together with the full Wave 1–4 andP0–P2GKE remediation (#675–#730): custom-VPC binding (CP-6), derived data-store/32egress (DE-1), non-loopback Linkerd mesh identity (LT-1), blocking refusal/deferral evidence commits (BR-1–BR-3),deployment/k8s/shadow-manifest retirement (KM-1–KM-2), in-cluster advisor proxy routing and GEAP/AGW retirement (AR-1,EA-1–EA-3), human OIDC + WebAuthn HITL quorum binding (HI-1), mesh-authenticatedINFRAcustody (IC-1–IC-4), server-bound Python STPA enforcement (ST-1), native KubernetesinitContainersOPA UDS sidecar (OP-1–OP-2), per-workload network/mesh segmentation (NS-1–NS-2), persistent 120-day CMEK evidence domain and bound cross-teardown genesis rotation (ED-1), KMS Cloud Audit Log corroboration, in-cluster Lulav0.16.0CronJob auditing (26/26active specs satisfied understartup_grace_hours == 0) with a2 × scheduledead-man's switch, and regionalEU_ECB/APAC_MASscope alignment (5adopter-operated institutional controls markednot-applicable,gdpr-art22split betweenHOLDSruntime enforcement andplannedEU-006contestation intake). Numbered4.1.0rather than5.0.0because this work makes4.0.0's existing governance, identity, and evidence-custody claims true on GKE rather than introducing a new major capability generation; seedocs/BREAKING_CHANGES.md(IB-1–OP-2) and thev4.0.0post-release errata below. Ships alongsideclient-v0.3.0, the first functional release ofpackages/cage-client.
Added
-
Matched-SHA two-project Gate W certification (
fa772122), persistent WORM/KMS custody corroboration, in-cluster Lulav0.16.0auditor + dead-man's switch, nativeinitContainersOPA sidecar, regional SSP scope alignment, andcage-clientv0.3.0(#675–#730) (gate_w_certification.json,staging_lifecycle.sh,evidence_domain,lula_cron,gateway,policy.py,packages/cage-client,POAM.md).- Gate W empirical certification (
fa772122,2026-11-12): Verified at identicalmainSHA across both a zero-state clean-room GKE project (fresh_project_clean_room, max cold pull+queue156.247svs600sPhase 2 timeout archived inkubelet-image-pull-durations-*.json) and a recovery validation project (fresh_project_with_phase0_kms_residue, exercising tombstonedDELETEDWIF pool/provider undelete,--import-staterecovery of the Binary Authorization Grafeas note with surviving image occurrences + KMS/WORM set, andread_worm_chain_anchor.pycold-start binding to a prior multi-batch WORM chain): Phase 1 two-stage zero-driftterraform plan, Phase 29/9workloadsReadywithrestartCount == 0, Phase 326/26active Lulav0.16.0specssatisfied(0not-satisfied) understartup_grace_hours == 0, Phase 4US_FED/EU_ECB/APAC_MAS/residency/Langfuse compliance isolation, Phase 5 live sweeps (live_external,integration,12/12test_gke_trade_flow.pypreview -> 2-human OIDC+WebAuthn quorum ->POST_HITLexecution,safety_rate == 1.0withblocked_traces == 0across all 5 controls, GMPcage_*timeSeries, bidirectional KMS Cloud Audit Log corroboration), and Phase 6 intra-run teardown -> rebuild (bound_rotations >= 1,declared_gaps == 0) -> final destroy (0unexpected survivors). Closes 34 POA&M items with finding-ID-bound regression tests while trackingPOAM-2026-201(lula_audit->A.5.3observer-subject feedback spiral) openly. - Durable post-W detection & quarterly expiry (
#705,#707):CronJob/lula-auditemits structuredevaluated_count/satisfied_count/failed_controlstelemetry enforced against a>= 26active-manifest corpus floor; failing runs evaluate to blocking (False) onA.5.3, firenotifier.send_critical_alert(), and pair with a2 × scheduledead-man's switch (sla_monitor.py+google_monitoring_alert_policybound to@lahlfors), whilescripts/check_gate_w_freshness.pyfails scheduled CI once the 90-day certification window expires. - Regional SSP & Lula scope alignment (
#730): Reclassifies 5 institutional adopter obligations (eu-ai-act-art9,dora-art10,mas-feat,mas-notice-655,mas-trm-s6) tonot-applicable(control-origination: adopter-operated) with concrete 3-step adopter integration runbooks, splitsgdpr-art22into animplemented(HOLDS) runtime component (REQUIRE_APPROVAL, distinct-principal quorum,POST_HITLdrift revalidation) and aplannedcontroller contestation component (EU-006), keepsra-5plannedunderPOAM-010, and refreshes the 209-row OSCAL evidence-claim census. cage-clientv0.3.0(client-v0.3.0,#675,#676): First functional SDK release. Discloses three facts together: (1)client-v0.1.0andclient-v0.2.0never completed a call against a live gateway (defer_tokenvs.deferred_id/ envelope schema mismatch); (2) out-of-bandkidGovernanceEnvelope.signatureverification (ES256/EdDSAover RFC 8785 JCS,expires_atfreshness, andsubject.action_hashbinding) is now enforced by default and cannot be disabled in enforcing postures; and (3) previewGovernanceEnvelopedropped the unpopulatedsubject.record_hashandgovernance_context.controls_satisfiedfields (EP-1).
- Gate W empirical certification (
-
CI compares the repository's live protection with the documented configuration, and POAM-2026-116, POAM-2026-133 and POAM-2026-170 close on it (
ci(ci),check_repo_rules.py,repo-rules.yml,test_check_repo_rules.py,branch-protection-rules.md,CONTRIBUTING.md,POAM.md).check_repo_rules.pyreads the rules onmainand the release-tag ruleset from the GitHub API and fails on any difference from what the document says, in either direction: a rule, check, pin or ruleset missing or disabled, and also one added. A fetch error fails it too.repo-rules.ymlruns it on every pull request, every push tomainand daily, because what it checks can change without a commit.- The tests run seventeen planted drifts against the API's recorded responses and require each to be reported. They also hold the document's required-check table equal to the checker's pins, so the two cannot drift apart. Eight mutants of the checker each fail them.
- Run live against a branch no ruleset covers, the checker reported all four of
main's rules missing and exited 1. Bypass actors are visible only to admins, so a bypass actor added to a ruleset goes unseen. CONTRIBUTING.mdhad its own protection table and settings list: CODEOWNERS review, protectedrc-v*andrelease/**, seven checks it called required, three of which are not and one of which (Marker Contract Check) does not exist, tag patterns no rule uses, and read-and-write workflow permissions. It now summarises what is enforced and points to.github/branch-protection-rules.md, asJURISDICTION_INVENTORY.mddoes, so one list of required checks remains.
-
Pure-stdlib
cage-audit/3.0stream-invariant oracle (INV-1–INV-5), live Compose--streamCI gate, andGOVERNANCE_THRESHOLDS_LOADEDattestation (POAM-2026-151) (feat(governance),stream_invariants.py,check_trace_conformance.py,thresholds.py,ci.yml,docker-compose.yml).proof/stream_invariants.py(zerosrc/imports, pure-stdlib RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256) verifiescage-audit/3.0chain integrity,GOVERNANCE_THRESHOLDS_LOADEDdigest agreement (POAM-2026-151Option 2 producer, together withthresholds_digestonGET /governance/policy-version),INV-1actuation seal provenance,INV-2single-use nonce consumption,INV-3refusal receipt integrity (proof_hash+payload_hash),INV-4barrier non-violation, andINV-5settlement ledger conservation.POST /tools/executesurfacesproof_hashon tool-caught governance refusals,docker-compose.ymlprovisions an internalredis:7.2-alpine(noeviction) service and defaults local dev signing toCAGE_KMS_PROVIDER=ed25519(SoftwareEd25519ProviderEdDSAJWT seals soCAGE_SEAL_STRICT_MODE=truestays enforced out of the box),QUICKSTART.mdadds an explicit dev-only Cloud KMS callout and an end-to-end/tools/executeseal mint→verify→consume + first-DENY step, andquickstart-smokerunsscripts/check_trace_conformance.py --streamover an actual live Docker Compose evidence stream.
-
Unfiltered
pull_requestworkflow triggers for stacked PRs (POAM-2026-153) and formal-verification / audit-posture disclosures (POAM-2026-154,POAM-2026-115,POAM-2026-120) (ci(ci), [`ci....
Gate W Certification Evidence Archive — 8956f505 (2026-11-14)
Immutable WORM custody and Gate W clean-room certification archive for main commit 8956f5057c62a8e833ad2b2c7beb3aadc48cdf83 (2026-11-14T01:59:25Z).
gate-w-8956f505-clean-room-worm-archive.tar.gz(sha256: aa573aebee341e6d16608fb4e464946451201d2a415f5320a41d069e51a47242)gate-w-certification/8956f505/manifest.json(sha256: 3d58b3f9afddf5a85f7b7eeb5d9fc89c6dff0958c7f019f9eb05ace354b89528,exit_code: 0,overall_status: "PASS",deployment_target_mode: "fresh_project_clean_room")- Verified Custody Chain:
verified_batches=6, total_records=97, bound_rotations=1, declared_gaps=0, non_evidentiary=0(AS-6Cloud KMSAsymmetricSignaudit-log corroborationcorroborated: truepre- and post-rebuild) - Newly Exercised Controls Over
fa772122:- Linkerd
defaultInboundPolicy = "all-authenticated"+:9090mTLS scrape + symmetricgateway/compliance-bridgeGMPprometheus.googleapis.com/cage_*series & absence alarms (#733) opentelemetry-api>=1.45.2+sanitize_trace_carrier()(#734)- In-mesh
GatewayClient/cage-client==0.3.0Cloud KMSES256JWKS verification (#736) - Fail-closed Binary Authorization negative unattested-pod admission refusal probe (
#737,--namespace default,imagepolicywebhook.image-policy.k8s.io)
- Linkerd
client-v0.3.0 — First Functional CAGE Client SDK
Warning
Security Errata (2026-11-19 — GHSA-gc2v-v2jw-q499): Item 2 below overstated 0.3.0 verification coverage. In cage-client==0.3.0, ES256/EdDSA signature, expires_at, and subject.action_hash checks ran only on HTTP 200 ALLOW/NARROW envelopes — HTTP 403 DENIED (_handle_deny_response()), 202/409/422 fallback branches, and verify_verdict() did not verify envelope signatures. Upgrade to client-v0.4.0 (3feffdf6, #820, CC-04) together with a gateway that wraps HTTP 403 refusals in signed GovernanceEnvelopes.
Summary — First Functional cage-client Release
client-v0.3.0 (cage-client==0.3.0) is the first functional release of the standalone CAGE Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) client SDK (packages/cage-client/).
Required Three-Part Disclosure
client-v0.1.0andclient-v0.2.0never completed a call against a real gateway. Prior SDK releases were tested only against canned mock payloads and failed against the live CAGE Gateway wire contract (includingdefer_tokenvs.deferred_iddeferral-ticket extraction and previewGovernanceEnvelopeschema mismatches). Do not use0.1.0or0.2.0.- Envelope signature, freshness, and request-binding verification are now enforced fail-closed by default (
#675). By default (verify_signature=True,verify_expiration=True,verify_subject=True),CageClientresolves signing keys strictly out-of-band bykidvia{gateway_url}/governance/.well-known/jwks.json(JwksKeyResolverwith bounded TTL and hard staleness eviction) or caller-pinnedpublic_keys— never from embedded envelope keys — verifiesES256(EC P-256) /EdDSA(Ed25519) signatures over RFC 8785 JCS canonical bytes, enforces strict JSON parsing (rejecting duplicate keys andNaN/Infinity), validatesexpires_attemporal freshness, and checkssubject.action+subject.action_hashrequest binding before returningALLOWorNARROWverdicts (note:DENY403and202/409/422paths were NOT signature-verified in0.3.0; see Security Errata above andGHSA-gc2v-v2jw-q499). Disabling verification is rejected at startup in any non-dev/testCAGE_ENVposture. GovernanceEnvelopedroppedsubject.record_hashandgovernance_context.controls_satisfied(#676,EP-1).POST /governance/validate-actionis a non-committing (DRY_RUN) preview that neither appends a decision record nor computes control satisfaction, so both preview fields were always unpopulated and have been removed from theGovernanceEnvelopeschema (extra="forbid").
Installation
pip install https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine/releases/download/client-v0.3.0/cage_client-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl
# Or with LangGraph adapter extras from git:
pip install "cage-client[langgraph] @ git+https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine.git@client-v0.3.0#subdirectory=packages/cage-client"v4.0.0 — Cybernetic Governance Engine
Post-Release Errata (
2026-11-12, reconciled inv4.1.0andclient-v0.3.0): Four claims carried by repository documentation and compliance artifacts atv4.0.0tag time (8caa7eaf,2026-10-26) were not supported at tag time:
- The deferral tier (
DEFER/REQUIRE_APPROVAL):POST /v1/defer/{defer_id}/escalateaccepted workload SVIDs and unverifiedjwt_claims, failed open whenCAGE_TRUSTED_OPERATOR_IDENTITIESwas unset, left WebAuthn challenge binding optional in enforcing postures, and emittedGOVERNANCE_DEFERRAL/GOVERNANCE_REFUSALbest-effort rather than blocking on the evidence chain (remediated in#685and#689; verified end-to-end in Gate Wfa772122).- The regional and cluster Lula compliance results: All 33
compliance/lula/lula-validation-*.yamlmanifests targeted Lulav0.4syntax that failedlula validateunderv0.16.0, inspected unmanageddeployment/k8s/shadow manifests outside Terraform state, lacked an in-cluster scheduled auditor, and included 6 unimplemented regional/v1/compliance/...routes (DORA Art. 10,EU AI Act Art. 9,GDPR Art. 22,MAS FEAT,MAS Notice 655,MAS TRM §6) whilecompliance-matrixhad reported green while executing zero tests (remediated in#664,#686,#695,#704–#730).- The published
cage-clientSDK (client-v0.1.0,client-v0.2.0): Neither0.1.0nor0.2.0had completed a call against a real gateway (defer_tokenvs.deferred_id/ envelope schema mismatch), neither verifiedGovernanceEnvelope.signaturecryptographically, andGovernanceEnvelopecarried unpopulatedrecord_hashandcontrols_satisfiedpreview fields (remediated in#675,#676, andclient-v0.3.0).- The multi-domain plugin seam (
healthcare,physical_ai): While the Layer 1 / Layer 2CagePlugindispatch boundary operated inv4.0.0, onlycage_financeis a finalized domain plugin;cage_healthcareandcage_physical_aiwere and remain declared non-production reference stubs blocked in enforcing postures (POAM-2026-076–078,POAM-2026-198).
Security release, and a major version. It fixes one published advisory:
| Advisory | Severity | Summary | Credit |
|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c | 6.5 Medium | Finance causal tier never enforced a working causal boundary: the risk boundary tripped 10,000× too high and the placebo refutation could not fail | Found by the maintainers |
Upgrading: this release has breaking changes. Each is marked BREAKING below, and docs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md lists them (CT-1 to CT-6). No 3.x release carries the fix.
Release Summary: Security release, and a major version. Fixes GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c (CVSS 6.5 Medium): in 3.0.0–3.3.0 neither refusal path of the finance causal tier could refuse. Finance
execute_tradeabove about $9,144 on the synthetic telemetry is now refused, with no approval path; senior trades up to $500,000 were ALLOW or REQUIRE_APPROVAL. Phase 1 also refuses a regression too ill-conditioned to fit reproducibly (design_ill_conditioned). No 3.x release carries the fix. A major version because the fix is breaking, and because 3.1.0–3.3.0 shipped breaking changes as minor releases, contrary to the Semantic Versioning this changelog states. From 4.0.0, breaking changes to the documented external surface — the Substrate Contract and the published client APIs — ship only in a major version; internal implementation may change in any release. Breaking changes:docs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.mdCT-1 to CT-6.
Fixed
-
The finance causal tier's two refusal paths operate for the first time (GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c; affects ≥ 3.0.0, ≤ 3.3.0) (
fix(governance)!,gatekeeper.py,world_model_refresher.py,contracts.py). No release has enforced a working causal boundary: in 3.0.0–3.3.0 neither refusal path of the causal tier could refuse once its telemetry gates passed. Marginal risk boundary: DoWhy fitted β per dollar and the boundary dividedβ × amountbynormalization_scale(10,000) a second time, so on the finance synthetic telemetry it tripped above about $91.4M instead of the documented rule's $9,144 (0.5 + β × amount > 0.95). β is now fitted ontrade_amount / normalization_scaleat both call sites (in-thread and the refresher's process pool); the formula is unchanged, so the scale cancels. Placebo refutation: dowhy's default placebo for a float treatment is N(0, 0), so every simulated effect was 0.0 and the p-value NaN (or a finite 1.0 from 100 simulations), and the gatekeeper read a missing or NaN p-value as a pass: phase 2 always trusted the world model andGOVERNANCE_TRACErecorded the causal stage asPASS. Phase 2 now permutes the treatment and refuses the world model when its result is missing or non-finite (placebo_result_invalid) or the simulated effects have zero spread (placebo_degenerate); thep < 0.05lock is unchanged. New regression suites:tests/test_causal_risk_boundary.py,tests/test_causal_placebo_refutation.py. POAM-2026-114.- BREAKING — behaviour: finance
execute_tradeis refused (HARD, DENY; no approval can override) when0.5 + β × amount / normalization_scale > 0.95: about $9,144 on the synthetic telemetry the quickstart and GKE--env devvalidate, and0.45 × 10,000 / βfor a live β. Senior trades from about $9,144 up to the next binding control (about $500,000) that were ALLOW or REQUIRE_APPROVAL are now DENY, a fiftyfold tightening of the senior ceiling; junior trades in OPA's $5,000–$10,000 review band are DENY from about $9,144. Enforcing deployments without at leastcausal.min_samplesfresh live traces are unaffected: they already deny everyexecute_tradeat this tier. - BREAKING — units and API:
WorldModelVerdict.betaand thecausal.estimated_effectspan attribute are per normalised unit (0.492 instead of 4.92e-05 on the synthetic telemetry);causal.placebo_effect_magnitude(0.2) is per normalised unit too.validate_world_model()takes a required keyword-onlynormalization_scale.CausalSpecrejects a non-finite or non-positivenormalization_scale.CAUSAL_NORMALIZATION_SCALEis no longer read from the environment; remove it if you set it as the interim workaround. Test doubles that fakedCausalModel.refute_estimatemust patchgatekeeper._placebo_refutationinstead. Verdicts cached under the old units are not read after upgrade (the spec fingerprint includes the scale). Seedocs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md.
- BREAKING — behaviour: finance
-
The causal tier refuses a regression it cannot fit reproducibly, before fitting it (
fix(governance)!,gatekeeper.py). Phase 1 computes the LAPACK rounding-error bound of thebackdoor.linear_regressionfit,eps × (2κ / cos θ + κ² tan θ)from the design's condition number κ and the residual angle θ, and refuses the world model withdesign_ill_conditionedwhen it exceeds 1e-6. Below that, the coefficients agree to about six significant figures on every correct IEEE-754 platform, a domain-agnostic floor; on the finance synthetic telemetry it is about one cent of the $9,144 trip point. A constant treatment, or one collinear with a covariate, makes the design rank-deficient: its fitted slope was rounding noise, +0.10 on macOS arm64 and −6.5 × 10¹¹ on Linux x86_64, so which guard refused it depended on the platform, and the first public CI run of the GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c fix failed on it. A bound, not a variance or condition-number cutoff, because residual noise amplifies ill-conditioning (the κ² term). Well-conditioned telemetry is unaffected: its bound is about 1e-14. Seedocs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.mdCT-6. -
The hermetic CI job installs what it claims, from
uv.lock(fix(ci),test-hermetic.yml,pyproject.toml). It ranuv pip install -e ".[gateway,compliance_bridge]". No extra is calledcompliance_bridge, anduv piponly warns about an unknown extra, so the job never installed thecomplianceextra it named. It then installed its test dependencies by name and unpinned, so each run could resolve different versio...
v3.3.0 — Cybernetic Governance Engine
Security release. It fixes two published advisories:
| Advisory | Severity | Summary | Credit |
|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm | 5.3 Medium | Revocation during human review not re-checked after approval (FRIA tier); trade policy limits bypassed by execute_trade_bounded and BTC case variants |
Reported by Dominik Blain (@dom-omg), Ironproof |
| GHSA-w39v-5v7h-fxg9 | 5.3 Medium | Model-controlled trader_role raises OPA fiscal limits on the committing trade path |
Found during maintainer triage |
Thank you to Dominik Blain for a careful report that came with runnable tests for each finding and Z3 counterexamples, and to Daniel Fairbanks (@danofairanks) for the reports behind #511, #512, #513, #514, #516 and #519.
Upgrading: this release has breaking changes. Each is marked Breaking below; docs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md covers the GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm changes (GH-1 to GH-7).
Release Summary: Security release. Fixes GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm and GHSA-w39v-5v7h-fxg9 (both CVSS 5.3 Medium). A trade now executes at most once per
transaction_id, an MCP tool call whose outcome is unknown is no longer resent, and single-use Redis writes and evidence-stream appends are retry-safe. The advisor binds the end-user principal to a verified OIDC identity, the evidence custodian recovers a lost custody cursor from WORM attestations, and skill certification receipts bind the stages and evidence they report (cage.skill.cer.v2). Entries marked Breaking change behaviour or interfaces; see alsoBREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md.
Fixed
- Approved requests re-run the FRIA tier and answer only the holds the reviewer saw, and the trade policy holds every trade action to its limits (GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm, CVSS 5.3 Medium) (
fix(security)!— reported by Dominik Blain (@dom-omg), Ironproof,src/gateway/governance/governor/pipeline.py,src/gateway/governance/governor/governor.py,src/gateway/governance/jurisdiction/eu_ai_act/fria_tier.py,src/gateway/governance/governor/stages/opa.py,src/cage_finance/opa/trade_governance.rego). Thank you to Dominik Blain for a careful report, which came with runnable tests for each finding and Z3 counterexamples. Three findings. (1) POST_HITL never re-ran theEU_ECBfriatier, so a determination the normative provider revoked while a human reviewed a held request (or a provider that became unavailable, or an artefact that expired meanwhile) was never observed, and the approved request was sealed. A read-only tier now declaresrevalidated_after_approval(GovernanceTier;Truefor mutating tiers,Falseby default for read-only ones, copied byDomainTierStage), andstage_runs_under(profile, *, name, mutating, revalidated)runs every such tier under POST_HITL, selected by structure, never by name.JurisdictionContributionrefuses a tier that does not declare it;FriaTierdoes. Under POST_HITL a re-run tier's HITL finding is answered only if the approval was given against it:DeferToken.hitl_holdsreads the(tier, code)holds of the parked decision,enforce_approved_governance()passes them asPostHitlApproval.approved_holds, andrun_pipeline()drops exactly those (answered_by_approval()). A hold the reviewer was never shown is refused[APPROVAL_CONTEXT_DRIFT](unapproved_holdsin the refusal meta) and a HARD finding denies, both spending the approval; aRELIANCE_INELIGIBLEfinding defers and keeps it. Re-running the tier without answering the approved hold would have blocked every legitimate approval of aFRIA_EXTERNAL_HOLD; answering every hold would have sealed one the reviewer never saw. OPA'sMANUAL_REVIEWis answered the same way:OpaStageused to answer its own review under POST_HITL, so an approval given for another hold (a FRIA hold, for example) also satisfied an OPA review nobody was shown. It now reportsgovernance/OPA_MANUAL_REVIEWunder every profile, and only an approval given against that hold answers it.proof/model.pyreplacesjurisdiction_keeps_post_hitl_setwith claim 10post_hitl_rechecks_jurisdictionand adds claim 14approval_answers_only_its_holds; state counts are unchanged (38 / 19 / 35, EU 42). (2)trade_governance.regoapplied its RBAC ladder only toexecute_trade:execute_trade_boundedfell through to the risk-profile rules, which allowed it for any role, amount and asset, and the BTC restriction comparedcurrencyexactly, so"btc","Btc"and"BTC "passed it. Every action intrade_actions(execute_trade,execute_trade_bounded) is now held to the RBAC limits, quota rules and asset restrictions and excluded from the risk-profile rules, so a bounded trade is decided exactly likeexecute_trade, including one no risk-profile rule matched (norisk_profile, or a senior'sspeculative), which fell to the default DENY before;risk_profileis caller-supplied, so that DENY was never a control (the same caller could sendmoderateand be allowed any amount or asset). A trade'scurrencymust name a tradable currency (tradable_currencies, an allowlist:USD, the only currency the reference broker settles), so an alternate code for a restricted asset (XBT) or a look-alike spelling is never admitted, andrestricted_assets(BTC,XBT) are refused as thesymboltoo; both values are compared trimmed and upper-cased. Such a trade is an explicit DENY, and_rbac_denycarries the same condition, so the authorization-claim and token-quotaMANUAL_REVIEWrules no longer route it to a human. The advisor's trade params are deliberately not normalised: approval redemption bindssymbol,currencyandsideby exact match (_approval_covers_tradeintool_provider.py), so the policy is where spellings are normalised. (3) Thevalidate_fria()payload named no caller and no correlation id, so provider_01 could not mint aConsequenceTokenand refused every admission.FriaTiernow sends the workload identity the gateway verified for the request (current_client_identity()) asactor_id/operator_urn(""when there is none, never a request value), the active trace id ascorrelation_id, and athread_idfalling back to that trace id. Tests:tests/governor/test_jurisdiction_wiring.py(the advisory's revoke-during-review scenario, provider outage and artefact expiry at revalidation, unseen-hold drift, approved holds still sealing, no barrier headroom committed on revocation, payload identity),tests/test_formal_profile_parity.py(runtime parity with claims 10 and 14, OPA's hold included),tests/governor/test_post_hitl_approval_spend.py(an approved OPA review seals; one the reviewer never saw is drift),tests/governor/stages/test_opa_stage.py, golden scenario 09 (tests/governor/golden/fixtures.py) andcompliance/postures/us_fed/opa/constraints_test.rego(23 new cases, 19 of which fail against the previous policy). OSCAL: theeu-ai-act-art27statements in [system-security-plan-eu-ecb.yaml](https://github.com...
v3.2.0 — Cybernetic Governance Engine
Summary
Updates all core root markdown documents (README.md, AGENTS.md, COMPLIANCE.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, CHANGELOG.md) and docs/architecture/*.md specifications to reflect the consolidated Wave A–D performance, horizontal scalability, and resilience architecture (#506), VEIP Phase 2 Warrant Reliance, CustodyVerifier read-back verification, StateCommitmentService, and GEPA/GEAP offline evaluation extensions, and steps the CAGE version to 3.2.0 (v3.2.0).
1. Core Root Markdown & docs/architecture/ Updates
README.md,AGENTS.md,COMPLIANCE.md,CONTRIBUTING.md,CHANGELOG.md:- Added
What's New in v3.2.0toREADME.mdand promoted## [Unreleased]to## [3.2.0] - 2026-10-22inCHANGELOG.md. - Updated canonical module namespaces in
AGENTS.md(WorldModelRefresher,WarrantStage,StateCommitmentService,SharedRateLimiter). - Added v3.2.0 compliance posture summary in
COMPLIANCE.md.
- Added
docs/architecture/*.md(27 architecture documents):ARCHITECTURE.md: Updated tov3.2.0, stateless FastMCP Streamable HTTP (/mcp/), 40-fieldAgentState, and addedWarrantStage,WorldModelRefresher,StateCommitmentService, andSharedRateLimiterto the kernel module inventory.LATENCY_STRATEGY.md: Documented the 6 Wave A–D hot-path latency reductions (backgroundWorldModelRefresher, off-loopsign_async+ cached KMS metadata,EvidenceStreamSinkgroup commit,routing_verdict_cachesingle-evaluation trade preview reuse, stateless MCP Streamable HTTP + 300s tool cache +uvloop/httptools, and sharedBlockingConnectionPool+ singletonDeferQueue).GATEWAY_ARCHITECTURE.md,CRYPTOGRAPHIC_SIGNER_ENGINE.md,EVIDENCE_CHAIN.md,CONSEQUENCE_GATEWAY.md,DEFERRAL_QUEUE.md,SYMBOLIC_GOVERNOR_RUNTIME.md,AGENT_SYSTEM_ARCHITECTURE.md,AGENT_STATE_SCHEMA_ENFORCEMENT.md,TECH_STACK.md, and remainingdocs/architecture/*.mdfiles: Synchronized headers and architectural specifications tov3.2.0.
2. Version Bump to 3.2.0 (v3.2.0)
-
pyproject.toml&uv.lock:3.0.1$\rightarrow$ 3.2.0 -
src/cybernetic_governance_engine/__init__.py:__version__ = "3.2.0" -
src/gateway/governance/oscal_ssp_exporter.py&compliance/oscal/*.yaml: Regenerated OSCAL SSP (version: "3.2.0"), component definition, and STPA compiler patch.
Verification
uv run python scripts/check_doc_references.py(Gate G9 — 48 documentation files audited, 0 broken references)uv run python scripts/check_stpa_freshness.pyuv run pytest tests/test_oscal_ssp_exporter.py tests/test_compliance_bridge.py -q(86 passed)uv run ruff check src/ tests/&uv run ruff format --check src/ tests/
client-v0.2.0
What's Changed
- fix(ci): fix compliance gate CI failures and mirror workflow by @lahlfors in #16
- fix(ci): resolve 11 failing CI checks across compliance and security workflows by @lahlfors in #17
- fix(ci): resolve EU_ECB, APAC_MAS, ISO 42001 compliance gate failures by @lahlfors in #18
- fix(ci): resolve EU_ECB, APAC_MAS, ISO 42001, and ai600 lula CI failures by @lahlfors in #19
- style(compliance): apply ruff format to posture check scripts by @lahlfors in #20
- fix(gateway): enforce input governance for all message roles in inference proxy by @lahlfors in #28
- fix(gateway): add routing seal enforcement to validate-action endpoint by @lahlfors in #29
- bound email PII regex quantifiers to stop quadratic backtracking by @Nussu06 in #22
- fix(compliance-bridge): sanitize audit_id in export filename header by @Nussu06 in #24
- fix(compliance-bridge): escape untrusted fields in slack alert by @Nussu06 in #26
- fix(compliance-bridge): bind node metadata into evidence chain record_hash by @Nussu06 in #23
- chore(infra): fix GKE tfvars, tf depends_on, and redis svc name by @lahlfors in #30
- feat(compliance): POAM-023 CBF external reconciliation worker by @lahlfors in #31
- feat(gateway): Phase A ingress adapters — AAIF, ACS, OSCAL, Lula, AGP uploader by @lahlfors in #32
- feat(gateway): Phase B AGW absorption — agent catalog, OIDC middleware, hybrid server by @lahlfors in #33
- feat(governance): FTRA commencement reachability analysis by @lahlfors in #34
- feat(gateway): Phase C agent registry integration — OSCAL exporter, registry adapter by @lahlfors in #35
- chore(ci)(deps): bump the github-actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #25
- chore(deps): bump torch from 2.10.0 to 2.13.0 in the uv group across 1 directory by @dependabot[bot] in #27
- fix(governance): add spiffe trust-domain agent entries to catalog by @lahlfors in #36
- fix(governance): resolve 9 test failures on main by @lahlfors in #37
- fix(compliance): await webhook dispatch tasks with asyncio.gather by @lahlfors in #38
- fix(tests): resolve all GKE integration test failures by @lahlfors in #40
- docs(docs): refresh v2.1.0 documentation across all sections by @lahlfors in #41
- chore(docs): update roo agent mode rules and global standards by @lahlfors in #42
- chore(compliance): refresh lula assessment results and readme by @lahlfors in #43
- chore(governance): bump package version to v2.1.0 by @lahlfors in #44
- chore(ci): enforce squash-merge policy across CI and agent rules by @lahlfors in #45
- docs(docs): rewrite v2.1.0 changelog section to lead with capabilities by @lahlfors in #46
- fix(governance): fix ruff I001 import order and RUF003 char in comments by @lahlfors in #47
- fix(ci): resolve 11 failing CI checks across compliance and security workflows by @lahlfors in #50
- fix(ci): resolve 5 gke integration test failures by @lahlfors in #51
- fix(ci): pin pyasn1>=0.6.4 and setuptools>=83.0.0 to remediate pip-audit CVEs by @lahlfors in #52
- chore(ci)(deps): bump the github-actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #39
- fix(governance): security hardening, debug improvements, and dev-env cleanup by @lahlfors in #54
- fix(trustlayers): encode untrusted path segments in provider URLs by @Nussu06 in #56
- fix(compliance): match webhook region guard on full dns labels by @Nussu06 in #55
- fix(ci): resolve ruff lint violations and restore missing decisions module by @lahlfors in #57
- docs: correct pipeline tier numbering and dangling links across docs by @lahlfors in #58
- docs: complete v2 documentation audit -- remove fictional refs, fix FTRA description by @lahlfors in #59
- fix(compliance): make sla_monitor region-aware (FINDING-05) by @lahlfors in #60
- fix(governance): remove FTRA scaffold, add coverage, fix 2 bugs by @lahlfors in #61
- fix(governance): add jurisdiction-aware HITL and PII citations by @lahlfors in #62
- chore(governance): bump package version to v2.1.1 by @lahlfors in #63
- fix(governance): add FRIA tier proof, OTel telemetry, and paper revision by @lahlfors in #64
- feat(gateway): add authorization and confidence claim detectors by @lahlfors in #66
- fix(governance): restore causal gatekeeper bool contract and isolate test mocks by @lahlfors in #67
- docs(docs): retire CAGE_ARXIV.md and re-point engineering citations by @lahlfors in #68
- chore: apply sw quality remediation plan across infra, gateway, and ci by @lahlfors in #71
- fix(governance): reject non-finite or negative amount in cbf barrier by @Nussu06 in #70
- feat(governance): add anti-replay seal burn and seam consequence boundary by @lahlfors in #72
- fix(tests): repair live GKE test isolation and dev infra resilience by @lahlfors in #73
- refactor(infra): remove deprecated vllm idle detector by @lahlfors in #74
- feat(governance): CAGE implementation program — phases 1-5 complete by @lahlfors in #75
- fix(compliance): activate reconciliation worker [POAM-2026-038] by @lahlfors in #78
- feat(docs): remediate CAGE_ARXIV.md and enable safety-by-default by @lahlfors in #79
- feat(governance): consolidate v3 migration, coverage, and ci fixes by @lahlfors in #82
- fix(governance): validate stpa_compiler schema fields before code generation by @Nussu06 in #80
- chore(ci)(deps): bump google-github-actions/auth from 2.1.7 to 3.0.0 in the github-actions-all group by @dependabot[bot] in #81
- feat(governance): implement audit remediations and formal models by @lahlfors in #84
- docs(governance): remediate peer review findings and align docstrings by @lahlfors in #85
- fix(governance)!: complete outstanding v3.0.0 breaking changes by @lahlfors in #88
- fix(infra): contain LocalStorage paths within the storage root by @Nussu06 in #83
- feat(governance): add external attestations envelope and veip poc by @lahlfors in https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine/pu...
CAGE Client SDK v0.1.0
CAGE Client SDK v0.1.0 (Initial Release)
Lightweight Python Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) client for the Cybernetic AI Governance Engine (CAGE).
Features:
- Zero-monorepo footprint: Only ~25 KB with no heavy server dependencies (no Redis, NeMo, spaCy, or Kubeflow required).
- LangGraph Native Adapter: Pre-execution node decoration via
@cage_guard. - Tri-State Governance Handling: Handles ALLOW, DENY (with structured replanning metadata), and DEFER (for HITL approval).
- HMAC Routing Seals: Cryptographic tamper detection with micro-TTL enforcement.
- W3C Distributed Tracing: Generates compliant traceparent headers for cross-service observability.
Installation:
# Direct install from GitHub Release:
pip install https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine/releases/download/client-v0.1.0/cage_client-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl
# Or install with LangGraph support from git:
pip install "cage-client[langgraph] @ git+https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine.git#subdirectory=packages/cage-client"What's Changed
- fix(ci): fix compliance gate CI failures and mirror workflow by @lahlfors in #16
- fix(ci): resolve 11 failing CI checks across compliance and security workflows by @lahlfors in #17
- fix(ci): resolve EU_ECB, APAC_MAS, ISO 42001 compliance gate failures by @lahlfors in #18
- fix(ci): resolve EU_ECB, APAC_MAS, ISO 42001, and ai600 lula CI failures by @lahlfors in #19
- style(compliance): apply ruff format to posture check scripts by @lahlfors in #20
- fix(gateway): enforce input governance for all message roles in inference proxy by @lahlfors in #28
- fix(gateway): add routing seal enforcement to validate-action endpoint by @lahlfors in #29
- bound email PII regex quantifiers to stop quadratic backtracking by @Nussu06 in #22
- fix(compliance-bridge): sanitize audit_id in export filename header by @Nussu06 in #24
- fix(compliance-bridge): escape untrusted fields in slack alert by @Nussu06 in #26
- fix(compliance-bridge): bind node metadata into evidence chain record_hash by @Nussu06 in #23
- chore(infra): fix GKE tfvars, tf depends_on, and redis svc name by @lahlfors in #30
- feat(compliance): POAM-023 CBF external reconciliation worker by @lahlfors in #31
- feat(gateway): Phase A ingress adapters — AAIF, ACS, OSCAL, Lula, AGP uploader by @lahlfors in #32
- feat(gateway): Phase B AGW absorption — agent catalog, OIDC middleware, hybrid server by @lahlfors in #33
- feat(governance): FTRA commencement reachability analysis by @lahlfors in #34
- feat(gateway): Phase C agent registry integration — OSCAL exporter, registry adapter by @lahlfors in #35
- chore(ci)(deps): bump the github-actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #25
- chore(deps): bump torch from 2.10.0 to 2.13.0 in the uv group across 1 directory by @dependabot[bot] in #27
- fix(governance): add spiffe trust-domain agent entries to catalog by @lahlfors in #36
- fix(governance): resolve 9 test failures on main by @lahlfors in #37
- fix(compliance): await webhook dispatch tasks with asyncio.gather by @lahlfors in #38
- fix(tests): resolve all GKE integration test failures by @lahlfors in #40
- docs(docs): refresh v2.1.0 documentation across all sections by @lahlfors in #41
- chore(docs): update roo agent mode rules and global standards by @lahlfors in #42
- chore(compliance): refresh lula assessment results and readme by @lahlfors in #43
- chore(governance): bump package version to v2.1.0 by @lahlfors in #44
- chore(ci): enforce squash-merge policy across CI and agent rules by @lahlfors in #45
- docs(docs): rewrite v2.1.0 changelog section to lead with capabilities by @lahlfors in #46
- fix(governance): fix ruff I001 import order and RUF003 char in comments by @lahlfors in #47
- fix(ci): resolve 11 failing CI checks across compliance and security workflows by @lahlfors in #50
- fix(ci): resolve 5 gke integration test failures by @lahlfors in #51
- fix(ci): pin pyasn1>=0.6.4 and setuptools>=83.0.0 to remediate pip-audit CVEs by @lahlfors in #52
- chore(ci)(deps): bump the github-actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #39
- fix(governance): security hardening, debug improvements, and dev-env cleanup by @lahlfors in #54
- fix(trustlayers): encode untrusted path segments in provider URLs by @Nussu06 in #56
- fix(compliance): match webhook region guard on full dns labels by @Nussu06 in #55
- fix(ci): resolve ruff lint violations and restore missing decisions module by @lahlfors in #57
- docs: correct pipeline tier numbering and dangling links across docs by @lahlfors in #58
- docs: complete v2 documentation audit -- remove fictional refs, fix FTRA description by @lahlfors in #59
- fix(compliance): make sla_monitor region-aware (FINDING-05) by @lahlfors in #60
- fix(governance): remove FTRA scaffold, add coverage, fix 2 bugs by @lahlfors in #61
- fix(governance): add jurisdiction-aware HITL and PII citations by @lahlfors in #62
- chore(governance): bump package version to v2.1.1 by @lahlfors in #63
- fix(governance): add FRIA tier proof, OTel telemetry, and paper revision by @lahlfors in #64
- feat(gateway): add authorization and confidence claim detectors by @lahlfors in #66
- fix(governance): restore causal gatekeeper bool contract and isolate test mocks by @lahlfors in #67
- docs(docs): retire CAGE_ARXIV.md and re-point engineering citations by @lahlfors in #68
- chore: apply sw quality remediation plan across infra, gateway, and ci by @lahlfors in #71
- fix(governance): reject non-finite or negative amount in cbf barrier by @Nussu06 in #70
- feat(governance): add anti-replay seal burn and seam consequence boundary by @lahlfors in #72
- fix(tests): repair live GKE test isolation and dev infra resilience by @lahlfors in #73
- refactor(infra): remove deprecated vllm idle detector by @lahlfors in #74
- feat(governance): CAGE implementation program — phases 1-5 complete by @lahlfors in #75
- fix(compliance): activate reconciliation worker [POAM-2026-038] by @lahlfors in #78
- feat(docs): remediate CAGE_ARXIV.md and enable safety-by-default by @lahlfors in #79
- feat(governance): consolidate v3 migration, coverage, and ci fixes by @lahlfors in #82
- fix(governance): valida...