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client-v0.4.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 19 Nov 21:08
3feffdf

What's Changed

  • fix(healthcare)!: declare stub maturity, refused in enforcing postures by @lahlfors in #759
  • feat(compliance): record Lula rating breakdown in Gate W runs by @lahlfors in #760
  • docs(docs): restore full README reconciled against current code by @lahlfors in #761
  • fix(compliance): re-rate hollowed Lula specs; gate rows on their Rego by @lahlfors in #762
  • fix(governance)!: resolve CAGE_DEPLOYMENT_REGION in one reader by @lahlfors in #764
  • fix(governance)!: enforce cold-store residency on bucket location by @lahlfors in #765
  • fix(tests): close live tunnel and refuse GATEWAY_URL in hermetic runs by @lahlfors in #766
  • feat(compliance)!: stamp deployment posture in batch attestations by @lahlfors in #767
  • fix(governance)!: unify enforcing posture guards and hermetic ci gates by @lahlfors in #768
  • docs(compliance): withdraw sbom cronjob claim and close poam-221 by @lahlfors in #769
  • ci(governance): record every unreviewed merge and fail closed by @lahlfors in #773
  • fix(security)!: stop exporting raw prompts and user ids to telemetry by @lahlfors in #774
  • docs(compliance): withdraw ttm monitoring column and hold ra signing by @lahlfors in #770
  • fix(compliance): delete g9 waiver and retract unperformed q1 sar by @lahlfors in #771
  • docs(compliance): open poam-225 for raw prompt export and fix poam-159 by @lahlfors in #772
  • docs(compliance): correct langfuse content and retention in oscal by @lahlfors in #775
  • docs(infra): record #712/#713/#724 upgrade cost and recovery (UP-1) by @lahlfors in #778
  • feat(gateway)!: enforce gateway-mediated durable checkpoint storage by @lahlfors in #779
  • docs(compliance): rewrite pia store inventory; close POAM-2026-225/226 by @lahlfors in #780
  • fix(governance)!: split WORM refusal retention from raw params by @lahlfors in #781
  • fix(infra): admit trusted identities on gateway-canary HTTPRoute by @lahlfors in #782
  • fix(infra): hash local mesh-policy templates in helm_release by @lahlfors in #783
  • docs(compliance): close POAM-2026-225 and POAM-2026-226 after rollout by @lahlfors in #784
  • docs(compliance): record POAM-2026-227 for gateway-canary lockout by @lahlfors in #785
  • docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-228 for gateway-error denial confusion by @lahlfors in #786
  • ci(tests): enforce gateway producer contracts on test fixtures by @lahlfors in #787
  • docs(docs): add reasoning-discipline rule for control checks by @lahlfors in #792
  • fix(gateway): harden inference proxy, rate limits, and server guards by @lahlfors in #789
  • fix(infra): wire CAGE_DEPLOYMENT_REGION into gateway-canary by @lahlfors in #795
  • docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-230: no alert reaches anyone by @lahlfors in #791
  • fix(infra): harden GKE WIF, network policies, and container posture by @lahlfors in #788
  • docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-231 and POAM-2026-232 by @lahlfors in #794
  • docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-233 on infra failures as refusals by @lahlfors in #793
  • fix(advisor): separate gateway transport errors from policy denials by @lahlfors in #790
  • docs(compliance): open POAM-2026-234 on favourable-error bias by @lahlfors in #796
  • fix(governance): harden kernel defer, crypto, FTRA, and warrant guards by @lahlfors in #798
  • fix(governance)!: require ActuationReceipt.outcome and harden actuators by @lahlfors in #797
  • fix(governance)!: harden sanitizers, snapshot binding, jcs, and quotas by @lahlfors in #801
  • docs(compliance): note POAM-2026-232 Stage 2 activation and daily bound by @lahlfors in #802
  • feat(ci): add shared measurement inventory and mechanism gate by @lahlfors in #804
  • fix(compliance): correct Gate W contamination audit scope and AC-3 by @lahlfors in #805
  • fix(governance)!: split OPA outages from signed policy refusals by @lahlfors in #803
  • fix(compliance): enforce OSCAL census read-back gate by @lahlfors in #806
  • fix(security)!: bind provider_06 evidence receipts to the evidence hash by @kitkatt7 in #799
  • fix(infra): decouple app Memorystore auth from governance switches by @lahlfors in #807
  • fix(infra): raise gateway-canary memory limit above plugin RSS by @lahlfors in #810
  • fix(security)!: require signed actuator_03 receipts with a key manifest by @kitkatt7 in #808
  • fix(security): require v0.3 signatures on live provider_05 artifacts by @kitkatt7 in #809
  • fix(governance): reject ConsequenceToken at exact exp and rec_exp by @Johnbjoseph-cybersec in #777
  • fix(security): redact grouped JCB, Diners and Discover 644-649 cards by @Johnbjoseph-cybersec in #763
  • docs(compliance): withdraw POAM-2026-210 presence claim and open 236 by @lahlfors in #811
  • fix(advisor)!: require service credentials outside /agent/query by @lahlfors in #813
  • fix(gateway)!: build proxy responses from an egress allowlist by @lahlfors in #814
  • fix(advisor)!: refuse asserted-principal override in enforcing posture by @lahlfors in #815
  • docs(docs): update SECURITY.md and reconcile provider_07 README by @lahlfors in #816
  • fix(governance)!: route redemption, stage, and feed outages to 503 by @lahlfors in #817
  • fix(governance): wire reconciler replay defense and atomic sequence by @lahlfors in #818
  • docs(compliance): close POAM-2026-238, record FA-2 drill, open 239 by @lahlfors in #819
  • feat(gateway)!: sign 403 refusals and upgrade cage-client to v0.4.0 by @lahlfors in #820

New Contributors

Full Changelog: conformance-v0.4.1...client-v0.4.0

conformance-v0.4.1

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@github-actions github-actions released this 14 Nov 21:57
9e17af0

What's Changed

  • feat(compliance): certify gate w 8956f50 and sync poam ledger by @lahlfors in #738
  • fix(finance): send governed trade amount as broker notional, not qty by @kitkatt7 in #517
  • fix(compliance): verify stream-ID ordering in custody verifier by @danofairanks in #739
  • fix(advisor)!: bind conversation threads to requesting principal by @lahlfors in #740
  • chore(ci): bump github-actions-all group with 3 action updates by @lahlfors in #741
  • fix(governance): close cross-boundary tier and proxy bypasses by @lahlfors in #742
  • docs(compliance): close POAM-2026-208 209 211 212 with red-green proof by @lahlfors in #744
  • feat(ci): catch early-return narrowing and middleware guard fallthrough by @lahlfors in #745
  • feat(gateway): add refusal-ratio alarm and synthetic mesh canary by @lahlfors in #746
  • fix(compliance): fix POAM-2026-215 and add idle-trace OSCAL remarks by @lahlfors in #748
  • fix(gateway)!: enforce fail-closed evidence commits on pass and seals by @lahlfors in #749
  • ci(ci): run weekly partner schedule on provisioned sandboxes by @lahlfors in #750
  • fix(infra): de-privilege default compute SA and close POAM-165 187 by @lahlfors in #751
  • fix(governance): verify inner governed CER in provider_02 resolver by @lahlfors in #753
  • test(tests): add over-the-wire conformance suite for actuator_03 by @lahlfors in #754
  • fix(security)!: align actuator_01 receipt verifier to intent_hash by @lahlfors in #755
  • feat(governance): add opt-in provider_01 v0.3 facts and receipt TTL by @lahlfors in #756
  • fix(governance): align provider-01-v0.2 endpoint verifier to live wire by @lahlfors in #752
  • fix(ci): match bare version string in publish-client-sdk smoke check by @lahlfors in #758

Full Changelog: gate-w-8956f505...conformance-v0.4.1

v4.1.0 — Cybernetic Governance Engine

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@lahlfors lahlfors released this 13 Nov 02:05
23b8c39

Release Summary: Corrective verification and compliance-custody release backed by the matched-SHA two-project Gate W certification archive at commit fa7721221d44a53d01def9d810dfbd01c96d4293 (gs://<PROJECT_ID>-evidence-worm-staging/gate-w-certification/fa772122/, archive_manifest_sha256: 70513815ba2cfe7f57a1bf5d5106528cad5f605387307717569bd254e6551be4, compliance/gate_w_certification.json). Ships everything accumulated in [Unreleased] since v4.0.0 (cage-audit/3.0 stream invariants, live repository-ruleset verification, CAGE_INFERENCE_BACKEND, Valkey AOF persistence, model-free kernel/install isolation) together with the full Wave 1–4 and P0–P2 GKE remediation (#675–#730): custom-VPC binding (CP-6), derived data-store /32 egress (DE-1), non-loopback Linkerd mesh identity (LT-1), blocking refusal/deferral evidence commits (BR-1–BR-3), deployment/k8s/ shadow-manifest retirement (KM-1–KM-2), in-cluster advisor proxy routing and GEAP/AGW retirement (AR-1, EA-1–EA-3), human OIDC + WebAuthn HITL quorum binding (HI-1), mesh-authenticated INFRA custody (IC-1–IC-4), server-bound Python STPA enforcement (ST-1), native Kubernetes initContainers OPA UDS sidecar (OP-1–OP-2), per-workload network/mesh segmentation (NS-1–NS-2), persistent 120-day CMEK evidence domain and bound cross-teardown genesis rotation (ED-1), KMS Cloud Audit Log corroboration, in-cluster Lula v0.16.0 CronJob auditing (26/26 active specs satisfied under startup_grace_hours == 0) with a 2 × schedule dead-man's switch, and regional EU_ECB / APAC_MAS scope alignment (5 adopter-operated institutional controls marked not-applicable, gdpr-art22 split between HOLDS runtime enforcement and planned EU-006 contestation intake). Numbered 4.1.0 rather than 5.0.0 because this work makes 4.0.0's existing governance, identity, and evidence-custody claims true on GKE rather than introducing a new major capability generation; see docs/BREAKING_CHANGES.md (IB-1–OP-2) and the v4.0.0 post-release errata below. Ships alongside client-v0.3.0, the first functional release of packages/cage-client.

Added

  • Matched-SHA two-project Gate W certification (fa772122), persistent WORM/KMS custody corroboration, in-cluster Lula v0.16.0 auditor + dead-man's switch, native initContainers OPA sidecar, regional SSP scope alignment, and cage-client v0.3.0 (#675–#730) (gate_w_certification.json, staging_lifecycle.sh, evidence_domain, lula_cron, gateway, policy.py, packages/cage-client, POAM.md).

    • Gate W empirical certification (fa772122, 2026-11-12): Verified at identical main SHA across both a zero-state clean-room GKE project (fresh_project_clean_room, max cold pull+queue 156.247s vs 600s Phase 2 timeout archived in kubelet-image-pull-durations-*.json) and a recovery validation project (fresh_project_with_phase0_kms_residue, exercising tombstoned DELETED WIF pool/provider undelete, --import-state recovery of the Binary Authorization Grafeas note with surviving image occurrences + KMS/WORM set, and read_worm_chain_anchor.py cold-start binding to a prior multi-batch WORM chain): Phase 1 two-stage zero-drift terraform plan, Phase 2 9/9 workloads Ready with restartCount == 0, Phase 3 26/26 active Lula v0.16.0 specs satisfied (0 not-satisfied) under startup_grace_hours == 0, Phase 4 US_FED/EU_ECB/APAC_MAS/residency/Langfuse compliance isolation, Phase 5 live sweeps (live_external, integration, 12/12 test_gke_trade_flow.py preview -> 2-human OIDC+WebAuthn quorum -> POST_HITL execution, safety_rate == 1.0 with blocked_traces == 0 across all 5 controls, GMP cage_* timeSeries, bidirectional KMS Cloud Audit Log corroboration), and Phase 6 intra-run teardown -> rebuild (bound_rotations >= 1, declared_gaps == 0) -> final destroy (0 unexpected survivors). Closes 34 POA&M items with finding-ID-bound regression tests while tracking POAM-2026-201 (lula_audit -> A.5.3 observer-subject feedback spiral) openly.
    • Durable post-W detection & quarterly expiry (#705, #707): CronJob/lula-audit emits structured evaluated_count / satisfied_count / failed_controls telemetry enforced against a >= 26 active-manifest corpus floor; failing runs evaluate to blocking (False) on A.5.3, fire notifier.send_critical_alert(), and pair with a 2 × schedule dead-man's switch (sla_monitor.py + google_monitoring_alert_policy bound to @lahlfors), while scripts/check_gate_w_freshness.py fails scheduled CI once the 90-day certification window expires.
    • Regional SSP & Lula scope alignment (#730): Reclassifies 5 institutional adopter obligations (eu-ai-act-art9, dora-art10, mas-feat, mas-notice-655, mas-trm-s6) to not-applicable (control-origination: adopter-operated) with concrete 3-step adopter integration runbooks, splits gdpr-art22 into an implemented (HOLDS) runtime component (REQUIRE_APPROVAL, distinct-principal quorum, POST_HITL drift revalidation) and a planned controller contestation component (EU-006), keeps ra-5 planned under POAM-010, and refreshes the 209-row OSCAL evidence-claim census.
    • cage-client v0.3.0 (client-v0.3.0, #675, #676): First functional SDK release. Discloses three facts together: (1) client-v0.1.0 and client-v0.2.0 never completed a call against a live gateway (defer_token vs. deferred_id / envelope schema mismatch); (2) out-of-band kid GovernanceEnvelope.signature verification (ES256/EdDSA over RFC 8785 JCS, expires_at freshness, and subject.action_hash binding) is now enforced by default and cannot be disabled in enforcing postures; and (3) preview GovernanceEnvelope dropped the unpopulated subject.record_hash and governance_context.controls_satisfied fields (EP-1).
  • CI compares the repository's live protection with the documented configuration, and POAM-2026-116, POAM-2026-133 and POAM-2026-170 close on it (ci(ci), check_repo_rules.py, repo-rules.yml, test_check_repo_rules.py, branch-protection-rules.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, POAM.md).

    • check_repo_rules.py reads the rules on main and the release-tag ruleset from the GitHub API and fails on any difference from what the document says, in either direction: a rule, check, pin or ruleset missing or disabled, and also one added. A fetch error fails it too. repo-rules.yml runs it on every pull request, every push to main and daily, because what it checks can change without a commit.
    • The tests run seventeen planted drifts against the API's recorded responses and require each to be reported. They also hold the document's required-check table equal to the checker's pins, so the two cannot drift apart. Eight mutants of the checker each fail them.
    • Run live against a branch no ruleset covers, the checker reported all four of main's rules missing and exited 1. Bypass actors are visible only to admins, so a bypass actor added to a ruleset goes unseen.
    • CONTRIBUTING.md had its own protection table and settings list: CODEOWNERS review, protected rc-v* and release/**, seven checks it called required, three of which are not and one of which (Marker Contract Check) does not exist, tag patterns no rule uses, and read-and-write workflow permissions. It now summarises what is enforced and points to .github/branch-protection-rules.md, as JURISDICTION_INVENTORY.md does, so one list of required checks remains.
  • Pure-stdlib cage-audit/3.0 stream-invariant oracle (INV-1–INV-5), live Compose --stream CI gate, and GOVERNANCE_THRESHOLDS_LOADED attestation (POAM-2026-151) (feat(governance), stream_invariants.py, check_trace_conformance.py, thresholds.py, ci.yml, docker-compose.yml).

    • proof/stream_invariants.py (zero src/ imports, pure-stdlib RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256) verifies cage-audit/3.0 chain integrity, GOVERNANCE_THRESHOLDS_LOADED digest agreement (POAM-2026-151 Option 2 producer, together with thresholds_digest on GET /governance/policy-version), INV-1 actuation seal provenance, INV-2 single-use nonce consumption, INV-3 refusal receipt integrity (proof_hash + payload_hash), INV-4 barrier non-violation, and INV-5 settlement ledger conservation.
    • POST /tools/execute surfaces proof_hash on tool-caught governance refusals, docker-compose.yml provisions an internal redis:7.2-alpine (noeviction) service and defaults local dev signing to CAGE_KMS_PROVIDER=ed25519 (SoftwareEd25519Provider EdDSA JWT seals so CAGE_SEAL_STRICT_MODE=true stays enforced out of the box), QUICKSTART.md adds an explicit dev-only Cloud KMS callout and an end-to-end /tools/execute seal mint→verify→consume + first-DENY step, and quickstart-smoke runs scripts/check_trace_conformance.py --stream over an actual live Docker Compose evidence stream.
  • Unfiltered pull_request workflow triggers for stacked PRs (POAM-2026-153) and formal-verification / audit-posture disclosures (POAM-2026-154, POAM-2026-115, POAM-2026-120) (ci(ci), [`ci....

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Gate W Certification Evidence Archive — 8956f505 (2026-11-14)

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@lahlfors lahlfors released this 14 Nov 02:03
8956f50

Immutable WORM custody and Gate W clean-room certification archive for main commit 8956f5057c62a8e833ad2b2c7beb3aadc48cdf83 (2026-11-14T01:59:25Z).

  • gate-w-8956f505-clean-room-worm-archive.tar.gz (sha256: aa573aebee341e6d16608fb4e464946451201d2a415f5320a41d069e51a47242)
  • gate-w-certification/8956f505/manifest.json (sha256: 3d58b3f9afddf5a85f7b7eeb5d9fc89c6dff0958c7f019f9eb05ace354b89528, exit_code: 0, overall_status: "PASS", deployment_target_mode: "fresh_project_clean_room")
  • Verified Custody Chain: verified_batches=6, total_records=97, bound_rotations=1, declared_gaps=0, non_evidentiary=0 (AS-6 Cloud KMS AsymmetricSign audit-log corroboration corroborated: true pre- and post-rebuild)
  • Newly Exercised Controls Over fa772122:
    • Linkerd defaultInboundPolicy = "all-authenticated" + :9090 mTLS scrape + symmetric gateway / compliance-bridge GMP prometheus.googleapis.com/cage_* series & absence alarms (#733)
    • opentelemetry-api>=1.45.2 + sanitize_trace_carrier() (#734)
    • In-mesh GatewayClient / cage-client==0.3.0 Cloud KMS ES256 JWKS verification (#736)
    • Fail-closed Binary Authorization negative unattested-pod admission refusal probe (#737, --namespace default, imagepolicywebhook.image-policy.k8s.io)

client-v0.3.0 — First Functional CAGE Client SDK

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@github-actions github-actions released this 13 Nov 01:59
23b8c39

Warning

Security Errata (2026-11-19 — GHSA-gc2v-v2jw-q499): Item 2 below overstated 0.3.0 verification coverage. In cage-client==0.3.0, ES256/EdDSA signature, expires_at, and subject.action_hash checks ran only on HTTP 200 ALLOW/NARROW envelopes — HTTP 403 DENIED (_handle_deny_response()), 202/409/422 fallback branches, and verify_verdict() did not verify envelope signatures. Upgrade to client-v0.4.0 (3feffdf6, #820, CC-04) together with a gateway that wraps HTTP 403 refusals in signed GovernanceEnvelopes.

Summary — First Functional cage-client Release

client-v0.3.0 (cage-client==0.3.0) is the first functional release of the standalone CAGE Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) client SDK (packages/cage-client/).

Required Three-Part Disclosure

  1. client-v0.1.0 and client-v0.2.0 never completed a call against a real gateway. Prior SDK releases were tested only against canned mock payloads and failed against the live CAGE Gateway wire contract (including defer_token vs. deferred_id deferral-ticket extraction and preview GovernanceEnvelope schema mismatches). Do not use 0.1.0 or 0.2.0.
  2. Envelope signature, freshness, and request-binding verification are now enforced fail-closed by default (#675). By default (verify_signature=True, verify_expiration=True, verify_subject=True), CageClient resolves signing keys strictly out-of-band by kid via {gateway_url}/governance/.well-known/jwks.json (JwksKeyResolver with bounded TTL and hard staleness eviction) or caller-pinned public_keys — never from embedded envelope keys — verifies ES256 (EC P-256) / EdDSA (Ed25519) signatures over RFC 8785 JCS canonical bytes, enforces strict JSON parsing (rejecting duplicate keys and NaN/Infinity), validates expires_at temporal freshness, and checks subject.action + subject.action_hash request binding before returning ALLOW or NARROW verdicts (note: DENY 403 and 202/409/422 paths were NOT signature-verified in 0.3.0; see Security Errata above and GHSA-gc2v-v2jw-q499). Disabling verification is rejected at startup in any non-dev/test CAGE_ENV posture.
  3. GovernanceEnvelope dropped subject.record_hash and governance_context.controls_satisfied (#676, EP-1). POST /governance/validate-action is a non-committing (DRY_RUN) preview that neither appends a decision record nor computes control satisfaction, so both preview fields were always unpopulated and have been removed from the GovernanceEnvelope schema (extra="forbid").

Installation

pip install https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine/releases/download/client-v0.3.0/cage_client-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl
# Or with LangGraph adapter extras from git:
pip install "cage-client[langgraph] @ git+https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine.git@client-v0.3.0#subdirectory=packages/cage-client"

v4.0.0 — Cybernetic Governance Engine

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@lahlfors lahlfors released this 26 Oct 22:42
8caa7ea

Post-Release Errata (2026-11-12, reconciled in v4.1.0 and client-v0.3.0): Four claims carried by repository documentation and compliance artifacts at v4.0.0 tag time (8caa7eaf, 2026-10-26) were not supported at tag time:

  1. The deferral tier (DEFER / REQUIRE_APPROVAL): POST /v1/defer/{defer_id}/escalate accepted workload SVIDs and unverified jwt_claims, failed open when CAGE_TRUSTED_OPERATOR_IDENTITIES was unset, left WebAuthn challenge binding optional in enforcing postures, and emitted GOVERNANCE_DEFERRAL / GOVERNANCE_REFUSAL best-effort rather than blocking on the evidence chain (remediated in #685 and #689; verified end-to-end in Gate W fa772122).
  2. The regional and cluster Lula compliance results: All 33 compliance/lula/lula-validation-*.yaml manifests targeted Lula v0.4 syntax that failed lula validate under v0.16.0, inspected unmanaged deployment/k8s/ shadow manifests outside Terraform state, lacked an in-cluster scheduled auditor, and included 6 unimplemented regional /v1/compliance/... routes (DORA Art. 10, EU AI Act Art. 9, GDPR Art. 22, MAS FEAT, MAS Notice 655, MAS TRM §6) while compliance-matrix had reported green while executing zero tests (remediated in #664, #686, #695, #704–#730).
  3. The published cage-client SDK (client-v0.1.0, client-v0.2.0): Neither 0.1.0 nor 0.2.0 had completed a call against a real gateway (defer_token vs. deferred_id / envelope schema mismatch), neither verified GovernanceEnvelope.signature cryptographically, and GovernanceEnvelope carried unpopulated record_hash and controls_satisfied preview fields (remediated in #675, #676, and client-v0.3.0).
  4. The multi-domain plugin seam (healthcare, physical_ai): While the Layer 1 / Layer 2 CagePlugin dispatch boundary operated in v4.0.0, only cage_finance is a finalized domain plugin; cage_healthcare and cage_physical_ai were and remain declared non-production reference stubs blocked in enforcing postures (POAM-2026-076–078, POAM-2026-198).

Security release, and a major version. It fixes one published advisory:

Advisory Severity Summary Credit
GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c 6.5 Medium Finance causal tier never enforced a working causal boundary: the risk boundary tripped 10,000× too high and the placebo refutation could not fail Found by the maintainers

Upgrading: this release has breaking changes. Each is marked BREAKING below, and docs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md lists them (CT-1 to CT-6). No 3.x release carries the fix.


Release Summary: Security release, and a major version. Fixes GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c (CVSS 6.5 Medium): in 3.0.0–3.3.0 neither refusal path of the finance causal tier could refuse. Finance execute_trade above about $9,144 on the synthetic telemetry is now refused, with no approval path; senior trades up to $500,000 were ALLOW or REQUIRE_APPROVAL. Phase 1 also refuses a regression too ill-conditioned to fit reproducibly (design_ill_conditioned). No 3.x release carries the fix. A major version because the fix is breaking, and because 3.1.0–3.3.0 shipped breaking changes as minor releases, contrary to the Semantic Versioning this changelog states. From 4.0.0, breaking changes to the documented external surface — the Substrate Contract and the published client APIs — ship only in a major version; internal implementation may change in any release. Breaking changes: docs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md CT-1 to CT-6.

Fixed

  • The finance causal tier's two refusal paths operate for the first time (GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c; affects ≥ 3.0.0, ≤ 3.3.0) (fix(governance)!, gatekeeper.py, world_model_refresher.py, contracts.py). No release has enforced a working causal boundary: in 3.0.0–3.3.0 neither refusal path of the causal tier could refuse once its telemetry gates passed. Marginal risk boundary: DoWhy fitted β per dollar and the boundary divided β × amount by normalization_scale (10,000) a second time, so on the finance synthetic telemetry it tripped above about $91.4M instead of the documented rule's $9,144 (0.5 + β × amount > 0.95). β is now fitted on trade_amount / normalization_scale at both call sites (in-thread and the refresher's process pool); the formula is unchanged, so the scale cancels. Placebo refutation: dowhy's default placebo for a float treatment is N(0, 0), so every simulated effect was 0.0 and the p-value NaN (or a finite 1.0 from 100 simulations), and the gatekeeper read a missing or NaN p-value as a pass: phase 2 always trusted the world model and GOVERNANCE_TRACE recorded the causal stage as PASS. Phase 2 now permutes the treatment and refuses the world model when its result is missing or non-finite (placebo_result_invalid) or the simulated effects have zero spread (placebo_degenerate); the p < 0.05 lock is unchanged. New regression suites: tests/test_causal_risk_boundary.py, tests/test_causal_placebo_refutation.py. POAM-2026-114.

    • BREAKING — behaviour: finance execute_trade is refused (HARD, DENY; no approval can override) when 0.5 + β × amount / normalization_scale > 0.95: about $9,144 on the synthetic telemetry the quickstart and GKE --env dev validate, and 0.45 × 10,000 / β for a live β. Senior trades from about $9,144 up to the next binding control (about $500,000) that were ALLOW or REQUIRE_APPROVAL are now DENY, a fiftyfold tightening of the senior ceiling; junior trades in OPA's $5,000–$10,000 review band are DENY from about $9,144. Enforcing deployments without at least causal.min_samples fresh live traces are unaffected: they already deny every execute_trade at this tier.
    • BREAKING — units and API: WorldModelVerdict.beta and the causal.estimated_effect span attribute are per normalised unit (0.492 instead of 4.92e-05 on the synthetic telemetry); causal.placebo_effect_magnitude (0.2) is per normalised unit too. validate_world_model() takes a required keyword-only normalization_scale. CausalSpec rejects a non-finite or non-positive normalization_scale. CAUSAL_NORMALIZATION_SCALE is no longer read from the environment; remove it if you set it as the interim workaround. Test doubles that faked CausalModel.refute_estimate must patch gatekeeper._placebo_refutation instead. Verdicts cached under the old units are not read after upgrade (the spec fingerprint includes the scale). See docs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md.
  • The causal tier refuses a regression it cannot fit reproducibly, before fitting it (fix(governance)!, gatekeeper.py). Phase 1 computes the LAPACK rounding-error bound of the backdoor.linear_regression fit, eps × (2κ / cos θ + κ² tan θ) from the design's condition number κ and the residual angle θ, and refuses the world model with design_ill_conditioned when it exceeds 1e-6. Below that, the coefficients agree to about six significant figures on every correct IEEE-754 platform, a domain-agnostic floor; on the finance synthetic telemetry it is about one cent of the $9,144 trip point. A constant treatment, or one collinear with a covariate, makes the design rank-deficient: its fitted slope was rounding noise, +0.10 on macOS arm64 and −6.5 × 10¹¹ on Linux x86_64, so which guard refused it depended on the platform, and the first public CI run of the GHSA-c8pw-f3g3-xg7c fix failed on it. A bound, not a variance or condition-number cutoff, because residual noise amplifies ill-conditioning (the κ² term). Well-conditioned telemetry is unaffected: its bound is about 1e-14. See docs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md CT-6.

  • The hermetic CI job installs what it claims, from uv.lock (fix(ci), test-hermetic.yml, pyproject.toml). It ran uv pip install -e ".[gateway,compliance_bridge]". No extra is called compliance_bridge, and uv pip only warns about an unknown extra, so the job never installed the compliance extra it named. It then installed its test dependencies by name and unpinned, so each run could resolve different versio...

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v3.3.0 — Cybernetic Governance Engine

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@lahlfors lahlfors released this 26 Oct 00:54
5a7104b

Security release. It fixes two published advisories:

Advisory Severity Summary Credit
GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm 5.3 Medium Revocation during human review not re-checked after approval (FRIA tier); trade policy limits bypassed by execute_trade_bounded and BTC case variants Reported by Dominik Blain (@dom-omg), Ironproof
GHSA-w39v-5v7h-fxg9 5.3 Medium Model-controlled trader_role raises OPA fiscal limits on the committing trade path Found during maintainer triage

Thank you to Dominik Blain for a careful report that came with runnable tests for each finding and Z3 counterexamples, and to Daniel Fairbanks (@danofairanks) for the reports behind #511, #512, #513, #514, #516 and #519.

Upgrading: this release has breaking changes. Each is marked Breaking below; docs/BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md covers the GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm changes (GH-1 to GH-7).


Release Summary: Security release. Fixes GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm and GHSA-w39v-5v7h-fxg9 (both CVSS 5.3 Medium). A trade now executes at most once per transaction_id, an MCP tool call whose outcome is unknown is no longer resent, and single-use Redis writes and evidence-stream appends are retry-safe. The advisor binds the end-user principal to a verified OIDC identity, the evidence custodian recovers a lost custody cursor from WORM attestations, and skill certification receipts bind the stages and evidence they report (cage.skill.cer.v2). Entries marked Breaking change behaviour or interfaces; see also BREAKING_CHANGES_v3.md.

Fixed

  • Approved requests re-run the FRIA tier and answer only the holds the reviewer saw, and the trade policy holds every trade action to its limits (GHSA-f6xq-23f7-9grm, CVSS 5.3 Medium) (fix(security)! — reported by Dominik Blain (@dom-omg), Ironproof, src/gateway/governance/governor/pipeline.py, src/gateway/governance/governor/governor.py, src/gateway/governance/jurisdiction/eu_ai_act/fria_tier.py, src/gateway/governance/governor/stages/opa.py, src/cage_finance/opa/trade_governance.rego). Thank you to Dominik Blain for a careful report, which came with runnable tests for each finding and Z3 counterexamples. Three findings. (1) POST_HITL never re-ran the EU_ECB fria tier, so a determination the normative provider revoked while a human reviewed a held request (or a provider that became unavailable, or an artefact that expired meanwhile) was never observed, and the approved request was sealed. A read-only tier now declares revalidated_after_approval (GovernanceTier; True for mutating tiers, False by default for read-only ones, copied by DomainTierStage), and stage_runs_under(profile, *, name, mutating, revalidated) runs every such tier under POST_HITL, selected by structure, never by name. JurisdictionContribution refuses a tier that does not declare it; FriaTier does. Under POST_HITL a re-run tier's HITL finding is answered only if the approval was given against it: DeferToken.hitl_holds reads the (tier, code) holds of the parked decision, enforce_approved_governance() passes them as PostHitlApproval.approved_holds, and run_pipeline() drops exactly those (answered_by_approval()). A hold the reviewer was never shown is refused [APPROVAL_CONTEXT_DRIFT] (unapproved_holds in the refusal meta) and a HARD finding denies, both spending the approval; a RELIANCE_INELIGIBLE finding defers and keeps it. Re-running the tier without answering the approved hold would have blocked every legitimate approval of a FRIA_EXTERNAL_HOLD; answering every hold would have sealed one the reviewer never saw. OPA's MANUAL_REVIEW is answered the same way: OpaStage used to answer its own review under POST_HITL, so an approval given for another hold (a FRIA hold, for example) also satisfied an OPA review nobody was shown. It now reports governance / OPA_MANUAL_REVIEW under every profile, and only an approval given against that hold answers it. proof/model.py replaces jurisdiction_keeps_post_hitl_set with claim 10 post_hitl_rechecks_jurisdiction and adds claim 14 approval_answers_only_its_holds; state counts are unchanged (38 / 19 / 35, EU 42). (2) trade_governance.rego applied its RBAC ladder only to execute_trade: execute_trade_bounded fell through to the risk-profile rules, which allowed it for any role, amount and asset, and the BTC restriction compared currency exactly, so "btc", "Btc" and "BTC " passed it. Every action in trade_actions (execute_trade, execute_trade_bounded) is now held to the RBAC limits, quota rules and asset restrictions and excluded from the risk-profile rules, so a bounded trade is decided exactly like execute_trade, including one no risk-profile rule matched (no risk_profile, or a senior's speculative), which fell to the default DENY before; risk_profile is caller-supplied, so that DENY was never a control (the same caller could send moderate and be allowed any amount or asset). A trade's currency must name a tradable currency (tradable_currencies, an allowlist: USD, the only currency the reference broker settles), so an alternate code for a restricted asset (XBT) or a look-alike spelling is never admitted, and restricted_assets (BTC, XBT) are refused as the symbol too; both values are compared trimmed and upper-cased. Such a trade is an explicit DENY, and _rbac_deny carries the same condition, so the authorization-claim and token-quota MANUAL_REVIEW rules no longer route it to a human. The advisor's trade params are deliberately not normalised: approval redemption binds symbol, currency and side by exact match (_approval_covers_trade in tool_provider.py), so the policy is where spellings are normalised. (3) The validate_fria() payload named no caller and no correlation id, so provider_01 could not mint a ConsequenceToken and refused every admission. FriaTier now sends the workload identity the gateway verified for the request (current_client_identity()) as actor_id / operator_urn ("" when there is none, never a request value), the active trace id as correlation_id, and a thread_id falling back to that trace id. Tests: tests/governor/test_jurisdiction_wiring.py (the advisory's revoke-during-review scenario, provider outage and artefact expiry at revalidation, unseen-hold drift, approved holds still sealing, no barrier headroom committed on revocation, payload identity), tests/test_formal_profile_parity.py (runtime parity with claims 10 and 14, OPA's hold included), tests/governor/test_post_hitl_approval_spend.py (an approved OPA review seals; one the reviewer never saw is drift), tests/governor/stages/test_opa_stage.py, golden scenario 09 (tests/governor/golden/fixtures.py) and compliance/postures/us_fed/opa/constraints_test.rego (23 new cases, 19 of which fail against the previous policy). OSCAL: the eu-ai-act-art27 statements in [system-security-plan-eu-ecb.yaml](https://github.com...
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v3.2.0 — Cybernetic Governance Engine

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@lahlfors lahlfors released this 22 Oct 19:01
b750506

Summary

Updates all core root markdown documents (README.md, AGENTS.md, COMPLIANCE.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, CHANGELOG.md) and docs/architecture/*.md specifications to reflect the consolidated Wave A–D performance, horizontal scalability, and resilience architecture (#506), VEIP Phase 2 Warrant Reliance, CustodyVerifier read-back verification, StateCommitmentService, and GEPA/GEAP offline evaluation extensions, and steps the CAGE version to 3.2.0 (v3.2.0).

1. Core Root Markdown & docs/architecture/ Updates

  • README.md, AGENTS.md, COMPLIANCE.md, CONTRIBUTING.md, CHANGELOG.md:
    • Added What's New in v3.2.0 to README.md and promoted ## [Unreleased] to ## [3.2.0] - 2026-10-22 in CHANGELOG.md.
    • Updated canonical module namespaces in AGENTS.md (WorldModelRefresher, WarrantStage, StateCommitmentService, SharedRateLimiter).
    • Added v3.2.0 compliance posture summary in COMPLIANCE.md.
  • docs/architecture/*.md (27 architecture documents):
    • ARCHITECTURE.md: Updated to v3.2.0, stateless FastMCP Streamable HTTP (/mcp/), 40-field AgentState, and added WarrantStage, WorldModelRefresher, StateCommitmentService, and SharedRateLimiter to the kernel module inventory.
    • LATENCY_STRATEGY.md: Documented the 6 Wave A–D hot-path latency reductions (background WorldModelRefresher, off-loop sign_async + cached KMS metadata, EvidenceStreamSink group commit, routing_verdict_cache single-evaluation trade preview reuse, stateless MCP Streamable HTTP + 300s tool cache + uvloop/httptools, and shared BlockingConnectionPool + singleton DeferQueue).
    • GATEWAY_ARCHITECTURE.md, CRYPTOGRAPHIC_SIGNER_ENGINE.md, EVIDENCE_CHAIN.md, CONSEQUENCE_GATEWAY.md, DEFERRAL_QUEUE.md, SYMBOLIC_GOVERNOR_RUNTIME.md, AGENT_SYSTEM_ARCHITECTURE.md, AGENT_STATE_SCHEMA_ENFORCEMENT.md, TECH_STACK.md, and remaining docs/architecture/*.md files: Synchronized headers and architectural specifications to v3.2.0.

2. Version Bump to 3.2.0 (v3.2.0)

  • pyproject.toml & uv.lock: 3.0.1 $\rightarrow$ 3.2.0
  • src/cybernetic_governance_engine/__init__.py: __version__ = "3.2.0"
  • src/gateway/governance/oscal_ssp_exporter.py & compliance/oscal/*.yaml: Regenerated OSCAL SSP (version: "3.2.0"), component definition, and STPA compiler patch.

Verification

  • uv run python scripts/check_doc_references.py (Gate G9 — 48 documentation files audited, 0 broken references)
  • uv run python scripts/check_stpa_freshness.py
  • uv run pytest tests/test_oscal_ssp_exporter.py tests/test_compliance_bridge.py -q (86 passed)
  • uv run ruff check src/ tests/ & uv run ruff format --check src/ tests/

client-v0.2.0

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@github-actions github-actions released this 28 Sep 16:45

What's Changed

  • fix(ci): fix compliance gate CI failures and mirror workflow by @lahlfors in #16
  • fix(ci): resolve 11 failing CI checks across compliance and security workflows by @lahlfors in #17
  • fix(ci): resolve EU_ECB, APAC_MAS, ISO 42001 compliance gate failures by @lahlfors in #18
  • fix(ci): resolve EU_ECB, APAC_MAS, ISO 42001, and ai600 lula CI failures by @lahlfors in #19
  • style(compliance): apply ruff format to posture check scripts by @lahlfors in #20
  • fix(gateway): enforce input governance for all message roles in inference proxy by @lahlfors in #28
  • fix(gateway): add routing seal enforcement to validate-action endpoint by @lahlfors in #29
  • bound email PII regex quantifiers to stop quadratic backtracking by @Nussu06 in #22
  • fix(compliance-bridge): sanitize audit_id in export filename header by @Nussu06 in #24
  • fix(compliance-bridge): escape untrusted fields in slack alert by @Nussu06 in #26
  • fix(compliance-bridge): bind node metadata into evidence chain record_hash by @Nussu06 in #23
  • chore(infra): fix GKE tfvars, tf depends_on, and redis svc name by @lahlfors in #30
  • feat(compliance): POAM-023 CBF external reconciliation worker by @lahlfors in #31
  • feat(gateway): Phase A ingress adapters — AAIF, ACS, OSCAL, Lula, AGP uploader by @lahlfors in #32
  • feat(gateway): Phase B AGW absorption — agent catalog, OIDC middleware, hybrid server by @lahlfors in #33
  • feat(governance): FTRA commencement reachability analysis by @lahlfors in #34
  • feat(gateway): Phase C agent registry integration — OSCAL exporter, registry adapter by @lahlfors in #35
  • chore(ci)(deps): bump the github-actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #25
  • chore(deps): bump torch from 2.10.0 to 2.13.0 in the uv group across 1 directory by @dependabot[bot] in #27
  • fix(governance): add spiffe trust-domain agent entries to catalog by @lahlfors in #36
  • fix(governance): resolve 9 test failures on main by @lahlfors in #37
  • fix(compliance): await webhook dispatch tasks with asyncio.gather by @lahlfors in #38
  • fix(tests): resolve all GKE integration test failures by @lahlfors in #40
  • docs(docs): refresh v2.1.0 documentation across all sections by @lahlfors in #41
  • chore(docs): update roo agent mode rules and global standards by @lahlfors in #42
  • chore(compliance): refresh lula assessment results and readme by @lahlfors in #43
  • chore(governance): bump package version to v2.1.0 by @lahlfors in #44
  • chore(ci): enforce squash-merge policy across CI and agent rules by @lahlfors in #45
  • docs(docs): rewrite v2.1.0 changelog section to lead with capabilities by @lahlfors in #46
  • fix(governance): fix ruff I001 import order and RUF003 char in comments by @lahlfors in #47
  • fix(ci): resolve 11 failing CI checks across compliance and security workflows by @lahlfors in #50
  • fix(ci): resolve 5 gke integration test failures by @lahlfors in #51
  • fix(ci): pin pyasn1>=0.6.4 and setuptools>=83.0.0 to remediate pip-audit CVEs by @lahlfors in #52
  • chore(ci)(deps): bump the github-actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #39
  • fix(governance): security hardening, debug improvements, and dev-env cleanup by @lahlfors in #54
  • fix(trustlayers): encode untrusted path segments in provider URLs by @Nussu06 in #56
  • fix(compliance): match webhook region guard on full dns labels by @Nussu06 in #55
  • fix(ci): resolve ruff lint violations and restore missing decisions module by @lahlfors in #57
  • docs: correct pipeline tier numbering and dangling links across docs by @lahlfors in #58
  • docs: complete v2 documentation audit -- remove fictional refs, fix FTRA description by @lahlfors in #59
  • fix(compliance): make sla_monitor region-aware (FINDING-05) by @lahlfors in #60
  • fix(governance): remove FTRA scaffold, add coverage, fix 2 bugs by @lahlfors in #61
  • fix(governance): add jurisdiction-aware HITL and PII citations by @lahlfors in #62
  • chore(governance): bump package version to v2.1.1 by @lahlfors in #63
  • fix(governance): add FRIA tier proof, OTel telemetry, and paper revision by @lahlfors in #64
  • feat(gateway): add authorization and confidence claim detectors by @lahlfors in #66
  • fix(governance): restore causal gatekeeper bool contract and isolate test mocks by @lahlfors in #67
  • docs(docs): retire CAGE_ARXIV.md and re-point engineering citations by @lahlfors in #68
  • chore: apply sw quality remediation plan across infra, gateway, and ci by @lahlfors in #71
  • fix(governance): reject non-finite or negative amount in cbf barrier by @Nussu06 in #70
  • feat(governance): add anti-replay seal burn and seam consequence boundary by @lahlfors in #72
  • fix(tests): repair live GKE test isolation and dev infra resilience by @lahlfors in #73
  • refactor(infra): remove deprecated vllm idle detector by @lahlfors in #74
  • feat(governance): CAGE implementation program — phases 1-5 complete by @lahlfors in #75
  • fix(compliance): activate reconciliation worker [POAM-2026-038] by @lahlfors in #78
  • feat(docs): remediate CAGE_ARXIV.md and enable safety-by-default by @lahlfors in #79
  • feat(governance): consolidate v3 migration, coverage, and ci fixes by @lahlfors in #82
  • fix(governance): validate stpa_compiler schema fields before code generation by @Nussu06 in #80
  • chore(ci)(deps): bump google-github-actions/auth from 2.1.7 to 3.0.0 in the github-actions-all group by @dependabot[bot] in #81
  • feat(governance): implement audit remediations and formal models by @lahlfors in #84
  • docs(governance): remediate peer review findings and align docstrings by @lahlfors in #85
  • fix(governance)!: complete outstanding v3.0.0 breaking changes by @lahlfors in #88
  • fix(infra): contain LocalStorage paths within the storage root by @Nussu06 in #83
  • feat(governance): add external attestations envelope and veip poc by @lahlfors in https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine/pu...
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CAGE Client SDK v0.1.0

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@lahlfors lahlfors released this 19 Sep 01:17

CAGE Client SDK v0.1.0 (Initial Release)

Lightweight Python Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) client for the Cybernetic AI Governance Engine (CAGE).

Features:

  • Zero-monorepo footprint: Only ~25 KB with no heavy server dependencies (no Redis, NeMo, spaCy, or Kubeflow required).
  • LangGraph Native Adapter: Pre-execution node decoration via @cage_guard.
  • Tri-State Governance Handling: Handles ALLOW, DENY (with structured replanning metadata), and DEFER (for HITL approval).
  • HMAC Routing Seals: Cryptographic tamper detection with micro-TTL enforcement.
  • W3C Distributed Tracing: Generates compliant traceparent headers for cross-service observability.

Installation:

# Direct install from GitHub Release:
pip install https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine/releases/download/client-v0.1.0/cage_client-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl

# Or install with LangGraph support from git:
pip install "cage-client[langgraph] @ git+https://github.com/google/cybernetic-agent-governance-engine.git#subdirectory=packages/cage-client"

What's Changed

  • fix(ci): fix compliance gate CI failures and mirror workflow by @lahlfors in #16
  • fix(ci): resolve 11 failing CI checks across compliance and security workflows by @lahlfors in #17
  • fix(ci): resolve EU_ECB, APAC_MAS, ISO 42001 compliance gate failures by @lahlfors in #18
  • fix(ci): resolve EU_ECB, APAC_MAS, ISO 42001, and ai600 lula CI failures by @lahlfors in #19
  • style(compliance): apply ruff format to posture check scripts by @lahlfors in #20
  • fix(gateway): enforce input governance for all message roles in inference proxy by @lahlfors in #28
  • fix(gateway): add routing seal enforcement to validate-action endpoint by @lahlfors in #29
  • bound email PII regex quantifiers to stop quadratic backtracking by @Nussu06 in #22
  • fix(compliance-bridge): sanitize audit_id in export filename header by @Nussu06 in #24
  • fix(compliance-bridge): escape untrusted fields in slack alert by @Nussu06 in #26
  • fix(compliance-bridge): bind node metadata into evidence chain record_hash by @Nussu06 in #23
  • chore(infra): fix GKE tfvars, tf depends_on, and redis svc name by @lahlfors in #30
  • feat(compliance): POAM-023 CBF external reconciliation worker by @lahlfors in #31
  • feat(gateway): Phase A ingress adapters — AAIF, ACS, OSCAL, Lula, AGP uploader by @lahlfors in #32
  • feat(gateway): Phase B AGW absorption — agent catalog, OIDC middleware, hybrid server by @lahlfors in #33
  • feat(governance): FTRA commencement reachability analysis by @lahlfors in #34
  • feat(gateway): Phase C agent registry integration — OSCAL exporter, registry adapter by @lahlfors in #35
  • chore(ci)(deps): bump the github-actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #25
  • chore(deps): bump torch from 2.10.0 to 2.13.0 in the uv group across 1 directory by @dependabot[bot] in #27
  • fix(governance): add spiffe trust-domain agent entries to catalog by @lahlfors in #36
  • fix(governance): resolve 9 test failures on main by @lahlfors in #37
  • fix(compliance): await webhook dispatch tasks with asyncio.gather by @lahlfors in #38
  • fix(tests): resolve all GKE integration test failures by @lahlfors in #40
  • docs(docs): refresh v2.1.0 documentation across all sections by @lahlfors in #41
  • chore(docs): update roo agent mode rules and global standards by @lahlfors in #42
  • chore(compliance): refresh lula assessment results and readme by @lahlfors in #43
  • chore(governance): bump package version to v2.1.0 by @lahlfors in #44
  • chore(ci): enforce squash-merge policy across CI and agent rules by @lahlfors in #45
  • docs(docs): rewrite v2.1.0 changelog section to lead with capabilities by @lahlfors in #46
  • fix(governance): fix ruff I001 import order and RUF003 char in comments by @lahlfors in #47
  • fix(ci): resolve 11 failing CI checks across compliance and security workflows by @lahlfors in #50
  • fix(ci): resolve 5 gke integration test failures by @lahlfors in #51
  • fix(ci): pin pyasn1>=0.6.4 and setuptools>=83.0.0 to remediate pip-audit CVEs by @lahlfors in #52
  • chore(ci)(deps): bump the github-actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #39
  • fix(governance): security hardening, debug improvements, and dev-env cleanup by @lahlfors in #54
  • fix(trustlayers): encode untrusted path segments in provider URLs by @Nussu06 in #56
  • fix(compliance): match webhook region guard on full dns labels by @Nussu06 in #55
  • fix(ci): resolve ruff lint violations and restore missing decisions module by @lahlfors in #57
  • docs: correct pipeline tier numbering and dangling links across docs by @lahlfors in #58
  • docs: complete v2 documentation audit -- remove fictional refs, fix FTRA description by @lahlfors in #59
  • fix(compliance): make sla_monitor region-aware (FINDING-05) by @lahlfors in #60
  • fix(governance): remove FTRA scaffold, add coverage, fix 2 bugs by @lahlfors in #61
  • fix(governance): add jurisdiction-aware HITL and PII citations by @lahlfors in #62
  • chore(governance): bump package version to v2.1.1 by @lahlfors in #63
  • fix(governance): add FRIA tier proof, OTel telemetry, and paper revision by @lahlfors in #64
  • feat(gateway): add authorization and confidence claim detectors by @lahlfors in #66
  • fix(governance): restore causal gatekeeper bool contract and isolate test mocks by @lahlfors in #67
  • docs(docs): retire CAGE_ARXIV.md and re-point engineering citations by @lahlfors in #68
  • chore: apply sw quality remediation plan across infra, gateway, and ci by @lahlfors in #71
  • fix(governance): reject non-finite or negative amount in cbf barrier by @Nussu06 in #70
  • feat(governance): add anti-replay seal burn and seam consequence boundary by @lahlfors in #72
  • fix(tests): repair live GKE test isolation and dev infra resilience by @lahlfors in #73
  • refactor(infra): remove deprecated vllm idle detector by @lahlfors in #74
  • feat(governance): CAGE implementation program — phases 1-5 complete by @lahlfors in #75
  • fix(compliance): activate reconciliation worker [POAM-2026-038] by @lahlfors in #78
  • feat(docs): remediate CAGE_ARXIV.md and enable safety-by-default by @lahlfors in #79
  • feat(governance): consolidate v3 migration, coverage, and ci fixes by @lahlfors in #82
  • fix(governance): valida...
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