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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: draft-ietf-acme-acme.md
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@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ deploying an HTTPS server using ACME, the experience would be something like thi
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automatically downloads and installs it, potentially notifying the operator
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via email, SMS, etc.
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* The ACME client periodically contacts the CA to get updated certificates,
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stapled Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses, or whatever else would be required to keep the web server functional and its credentials up to date.
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stapled Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses {{?RFC6960}}, or whatever else would be required to keep the web server functional and its credentials up to date.
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In this way, it would be nearly as easy to deploy with a CA-issued certificate
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as with a self-signed certificate. Furthermore, the maintenance of that
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# Protocol Overview
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ACME allows a client to request certificate management actions using a set of
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JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) messages carried over HTTPS {{!RFC8259}} {{!RFC2818}}.
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JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) messages {{!RFC8259}} carried over HTTPS {{!RFC2818}}.
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Issuance using ACME resembles a traditional CA's issuance process, in which a user creates an account,
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requests a certificate, and proves control of the domain(s) in that certificate in
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order for the CA to issue the requested certificate.
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## HTTPS Requests
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Each ACME function is accomplished by the client sending a sequence of HTTPS
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requests to the server, carrying JSON messages {{!RFC2818}}{{!RFC8259}}. Use of
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requests to the server {{!RFC2818}}, carrying JSON messages {{!RFC8259}}. Use of
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HTTPS is REQUIRED. Each subsection of
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{{certificate-management}} below describes the message formats used by the
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function and the order in which messages are sent.
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next validation query, since the status of the challenge will not change until
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that time.
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Clients can explicitly request a retry by resending their response to a
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Clients can explicitly request a retry by re-sending their response to a
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challenge in a new POST request (with a new nonce, etc.). This allows clients
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to request a retry when the state has changed (e.g., after firewall rules have been
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updated). Servers SHOULD retry a request immediately on receiving such a POST
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: rfced/draft-ietf-acme-acme.clean.xml
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automatically downloads and installs it, potentially notifying the operator
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via email, SMS, etc.</t>
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<t>The ACME client periodically contacts the CA to get updated certificates,
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stapled Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses, or whatever else would be required to keep the web server functional and its credentials up to date.</t>
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stapled Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responses <xreftarget="RFC6960"/>, or whatever else would be required to keep the web server functional and its credentials up to date.</t>
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</list></t>
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<t>In this way, it would be nearly as easy to deploy with a CA-issued certificate
<abstract><t>This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current status of a digital certificate without requiring Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Additional mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in separate documents. This document obsoletes RFCs 2560 and 6277. It also updates RFC 5912.</t></abstract>
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