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Releases · indirect-b/chat-app
v6.5.0 — Google profile sync
v6.5.0 (Latest) — Google profile sync: display name + photo from the Google profile
- The name and photo from the Google profile now become the user's chat profile at sign-in. Existing users get updated on their next Google login.
- If the user edits their display name or photo in the profile settings, their own choice wins — Google sign-in will not overwrite it afterwards.
- The Google photo loads from lh3.googleusercontent.com (the only new image host allowed); other external avatar URLs are not loaded.
- 142/142 tests pass.
- Known limits: Google sign-in itself was not verified live over HTTP (it needs a real Google token); profile refresh happens on the next login only, so a user who never logs in again keeps their old profile.
v6.4.0 — Google-only login, redirect sign-in, styled privacy page
v6.4.0 (Latest) — Google-only login: Bale and email login removed, redirect-mode Google Sign-In, styled privacy page
- Login is now Google-only: the Bale and email OTP flows and /api/register are removed. The recovery-code login stays as the fallback for anyone who loses Google access.
- Google Sign-In now uses redirect mode instead of a popup: the whole page goes to Google and comes back, which fixes the blank page mobile users hit after picking an account. The redirect URIs are registered in the Cloud Console.
- The /privacy page has a proper UI now: dark, RTL, Persian first, matching the app; still no scripts and no external resources (page-specific CSP).
- Account deletion is now confirmed with the one-time recovery code instead of a Bale OTP — this also fixes deletion for Google users, for whom Bale OTP delivery was impossible.
- 112/112 tests pass.
- Known limits: Bale users who did not save a recovery code are locked out — there is no self-service recovery for them. The Bale bot no longer answers /start (login is gone); it still powers health checks and admin notifications.
v6.3.0 — Media end-to-end encryption, room and profile access control
v6.3.0 (Latest) — Media end-to-end encryption: files encrypted with the room key, members-only media links
- Files (photos, voice, video) are now encrypted with the room key before upload (PQF1 + AES-256-GCM); the server only ever stores ciphertext. The message ratchet is untouched — the file key comes from stable per-room material.
- Media links open only for logged-in members of that chat: /api/media requires a session token and room membership; the public /uploads route is gone; deleted messages' media is denied; orphan media is denied. Avatars stay visible to logged-in users (public profile pictures by design, never anonymous).
- Old media: access-controlled through its message's room, but NOT encrypted — the server never had the key, so it cannot retro-encrypt. Re-upload a file to encrypt it.
- Room and profile access control: /api/messages/:roomId now requires a session and room membership; /api/groups/:username, /api/contacts/:username, POST /api/user/update and POST /api/add-contact now require a session and only let a user act on their own data (anyone could previously read any room's messages or overwrite any user's profile).
- 123/123 tests pass.
- Known limits: the 1:1 file key is ECDH-derived (classical) — the PQ ratchet key is wiped on every rekey and cannot serve as a stable file key; group files use the ML-KEM-distributed epoch key. A member can still re-share a decrypted file outside the app.
v6.2.0 — Login without Bale: email + Google Sign-In, privacy page, database hardening
Login without Bale: email signup (OTP), Google Sign-In (server-verified), public privacy page, database hardening.
- Email signup: one-time code by email (Gmail SMTP, env-gated), same one-time recovery code at registration. Bale stays as the other path.
- Google Sign-In (primary): the server verifies the Google ID token; a new account is created atomically from the verified email. No client secret anywhere.
- Security fix: /api/register now requires a verified one-time code first — before, anyone could register any Bale ID or email without proving ownership and receive its recovery code.
- Privacy page: public /privacy (Persian + English), linked from the login screen.
- Database hardening: production SSL now verifies the database certificate; RLS enabled on all 7 tables with app-only policies; a least-privilege chatapp role (supabase/hardening.sql); startup tolerates DDL permission errors and probes table readability before falling back to local storage. 76/76 tests pass.
- Known limits: media files (images, voice, video) are stored unencrypted — only message text is end-to-end encrypted; email OTP stays dormant until its env vars are set; Google Sign-In is in Testing mode (owner only) until the OAuth app is published to Production.
v6.1.0 — Hardening round 2
What's new
- Key storage: private keys moved out of localStorage into IndexedDB (v4 keystore). The ECDH P-256 key is a non-extractable WebCrypto key. Legacy v2/v3 keys are discarded on upgrade.
- CSP: removed
unsafe-inline, dropped the unpinned Google Fonts CDN. Admin and error pages now use self-hosted CSS/JS only. - Auth: Bale fallback — one-time recovery codes (128-bit, scrypt-hashed server-side, rate-limited), Bale health probe,
GET /api/health. - Tests: NIST KAT vectors for ML-KEM-768 + ML-DSA-65, fuzz tests (490+ malformed inputs, all fail closed), benchmark suite. 31/31 tests pass.
- Docs: SECURITY.md, THREAT_MODEL.md, AUDIT_STATUS.md, DEPLOYMENT.md, CONTRIBUTING.md.
Fixed during verification
- The round-2 export was built on a pre-round-1 baseline and had reverted 7 round-1 fixes: unauthenticated key/group endpoints, group epoch keys derived from public inputs, a public default passphrase, missing group replay tracking, no ratchet rotation, raw ECDH bits used as AES keys, and a VOPRF seed derived from the admin password. All restored, covered by new regression tests.
- Latent bug: group creation never sent its auth token (would 401). Fixed.
Known limitations
- ML-KEM/ML-DSA keys are stored AES-GCM-wrapped in IndexedDB — WebCrypto has no native ML-KEM/ML-DSA key objects yet. Only ECDH P-256 is a non-extractable CryptoKey.
- Multi-device sync is documented, not implemented.
- Ratchet rotation has no previous-session slot — in-flight pre-rotation messages may fail closed (safe direction).
- Server endpoints verified by code review + type-check; no live HTTP test yet. Live two-client group test still pending.
- No independent audit exists. Self-reviewed research project, not a production-grade messenger.
PQ-MPRBA Whitepaper v2.0 (hardened)
Whitepaper v2.0 for PQ-MPRBA, the hybrid post-quantum E2EE messaging protocol — describes the hardened design after a November 2026 security review (14 findings fixed). Experimental, not independently audited, no formal proof. Hybrid post-quantum, not fully post-quantum.