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v6.1.0 — Hardening round 2

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@indirect-b indirect-b released this 19 Nov 13:26
· 9 commits to main since this release
82c4cac

What's new

  • Key storage: private keys moved out of localStorage into IndexedDB (v4 keystore). The ECDH P-256 key is a non-extractable WebCrypto key. Legacy v2/v3 keys are discarded on upgrade.
  • CSP: removed unsafe-inline, dropped the unpinned Google Fonts CDN. Admin and error pages now use self-hosted CSS/JS only.
  • Auth: Bale fallback — one-time recovery codes (128-bit, scrypt-hashed server-side, rate-limited), Bale health probe, GET /api/health.
  • Tests: NIST KAT vectors for ML-KEM-768 + ML-DSA-65, fuzz tests (490+ malformed inputs, all fail closed), benchmark suite. 31/31 tests pass.
  • Docs: SECURITY.md, THREAT_MODEL.md, AUDIT_STATUS.md, DEPLOYMENT.md, CONTRIBUTING.md.

Fixed during verification

  • The round-2 export was built on a pre-round-1 baseline and had reverted 7 round-1 fixes: unauthenticated key/group endpoints, group epoch keys derived from public inputs, a public default passphrase, missing group replay tracking, no ratchet rotation, raw ECDH bits used as AES keys, and a VOPRF seed derived from the admin password. All restored, covered by new regression tests.
  • Latent bug: group creation never sent its auth token (would 401). Fixed.

Known limitations

  • ML-KEM/ML-DSA keys are stored AES-GCM-wrapped in IndexedDB — WebCrypto has no native ML-KEM/ML-DSA key objects yet. Only ECDH P-256 is a non-extractable CryptoKey.
  • Multi-device sync is documented, not implemented.
  • Ratchet rotation has no previous-session slot — in-flight pre-rotation messages may fail closed (safe direction).
  • Server endpoints verified by code review + type-check; no live HTTP test yet. Live two-client group test still pending.
  • No independent audit exists. Self-reviewed research project, not a production-grade messenger.