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v0.2.0
What's Changed
- ci: bump the actions-all group across 1 directory with 4 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #3
- docs: tighten the wording of the design, research and project docs by @kanywst in #4
- feat: verify AAT delegation chains in the gate by @kanywst in #5
- feat(website): add the project site and deploy it to GitHub Pages by @kanywst in #6
- chore(release): 0.2.0 by @kanywst in #8
New Contributors
- @dependabot[bot] made their first contribution in #3
- @kanywst made their first contribution in #4
Full Changelog: v0.1.0...v0.2.0
Verifying this release
Every asset is signed with cosign keyless, so there is no long-lived key to leak or rotate. The certificate binds the signature to the workflow run that produced these assets. A signature made by anything else will not verify, whatever the file is called.
Start with SHA256SUMS: verify its signature, then let it vouch for everything else.
cosign verify-blob SHA256SUMS \
--bundle SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity "https://github.com/kanywst/visado/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/v0.2.0" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
sha256sum --check --ignore-missing SHA256SUMSThe identity above is the exact one these assets were signed under. It usually ends in refs/tags/v0.2.0; if it ends in a branch instead, the assets were attached by a re-run of the release workflow from that branch rather than by the original tag push.
Each asset also has its own <name>.sigstore.json bundle, carrying that asset's signature and certificate together, if you would rather verify one directly.
The tarballs carry SLSA build provenance, which says which workflow run built them from which commit:
gh attestation verify visado-v0.2.0-<target>.tar.gz --repo kanywst/visadoAn SPDX software bill of materials is attached as visado-v0.2.0-sbom.spdx.json.