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What's Changed
- test: fuzz every untrusted-input parser, pin Docker images, add the Best Practices badge by @kanywst in #9
- deps(website): bump the website-all group across 1 directory with 2 updates by @dependabot[bot] in #7
- deps(docker): bump rust from 1.91-slim-bookworm to 1.100-slim-bookworm by @dependabot[bot] in #10
- feat: verify asor-03 delegation chains by @kanywst in #11
- feat(credentials): authenticate callers by HTTP signature, mTLS and JWT-SVID by @kanywst in #12
- feat(lab): issue the workloads' WITs with SPIRE by @kanywst in #13
- feat(server): trust a WIT issuer's keys from a JWK set file by @kanywst in #14
- deps(docker): bump alpine from 3.22 to 3.24 in /deploy/lab/spire by @dependabot[bot] in #15
- feat(credentials): authenticate DPoP-bound access tokens by @kanywst in #16
- feat(chain-act): read RFC 8693 act claims as delegation chains by @kanywst in #17
- feat(lab): exercise HTTP signature, mTLS, JWT-SVID and DPoP callers by @kanywst in #18
- feat: show recent decisions and their delegation chains by @kanywst in #19
- build: cache the cargo registry and target between local image builds by @kanywst in #20
- chore(release): 0.3.0 by @kanywst in #21
Full Changelog: v0.2.0...v0.3.0
Verifying this release
Every asset is signed with cosign keyless, so there is no long-lived key to leak or rotate. The certificate binds the signature to the workflow run that produced these assets. A signature made by anything else will not verify, whatever the file is called.
Start with SHA256SUMS: verify its signature, then let it vouch for everything else.
cosign verify-blob SHA256SUMS \
--bundle SHA256SUMS.sigstore.json \
--certificate-identity "https://github.com/kanywst/visado/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/heads/main" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
sha256sum --check --ignore-missing SHA256SUMSThe identity above is the exact one these assets were signed under. It usually ends in refs/tags/v0.3.0; if it ends in a branch instead, the assets were attached by a re-run of the release workflow from that branch rather than by the original tag push.
Each asset also has its own <name>.sigstore.json bundle, carrying that asset's signature and certificate together, if you would rather verify one directly.
The tarballs carry SLSA build provenance, which says which workflow run built them from which commit:
gh attestation verify visado-v0.3.0-<target>.tar.gz --repo kanywst/visadoAn SPDX software bill of materials is attached as visado-v0.3.0-sbom.spdx.json.