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backport CPU LED trigger to 3.4 #124

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Bryan Wu and others added 3 commits March 10, 2013 18:19
Attempting to consolidate the ARM LED code, this removes the
custom RealView LED trigger code to turn LEDs on and off in
response to CPU activity and replace it with a standard trigger.

(bryan.wu@canonical.com:
It introduces several syscore stubs into this trigger.
It also provides ledtrig_cpu trigger event stub in <linux/leds.h>.
Although it was inspired by ARM work, it can be used in other arch.)

Cc: Richard Purdie <rpurdie@rpsys.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Bryan Wu <bryan.wu@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <jamie@jamieiles.com>
Tested-by: Jochen Friedrich <jochen@scram.de>
Seeing the following every time the CPU enters or leaves idle on a
Beagleboard:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/mutex.c:269
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 0, name: swapper/0
no locks held by swapper/0/0.
[<c001659c>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xf8) from [<c05aaa7c>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x380)
[<c05aaa7c>] (mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x380) from [<c043bd1c>] (ledtrig_cpu+0x38/0x88)
[<c043bd1c>] (ledtrig_cpu+0x38/0x88) from [<c000f4b0>] (cpu_idle+0xf4/0x120)
[<c000f4b0>] (cpu_idle+0xf4/0x120) from [<c07e47c8>] (start_kernel+0x2bc/0x30c)

Miles Lane has reported seeing similar splats during system suspend.

The mutex in struct led_trigger_cpu appears to have no function: it
resides in a per-cpu data structure which never changes after the
trigger is registered.  So just remove it.

Reported-by: Miles Lane <miles.lane@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <ntl@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Bryan Wu <roc@roc-samos.(none)>
Backport of fa8bbb13 from Linus master.

Signed-off-by: Michal Suchanek <hramrach@gmail.com>
@amery
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amery commented Mar 10, 2013

thank you! applied.

@amery amery closed this Mar 10, 2013
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 12, 2013
Turn it into (for example):

[    0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration:
[    0.074005] .... node   #0, CPUs:          #1   #2   #3   #4   #5   #6   #7
[    0.603005] .... node   #1, CPUs:     #8   #9  #10  #11  #12  #13  #14  #15
[    1.200005] .... node   #2, CPUs:    #16  #17  #18  #19  #20  #21  #22  #23
[    1.796005] .... node   #3, CPUs:    #24  #25  #26  #27  #28  #29  #30  #31
[    2.393005] .... node   #4, CPUs:    #32  #33  #34  #35  #36  #37  #38  #39
[    2.996005] .... node   #5, CPUs:    #40  #41  #42  #43  #44  #45  #46  #47
[    3.600005] .... node   #6, CPUs:    #48  #49  #50  #51  #52  #53  #54  #55
[    4.202005] .... node   #7, CPUs:    #56  #57  #58  #59  #60  #61  #62  #63
[    4.811005] .... node   #8, CPUs:    #64  #65  #66  #67  #68  #69  #70  #71
[    5.421006] .... node   #9, CPUs:    #72  #73  #74  #75  #76  #77  #78  #79
[    6.032005] .... node  #10, CPUs:    #80  #81  #82  #83  #84  #85  #86  #87
[    6.648006] .... node  #11, CPUs:    #88  #89  #90  #91  #92  #93  #94  #95
[    7.262005] .... node  #12, CPUs:    #96  #97  #98  #99 #100 #101 #102 #103
[    7.865005] .... node  #13, CPUs:   #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111
[    8.466005] .... node  #14, CPUs:   #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119
[    9.073006] .... node  #15, CPUs:   #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127
[    9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs

and drop useless elements.

Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed
version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a
Saturday evening.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com
Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 4, 2014
…_on()

The code for resizing the trace ring buffers has to run the per-cpu
resize on the CPU itself.  The code was using preempt_off() and
running the code for the current CPU directly, otherwise calling
schedule_work_on().

At least on RT this could result in the following:

|BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/rtmutex.c:673
|in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 607, name: bash
|3 locks held by bash/607:
|CPU: 0 PID: 607 Comm: bash Not tainted 3.12.15-rt25+ #124
|(rt_spin_lock+0x28/0x68)
|(free_hot_cold_page+0x84/0x3b8)
|(free_buffer_page+0x14/0x20)
|(rb_update_pages+0x280/0x338)
|(ring_buffer_resize+0x32c/0x3dc)
|(free_snapshot+0x18/0x38)
|(tracing_set_tracer+0x27c/0x2ac)

probably via
|cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/
|echo 1 > events/enable ; sleep 2
|echo 1024 > buffer_size_kb

If we just always use schedule_work_on(), there's no need for the
preempt_off().  So do that.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1405537633-31518-1-git-send-email-cminyard@mvista.com

Reported-by: Stanislav Meduna <stano@meduna.org>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2016
If the addition of the coresight devices get deferred, then there's a
window before child_name is populated by of_get_coresight_platform_data
from the respective component driver's probe and the attempted to access
the same from coresight_orphan_match resulting in kernel NULL pointer
dereference as below:

Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0x0
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 1038 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.7.0-rc3 #124
Hardware name: ARM Juno development board (r2) (DT)
Workqueue: events amba_deferred_retry_func
PC is at strcmp+0x1c/0x160
LR is at coresight_orphan_match+0x7c/0xd0
Call trace:
 strcmp+0x1c/0x160
 bus_for_each_dev+0x60/0xa0
 coresight_register+0x264/0x2e0
 tmc_probe+0x130/0x310
 amba_probe+0xd4/0x1c8
 driver_probe_device+0x22c/0x418
 __device_attach_driver+0xbc/0x158
 bus_for_each_drv+0x58/0x98
 __device_attach+0xc4/0x160
 device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18
 bus_probe_device+0x94/0xa0
 device_add+0x344/0x580
 amba_device_try_add+0x194/0x238
 amba_deferred_retry_func+0x48/0xd0
 process_one_work+0x118/0x378
 worker_thread+0x48/0x498
 kthread+0xd0/0xe8
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x40

This patch adds a check for non-NULL conn->child_name before accessing
the same.

Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 11, 2017
Andrey reported a kernel crash:

  general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
  Dumping ftrace buffer:
     (ftrace buffer empty)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 2 PID: 3880 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6+ #124
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  task: ffff880060048040 task.stack: ffff880069be8000
  RIP: 0010:ping_v4_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/ping.c:647 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:ping_v4_sendmsg+0x1acd/0x23f0 net/ipv4/ping.c:837
  RSP: 0018:ffff880069bef8b8 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880069befb90 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff880069befa30 RDI: 00000000000000c2
  RBP: ffff880069befbb8 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069befab0
  R13: ffff88006c624a80 R14: ffff880069befa70 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f6f7c716700(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000004a6f28 CR3: 000000003a134000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  Call Trace:
   inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline]
   sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
   SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687
   SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

This is because we miss a check for NULL pointer for skb_peek() when
the queue is empty. Other places already have the same check.

Fixes: c319b4d ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Feb 19, 2017
[ Upstream commit 73d2c66 ]

Andrey reported a kernel crash:

  general protection fault: 0000 [jwrdegoede#1] SMP KASAN
  Dumping ftrace buffer:
     (ftrace buffer empty)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 2 PID: 3880 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6+ linux-sunxi#124
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  task: ffff880060048040 task.stack: ffff880069be8000
  RIP: 0010:ping_v4_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/ping.c:647 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:ping_v4_sendmsg+0x1acd/0x23f0 net/ipv4/ping.c:837
  RSP: 0018:ffff880069bef8b8 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880069befb90 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff880069befa30 RDI: 00000000000000c2
  RBP: ffff880069befbb8 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069befab0
  R13: ffff88006c624a80 R14: ffff880069befa70 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f6f7c716700(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000004a6f28 CR3: 000000003a134000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  Call Trace:
   inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline]
   sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
   SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687
   SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

This is because we miss a check for NULL pointer for skb_peek() when
the queue is empty. Other places already have the same check.

Fixes: c319b4d ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 18, 2017
[ Upstream commit 73d2c66 ]

Andrey reported a kernel crash:

  general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
  Dumping ftrace buffer:
     (ftrace buffer empty)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 2 PID: 3880 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6+ #124
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
  task: ffff880060048040 task.stack: ffff880069be8000
  RIP: 0010:ping_v4_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/ping.c:647 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:ping_v4_sendmsg+0x1acd/0x23f0 net/ipv4/ping.c:837
  RSP: 0018:ffff880069bef8b8 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880069befb90 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff880069befa30 RDI: 00000000000000c2
  RBP: ffff880069befbb8 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069befab0
  R13: ffff88006c624a80 R14: ffff880069befa70 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f6f7c716700(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000004a6f28 CR3: 000000003a134000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  Call Trace:
   inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline]
   sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
   SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687
   SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

This is because we miss a check for NULL pointer for skb_peek() when
the queue is empty. Other places already have the same check.

Fixes: c319b4d ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jer-gentoo pushed a commit to MI-Group/linux-sunxi that referenced this pull request Mar 12, 2018
commit 73d2c66 upstream.

Andrey reported a kernel crash:

  general protection fault: 0000 [linux-sunxi#1] SMP KASAN
  Dumping ftrace buffer:
     (ftrace buffer empty)
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 2 PID: 3880 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc6+ linux-sunxi#124
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs
01/01/2011
  task: ffff880060048040 task.stack: ffff880069be8000
  RIP: 0010:ping_v4_push_pending_frames net/ipv4/ping.c:647 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:ping_v4_sendmsg+0x1acd/0x23f0 net/ipv4/ping.c:837
  RSP: 0018:ffff880069bef8b8 EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880069befb90 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff880069befa30 RDI: 00000000000000c2
  RBP: ffff880069befbb8 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880069befab0
  R13: ffff88006c624a80 R14: ffff880069befa70 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f6f7c716700(0000) GS:ffff88006de00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000004a6f28 CR3: 000000003a134000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  Call Trace:
   inet_sendmsg+0x164/0x5b0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:744
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:635 [inline]
   sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:645
   SYSC_sendto+0x660/0x810 net/socket.c:1687
   SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1655
   entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2

This is because we miss a check for NULL pointer for skb_peek() when
the queue is empty. Other places already have the same check.

Fixes: c319b4d ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 22, 2018
…on()

Fix the following slab-out-of-bounds kasan report in
ndisc_fill_redirect_hdr_option when the incoming ipv6 packet is not
linear and the accessed data are not in the linear data region of orig_skb.

[ 1503.122508] ==================================================================
[ 1503.122832] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ndisc_send_redirect+0x94e/0x990
[ 1503.123036] Read of size 1184 at addr ffff8800298ab6b0 by task netperf/1932

[ 1503.123220] CPU: 0 PID: 1932 Comm: netperf Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #124
[ 1503.123347] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-2.fc27 04/01/2014
[ 1503.123527] Call Trace:
[ 1503.123579]  <IRQ>
[ 1503.123638]  print_address_description+0x6e/0x280
[ 1503.123849]  kasan_report+0x233/0x350
[ 1503.123946]  memcpy+0x1f/0x50
[ 1503.124037]  ndisc_send_redirect+0x94e/0x990
[ 1503.125150]  ip6_forward+0x1242/0x13b0
[...]
[ 1503.153890] Allocated by task 1932:
[ 1503.153982]  kasan_kmalloc+0x9f/0xd0
[ 1503.154074]  __kmalloc_track_caller+0xb5/0x160
[ 1503.154198]  __kmalloc_reserve.isra.41+0x24/0x70
[ 1503.154324]  __alloc_skb+0x130/0x3e0
[ 1503.154415]  sctp_packet_transmit+0x21a/0x1810
[ 1503.154533]  sctp_outq_flush+0xc14/0x1db0
[ 1503.154624]  sctp_do_sm+0x34e/0x2740
[ 1503.154715]  sctp_primitive_SEND+0x57/0x70
[ 1503.154807]  sctp_sendmsg+0xaa6/0x1b10
[ 1503.154897]  sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80
[ 1503.154987]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x431/0x4b0
[ 1503.155078]  __sys_sendmsg+0xa4/0x130
[ 1503.155168]  do_syscall_64+0x171/0x3f0
[ 1503.155259]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

[ 1503.155436] Freed by task 1932:
[ 1503.155527]  __kasan_slab_free+0x134/0x180
[ 1503.155618]  kfree+0xbc/0x180
[ 1503.155709]  skb_release_data+0x27f/0x2c0
[ 1503.155800]  consume_skb+0x94/0xe0
[ 1503.155889]  sctp_chunk_put+0x1aa/0x1f0
[ 1503.155979]  sctp_inq_pop+0x2f8/0x6e0
[ 1503.156070]  sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x6a/0x230
[ 1503.156164]  sctp_inq_push+0x117/0x150
[ 1503.156255]  sctp_backlog_rcv+0xdf/0x4a0
[ 1503.156346]  __release_sock+0x142/0x250
[ 1503.156436]  release_sock+0x80/0x180
[ 1503.156526]  sctp_sendmsg+0xbb0/0x1b10
[ 1503.156617]  sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80
[ 1503.156708]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x431/0x4b0
[ 1503.156799]  __sys_sendmsg+0xa4/0x130
[ 1503.156889]  do_syscall_64+0x171/0x3f0
[ 1503.156980]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

[ 1503.157158] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800298ab600
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
[ 1503.157444] The buggy address is located 176 bytes inside of
                1024-byte region [ffff8800298ab600, ffff8800298aba00)
[ 1503.157702] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 1503.157820] page:ffffea0000a62a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 1503.158053] flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head)
[ 1503.158171] raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800e000e
[ 1503.158350] raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880036002600 0000000000000000
[ 1503.158523] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[ 1503.158698] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 1503.158816]  ffff8800298ab900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 1503.158988]  ffff8800298ab980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 1503.159165] >ffff8800298aba00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 1503.159338]                    ^
[ 1503.159436]  ffff8800298aba80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1503.159610]  ffff8800298abb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1503.159785] ==================================================================
[ 1503.159964] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

The test scenario to trigger the issue consists of 4 devices:
- H0: data sender, connected to LAN0
- H1: data receiver, connected to LAN1
- GW0 and GW1: routers between LAN0 and LAN1. Both of them have an
  ethernet connection on LAN0 and LAN1
On H{0,1} set GW0 as default gateway while on GW0 set GW1 as next hop for
data from LAN0 to LAN1.
Moreover create an ip6ip6 tunnel between H0 and H1 and send 3 concurrent
data streams (TCP/UDP/SCTP) from H0 to H1 through ip6ip6 tunnel (send
buffer size is set to 16K). While data streams are active flush the route
cache on HA multiple times.
I have not been able to identify a given commit that introduced the issue
since, using the reproducer described above, the kasan report has been
triggered from 4.14 and I have not gone back further.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 8, 2018
…on()

[ Upstream commit 9f62c15 ]

Fix the following slab-out-of-bounds kasan report in
ndisc_fill_redirect_hdr_option when the incoming ipv6 packet is not
linear and the accessed data are not in the linear data region of orig_skb.

[ 1503.122508] ==================================================================
[ 1503.122832] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ndisc_send_redirect+0x94e/0x990
[ 1503.123036] Read of size 1184 at addr ffff8800298ab6b0 by task netperf/1932

[ 1503.123220] CPU: 0 PID: 1932 Comm: netperf Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #124
[ 1503.123347] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.10.2-2.fc27 04/01/2014
[ 1503.123527] Call Trace:
[ 1503.123579]  <IRQ>
[ 1503.123638]  print_address_description+0x6e/0x280
[ 1503.123849]  kasan_report+0x233/0x350
[ 1503.123946]  memcpy+0x1f/0x50
[ 1503.124037]  ndisc_send_redirect+0x94e/0x990
[ 1503.125150]  ip6_forward+0x1242/0x13b0
[...]
[ 1503.153890] Allocated by task 1932:
[ 1503.153982]  kasan_kmalloc+0x9f/0xd0
[ 1503.154074]  __kmalloc_track_caller+0xb5/0x160
[ 1503.154198]  __kmalloc_reserve.isra.41+0x24/0x70
[ 1503.154324]  __alloc_skb+0x130/0x3e0
[ 1503.154415]  sctp_packet_transmit+0x21a/0x1810
[ 1503.154533]  sctp_outq_flush+0xc14/0x1db0
[ 1503.154624]  sctp_do_sm+0x34e/0x2740
[ 1503.154715]  sctp_primitive_SEND+0x57/0x70
[ 1503.154807]  sctp_sendmsg+0xaa6/0x1b10
[ 1503.154897]  sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80
[ 1503.154987]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x431/0x4b0
[ 1503.155078]  __sys_sendmsg+0xa4/0x130
[ 1503.155168]  do_syscall_64+0x171/0x3f0
[ 1503.155259]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

[ 1503.155436] Freed by task 1932:
[ 1503.155527]  __kasan_slab_free+0x134/0x180
[ 1503.155618]  kfree+0xbc/0x180
[ 1503.155709]  skb_release_data+0x27f/0x2c0
[ 1503.155800]  consume_skb+0x94/0xe0
[ 1503.155889]  sctp_chunk_put+0x1aa/0x1f0
[ 1503.155979]  sctp_inq_pop+0x2f8/0x6e0
[ 1503.156070]  sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x6a/0x230
[ 1503.156164]  sctp_inq_push+0x117/0x150
[ 1503.156255]  sctp_backlog_rcv+0xdf/0x4a0
[ 1503.156346]  __release_sock+0x142/0x250
[ 1503.156436]  release_sock+0x80/0x180
[ 1503.156526]  sctp_sendmsg+0xbb0/0x1b10
[ 1503.156617]  sock_sendmsg+0x68/0x80
[ 1503.156708]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x431/0x4b0
[ 1503.156799]  __sys_sendmsg+0xa4/0x130
[ 1503.156889]  do_syscall_64+0x171/0x3f0
[ 1503.156980]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7

[ 1503.157158] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800298ab600
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1024 of size 1024
[ 1503.157444] The buggy address is located 176 bytes inside of
                1024-byte region [ffff8800298ab600, ffff8800298aba00)
[ 1503.157702] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 1503.157820] page:ffffea0000a62a00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 1503.158053] flags: 0x4000000000008100(slab|head)
[ 1503.158171] raw: 4000000000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001800e000e
[ 1503.158350] raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff880036002600 0000000000000000
[ 1503.158523] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[ 1503.158698] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 1503.158816]  ffff8800298ab900: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 1503.158988]  ffff8800298ab980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[ 1503.159165] >ffff8800298aba00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 1503.159338]                    ^
[ 1503.159436]  ffff8800298aba80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1503.159610]  ffff8800298abb00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 1503.159785] ==================================================================
[ 1503.159964] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

The test scenario to trigger the issue consists of 4 devices:
- H0: data sender, connected to LAN0
- H1: data receiver, connected to LAN1
- GW0 and GW1: routers between LAN0 and LAN1. Both of them have an
  ethernet connection on LAN0 and LAN1
On H{0,1} set GW0 as default gateway while on GW0 set GW1 as next hop for
data from LAN0 to LAN1.
Moreover create an ip6ip6 tunnel between H0 and H1 and send 3 concurrent
data streams (TCP/UDP/SCTP) from H0 to H1 through ip6ip6 tunnel (send
buffer size is set to 16K). While data streams are active flush the route
cache on HA multiple times.
I have not been able to identify a given commit that introduced the issue
since, using the reproducer described above, the kasan report has been
triggered from 4.14 and I have not gone back further.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jwrdegoede pushed a commit to jwrdegoede/linux-sunxi that referenced this pull request Feb 7, 2019
This fixes the following warning at boot when the kernel is booted on a
board with more CPU cores than was configured in NR_CPUS:

  smp_init_cpus: Core Count = 8
  smp_init_cpus: Core Id = 0
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at include/linux/cpumask.h:121 smp_init_cpus+0x54/0x74
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00015-g1459333f88a0 linux-sunxi#124
  Call Trace:
    __warn$part$3+0x6a/0x7c
    warn_slowpath_null+0x35/0x3c
    smp_init_cpus+0x54/0x74
    setup_arch+0x1c0/0x1d0
    start_kernel+0x44/0x310
    _startup+0x107/0x107

Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2019
[ Upstream commit 25384ce ]

This fixes the following warning at boot when the kernel is booted on a
board with more CPU cores than was configured in NR_CPUS:

  smp_init_cpus: Core Count = 8
  smp_init_cpus: Core Id = 0
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at include/linux/cpumask.h:121 smp_init_cpus+0x54/0x74
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00015-g1459333f88a0 linux-sunxi#124
  Call Trace:
    __warn$part$3+0x6a/0x7c
    warn_slowpath_null+0x35/0x3c
    smp_init_cpus+0x54/0x74
    setup_arch+0x1c0/0x1d0
    start_kernel+0x44/0x310
    _startup+0x107/0x107

Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Mar 14, 2019
[ Upstream commit 25384ce ]

This fixes the following warning at boot when the kernel is booted on a
board with more CPU cores than was configured in NR_CPUS:

  smp_init_cpus: Core Count = 8
  smp_init_cpus: Core Id = 0
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at include/linux/cpumask.h:121 smp_init_cpus+0x54/0x74
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00015-g1459333f88a0 linux-sunxi#124
  Call Trace:
    __warn$part$3+0x6a/0x7c
    warn_slowpath_null+0x35/0x3c
    smp_init_cpus+0x54/0x74
    setup_arch+0x1c0/0x1d0
    start_kernel+0x44/0x310
    _startup+0x107/0x107

Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jwrdegoede pushed a commit to jwrdegoede/linux-sunxi that referenced this pull request Jun 22, 2023
[BUG]
David reported an ASSERT() get triggered during fio load on 8 devices
with data/raid6 and metadata/raid1c3:

  fio --rw=randrw --randrepeat=1 --size=3000m \
	  --bsrange=512b-64k --bs_unaligned \
	  --ioengine=libaio --fsync=1024 \
	  --name=job0 --name=job1 \

The ASSERT() is from rbio_add_bio() of raid56.c:

	ASSERT(orig_logical >= full_stripe_start &&
	       orig_logical + orig_len <= full_stripe_start +
	       rbio->nr_data * BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN);

Which is checking if the target rbio is crossing the full stripe
boundary.

  [100.789] assertion failed: orig_logical >= full_stripe_start && orig_logical + orig_len <= full_stripe_start + rbio->nr_data * BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN, in fs/btrfs/raid56.c:1622
  [100.795] ------------[ cut here ]------------
  [100.796] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/raid56.c:1622!
  [100.797] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
  [100.798] CPU: 1 PID: 100 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-default+ linux-sunxi#124
  [100.799] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
  [100.802] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1)
  [100.803] RIP: 0010:rbio_add_bio+0x204/0x210 [btrfs]
  [100.806] RSP: 0018:ffff888104a8f300 EFLAGS: 00010246
  [100.808] RAX: 00000000000000a1 RBX: ffff8881075907e0 RCX: ffffed1020951e01
  [100.809] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000001
  [100.811] RBP: 0000000141d20000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888104a8f04f
  [100.813] R10: ffffed1020951e09 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff88810e87f400
  [100.815] R13: 0000000041d20000 R14: 0000000144529000 R15: ffff888101524000
  [100.817] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811ac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [100.821] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [100.822] CR2: 000055d54e44c270 CR3: 000000010a9a1006 CR4: 00000000003706a0
  [100.824] Call Trace:
  [100.825]  <TASK>
  [100.825]  ? die+0x32/0x80
  [100.826]  ? do_trap+0x12d/0x160
  [100.827]  ? rbio_add_bio+0x204/0x210 [btrfs]
  [100.827]  ? rbio_add_bio+0x204/0x210 [btrfs]
  [100.829]  ? do_error_trap+0x90/0x130
  [100.830]  ? rbio_add_bio+0x204/0x210 [btrfs]
  [100.831]  ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x30
  [100.833]  ? rbio_add_bio+0x204/0x210 [btrfs]
  [100.835]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x29/0x40
  [100.836]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
  [100.837]  ? rbio_add_bio+0x204/0x210 [btrfs]
  [100.837]  raid56_parity_write+0x64/0x270 [btrfs]
  [100.838]  btrfs_submit_chunk+0x26e/0x800 [btrfs]
  [100.840]  ? btrfs_bio_init+0x80/0x80 [btrfs]
  [100.841]  ? release_pages+0x503/0x6d0
  [100.842]  ? folio_unlock+0x2f/0x60
  [100.844]  ? __folio_put+0x60/0x60
  [100.845]  ? btrfs_do_readpage+0xae0/0xae0 [btrfs]
  [100.847]  btrfs_submit_bio+0x21/0x60 [btrfs]
  [100.847]  submit_one_bio+0x6a/0xb0 [btrfs]
  [100.849]  extent_write_cache_pages+0x395/0x680 [btrfs]
  [100.850]  ? __extent_writepage+0x520/0x520 [btrfs]
  [100.851]  ? mark_usage+0x190/0x190
  [100.852]  extent_writepages+0xdb/0x130 [btrfs]
  [100.853]  ? extent_write_locked_range+0x480/0x480 [btrfs]
  [100.854]  ? mark_usage+0x190/0x190
  [100.854]  ? attach_extent_buffer_page+0x220/0x220 [btrfs]
  [100.855]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x178/0x280
  [100.856]  ? writeback_sb_inodes+0x245/0x7f0
  [100.857]  do_writepages+0x102/0x2e0
  [100.858]  ? page_writeback_cpu_online+0x10/0x10
  [100.859]  ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x14a/0x4d0
  [100.860]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0x280/0x280
  [100.861]  ? __lock_acquired+0x1e9/0x3d0
  [100.862]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x1b0/0x1b0
  [100.863]  __writeback_single_inode+0x94/0x450
  [100.864]  writeback_sb_inodes+0x372/0x7f0
  [100.864]  ? lock_sync+0xd0/0xd0
  [100.865]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x93/0xf0
  [100.866]  ? sync_inode_metadata+0xc0/0xc0
  [100.867]  ? rwsem_optimistic_spin+0x340/0x340
  [100.868]  __writeback_inodes_wb+0x70/0x130
  [100.869]  wb_writeback+0x2d1/0x530
  [100.869]  ? __writeback_inodes_wb+0x130/0x130
  [100.870]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare.part.0+0xf1/0x1c0
  [100.870]  wb_do_writeback+0x3eb/0x480
  [100.871]  ? wb_writeback+0x530/0x530
  [100.871]  ? mark_lock_irq+0xcd0/0xcd0
  [100.872]  wb_workfn+0xe0/0x3f0<

[CAUSE]
Commit a97699d ("btrfs: replace map_lookup->stripe_len by
BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN") changes how we calculate the map length, to reduce
u64 division.

Function btrfs_max_io_len() is to get the length to the stripe boundary.

It calculates the full stripe start offset (inside the chunk) by the
following code:

		*full_stripe_start =
			rounddown(*stripe_nr, nr_data_stripes(map)) <<
			BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN_SHIFT;

The calculation itself is fine, but the value returned by rounddown() is
dependent on both @stripe_nr (which is u32) and nr_data_stripes() (which
returned int).

Thus the result is also u32, then we do the left shift, which can
overflow u32.

If such overflow happens, @full_stripe_start will be a value way smaller
than @offset, causing later "full_stripe_len - (offset -
*full_stripe_start)" to underflow, thus make later length calculation to
have no stripe boundary limit, resulting a write bio to exceed stripe
boundary.

There are some other locations like this, with a u32 @stripe_nr got left
shift, which can lead to a similar overflow.

[FIX]
Fix all @stripe_nr with left shift with a type cast to u64 before the
left shift.

Those involved @stripe_nr or similar variables are recording the stripe
number inside the chunk, which is small enough to be contained by u32,
but their offset inside the chunk can not fit into u32.

Thus for those specific left shifts, a type cast to u64 is necessary so
this patch does not touch them and the code will be cleaned up in the
future to keep the fix minimal.

Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Fixes: a97699d ("btrfs: replace map_lookup->stripe_len by BTRFS_STRIPE_LEN")
Tested-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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