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sched: remove useless export #88

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sched: remove useless export #88

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adrientetar
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This is a partial revert of commit 67aaa26.

  • this export is unneeded since Smartass version 2.
  • it is misplaced: it shouldn't be added at the end of the file but at the end of the corresponding function (through this doesn't trigger any compilation error).

@adrientetar
sched: remove useless export
e052ae8 
This is a partial revert of commit 67aaa26.
- this export is unneeded since Smartass version 2.
- it is misplaced: it shouldn't be added at the end of the file but at the end of the corresponding function (through this doesn't trigger any compilation error).

Signed-off-by: adridu59 <adri-from-59@hotmail.fr>
@amery
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amery commented Oct 23, 2012

thank you. merged. but please prefer the mailing list in future.

@amery amery closed this Oct 23, 2012
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 12, 2013
@bp3tk0v
x86/boot: Further compress CPUs bootup message
a17bce4 
Turn it into (for example):

[    0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration:
[    0.074005] .... node   #0, CPUs:          #1   #2   #3   #4   #5   #6   #7
[    0.603005] .... node   #1, CPUs:     #8   #9  #10  #11  #12  #13  #14  #15
[    1.200005] .... node   #2, CPUs:    #16  #17  #18  #19  #20  #21  #22  #23
[    1.796005] .... node   #3, CPUs:    #24  #25  #26  #27  #28  #29  #30  #31
[    2.393005] .... node   #4, CPUs:    #32  #33  #34  #35  #36  #37  #38  #39
[    2.996005] .... node   #5, CPUs:    #40  #41  #42  #43  #44  #45  #46  #47
[    3.600005] .... node   #6, CPUs:    #48  #49  #50  #51  #52  #53  #54  #55
[    4.202005] .... node   #7, CPUs:    #56  #57  #58  #59  #60  #61  #62  #63
[    4.811005] .... node   #8, CPUs:    #64  #65  #66  #67  #68  #69  #70  #71
[    5.421006] .... node   #9, CPUs:    #72  #73  #74  #75  #76  #77  #78  #79
[    6.032005] .... node  #10, CPUs:    #80  #81  #82  #83  #84  #85  #86  #87
[    6.648006] .... node  #11, CPUs:    #88  #89  #90  #91  #92  #93  #94  #95
[    7.262005] .... node  #12, CPUs:    #96  #97  #98  #99 #100 #101 #102 #103
[    7.865005] .... node  #13, CPUs:   #104 #105 #106 #107 #108 #109 #110 #111
[    8.466005] .... node  #14, CPUs:   #112 #113 #114 #115 #116 #117 #118 #119
[    9.073006] .... node  #15, CPUs:   #120 #121 #122 #123 #124 #125 #126 #127
[    9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs

and drop useless elements.

Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed
version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a
Saturday evening.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com
Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 7, 2014
@paulburton @ralfbaechle
MIPS: consistently clear MSA flags when starting & copying threads
7daef8f 
The TIF_MSA_CTX_LIVE flag (indicating that a task has MSA context which
needs to be preserved) was being cleared in start_thread, but the
TIF_USEDMSA flag (indicating that a task has used MSA in this timeslice)
was not. In copy_thread neither flag was cleared, but both need to be.
Without clearing these flags the kernel will proceed to attempt to save
MSA context when the task is context switched out, and if the task had
not used MSA in the meantime then it will fail because MSA or the FPU
are disabled. The end result is typically:

  do_cpu invoked from kernel context![#1]:
  CPU: 0 PID: 99 Comm: sh Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-00025-g6dc9476-dirty #88
  task: 8f23dc60 ti: 8f1d8000 task.ti: 8f1d8000
  ...
  Call Trace:
  [<8010edbc>] resume+0x5c/0x280
  [<80481e0c>] __schedule+0x370/0x800
  [<80104838>] work_resched+0x8/0x2c

Fix by consistently clearing both flags in both functions.

Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/7309/
Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 30, 2015
drm/nouveau/pci: enable c800 magic for some unknown Samsung laptop
c294a05 
fdo#70354 - comment #88.

Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2016
@vegard @johnstultz-work
time: Avoid undefined behaviour in timespec64_add_safe()
469e857 
I ran into this:

    ================================================================================
    UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/time/time.c:783:2
    signed integer overflow:
    5273 + 9223372036854771711 cannot be represented in type 'long int'
    CPU: 0 PID: 17363 Comm: trinity-c0 Not tainted 4.8.0-rc1+ #88
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org
    04/01/2014
     0000000000000000 ffff88011457f8f0 ffffffff82344f50 0000000041b58ab3
     ffffffff84f98080 ffffffff82344ea4 ffff88011457f918 ffff88011457f8c8
     ffff88011457f8e0 7fffffffffffefff ffff88011457f6d8 dffffc0000000000
    Call Trace:
     [<ffffffff82344f50>] dump_stack+0xac/0xfc
     [<ffffffff82344ea4>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0xc4/0xc4
     [<ffffffff8242f4c8>] ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x8a
     [<ffffffff8242fc04>] handle_overflow+0x202/0x23d
     [<ffffffff8242fa02>] ? val_to_string.constprop.6+0x11e/0x11e
     [<ffffffff823c7837>] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x20
     [<ffffffff8131b581>] ? __sigqueue_free.part.13+0x51/0x70
     [<ffffffff8146d4e0>] ? rcu_is_watching+0x110/0x110
     [<ffffffff8242fc4d>] __ubsan_handle_add_overflow+0xe/0x10
     [<ffffffff81476ef8>] timespec64_add_safe+0x298/0x340
     [<ffffffff81476c60>] ? timespec_add_safe+0x330/0x330
     [<ffffffff812f7990>] ? wait_noreap_copyout+0x1d0/0x1d0
     [<ffffffff8184bf18>] poll_select_set_timeout+0xf8/0x170
     [<ffffffff8184be20>] ? poll_schedule_timeout+0x2b0/0x2b0
     [<ffffffff813aa9bb>] ? __might_sleep+0x5b/0x260
     [<ffffffff833c8a87>] __sys_recvmmsg+0x107/0x790
     [<ffffffff833c8980>] ? SyS_recvmsg+0x20/0x20
     [<ffffffff81486378>] ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x3b8/0x1380
     [<ffffffff845f8bfb>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3b/0x60
     [<ffffffff8148bcea>] ? do_setitimer+0x39a/0x8e0
     [<ffffffff813aa9bb>] ? __might_sleep+0x5b/0x260
     [<ffffffff833c9110>] ? __sys_recvmmsg+0x790/0x790
     [<ffffffff833c91e9>] SyS_recvmmsg+0xd9/0x160
     [<ffffffff833c9110>] ? __sys_recvmmsg+0x790/0x790
     [<ffffffff823c7853>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
     [<ffffffff8162f680>] ? __context_tracking_exit.part.3+0x30/0x1b0
     [<ffffffff833c9110>] ? __sys_recvmmsg+0x790/0x790
     [<ffffffff81007bd3>] do_syscall_64+0x1b3/0x4b0
     [<ffffffff845f936a>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
    ================================================================================

Line 783 is this:

783         set_normalized_timespec64(&res, lhs.tv_sec + rhs.tv_sec,
784                         lhs.tv_nsec + rhs.tv_nsec);

In other words, since lhs.tv_sec and rhs.tv_sec are both time64_t, this
is a signed addition which will cause undefined behaviour on overflow.

Note that this is not currently a huge concern since the kernel should be
built with -fno-strict-overflow by default, but could be a problem in the
future, a problem with older compilers, or other compilers than gcc.

The easiest way to avoid the overflow is to cast one of the arguments to
unsigned (so the addition will be done using unsigned arithmetic).

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Prarit Bhargava <prarit@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 15, 2016
@aik @bjorn-helgaas
PCI: Enable access to non-standard VPD for Chelsio devices (cxgb3)
1c7de2b 
There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store some
non-standard blocks (example below).  However pci_vpd_size() returns the
length of the first block only assuming that there can be only one VPD "End
Tag".

Since 4e1a635 ("vfio/pci: Use kernel VPD access functions"), VFIO
blocks access beyond that offset, which prevents the guest "cxgb3" driver
from probing the device.  The host system does not have this problem as its
driver accesses the config space directly without pci_read_vpd().

Add a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value.  The maximum size
is taken from EEPROMSIZE in drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/common.h.
We do not read the tag as the cxgb3 driver does as the driver supports
writing to EEPROM/VPD and when it writes, it only checks for 8192 bytes
boundary.  The quirk is registered for all devices supported by the cxgb3
driver.

This adds a quirk to the PCI layer (not to the cxgb3 driver) as the cxgb3
driver itself accesses VPD directly and the problem only exists with the
vfio-pci driver (when cxgb3 is not running on the host and may not be even
loaded) which blocks accesses beyond the first block of VPD data.  However
vfio-pci itself does not have quirks mechanism so we add it to PCI.

This is the controller:
Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]

This is what I parsed from its VPD:
===
b'\x82*\x0010 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter\x90J\x00EC\x07D76809 FN\x0746K'
 0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
	b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter'
 002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
	#00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 '
	#0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897'
	#14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897'
	#1e [MN] len=4: b'1037'
	#25 [FC] len=4: b'5769'
	#2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V'
	#3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
 007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag

 0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
	b'S310E-SR-X      '
 0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
	#00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD             '
	#13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2     '
	#26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V  '
	#39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
	#48 [V0] len=6: b'175000'
	#51 [V1] len=6: b'266666'
	#5a [V2] len=6: b'266666'
	#63 [V3] len=6: b'2000  '
	#6c [V4] len=2: b'1 '
	#71 [V5] len=6: b'c2    '
	#7a [V6] len=6: b'0     '
	#83 [V7] len=2: b'1 '
	#88 [V8] len=2: b'0 '
	#8d [V9] len=2: b'0 '
	#92 [VA] len=2: b'0 '
	#97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
 0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
	#00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp  '
	#13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
	#26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp  '
	#39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
	#4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
 0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag

10f3 Large item 13315 bytes; name 0x62
!!! unknown item name 98: b'\xd0\x03\x00@`\x0c\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
===

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Jan 13, 2017
@aik @gregkh
PCI: Enable access to non-standard VPD for Chelsio devices (cxgb3)
1aaa777 
commit 1c7de2b upstream.

There is at least one Chelsio 10Gb card which uses VPD area to store some
non-standard blocks (example below).  However pci_vpd_size() returns the
length of the first block only assuming that there can be only one VPD "End
Tag".

Since 4e1a635 ("vfio/pci: Use kernel VPD access functions"), VFIO
blocks access beyond that offset, which prevents the guest "cxgb3" driver
from probing the device.  The host system does not have this problem as its
driver accesses the config space directly without pci_read_vpd().

Add a quirk to override the VPD size to a bigger value.  The maximum size
is taken from EEPROMSIZE in drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb3/common.h.
We do not read the tag as the cxgb3 driver does as the driver supports
writing to EEPROM/VPD and when it writes, it only checks for 8192 bytes
boundary.  The quirk is registered for all devices supported by the cxgb3
driver.

This adds a quirk to the PCI layer (not to the cxgb3 driver) as the cxgb3
driver itself accesses VPD directly and the problem only exists with the
vfio-pci driver (when cxgb3 is not running on the host and may not be even
loaded) which blocks accesses beyond the first block of VPD data.  However
vfio-pci itself does not have quirks mechanism so we add it to PCI.

This is the controller:
Ethernet controller [0200]: Chelsio Communications Inc T310 10GbE Single Port Adapter [1425:0030]

This is what I parsed from its VPD:
===
b'\x82*\x0010 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter\x90J\x00EC\x07D76809 FN\x0746K'
 0000 Large item 42 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
	b'10 Gigabit Ethernet-SR PCI Express Adapter'
 002d Large item 74 bytes; name 0x10
	#00 [EC] len=7: b'D76809 '
	#0a [FN] len=7: b'46K7897'
	linux-sunxi#14 [PN] len=7: b'46K7897'
	#1e [MN] len=4: b'1037'
	linux-sunxi#25 [FC] len=4: b'5769'
	#2c [SN] len=12: b'YL102035603V'
	#3b [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
 007a Small item 1 bytes; name 0xf End Tag

 0c00 Large item 16 bytes; name 0x2 Identifier String
	b'S310E-SR-X      '
 0c13 Large item 234 bytes; name 0x10
	#00 [PN] len=16: b'TBD             '
	linux-sunxi#13 [EC] len=16: b'110107730D2     '
	linux-sunxi#26 [SN] len=16: b'97YL102035603V  '
	linux-sunxi#39 [NA] len=12: b'00145E992ED1'
	linux-sunxi#48 [V0] len=6: b'175000'
	linux-sunxi#51 [V1] len=6: b'266666'
	#5a [V2] len=6: b'266666'
	linux-sunxi#63 [V3] len=6: b'2000  '
	#6c [V4] len=2: b'1 '
	linux-sunxi#71 [V5] len=6: b'c2    '
	#7a [V6] len=6: b'0     '
	linux-sunxi#83 [V7] len=2: b'1 '
	linux-sunxi#88 [V8] len=2: b'0 '
	#8d [V9] len=2: b'0 '
	linux-sunxi#92 [VA] len=2: b'0 '
	linux-sunxi#97 [RV] len=80: b's\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
 0d00 Large item 252 bytes; name 0x11
	#00 [VC] len=16: b'122310_1222 dp  '
	linux-sunxi#13 [VD] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
	linux-sunxi#26 [VE] len=16: b'122310_1353 fp  '
	linux-sunxi#39 [VF] len=16: b'610-0001-00 H1\x00\x00'
	#4c [RW] len=173: b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'...
 0dff Small item 0 bytes; name 0xf End Tag

10f3 Large item 13315 bytes; name 0x62
!!! unknown item name 98: b'\xd0\x03\x00@`\x0c\x08\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00'
===

Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 11, 2018
@davem330
tipc: fix one byte leak in tipc_sk_set_orig_addr()
09c8b97 
sysbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in recvmsg() that
I tracked down to tipc_sk_set_orig_addr(), missing
srcaddr->member.scope initialization.

This patches moves srcaddr->sock.scope init to follow
fields order and ease future verifications.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:226
CPU: 0 PID: 4549 Comm: syz-executor287 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x135/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1157
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:226
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2285
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2328 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2338 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2335 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x325/0x460 net/socket.c:2335
 do_syscall_64+0x154/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x4455e9
RSP: 002b:00007fe3bd36ddb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dac24 RCX: 00000000004455e9
RDX: 0000000000002002 RSI: 0000000020000400 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dac20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fff98ce4b6f R14: 00007fe3bd36e9c0 R15: 0000000000000003

Local variable description: ----addr@___sys_recvmsg
Variable was created at:
 ___sys_recvmsg+0xd5/0x810 net/socket.c:2246
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2328 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2338 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2335 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x325/0x460 net/socket.c:2335

Byte 19 of 32 is uninitialized

Fixes: 31c82a2 ("tipc: add second source address to recvmsg()/recvfrom()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request May 22, 2018
@gregkh
tipc: fix one byte leak in tipc_sk_set_orig_addr()
b9634c2 
[ Upstream commit 09c8b97 ]

sysbot/KMSAN reported an uninit-value in recvmsg() that
I tracked down to tipc_sk_set_orig_addr(), missing
srcaddr->member.scope initialization.

This patches moves srcaddr->sock.scope init to follow
fields order and ease future verifications.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:226
CPU: 0 PID: 4549 Comm: syz-executor287 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x135/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1157
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x69/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1199
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x32e/0x530 net/socket.c:226
 ___sys_recvmsg+0x4e2/0x810 net/socket.c:2285
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2328 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2338 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2335 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x325/0x460 net/socket.c:2335
 do_syscall_64+0x154/0x220 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x4455e9
RSP: 002b:00007fe3bd36ddb8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002f
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dac24 RCX: 00000000004455e9
RDX: 0000000000002002 RSI: 0000000020000400 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000006dac20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fff98ce4b6f R14: 00007fe3bd36e9c0 R15: 0000000000000003

Local variable description: ----addr@___sys_recvmsg
Variable was created at:
 ___sys_recvmsg+0xd5/0x810 net/socket.c:2246
 __sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2328 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2338 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2335 [inline]
 __x64_sys_recvmsg+0x325/0x460 net/socket.c:2335

Byte 19 of 32 is uninitialized

Fixes: 31c82a2 ("tipc: add second source address to recvmsg()/recvfrom()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 2, 2018
@axboe
block: brd: associate with queue until adding disk
153fcd5 
brd_free() may be called in failure path on one brd instance which
disk isn't added yet, so release handler of gendisk may free the
associated request_queue early and causes the following use-after-free[1].

This patch fixes this issue by associating gendisk with request_queue
just before adding disk.

[1] KASAN: use-after-free Read in del_timer_syncNon-volatile memory driver v1.3
Linux agpgart interface v0.103
[drm] Initialized vgem 1.0.0 20120112 for virtual device on minor 0
usbcore: registered new interface driver udl
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801d1b6b540 by task swapper/0/1

CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.19.0+ #88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x244/0x39d lib/dump_stack.c:113
  print_address_description.cold.7+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
  kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
  kasan_report.cold.8+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
  __lock_acquire+0x36d9/0x4c20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3218
  lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3844
  del_timer_sync+0xb7/0x270 kernel/time/timer.c:1283
  blk_cleanup_queue+0x413/0x710 block/blk-core.c:809
  brd_free+0x5d/0x71 drivers/block/brd.c:422
  brd_init+0x2eb/0x393 drivers/block/brd.c:518
  do_one_initcall+0x145/0x957 init/main.c:890
  do_initcall_level init/main.c:958 [inline]
  do_initcalls init/main.c:966 [inline]
  do_basic_setup init/main.c:984 [inline]
  kernel_init_freeable+0x5c6/0x6b9 init/main.c:1148
  kernel_init+0x11/0x1ae init/main.c:1068
  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:350

Reported-by: syzbot+3701447012fe951dabb2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
amery pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 13, 2018
@mchehab
media: vb2: keep a reference to the request until dqbuf
6093d30 
When vb2_buffer_done is called the buffer is unbound from the
request and put. The media_request_object_put also 'put's the
request reference. If the application has already closed the
request fd, then that means that the request reference at that
point goes to 0 and the whole request is released.

This means that the control handler associated with the request is
also freed and that causes this kernel oops:

[174705.995401] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:908
[174705.995411] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 28071, name: vivid-000-vid-o
[174705.995416] 2 locks held by vivid-000-vid-o/28071:
[174705.995420]  #0: 000000001ea3a232 (&dev->mutex#3){....}, at: vivid_thread_vid_out+0x3f5/0x550 [vivid]
[174705.995447]  #1: 00000000e30a0d1e (&(&q->done_lock)->rlock){....}, at: vb2_buffer_done+0x92/0x1d0 [videobuf2_common]
[174705.995460] Preemption disabled at:
[174705.995461] [<0000000000000000>]           (null)
[174705.995472] CPU: 11 PID: 28071 Comm: vivid-000-vid-o Tainted: G        W         4.20.0-rc1-test-no #88
[174705.995476] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/19/2017
[174705.995481] Call Trace:
[174705.995500]  dump_stack+0x46/0x60
[174705.995512]  ___might_sleep.cold.79+0xe1/0xf1
[174705.995523]  __mutex_lock+0x50/0x8f0
[174705.995531]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[174705.995536]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[174705.995542]  ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x90
[174705.995564]  ? v4l2_ctrl_handler_free.part.13+0x44/0x1d0 [videodev]
[174705.995576]  v4l2_ctrl_handler_free.part.13+0x44/0x1d0 [videodev]
[174705.995590]  v4l2_ctrl_request_release+0x1c/0x30 [videodev]
[174705.995600]  media_request_clean+0x64/0xe0 [media]
[174705.995609]  media_request_release+0x19/0x40 [media]
[174705.995617]  vb2_buffer_done+0xef/0x1d0 [videobuf2_common]
[174705.995630]  vivid_thread_vid_out+0x2c1/0x550 [vivid]
[174705.995645]  ? vivid_stop_generating_vid_cap+0x1c0/0x1c0 [vivid]
[174705.995653]  kthread+0x113/0x130
[174705.995659]  ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80
[174705.995667]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

The vb2_buffer_done function can be called from interrupt context, so
anything that sleeps is not allowed.

The solution is to increment the request refcount when the buffer is
queued and decrement it when the buffer is dequeued. Releasing the
request is fine if that happens from VIDIOC_DQBUF.

Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Acked-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
wens pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 21, 2019
@ying-xue @davem330
tipc: fix uninit-value in in tipc_conn_rcv_sub
a88289f 
syzbot reported:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_conn_rcv_sub+0x184/0x950 net/tipc/topsrv.c:373
CPU: 0 PID: 66 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: tipc_rcv tipc_conn_recv_work
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
 tipc_conn_rcv_sub+0x184/0x950 net/tipc/topsrv.c:373
 tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock net/tipc/topsrv.c:409 [inline]
 tipc_conn_recv_work+0x3cd/0x560 net/tipc/topsrv.c:424
 process_one_work+0x12c6/0x1f60 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
 worker_thread+0x113c/0x24f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 kthread+0x539/0x720 kernel/kthread.c:239
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412

Local variable description: ----s.i@tipc_conn_recv_work
Variable was created at:
 tipc_conn_recv_work+0x65/0x560 net/tipc/topsrv.c:419
 process_one_work+0x12c6/0x1f60 kernel/workqueue.c:2145

In tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock(), it always supposes the length of message
received from sock_recvmsg() is not smaller than the size of struct
tipc_subscr. However, this assumption is false. Especially when the
length of received message is shorter than struct tipc_subscr size,
we will end up touching uninitialized fields in tipc_conn_rcv_sub().

Reported-by: syzbot+8951a3065ee7fd6d6e23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+75e6e042c5bbf691fc82@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Jan 25, 2019
@ying-xue @gregkh
tipc: fix uninit-value in in tipc_conn_rcv_sub
9277333 
commit a88289f upstream.

syzbot reported:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_conn_rcv_sub+0x184/0x950 net/tipc/topsrv.c:373
CPU: 0 PID: 66 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: tipc_rcv tipc_conn_recv_work
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
 tipc_conn_rcv_sub+0x184/0x950 net/tipc/topsrv.c:373
 tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock net/tipc/topsrv.c:409 [inline]
 tipc_conn_recv_work+0x3cd/0x560 net/tipc/topsrv.c:424
 process_one_work+0x12c6/0x1f60 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
 worker_thread+0x113c/0x24f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 kthread+0x539/0x720 kernel/kthread.c:239
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412

Local variable description: ----s.i@tipc_conn_recv_work
Variable was created at:
 tipc_conn_recv_work+0x65/0x560 net/tipc/topsrv.c:419
 process_one_work+0x12c6/0x1f60 kernel/workqueue.c:2145

In tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock(), it always supposes the length of message
received from sock_recvmsg() is not smaller than the size of struct
tipc_subscr. However, this assumption is false. Especially when the
length of received message is shorter than struct tipc_subscr size,
we will end up touching uninitialized fields in tipc_conn_rcv_sub().

Reported-by: syzbot+8951a3065ee7fd6d6e23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+75e6e042c5bbf691fc82@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Jan 25, 2019
@ying-xue @gregkh
tipc: fix uninit-value in in tipc_conn_rcv_sub
e4ce0e2 
commit a88289f upstream.

syzbot reported:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_conn_rcv_sub+0x184/0x950 net/tipc/topsrv.c:373
CPU: 0 PID: 66 Comm: kworker/u4:4 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: tipc_rcv tipc_conn_recv_work
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x142/0x240 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1067
 __msan_warning_32+0x6c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:683
 tipc_conn_rcv_sub+0x184/0x950 net/tipc/topsrv.c:373
 tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock net/tipc/topsrv.c:409 [inline]
 tipc_conn_recv_work+0x3cd/0x560 net/tipc/topsrv.c:424
 process_one_work+0x12c6/0x1f60 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
 worker_thread+0x113c/0x24f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 kthread+0x539/0x720 kernel/kthread.c:239
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412

Local variable description: ----s.i@tipc_conn_recv_work
Variable was created at:
 tipc_conn_recv_work+0x65/0x560 net/tipc/topsrv.c:419
 process_one_work+0x12c6/0x1f60 kernel/workqueue.c:2145

In tipc_conn_rcv_from_sock(), it always supposes the length of message
received from sock_recvmsg() is not smaller than the size of struct
tipc_subscr. However, this assumption is false. Especially when the
length of received message is shorter than struct tipc_subscr size,
we will end up touching uninitialized fields in tipc_conn_rcv_sub().

Reported-by: syzbot+8951a3065ee7fd6d6e23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+75e6e042c5bbf691fc82@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
jwrdegoede pushed a commit to jwrdegoede/linux-sunxi that referenced this pull request Feb 27, 2019
@davem330
net/x25: fix a race in x25_bind()
797a22b 
syzbot was able to trigger another soft lockup [1]

I first thought it was the O(N^2) issue I mentioned in my
prior fix (f657d22ee1f "net/x25: do not hold the cpu
too long in x25_new_lci()"), but I eventually found
that x25_bind() was not checking SOCK_ZAPPED state under
socket lock protection.

This means that multiple threads can end up calling
x25_insert_socket() for the same socket, and corrupt x25_list

[1]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 123s! [syz-executor.2:10492]
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 27515
hardirqs last  enabled at (27514): [<ffffffff81006673>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
hardirqs last disabled at (27515): [<ffffffff8100668f>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
softirqs last  enabled at (32): [<ffffffff8632ee73>] x25_get_neigh+0xa3/0xd0 net/x25/x25_link.c:336
softirqs last disabled at (34): [<ffffffff86324bc3>] x25_find_socket+0x23/0x140 net/x25/af_x25.c:341
CPU: 0 PID: 10492 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x4/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:97
Code: f4 ff ff ff e8 11 9f ea ff 48 c7 05 12 fb e5 08 00 00 00 00 e9 c8 e9 ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 <48> 8b 75 08 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ee 01 00 65 8b 15 38 0c 92 7e 81 e2
RSP: 0018:ffff88806e94fc48 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 1ffff1100d84dac5 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc90006197000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff86324bf3 RDI: ffff88806c26d628
RBP: ffff88806e94fc48 R08: ffff88806c1c6500 R09: fffffbfff1282561
R10: fffffbfff1282560 R11: ffffffff89412b03 R12: ffff88806c26d628
R13: ffff888090455200 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f3a107e4700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f3a107e3db8 CR3: 00000000a5544000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 __x25_find_socket net/x25/af_x25.c:327 [inline]
 x25_find_socket+0x7d/0x140 net/x25/af_x25.c:342
 x25_new_lci net/x25/af_x25.c:355 [inline]
 x25_connect+0x380/0xde0 net/x25/af_x25.c:784
 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1662
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1673 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1670 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1670
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e29
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f3a107e3c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457e29
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000073c040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3a107e46d4
R13: 00000000004be362 R14: 00000000004ceb98 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 10493 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:193 [inline]
RIP: 0010:queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x143/0x290 kernel/locking/qrwlock.c:86
Code: 4c 8d 2c 01 41 83 c7 03 41 0f b6 45 00 41 38 c7 7c 08 84 c0 0f 85 0c 01 00 00 8b 03 3d 00 01 00 00 74 1a f3 90 41 0f b6 55 00 <41> 38 d7 7c eb 84 d2 74 e7 48 89 df e8 cc aa 4e 00 eb dd be 04 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888085c47bd8 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffffffff89412b00 RCX: 1ffffffff1282560
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff89412b00
RBP: ffff888085c47c70 R08: 1ffffffff1282560 R09: fffffbfff1282561
R10: fffffbfff1282560 R11: ffffffff89412b03 R12: 00000000000000ff
R13: fffffbfff1282560 R14: 1ffff11010b88f7d R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  00007fdd04086700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fdd04064db8 CR3: 0000000090be0000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 queued_write_lock include/asm-generic/qrwlock.h:104 [inline]
 do_raw_write_lock+0x1d6/0x290 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:203
 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:204 [inline]
 _raw_write_lock_bh+0x3b/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312
 x25_insert_socket+0x21/0xe0 net/x25/af_x25.c:267
 x25_bind+0x273/0x340 net/x25/af_x25.c:703
 __sys_bind+0x23f/0x290 net/socket.c:1481
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1492 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1490 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1490
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e29

Fixes: 90c2729 ("X.25 remove bkl in bind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: andrew hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Mar 19, 2019
@gregkh
net/x25: fix a race in x25_bind()
64a6e35 
[ Upstream commit 797a22b ]

syzbot was able to trigger another soft lockup [1]

I first thought it was the O(N^2) issue I mentioned in my
prior fix (f657d22ee1f "net/x25: do not hold the cpu
too long in x25_new_lci()"), but I eventually found
that x25_bind() was not checking SOCK_ZAPPED state under
socket lock protection.

This means that multiple threads can end up calling
x25_insert_socket() for the same socket, and corrupt x25_list

[1]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 123s! [syz-executor.2:10492]
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 27515
hardirqs last  enabled at (27514): [<ffffffff81006673>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
hardirqs last disabled at (27515): [<ffffffff8100668f>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
softirqs last  enabled at (32): [<ffffffff8632ee73>] x25_get_neigh+0xa3/0xd0 net/x25/x25_link.c:336
softirqs last disabled at (34): [<ffffffff86324bc3>] x25_find_socket+0x23/0x140 net/x25/af_x25.c:341
CPU: 0 PID: 10492 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x4/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:97
Code: f4 ff ff ff e8 11 9f ea ff 48 c7 05 12 fb e5 08 00 00 00 00 e9 c8 e9 ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 <48> 8b 75 08 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ee 01 00 65 8b 15 38 0c 92 7e 81 e2
RSP: 0018:ffff88806e94fc48 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 1ffff1100d84dac5 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc90006197000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff86324bf3 RDI: ffff88806c26d628
RBP: ffff88806e94fc48 R08: ffff88806c1c6500 R09: fffffbfff1282561
R10: fffffbfff1282560 R11: ffffffff89412b03 R12: ffff88806c26d628
R13: ffff888090455200 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f3a107e4700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f3a107e3db8 CR3: 00000000a5544000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 __x25_find_socket net/x25/af_x25.c:327 [inline]
 x25_find_socket+0x7d/0x140 net/x25/af_x25.c:342
 x25_new_lci net/x25/af_x25.c:355 [inline]
 x25_connect+0x380/0xde0 net/x25/af_x25.c:784
 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1662
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1673 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1670 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1670
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e29
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f3a107e3c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457e29
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000073c040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3a107e46d4
R13: 00000000004be362 R14: 00000000004ceb98 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 10493 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:193 [inline]
RIP: 0010:queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x143/0x290 kernel/locking/qrwlock.c:86
Code: 4c 8d 2c 01 41 83 c7 03 41 0f b6 45 00 41 38 c7 7c 08 84 c0 0f 85 0c 01 00 00 8b 03 3d 00 01 00 00 74 1a f3 90 41 0f b6 55 00 <41> 38 d7 7c eb 84 d2 74 e7 48 89 df e8 cc aa 4e 00 eb dd be 04 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888085c47bd8 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffffffff89412b00 RCX: 1ffffffff1282560
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff89412b00
RBP: ffff888085c47c70 R08: 1ffffffff1282560 R09: fffffbfff1282561
R10: fffffbfff1282560 R11: ffffffff89412b03 R12: 00000000000000ff
R13: fffffbfff1282560 R14: 1ffff11010b88f7d R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  00007fdd04086700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fdd04064db8 CR3: 0000000090be0000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 queued_write_lock include/asm-generic/qrwlock.h:104 [inline]
 do_raw_write_lock+0x1d6/0x290 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:203
 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:204 [inline]
 _raw_write_lock_bh+0x3b/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312
 x25_insert_socket+0x21/0xe0 net/x25/af_x25.c:267
 x25_bind+0x273/0x340 net/x25/af_x25.c:703
 __sys_bind+0x23f/0x290 net/socket.c:1481
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1492 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1490 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1490
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e29

Fixes: 90c2729 ("X.25 remove bkl in bind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: andrew hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Mar 19, 2019
@gregkh
net/x25: fix a race in x25_bind()
13b4305 
[ Upstream commit 797a22b ]

syzbot was able to trigger another soft lockup [1]

I first thought it was the O(N^2) issue I mentioned in my
prior fix (f657d22ee1f "net/x25: do not hold the cpu
too long in x25_new_lci()"), but I eventually found
that x25_bind() was not checking SOCK_ZAPPED state under
socket lock protection.

This means that multiple threads can end up calling
x25_insert_socket() for the same socket, and corrupt x25_list

[1]
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 123s! [syz-executor.2:10492]
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 27515
hardirqs last  enabled at (27514): [<ffffffff81006673>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
hardirqs last disabled at (27515): [<ffffffff8100668f>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
softirqs last  enabled at (32): [<ffffffff8632ee73>] x25_get_neigh+0xa3/0xd0 net/x25/x25_link.c:336
softirqs last disabled at (34): [<ffffffff86324bc3>] x25_find_socket+0x23/0x140 net/x25/af_x25.c:341
CPU: 0 PID: 10492 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc+0x4/0x50 kernel/kcov.c:97
Code: f4 ff ff ff e8 11 9f ea ff 48 c7 05 12 fb e5 08 00 00 00 00 e9 c8 e9 ff ff 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 <48> 8b 75 08 65 48 8b 04 25 40 ee 01 00 65 8b 15 38 0c 92 7e 81 e2
RSP: 0018:ffff88806e94fc48 EFLAGS: 00000286 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 1ffff1100d84dac5 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc90006197000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff86324bf3 RDI: ffff88806c26d628
RBP: ffff88806e94fc48 R08: ffff88806c1c6500 R09: fffffbfff1282561
R10: fffffbfff1282560 R11: ffffffff89412b03 R12: ffff88806c26d628
R13: ffff888090455200 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  00007f3a107e4700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f3a107e3db8 CR3: 00000000a5544000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 __x25_find_socket net/x25/af_x25.c:327 [inline]
 x25_find_socket+0x7d/0x140 net/x25/af_x25.c:342
 x25_new_lci net/x25/af_x25.c:355 [inline]
 x25_connect+0x380/0xde0 net/x25/af_x25.c:784
 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1662
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1673 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1670 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1670
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e29
Code: ad b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f3a107e3c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457e29
RDX: 0000000000000012 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000073c040 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f3a107e46d4
R13: 00000000004be362 R14: 00000000004ceb98 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Sending NMI from CPU 0 to CPUs 1:
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 PID: 10493 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:__read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:193 [inline]
RIP: 0010:queued_write_lock_slowpath+0x143/0x290 kernel/locking/qrwlock.c:86
Code: 4c 8d 2c 01 41 83 c7 03 41 0f b6 45 00 41 38 c7 7c 08 84 c0 0f 85 0c 01 00 00 8b 03 3d 00 01 00 00 74 1a f3 90 41 0f b6 55 00 <41> 38 d7 7c eb 84 d2 74 e7 48 89 df e8 cc aa 4e 00 eb dd be 04 00
RSP: 0018:ffff888085c47bd8 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000300 RBX: ffffffff89412b00 RCX: 1ffffffff1282560
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff89412b00
RBP: ffff888085c47c70 R08: 1ffffffff1282560 R09: fffffbfff1282561
R10: fffffbfff1282560 R11: ffffffff89412b03 R12: 00000000000000ff
R13: fffffbfff1282560 R14: 1ffff11010b88f7d R15: 0000000000000003
FS:  00007fdd04086700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fdd04064db8 CR3: 0000000090be0000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 queued_write_lock include/asm-generic/qrwlock.h:104 [inline]
 do_raw_write_lock+0x1d6/0x290 kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:203
 __raw_write_lock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:204 [inline]
 _raw_write_lock_bh+0x3b/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:312
 x25_insert_socket+0x21/0xe0 net/x25/af_x25.c:267
 x25_bind+0x273/0x340 net/x25/af_x25.c:703
 __sys_bind+0x23f/0x290 net/socket.c:1481
 __do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1492 [inline]
 __se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1490 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bind+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1490
 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x457e29

Fixes: 90c2729 ("X.25 remove bkl in bind")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: andrew hendry <andrew.hendry@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request May 31, 2019
@groeck @gregkh
hwmon: (f71805f) Use request_muxed_region for Super-IO accesses
c11665e 
[ Upstream commit 73e6ff7 ]

Super-IO accesses may fail on a system with no or unmapped LPC bus.

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffbffee0002e
pgd = ffffffc1d68d4000
[ffffffbffee0002e] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 94000046 [jwrdegoede#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: f71805f(+) hwmon
CPU: 3 PID: 1659 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.5.0+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
task: ffffffc1f6665400 ti: ffffffc1d6418000 task.ti: ffffffc1d6418000
PC is at f71805f_find+0x6c/0x358 [f71805f]

Also, other drivers may attempt to access the LPC bus at the same time,
resulting in undefined behavior.

Use request_muxed_region() to ensure that IO access on the requested
address space is supported, and to ensure that access by multiple
drivers is synchronized.

Fixes: e53004e ("hwmon: New f71805f driver")
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reported-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request May 31, 2019
@groeck @gregkh
hwmon: (f71805f) Use request_muxed_region for Super-IO accesses
e363683 
[ Upstream commit 73e6ff7 ]

Super-IO accesses may fail on a system with no or unmapped LPC bus.

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffbffee0002e
pgd = ffffffc1d68d4000
[ffffffbffee0002e] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 94000046 [jwrdegoede#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: f71805f(+) hwmon
CPU: 3 PID: 1659 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.5.0+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
task: ffffffc1f6665400 ti: ffffffc1d6418000 task.ti: ffffffc1d6418000
PC is at f71805f_find+0x6c/0x358 [f71805f]

Also, other drivers may attempt to access the LPC bus at the same time,
resulting in undefined behavior.

Use request_muxed_region() to ensure that IO access on the requested
address space is supported, and to ensure that access by multiple
drivers is synchronized.

Fixes: e53004e ("hwmon: New f71805f driver")
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reported-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Jun 1, 2019
@groeck @gregkh
hwmon: (f71805f) Use request_muxed_region for Super-IO accesses
5ea7f30 
[ Upstream commit 73e6ff7 ]

Super-IO accesses may fail on a system with no or unmapped LPC bus.

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffbffee0002e
pgd = ffffffc1d68d4000
[ffffffbffee0002e] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 94000046 [jwrdegoede#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: f71805f(+) hwmon
CPU: 3 PID: 1659 Comm: insmod Not tainted 4.5.0+ linux-sunxi#88
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
task: ffffffc1f6665400 ti: ffffffc1d6418000 task.ti: ffffffc1d6418000
PC is at f71805f_find+0x6c/0x358 [f71805f]

Also, other drivers may attempt to access the LPC bus at the same time,
resulting in undefined behavior.

Use request_muxed_region() to ensure that IO access on the requested
address space is supported, and to ensure that access by multiple
drivers is synchronized.

Fixes: e53004e ("hwmon: New f71805f driver")
Reported-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Reported-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Cc: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Garry <john.garry@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
jwrdegoede pushed a commit to jwrdegoede/linux-sunxi that referenced this pull request Nov 29, 2021
@axboe
io_uring: fix soft lockup when call __io_remove_buffers
1d0254e 
I got issue as follows:
[ 567.094140] __io_remove_buffers: [1]start ctx=0xffff8881067bf000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff8881fefe1680
[  594.360799] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u32:5:108]
[  594.364987] Modules linked in:
[  594.365405] irq event stamp: 604180238
[  594.365906] hardirqs last  enabled at (604180237): [<ffffffff93fec9bd>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2d/0x50
[  594.367181] hardirqs last disabled at (604180238): [<ffffffff93fbbadb>] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xb/0xc0
[  594.368420] softirqs last  enabled at (569080666): [<ffffffff94200654>] __do_softirq+0x654/0xa9e
[  594.369551] softirqs last disabled at (569080575): [<ffffffff913e1d6a>] irq_exit_rcu+0x1ca/0x250
[  594.370692] CPU: 2 PID: 108 Comm: kworker/u32:5 Tainted: G            L    5.15.0-next-20211112+ linux-sunxi#88
[  594.371891] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
[  594.373604] Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work
[  594.374303] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x33/0x50
[  594.375037] Code: 48 83 c7 18 53 48 89 f3 48 8b 74 24 10 e8 55 f5 55 fd 48 89 ef e8 ed a7 56 fd 80 e7 02 74 06 e8 43 13 7b fd fb bf 01 00 00 00 <e8> f8 78 474
[  594.377433] RSP: 0018:ffff888101587a70 EFLAGS: 00000202
[  594.378120] RAX: 0000000024030f0d RBX: 0000000000000246 RCX: 1ffffffff2f09106
[  594.379053] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff9449f0e0 RDI: 0000000000000001
[  594.379991] RBP: ffffffff9586cdc0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbfff2effcab
[  594.380923] R10: ffffffff977fe557 R11: fffffbfff2effcaa R12: ffff8881b8f3def0
[  594.381858] R13: 0000000000000246 R14: ffff888153a8b070 R15: 0000000000000000
[  594.382787] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888399c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  594.383851] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  594.384602] CR2: 00007fcbe71d2000 CR3: 00000000b4216000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[  594.385540] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  594.386474] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  594.387403] Call Trace:
[  594.387738]  <TASK>
[  594.388042]  find_and_remove_object+0x118/0x160
[  594.389321]  delete_object_full+0xc/0x20
[  594.389852]  kfree+0x193/0x470
[  594.390275]  __io_remove_buffers.part.0+0xed/0x147
[  594.390931]  io_ring_ctx_free+0x342/0x6a2
[  594.392159]  io_ring_exit_work+0x41e/0x486
[  594.396419]  process_one_work+0x906/0x15a0
[  594.399185]  worker_thread+0x8b/0xd80
[  594.400259]  kthread+0x3bf/0x4a0
[  594.401847]  ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
[  594.402343]  </TASK>

Message from syslogd@localhost at Nov 13 09:09:54 ...
kernel:watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 26s! [kworker/u32:5:108]
[  596.793660] __io_remove_buffers: [2099199]start ctx=0xffff8881067bf000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff8881fefe1680

We can reproduce this issue by follow syzkaller log:
r0 = syz_io_uring_setup(0x401, &(0x7f0000000300), &(0x7f0000003000/0x2000)=nil, &(0x7f0000ff8000/0x4000)=nil, &(0x7f0000000280)=<r1=>0x0, &(0x7f0000000380)=<r2=>0x0)
sendmsg$ETHTOOL_MSG_FEATURES_SET(0xffffffffffffffff, &(0x7f0000003080)={0x0, 0x0, &(0x7f0000003040)={&(0x7f0000000040)=ANY=[], 0x18}}, 0x0)
syz_io_uring_submit(r1, r2, &(0x7f0000000240)=@IORING_OP_PROVIDE_BUFFERS={0x1f, 0x5, 0x0, 0x401, 0x1, 0x0, 0x100, 0x0, 0x1, {0xfffd}}, 0x0)
io_uring_enter(r0, 0x3a2d, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0)

The reason above issue  is 'buf->list' has 2,100,000 nodes, occupied cpu lead
to soft lockup.
To solve this issue, we need add schedule point when do while loop in
'__io_remove_buffers'.
After add  schedule point we do regression, get follow data.
[  240.141864] __io_remove_buffers: [1]start ctx=0xffff888170603000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff8881116fcb00
[  268.408260] __io_remove_buffers: [1]start ctx=0xffff8881b92d2000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff888130c83180
[  275.899234] __io_remove_buffers: [2099199]start ctx=0xffff888170603000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff8881116fcb00
[  296.741404] __io_remove_buffers: [1]start ctx=0xffff8881b659c000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff8881010fe380
[  305.090059] __io_remove_buffers: [2099199]start ctx=0xffff8881b92d2000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff888130c83180
[  325.415746] __io_remove_buffers: [1]start ctx=0xffff8881b92d1000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff8881a17d8f00
[  333.160318] __io_remove_buffers: [2099199]start ctx=0xffff8881b659c000 bgid=65533 buf=0xffff8881010fe380
...

Fixes:8bab4c09f24e("io_uring: allow conditional reschedule for intensive iterators")
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211122024737.2198530-1-yebin10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request Jan 28, 2022
@kjain101 @gregkh
bpf: Remove config check to enable bpf support for branch records
69e402a 
[ Upstream commit db52f57 ]

Branch data available to BPF programs can be very useful to get stack traces
out of userspace application.

Commit fff7b64 ("bpf: Add bpf_read_branch_records() helper") added BPF
support to capture branch records in x86. Enable this feature also for other
architectures as well by removing checks specific to x86.

If an architecture doesn't support branch records, bpf_read_branch_records()
still has appropriate checks and it will return an -EINVAL in that scenario.
Based on UAPI helper doc in include/uapi/linux/bpf.h, unsupported architectures
should return -ENOENT in such case. Hence, update the appropriate check to
return -ENOENT instead.

Selftest 'perf_branches' result on power9 machine which has the branch stacks
support:

 - Before this patch:

  [command]# ./test_progs -t perf_branches
   linux-sunxi#88/1 perf_branches/perf_branches_hw:FAIL
   linux-sunxi#88/2 perf_branches/perf_branches_no_hw:OK
   linux-sunxi#88 perf_branches:FAIL
  Summary: 0/1 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 1 FAILED

 - After this patch:

  [command]# ./test_progs -t perf_branches
   linux-sunxi#88/1 perf_branches/perf_branches_hw:OK
   linux-sunxi#88/2 perf_branches/perf_branches_no_hw:OK
   linux-sunxi#88 perf_branches:OK
  Summary: 1/2 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Selftest 'perf_branches' result on power9 machine which doesn't have branch
stack report:

 - After this patch:

  [command]# ./test_progs -t perf_branches
   linux-sunxi#88/1 perf_branches/perf_branches_hw:SKIP
   linux-sunxi#88/2 perf_branches/perf_branches_no_hw:OK
   linux-sunxi#88 perf_branches:OK
  Summary: 1/1 PASSED, 1 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED

Fixes: fff7b64 ("bpf: Add bpf_read_branch_records() helper")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211206073315.77432-1-kjain@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
repojohnray pushed a commit to repojohnray/linux-sunxi-4.7.y that referenced this pull request May 1, 2023
@axboe @gregkh
powerpc: Don't try to copy PPR for task with NULL pt_regs
064a1c7 
commit fd72761 upstream.

powerpc sets up PF_KTHREAD and PF_IO_WORKER with a NULL pt_regs, which
from my (arguably very short) checking is not commonly done for other
archs. This is fine, except when PF_IO_WORKER's have been created and
the task does something that causes a coredump to be generated. Then we
get this crash:

  Kernel attempted to read user page (160) - exploit attempt? (uid: 1000)
  BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000160
  Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000000c3a60
  Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [jwrdegoede#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=32 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in: bochs drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper xts binfmt_misc ecb ctr syscopyarea sysfillrect cbc sysimgblt drm_ttm_helper aes_generic ttm sg libaes evdev joydev virtio_balloon vmx_crypto gf128mul drm dm_mod fuse loop configfs drm_panel_orientation_quirks ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid xhci_pci xhci_hcd usbcore usb_common sd_mod
  CPU: 1 PID: 1982 Comm: ppc-crash Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2+ linux-sunxi#88
  Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1202 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries
  NIP:  c0000000000c3a60 LR: c000000000039944 CTR: c0000000000398e0
  REGS: c0000000041833b0 TRAP: 0300   Not tainted  (6.3.0-rc2+)
  MSR:  800000000280b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 88082828  XER: 200400f8
  ...
  NIP memcpy_power7+0x200/0x7d0
  LR  ppr_get+0x64/0xb0
  Call Trace:
    ppr_get+0x40/0xb0 (unreliable)
    __regset_get+0x180/0x1f0
    regset_get_alloc+0x64/0x90
    elf_core_dump+0xb98/0x1b60
    do_coredump+0x1c34/0x24a0
    get_signal+0x71c/0x1410
    do_notify_resume+0x140/0x6f0
    interrupt_exit_user_prepare_main+0x29c/0x320
    interrupt_exit_user_prepare+0x6c/0xa0
    interrupt_return_srr_user+0x8/0x138

Because ppr_get() is trying to copy from a PF_IO_WORKER with a NULL
pt_regs.

Check for a valid pt_regs in both ppc_get/ppr_set, and return an error
if not set. The actual error value doesn't seem to be important here, so
just pick -EINVAL.

Fixes: fa43981 ("powerpc/ptrace: Enable support for NT_PPPC_TAR, NT_PPC_PPR, NT_PPC_DSCR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.8+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[mpe: Trim oops in change log, add Fixes & Cc stable]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/d9f63344-fe7c-56ae-b420-4a1a04a2ae4c@kernel.dk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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2 participants
@adrientetar @amery