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CookieRadar 2026.45
Added
docs/nis2-compliance.md: the answers to the seven questions a customer subject to NIS2
asks a software supplier, with only what the repository can back. Written in Italian, for
customers under d.lgs. 138/2024. Where the answer is "no" it says no: there is no penetration
test, no second reviewer, no access control because a CLI has no users, and the maintainer
can bypass the branch rules. It says what leaves the machine: the audited page and every
third party it loads, three times, from the operator's own address; the CELEX number of a
cited act to publications.europa.eu (eur-lex.europa.eu as the fallback) and the article of
the Consumer Code to Normattiva, only whenauditcites a provision. It says what Chromium
runs without (its sandbox, as Playwright starts it) and what was measured of its own traffic
on 2026-10-11: nothing but the page.tests/test_nis2_evidence.pycompares the hosts in the
document with those named in the modules that import httpx or Playwright, and holds the
cache, the report, the browser state, the image user, the release files and the scanners to
what the document says; it refuses "NIS2-ready", "no data sent to third parties" and similar
claims anywhere in it, inSECURITY.mdor in the README.- Every release carries SBOMs and dated scans (
.github/workflows/sbom.yml): CycloneDX 1.5
of the image, Debian packages included (Syft), and of the Python environment
(cyclonedx-py), plus Trivy reports of the image and of the repository at the tag, and a
note saying which commit and image digest they describe and that a CVE scan is not a
penetration test. It runs after "Publish to PyPI" has pushed the image of the tag, and on
demand for a release that is already out. SECURITY.mdsays how vulnerabilities are found, how fast they are answered, how
customers are told and how to roll back. A fix ships with the next release; for CVSS 9.0
or more, customers who gave a security contact hear within 48 hours. The paragraph on
"Known Open CVEs", last reviewed on 2026-09-10, is gone: it blamed Debian Bookworm, and the
image has been built on Trixie since 2026-09-20;SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.tomlis where the accepted ones
are, each with a review date.uv.lock, written with uv 0.12.18, and a Quality step that fails when it falls behind
pyproject.toml.
Fixed
- Tracking stored before any choice never reached the verdict. The verdict read the session
after the refusal only, so a site that wrote Google Analytics'_gabefore its banner was
answered — repubblica.it on 2026-10-17, TCF string still empty — could end in exit 0. A tracking
cookie present at the end of the pre-consent session (_ga,_ga_<id>,_fbp,_gcl_au, or
any cookie of a known tracker's domain) is now a VIOLATION of its own, whatever the refusal did,
with the same exit code, and the report cites art. 122(1) of the Codice privacy, fetched from
Normattiva, with ePrivacy art. 5(3). A request to a tracker before any choice is listed and not
cited: it does not by itself show anything stored on the device.batchsays the cause too. - corriere.it's refusal with a subscription was not seen, because it is a link. On 2026-10-17
the wall (RCS's, in the page itself — not in an iframe, as the audit had recorded) offered
"accetta e continua" and "preferenze" as buttons and "Rifiuta e abbonati" as an<a href="#">.
The subscription label was looked for among buttons only, so the wall showed no refusal of any
kind. Links are searched too; the report names the paid refusal and cites nothing. - Cookiebot was not recognised, and the report said there was no banner. On cookiebot.com on
2026-10-17 the dialog offered "Deny", "Customize", "Allow all" (in English, the scanner's
locale; "Rifiuta" and "Accetta tutti" in Italian, with the same ids), and CookieRadar knew
neither the labels nor the ids, while its banner selectors are case-sensitive and missed
"CybotCookiebotDialog". Didomi's notice names none of the words the hint looks for. Cookiebot's
ids and the labels measured that day ("Deny", "Allow all", corriere.it's "Accetta e continua")
are known now, the hint ignores case and knows Didomi's prefix, and when it recognises nothing
the note says no banner was recognised instead of claiming none was there. - A banner shown only to a browser that is not headless was never seen. Headless Chromium
announces "HeadlessChrome/", and on subito.it on 2026-10-17 the Didomi notice was not
mounted for it and was for "Chrome/" from the same browser: the audit said
UNVERIFIED, "no refusal could be applied", about a site that offers one. The sessions now
announce the browser's own User-Agent as the build says it with a window, and the report
states it. The test runs a real Chromium against the notice captured that day. - GDPR art. 4(11) was cited against banners that offer a refusal. On aranzulla.it (iubenda)
the refusal is the banner's "×", whose text says "Chiudi questa informativa per continuare
senza accettare"; on repubblica.it it is "Rifiuta e abbonati". Both were reported on
2026-10-17 as "Accept was applied and no refusal control was found", with art. 4(11) and
ePrivacy art. 5(3) cited. The close "×" of iubenda, Didomi, OneTrust and Cookiebot is now
tried after every explicit refusal, visible only — repubblica.it keeps one in the page with
display: none. A refusal sold with a subscription is named in the report, not clicked, and
cites nothing. And "no refusal" now also needs Accept to have been the one control on the
banner, counted just before the click: with others beside it, none recognised, the note gives
their number and cites nothing. The tests run a real Chromium against the two banners as
captured that day, trimmed, ids and order kept. - The local HTTPS server of the law-fetch tests allowed any TLS version. CodeQL raised a
highpy/insecure-protocolalert on it, which the new pull-request gate caught on #37. It now
requires TLS 1.2 at least, and makes its certificate withcryptography, added to thetest
extra, instead of callingopenssl, so the test can no longer skip itself. - On a pull request, Security Posture called live exceptions unused. CodeQL reports only what
the change introduces on a pull request ref, so when it reported anything, an exception for a
finding still open on main in an untouched file matched nothing and failed the gate
(cookieradar #37, 2026-10-12). main's open alerts now count as history the record may match,
like the closed ones; blocking is still decided on the pull request's own alerts. Simulated on
#37's real alerts: the false "unused" goes, the real new alert stays. - SonarCloud failed main on the coverage of new code (78.6% against 80%) after the HTTPS-only
law fetch:fetch_htmlwithout a client of its own and the redirect limit had no test. Both
are now exercised against real servers on 127.0.0.1: a plain HTTP server that is never served
in clear, and an HTTPS server, with a certificate made byopensslfor the test, whose
redirects loop until the limit stops them. - Security Posture judged every pull request by main's alerts. It listed the alerts without
aref, so GitHub answered for main, and its wait compared the scanners' runs with the merge
commit, which none of them carries: on mailradar #39 it waited two seconds. It now waits for
the runs of the branch head, Bandit included, and reads the open alerts ofrefs/pull/N/merge;
the closed ones come from that ref and from main, so an exception main holds as settled is not
called unused on a ref with no history. Checked against a recent pull request of each Radar
with the real tool: the same verdict as main in all six. - The texts of the law arrived in clear. Cellar answers its https:// URL with a 303 to an
http:// one (recorded on 2026-10-11 for the GDPR), andfetch_htmlfollowed it, so the act
travelled without TLS and the SHA-256 printed beside a citation described bytes nothing had
protected. Redirects are now followed by hand and a hop to http:// is taken over https://,
which serves the same document byte for byte; if that fails, the fallback to EUR-Lex applies.
Checked live: the GDPR came back whole over two HTTPS requests. The test replays Cellar's
recorded 303. - The Saturday mutation run would have died on the NIS2 tests. mutmut copies only the
paths inalso_copyintomutants/, andtests/test_nis2_evidence.pyreadsdocs/, which
was not among them. Listed now, with a test that reads, from its own source, every root
path those tests use and checks that mutmut copies it. - The licence gate had never refused anything.
pip-licenses --fail-on="GPL;AGPL;LGPL"
compares whole licence strings, and no package declares just "GPL": they declare "GNU
Lesser General Public License v2 or later (LGPLv2+)" and the like. Measured on 2026-10-11
with chardet 5.2.0 installed next to cookieradar: exit 0 without--partial-match, exit 1
with it. The flag is there now; CookieRadar's own runtime dependencies pass it.
Security
- CVE-2026-88647 in gnutls28 recorded in
SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml. A hostname
verification bypass with no fix in any Debian suite, found by the scan of the 2026.44
image; same chain as the five gnutls/krb5 entries of 2026-10-09 (libcups2t64, not
loaded by the headless shell), reviewed on 2026-11-30. - The gnutls28 and krb5 entries now say what was checked, not only what was read. The
six gnutls CVEs of 2026-10-08 were reproduced with the public PoC certificates against
Debian's own packages (trixie 3.8.9-3+deb13u4, sid 3.8.13-1) and had no upstream issue
anywhere on 2026-10-10; CVE-2026-107778 in krb5 gained Debian bug 1150461, a no-dsa for
trixie and a fix on the upstream 1.22 branch the same day. - The six gnutls CVEs are now reported, not only recorded. GnuTLS confidential issue
1965 and Debian bug 1150522 (src:gnutls28, found in 3.8.13-1 and 3.8.9-3+deb13u4), both
filed on 2026-10-10 with the reproduction transcripts; the exceptions name them.
Changed
-
SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml: the settled entries that stay now say why. Docker Scout and Snyk
stopped reporting the gcc-14 advisories (CVE-2026-102010 and CVE-2026-95619, and their Snyk ids)
on 2026-10-07 and 2026-10-08, so the gate lists them as settled.patchradar debianon 2026-10-15
still reports gcc-14 no-dsa in trixie at 14.2.0-19, with the fix only in sid, so the package is
still unfixed and only the reporting changed. The same holds for CVE-2026-107778 in krb5, quiet
since 2026-10-11 and still no-dsa with no fix in any suite (Debian bug 1150461). The entries are
kept, and each now records when the scanner fell silent and what Debian said, as this file's
CVE-2026-82560 entry already did. Deleting a flaw that is demonstrably present because a scanner
fell silent is the one direction the file must not drift in. -
The NIS2 document describes the branch rules as they are since 2026-10-12. The ruleset on
main lost the owner's bypass and requires a pull request for every change, the version bump
included; the document said the maintainer could bypass the rules. A test holds the new
wording and refuses the old. -
release.shfalls back to a rebase merge when the ruleset refuses a squash, as apkradar's
does, and says to enable auto-merge when it cannot be turned on. -
release.shgoes through a pull request. main now takes pull requests only, the owner
included, after a cloud session pushed straight to it with the owner's account. The script
commits the bump onrelease/vXand pushes that branch only; withghand a GitHub origin it
opens the pull request with auto-merge, waits for the merge and tags the merge commit.
./release.sh --tag Xis that last step alone. The guarantees stay: nothing is committed when
the suite fails, and the tag is made before anything is pushed. Ported from mailradar.