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CookieRadar 2026.45

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@github-actions github-actions released this 18 Oct 10:29
· 33 commits to main since this release
v2026.45
361ad37

Added

  • docs/nis2-compliance.md: the answers to the seven questions a customer subject to NIS2
    asks a software supplier, with only what the repository can back.
    Written in Italian, for
    customers under d.lgs. 138/2024. Where the answer is "no" it says no: there is no penetration
    test, no second reviewer, no access control because a CLI has no users, and the maintainer
    can bypass the branch rules. It says what leaves the machine: the audited page and every
    third party it loads, three times, from the operator's own address; the CELEX number of a
    cited act to publications.europa.eu (eur-lex.europa.eu as the fallback) and the article of
    the Consumer Code to Normattiva, only when audit cites a provision. It says what Chromium
    runs without (its sandbox, as Playwright starts it) and what was measured of its own traffic
    on 2026-10-11: nothing but the page. tests/test_nis2_evidence.py compares the hosts in the
    document with those named in the modules that import httpx or Playwright, and holds the
    cache, the report, the browser state, the image user, the release files and the scanners to
    what the document says; it refuses "NIS2-ready", "no data sent to third parties" and similar
    claims anywhere in it, in SECURITY.md or in the README.
  • Every release carries SBOMs and dated scans (.github/workflows/sbom.yml): CycloneDX 1.5
    of the image, Debian packages included (Syft), and of the Python environment
    (cyclonedx-py), plus Trivy reports of the image and of the repository at the tag, and a
    note saying which commit and image digest they describe and that a CVE scan is not a
    penetration test. It runs after "Publish to PyPI" has pushed the image of the tag, and on
    demand for a release that is already out.
  • SECURITY.md says how vulnerabilities are found, how fast they are answered, how
    customers are told and how to roll back.
    A fix ships with the next release; for CVSS 9.0
    or more, customers who gave a security contact hear within 48 hours. The paragraph on
    "Known Open CVEs", last reviewed on 2026-09-10, is gone: it blamed Debian Bookworm, and the
    image has been built on Trixie since 2026-09-20; SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml is where the accepted ones
    are, each with a review date.
  • uv.lock, written with uv 0.12.18, and a Quality step that fails when it falls behind
    pyproject.toml.

Fixed

  • Tracking stored before any choice never reached the verdict. The verdict read the session
    after the refusal only, so a site that wrote Google Analytics' _ga before its banner was
    answered — repubblica.it on 2026-10-17, TCF string still empty — could end in exit 0. A tracking
    cookie present at the end of the pre-consent session (_ga, _ga_<id>, _fbp, _gcl_au, or
    any cookie of a known tracker's domain) is now a VIOLATION of its own, whatever the refusal did,
    with the same exit code, and the report cites art. 122(1) of the Codice privacy, fetched from
    Normattiva, with ePrivacy art. 5(3). A request to a tracker before any choice is listed and not
    cited: it does not by itself show anything stored on the device. batch says the cause too.
  • corriere.it's refusal with a subscription was not seen, because it is a link. On 2026-10-17
    the wall (RCS's, in the page itself — not in an iframe, as the audit had recorded) offered
    "accetta e continua" and "preferenze" as buttons and "Rifiuta e abbonati" as an <a href="#">.
    The subscription label was looked for among buttons only, so the wall showed no refusal of any
    kind. Links are searched too; the report names the paid refusal and cites nothing.
  • Cookiebot was not recognised, and the report said there was no banner. On cookiebot.com on
    2026-10-17 the dialog offered "Deny", "Customize", "Allow all" (in English, the scanner's
    locale; "Rifiuta" and "Accetta tutti" in Italian, with the same ids), and CookieRadar knew
    neither the labels nor the ids, while its banner selectors are case-sensitive and missed
    "CybotCookiebotDialog". Didomi's notice names none of the words the hint looks for. Cookiebot's
    ids and the labels measured that day ("Deny", "Allow all", corriere.it's "Accetta e continua")
    are known now, the hint ignores case and knows Didomi's prefix, and when it recognises nothing
    the note says no banner was recognised instead of claiming none was there.
  • A banner shown only to a browser that is not headless was never seen. Headless Chromium
    announces "HeadlessChrome/", and on subito.it on 2026-10-17 the Didomi notice was not
    mounted for it and was for "Chrome/" from the same browser: the audit said
    UNVERIFIED, "no refusal could be applied", about a site that offers one. The sessions now
    announce the browser's own User-Agent as the build says it with a window, and the report
    states it. The test runs a real Chromium against the notice captured that day.
  • GDPR art. 4(11) was cited against banners that offer a refusal. On aranzulla.it (iubenda)
    the refusal is the banner's "×", whose text says "Chiudi questa informativa per continuare
    senza accettare"; on repubblica.it it is "Rifiuta e abbonati". Both were reported on
    2026-10-17 as "Accept was applied and no refusal control was found", with art. 4(11) and
    ePrivacy art. 5(3) cited. The close "×" of iubenda, Didomi, OneTrust and Cookiebot is now
    tried after every explicit refusal, visible only — repubblica.it keeps one in the page with
    display: none. A refusal sold with a subscription is named in the report, not clicked, and
    cites nothing. And "no refusal" now also needs Accept to have been the one control on the
    banner, counted just before the click: with others beside it, none recognised, the note gives
    their number and cites nothing. The tests run a real Chromium against the two banners as
    captured that day, trimmed, ids and order kept.
  • The local HTTPS server of the law-fetch tests allowed any TLS version. CodeQL raised a
    high py/insecure-protocol alert on it, which the new pull-request gate caught on #37. It now
    requires TLS 1.2 at least, and makes its certificate with cryptography, added to the test
    extra, instead of calling openssl, so the test can no longer skip itself.
  • On a pull request, Security Posture called live exceptions unused. CodeQL reports only what
    the change introduces on a pull request ref, so when it reported anything, an exception for a
    finding still open on main in an untouched file matched nothing and failed the gate
    (cookieradar #37, 2026-10-12). main's open alerts now count as history the record may match,
    like the closed ones; blocking is still decided on the pull request's own alerts. Simulated on
    #37's real alerts: the false "unused" goes, the real new alert stays.
  • SonarCloud failed main on the coverage of new code (78.6% against 80%) after the HTTPS-only
    law fetch: fetch_html without a client of its own and the redirect limit had no test. Both
    are now exercised against real servers on 127.0.0.1: a plain HTTP server that is never served
    in clear, and an HTTPS server, with a certificate made by openssl for the test, whose
    redirects loop until the limit stops them.
  • Security Posture judged every pull request by main's alerts. It listed the alerts without
    a ref, so GitHub answered for main, and its wait compared the scanners' runs with the merge
    commit, which none of them carries: on mailradar #39 it waited two seconds. It now waits for
    the runs of the branch head, Bandit included, and reads the open alerts of refs/pull/N/merge;
    the closed ones come from that ref and from main, so an exception main holds as settled is not
    called unused on a ref with no history. Checked against a recent pull request of each Radar
    with the real tool: the same verdict as main in all six.
  • The texts of the law arrived in clear. Cellar answers its https:// URL with a 303 to an
    http:// one (recorded on 2026-10-11 for the GDPR), and fetch_html followed it, so the act
    travelled without TLS and the SHA-256 printed beside a citation described bytes nothing had
    protected. Redirects are now followed by hand and a hop to http:// is taken over https://,
    which serves the same document byte for byte; if that fails, the fallback to EUR-Lex applies.
    Checked live: the GDPR came back whole over two HTTPS requests. The test replays Cellar's
    recorded 303.
  • The Saturday mutation run would have died on the NIS2 tests. mutmut copies only the
    paths in also_copy into mutants/, and tests/test_nis2_evidence.py reads docs/, which
    was not among them. Listed now, with a test that reads, from its own source, every root
    path those tests use and checks that mutmut copies it.
  • The licence gate had never refused anything. pip-licenses --fail-on="GPL;AGPL;LGPL"
    compares whole licence strings, and no package declares just "GPL": they declare "GNU
    Lesser General Public License v2 or later (LGPLv2+)" and the like. Measured on 2026-10-11
    with chardet 5.2.0 installed next to cookieradar: exit 0 without --partial-match, exit 1
    with it. The flag is there now; CookieRadar's own runtime dependencies pass it.

Security

  • CVE-2026-88647 in gnutls28 recorded in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml. A hostname
    verification bypass with no fix in any Debian suite, found by the scan of the 2026.44
    image; same chain as the five gnutls/krb5 entries of 2026-10-09 (libcups2t64, not
    loaded by the headless shell), reviewed on 2026-11-30.
  • The gnutls28 and krb5 entries now say what was checked, not only what was read. The
    six gnutls CVEs of 2026-10-08 were reproduced with the public PoC certificates against
    Debian's own packages (trixie 3.8.9-3+deb13u4, sid 3.8.13-1) and had no upstream issue
    anywhere on 2026-10-10; CVE-2026-107778 in krb5 gained Debian bug 1150461, a no-dsa for
    trixie and a fix on the upstream 1.22 branch the same day.
  • The six gnutls CVEs are now reported, not only recorded. GnuTLS confidential issue
    1965 and Debian bug 1150522 (src:gnutls28, found in 3.8.13-1 and 3.8.9-3+deb13u4), both
    filed on 2026-10-10 with the reproduction transcripts; the exceptions name them.

Changed

  • SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml: the settled entries that stay now say why. Docker Scout and Snyk
    stopped reporting the gcc-14 advisories (CVE-2026-102010 and CVE-2026-95619, and their Snyk ids)
    on 2026-10-07 and 2026-10-08, so the gate lists them as settled. patchradar debian on 2026-10-15
    still reports gcc-14 no-dsa in trixie at 14.2.0-19, with the fix only in sid, so the package is
    still unfixed and only the reporting changed. The same holds for CVE-2026-107778 in krb5, quiet
    since 2026-10-11 and still no-dsa with no fix in any suite (Debian bug 1150461). The entries are
    kept, and each now records when the scanner fell silent and what Debian said, as this file's
    CVE-2026-82560 entry already did. Deleting a flaw that is demonstrably present because a scanner
    fell silent is the one direction the file must not drift in.

  • The NIS2 document describes the branch rules as they are since 2026-10-12. The ruleset on
    main lost the owner's bypass and requires a pull request for every change, the version bump
    included; the document said the maintainer could bypass the rules. A test holds the new
    wording and refuses the old.

  • release.sh falls back to a rebase merge when the ruleset refuses a squash, as apkradar's
    does, and says to enable auto-merge when it cannot be turned on.

  • release.sh goes through a pull request. main now takes pull requests only, the owner
    included, after a cloud session pushed straight to it with the owner's account. The script
    commits the bump on release/vX and pushes that branch only; with gh and a GitHub origin it
    opens the pull request with auto-merge, waits for the merge and tags the merge commit.
    ./release.sh --tag X is that last step alone. The guarantees stay: nothing is committed when
    the suite fails, and the tag is made before anything is pushed. Ported from mailradar.