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CookieRadar 2026.48

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@github-actions github-actions released this 18 Nov 16:09
v2026.48
032b122

Changed

  • Two OpenSSL issues of 2026-11-17 are accepted until Debian ships 3.5.10. On 2026-11-18 Docker
    Scout reported CVE-2026-107493 and CVE-2026-124709 as high against the same openssl, and Security
    Posture failed again. OpenSSL rates both Low and fixes them in 3.5.10; Debian lists trixie and sid
    as vulnerable, with no fix. Neither is reachable here: one needs an application passing its own
    stack to PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex(), which OpenSSL and Python's ssl never do, the other a QUIC
    server. The advisory's third issue, CVE-2026-35190, is not reported by any scanner yet and has no
    entry, since an unused one fails the gate. Reviewed on 2026-12-15 with the four of 2026-11-10 below.

  • Four OpenSSL issues of 2026-11-10 are accepted until Debian ships 3.5.10. At the first scan of
    main on 2026-11-17 Docker Scout reported CVE-2026-95691, CVE-2026-95692, CVE-2026-88823 and
    CVE-2026-107496 as high against the base image's openssl 3.5.7-1~deb13u3, and Security Posture
    failed. OpenSSL rates all four Low and fixes them in 3.5.10; Debian has no trixie package with the
    fix yet. None is reachable here: they need the OpenSSL QUIC client, AES-GCM-SIV through EVP, or
    CMS_encrypt(), and Python's ssl exposes none of them, while the audited sites go through
    Chromium's own BoringSSL. The entries are reviewed on 2026-12-15; the rebuild that brings the DSA
    will make them fail the gate as unused.

  • The 49 exceptions due on 2026-11-30 are reviewed. Without the review, Security Posture would
    have failed on its own from 2026-12-01. Each entry was read again on 2026-11-17 against the Debian
    security tracker and archive, and against the image. 37 move on. libxml2, expat 2.9.0, krb5 and
    cups are still unfixed in trixie, or fixed only in sid, and move to 2026-12-31; acl, which is
    no-dsa and waits for a point release, moves to 2027-01-31. 12 go. Two expat CVEs were fixed by
    DSA-6566-1 and the image has the fix. harfbuzz is not affected in Debian. Four gnutls CVEs are
    rated unimportant by Debian, and one was rejected by its CNA. The four xorg-server entries cover
    packages the Dockerfile purges. krb5 CVE-2026-107778 stays: Docker Scout has been quiet on it
    since 2026-10-11, but the package has not changed. Run against the live alerts, the gate is green
    on 2026-11-17 and on 2026-12-01.

Fixed

  • A citation is "verified" only when the reference it cites is in the text downloaded now. The
    check looked at the article: with Cellar's page parsed and a point it cites, such as GDPR art.
    5(1)(a), missed by the parser, the reference fell back to the cache, old SHA-256 and date included,
    under "verified against Cellar"; with an empty cache the same label stood beside SHA256: not available. Every cited reference is now looked up in the text just parsed, and one that is missing
    makes the act a fetch failure: its citations come from the cache, labelled as such, or have no hash
    and say so. Ported from mailradar #103, as the five law modules below.

  • A failed download always reaches the EUR-Lex fallback and the cache. Only httpx.HTTPError was
    a fetch failure. A 303 to http://xn--/DOC_1 makes httpx raise idna.core.IDNAError, a
    ValueError, which skipped the fallback and ended the whole law check. httpx.InvalidURL and
    ValueError are now fetch failures too.

  • Redirects stay on the source's host. Any Location was followed, so a text served by another
    host was labelled "verified against Cellar". Cellar may redirect only to publications.europa.eu,
    EUR-Lex only to eur-lex.europa.eu and Normattiva only to www.normattiva.it, on the default port; the
    http:// hop Cellar makes is still taken over HTTPS. The hosts in docs/nis2-compliance.md are now
    the only ones the law check can reach, and the document says so.

  • A page is read up to 32 MiB, and a fetch ends after 120 seconds. The timeout bounded each read,
    not the whole, and nothing limited the size of the page. The body is now streamed, refused past
    MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES (32 MiB; the GDPR from Cellar is 823981 bytes) and abandoned past
    FETCH_DEADLINE (120 s, redirects included); either one is a fetch failure, so the fallbacks apply.

  • A change in the law is reported even when the cache cannot be written. The comparison with the
    previous text was made by the save, so with a read-only cache a law whose text changed was cited
    without the warning, and an unchanged wording was dated to the day of the audit. The merge is now
    law_cache.merge, made before the save and kept whether the save succeeds or not.

  • Errors and status lines name the source that was tried. A missing article always read "not
    found in the EUR-Lex page", for Normattiva and Cellar pages too, and the report's status line said
    "EUR-Lex unreachable" whatever had happened — for the GDPR, whose first source is Cellar, even when
    Cellar had answered. LawFetchError carries source and reached, ActStatus carries tried
    and failure, and the line says "GDPR: Cellar answered without the text cited" or "GDPR: Cellar
    and EUR-Lex unreachable".

  • A corrupt law cache is an empty one. A deeply nested law_cache.json made json.loads raise
    RecursionError, and the whole law check failed. It is now read as an empty cache.

  • Normattiva's "-bis" paragraphs have a reference of their own. Paragraph numbers were read as
    \d+, so paragraph 2-bis of art. 122 of the Codice privacy, and 3-bis and 4-bis of art. 21 of the
    Consumer Code, were part of the article's text and could not be cited; the later Latin numbers
    (-ter, -quater, ... -decies, -terdecies) are read too.

  • audit no longer lists trackers "loaded after rejection" when nothing was rejected. With a
    tracking cookie stored before any choice the verdict is VIOLATION whether or not the reject button
    was found, and the report then printed "N tracker(s) loaded after rejection" for the trackers of a
    session in which the refusal was never applied: on www.repubblica.it on 2026-11-17, a pay-to-refuse
    wall, five of them. The list is now printed only when the refusal was clicked, as batch and the
    law check already did.

  • A site that never loaded is no longer reported as measured. verdict ignored a session's error
    when there was no status: a navigation that failed outright (name not resolved, connection refused
    or reset, nothing before the timeout) left a session with no trackers and no cookie, which read as a
    clean one. On 2026-11-17 www.gnu.org's pre-consent session got net::ERR_CONNECTION_RESET while the
    other two loaded, and the verdict was OK; an unresolvable host exited with 2 and "reject button not
    found". A session with an error, no status and nothing from a document is now unreachable
    (scanner.unreachable). Every session unreachable is ⛔ NOT MEASURED, exit 3, in audit, batch
    and the law check; session 1 or 3 unreachable is never OK, and UNVERIFIED says which session never
    loaded. The README's exit codes say so.

  • A close "×" that subscribes is no longer clicked as a refusal. The close step ran before the
    check for a refusal sold with a subscription, and chose by selector alone. On www.ansa.it on
    2026-11-17 iubenda's .iubenda-cs-close-btn was labelled "Rifiuta e abbonati": it was clicked,
    Piano's checkout opened, and the session was measured as a refusal and cited. Every step that
    clicks now skips a control whose aria-label, text, value or title is a refusal sold with a
    subscription, and the English "Reject all and subscribe" (also "Reject", "Decline" or "Refuse" …
    "and subscribe") is recognised beside "Rifiuta e abbonati".

  • A tracker fired right after "Reject" is reported. The post-reject session waited two seconds
    after the click and only then emptied its lists before the reload, so every request in those two
    seconds was thrown away — among them a tag that fires on the consent update whatever the choice,
    which is the misconfiguration the session exists to find. The lists are now cut where they stood
    when the refusal was clicked: what the page loaded before it still does not count, what the click
    set off does.

  • A tag manager's library and a Consent Mode ping with storage denied are no longer cited after a
    refusal.
    Every tracker host contacted after "Reject" was a violation of GDPR art. 5(1)(a),
    ePrivacy art. 5(3), art. 7 and the Consumer Code, including the two kinds of request the README
    already called possibly lawful before any choice. On 2026-11-17, after a refusal that was clicked,
    www.köln.de loaded gtm.js, gtag/js and a GA4 collect with gcs=G100, and nothing else; it was
    a VIOLATION with four provisions cited. www.comune.milano.it loaded nine scripts from
    assets.adobedtm.com and no Adobe beacon. A domain whose every request after the refusal was a tag
    manager's library fetched as a script (Google Tag Manager, Adobe Launch, Tealium, TagCommander) or
    a Google ping with gcs=G100 is now reported as "Loaded after rejection, not cited", with the
    reason, and is not cited — unless the session holds a tracking cookie by name or a cookie on that
    domain. Beacons, pixels and granted pings stay violations, and so does a domain with any other
    request: aranzulla.it's doubleclick.net and googlesyndication.com still are. Violations has a
    not_cited field; scanner.not_cited_after_rejection names them. The README says what the rule is.

  • A listed site's own cookies are not "tracking stored before any choice". A cookie counted as
    tracking storage when its domain was on the tracker list, and linkedin.com is on it as a tracker of
    other sites: audited on its own domain, whose requests were already left out as first-party, its
    bcookie and lang made a VIOLATION citing art. 122(1) of the Codice privacy. A cookie now counts
    by its domain only when that domain is not the site's (is_same_site with the ...

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CookieRadar 2026.47.1

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@github-actions github-actions released this 15 Nov 12:38
v2026.47.1
f088cf7

Changed

  • A change to the image earns a fix version, and only that. A version ahead of the last tag needed a
    change under cookieradar/, so that no Radar gets a number for nothing. The Playwright fix above is
    in the Dockerfile alone, and the rule refused the release that puts a fixed image on Docker Hub, where
    latest is what Docker Scout reads and what people pull. A change to the Dockerfile, what the image
    is built from, now earns the third segment, the one kept for something urgent on what has already
    shipped, and never an ordinary count. The package on PyPI is the same code as 2026.47.
    tests/test_version_contract.py.

Security

  • Playwright 1.65.1, for the Node it carries. Playwright's driver is a Node binary of its own, and
    on 2026-11-15 Docker Scout reported ten high CVEs against the Node 24.21.0 inside 1.63.0, in the image
    just published as 2026.47: three fixed in Node 24.22.1 (CVE-2026-105482, -105483, -106069) and seven
    in the security release of 2026-11-11, 24.22.3 and 26.13.1 (CVE-2026-123863, -123864, -123865,
    -123866, -123872, -123874, -126051). Read from the Linux wheels that day, 1.64.1 bundles Node 24.22.1
    and 1.65.0 bundles 26.13.0, released before the fixes; 1.65.1 is the first with 26.13.1. It is four
    days old, under the fourteen days a dependency waits here, and goes in because the version it replaces
    has the known vulnerabilities. Its Node 26 links libatomic.so.1, which the slim base lacks and which
    stopped the build on 2026-11-12, so the Dockerfile installs libatomic1 before playwright install-deps. pyee leaves the lock: Playwright no longer depends on it.
    tests/test_docker_playwright.py holds the floor and the order.

CookieRadar 2026.47

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@github-actions github-actions released this 15 Nov 11:02
v2026.47
fa09377

Added

  • scanner.verdict and scanner.Verdict: the verdict as a public function. It lived in
    cli._verdict, which a caller could not import, and APKRadar's --full decided it by itself,
    more narrowly: three of the four ways a site is not OK came out as compliant. The command line
    now uses the same function, and Verdict's values are its exit codes.

Changed

  • The image runs Python 3.14. It was built on python:3.12-slim-trixie: 3.12 has had security fixes
    only since April 2025, and 3.13 joined it in October 2026. 3.14 gets bug fixes until October 2027 and
    security fixes until October 2030; 3.15, a month old, was too new for the wheels the image needs.
    exeradar and patchradar were already built on 3.14. sbom.yml resolves the Python environment of a
    release with the image's interpreter, so it moves to 3.14 too, and tests/test_docker_python.py keeps
    the two together. Measured on 2026-11-13 on the rebuilt image: the same audit of a local page, on 3.12
    and on 3.14, gives the same verdict, provisions and report.

  • pip leaves the image once cookieradar is installed. The 3.14 base ships pip 26.2.2, and Trivy
    reported five high findings against the packages pip vendors: msgpack 1.1.2 (CVE-2026-114613,
    GHSA-6v7p-g79w-8964), urllib3 2.7.0 (CVE-2026-97687, -97689) and setuptools 70.3.0 (CVE-2025-47273).
    pip 26.3 still vendors that setuptools. Nothing in the image runs pip after the build, so the layer
    that installs cookieradar uninstalls it, and sbom.yml drops it from the venv the source SBOM
    describes, as tests/test_nis2_evidence.py already required of any package the image removes
    (tests/test_docker_pip.py).

  • Trivy's expat and libXi findings are recorded, measured in the rebuilt image. On 2026-11-09
    Trivy began reporting four expat CVEs (CVE-2026-115506, -113351, -118370, -117610) and two libXi
    ones (CVE-2026-109089, -109090) in the Chromium dependencies, and Security Posture failed. Measured
    that day in the image rebuilt from v2026.46: Chromium declares the system libexpat directly, which
    the entries had not said (they named fontconfig and Mesa alone), so the expat entries rest on what
    each flaw takes rather than on its reach, and the two Debian has fixed elsewhere keep the short
    date, for the stable update to ask for. libXi comes in through the accessibility bridge only and
    its flaws need an X server, which headless Chromium never connects to.

  • The sqlite3 findings say what Debian decided, and Trivy's two new ones are recorded. On
    2026-11-09 Trivy began reporting CVE-2026-119374 and CVE-2026-119379, which only Docker Scout had
    reported, and Security Posture failed on main. Both now have a Trivy entry beside the Scout one.
    The sqlite3 entries also said there was no fixed version anywhere and that they waited for Debian:
    Debian has since fixed the three CVEs in sid (3.54.1-1) and marked them no-dsa for trixie, so no
    trixie update will come. They stay accepted on the ground they already gave, that no code of the
    project reaches the flawed parts of SQLite, until 2026-12-31, when the question becomes a base
    image with a fixed sqlite3.

  • Dependabot proposes a release once it is 14 days old, and actions arrive as one pull request.
    The Radar take a dependency at least 14 days after its release unless a known vulnerability makes the
    older version the risk; without a cooldown Dependabot opened twelve pull requests across the Radar on
    2026-10-29 and 2026-11-02 for releases two to thirteen days old. .github/dependabot.yml now sets a
    14-day cooldown on every ecosystem — Dependabot's security updates are not subject to it — and groups
    the GitHub Actions updates into one weekly pull request. tests/test_dependabot_config.py holds both.

  • Trivy scans the image a pull request builds; Snyk is gone. As in maksimtech/apkradar#54: of what
    snyk.yml ran, only the container scan worked. Snyk Open Source stopped on SNYK-OS-PYTHON-0013
    ("Missing required packages") here too, so its check on new dependency issues let everything through;
    Snyk Code repeated CodeQL, Bandit and SonarCloud; and the free plan's monthly test quota, shared by the
    Radar, was spent. trivy.yml now builds the image and scans it before merge, with no token and no
    quota. The Snyk-sourced entries left SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml, their reasons moving into the entries
    of the scanners that still report the same CVEs; tests/test_trivy_workflow.py holds the image scan,
    and tests/test_workflow_set.py keeps snyk.yml retired.
    Its first run reported the nine base-image CVEs the other Radar record (util-linux ×4, ncurses,
    systemd, perl, sqlite3, acl), to wait for Debian, and seventeen in Chromium's and the virtual
    display's dependencies: libxml2 ×8 (CVE-2026-6653 critical), cups ×2, the X.Org server behind Xvfb ×5,
    libX11 and libXrender. Each entry says, measured in the published image, why it is not reached: Chromium
    does not link libxml2, the image has the cups client library and no print server, Xvfb is never
    started and headless Chromium talks to no X server. The fix-elsewhere ones keep a short review date
    and the Debian bug to ask on. The Snyk entries' reasons moved to the Docker Scout and Trivy entries of
    the same CVEs; expat CVE-2026-115506, which only Snyk reported, is noted in the header. With them, the
    three sqlite3 CVEs Docker Scout raised on main on 2026-11-02, which had turned Security Posture red.

  • The author address published on PyPI is the project alias, github@maksimtech.com. It was a
    personal mailbox, which PyPI shows to anyone and bulk senders harvest: on 2026-10-31 a cold "patch
    offer" from a mass-mailing account reached it. Releases already published keep the old address;
    the next one carries the alias. tests/test_package_metadata.py keeps it that way.

Fixed

  • Security Posture reads every page of alerts. The code scanning API returns at most a hundred alerts
    per call, and the gate read one page of each list. On 2026-11-13 #68 had 123 open alerts on its ref and
    main had 142: three exceptions whose findings sat past the hundredth read as matching nothing, and the
    gate failed on a product whose every alert was explained. Read the other way, an unexplained alert past
    the hundredth would not have been seen at all. Each of the four reads now goes through
    gh api --paginate --slurp and joins the pages; a failed read still fails, so an unreadable list is not
    taken for an empty one. tests/test_security_posture_workflow.py runs the step's own function against a
    stand-in gh that answers in two pages. Run against the real API on #68: 123 alerts read, verdict ok.

  • The image builds again: it installs the Playwright that uv.lock resolves. The Dockerfile installed
    playwright>=1.40.0, so each build took the newest release on PyPI. On 2026-11-12 that was 1.65.1,
    published the day before, whose Node driver needs libatomic.so.1: python:3.12-slim-trixie does not
    ship it, playwright install-deps chromium stopped with exit code 127, and Trivy and Security Posture
    failed on main with no image to scan. The build of 2026-11-09, on the same base image digest, had
    taken 1.64.1. The image now installs playwright==1.63.0, the version uv.lock resolves, and
    tests/test_docker_playwright.py fails when a lock update leaves the Dockerfile behind.
    docs/nis2-compliance.md said the image resolves every dependency at build time; it now names
    Playwright as the exception.

  • Docker Scout no longer fails on its own base-image advice. From 2026-10-24 every run of
    docker-scout.yml failed and GitHub mailed it on each push to main: the CVE scan worked, then the scout
    CLI crashed in the recommendations part (nil pointer in recommendations/markdown.go) on images built
    on python:3.12-slim-trixie. The scan is now a step of its own that writes the SARIF and fails the job if it
    fails; the recommendations are a second step with continue-on-error. tests/test_scout_steps.py
    holds the two apart. Same change as maksimtech/mailradar#76.

  • Docker Scout scans the image as soon as it is published, and Security Posture reads that scan.
    The scan reads latest from Docker Hub but ran only on a push to main, weekly or by hand: after the
    certifi release the gate stayed red on the replaced image until both were dispatched by hand.
    docker-scout.yml now follows the image workflow (workflow_run, successful runs only) and
    security-posture.yml follows the scan. docs/nis2-compliance.md now says so, and tests/test_scan_after_publish.py
    holds them together.

Security

  • The image no longer carries an X server. playwright install-deps chromium installs xvfb and
    xserver-common for headed browsers without a display; nothing in the image starts one, and nothing
    else installed depends on either (measured 2026-11-13). The first image scanned since the build broke
    brought six X.Org Server CVEs against them (CVE-2026-109091, -109092, -109093, -109095, -109096,
    -109903), fixed in sid and open in trixie. Both packages are now purged in the same layer, and only
    they: --auto-remove would also take Mesa and libvulkan, which Chromium may load. The five older
    X.Org findings accepted in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml close with them. --no-headless has no display
    in the container. tests/test_docker_xserver.py keeps both packages out.

  • Fourteen MIT krb5 CVEs are recorded in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml. MIT's announcement of
    2026-11-09 (fixed in krb5 1.22.3) has no fix in Debian, sid included (bug 1153598). Measured
    2026-11-13: krb5 comes in through libcups, which chrome-headless-shell does not declare; it names
    libgssapi_krb5 only to answer an HTTP Negotiate challenge, with no krb5.conf and no credential cache in
    the image. Three of the CVEs are in libgssrpc, which is not installed (this line said two until the
    Docker ...

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CookieRadar 2026.46

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@github-actions github-actions released this 24 Oct 10:33
v2026.46
66062fa

Security

  • certifi 2026.10.19 in uv.lock, from 2026.7.22. The older bundle trusts emSign root CAs whose
    intermediate CA keys were compromised (GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2, critical, published 2026-10-20);
    2026.10.19 is the release the advisory names as fixed. The Security Posture gate stopped every pull
    request on it.
  • expat CVE-2026-115506 accepted in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml (SNYK-DEBIAN13-EXPAT-21479164,
    reported on 2026-10-23, review by 2026-11-30). A denial of service through entity amplification,
    unfixed in Debian and upstream; in the image the system libexpat1 only reads fontconfig's and Mesa's
    own files, and cookieradar parses no XML.
  • harfbuzz CVE-2026-113679 accepted in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml (SNYK-DEBIAN13-HARFBUZZ-21663516,
    reported on 2026-10-24, review by 2026-11-30). The flaw is in HarfBuzz's experimental WebAssembly
    shaper, which Debian does not build: the wasm option is disabled in 10.2.0 and libharfbuzz0b has no
    WAMR runtime among its dependencies.

Fixed

  • A verified text names the source it came from. EU acts are downloaded from Cellar
    (publications.europa.eu), with EUR-Lex only as the fallback, but the report said "verified against
    EUR-Lex" whichever answered (open item of the 2026-10-17 audit). It now says Cellar, EUR-Lex or
    Normattiva, as the case was; law_checker.check takes an optional HTTP client, so the path is tested
    on recorded answers. law_fetcher stays the only module that imports httpx at run time
    (test_nis2_evidence now tells a type-checking import from a real one).

CookieRadar 2026.45

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@github-actions github-actions released this 18 Oct 10:29
v2026.45
361ad37

Added

  • docs/nis2-compliance.md: the answers to the seven questions a customer subject to NIS2
    asks a software supplier, with only what the repository can back.
    Written in Italian, for
    customers under d.lgs. 138/2024. Where the answer is "no" it says no: there is no penetration
    test, no second reviewer, no access control because a CLI has no users, and the maintainer
    can bypass the branch rules. It says what leaves the machine: the audited page and every
    third party it loads, three times, from the operator's own address; the CELEX number of a
    cited act to publications.europa.eu (eur-lex.europa.eu as the fallback) and the article of
    the Consumer Code to Normattiva, only when audit cites a provision. It says what Chromium
    runs without (its sandbox, as Playwright starts it) and what was measured of its own traffic
    on 2026-10-11: nothing but the page. tests/test_nis2_evidence.py compares the hosts in the
    document with those named in the modules that import httpx or Playwright, and holds the
    cache, the report, the browser state, the image user, the release files and the scanners to
    what the document says; it refuses "NIS2-ready", "no data sent to third parties" and similar
    claims anywhere in it, in SECURITY.md or in the README.
  • Every release carries SBOMs and dated scans (.github/workflows/sbom.yml): CycloneDX 1.5
    of the image, Debian packages included (Syft), and of the Python environment
    (cyclonedx-py), plus Trivy reports of the image and of the repository at the tag, and a
    note saying which commit and image digest they describe and that a CVE scan is not a
    penetration test. It runs after "Publish to PyPI" has pushed the image of the tag, and on
    demand for a release that is already out.
  • SECURITY.md says how vulnerabilities are found, how fast they are answered, how
    customers are told and how to roll back.
    A fix ships with the next release; for CVSS 9.0
    or more, customers who gave a security contact hear within 48 hours. The paragraph on
    "Known Open CVEs", last reviewed on 2026-09-10, is gone: it blamed Debian Bookworm, and the
    image has been built on Trixie since 2026-09-20; SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml is where the accepted ones
    are, each with a review date.
  • uv.lock, written with uv 0.12.18, and a Quality step that fails when it falls behind
    pyproject.toml.

Fixed

  • Tracking stored before any choice never reached the verdict. The verdict read the session
    after the refusal only, so a site that wrote Google Analytics' _ga before its banner was
    answered — repubblica.it on 2026-10-17, TCF string still empty — could end in exit 0. A tracking
    cookie present at the end of the pre-consent session (_ga, _ga_<id>, _fbp, _gcl_au, or
    any cookie of a known tracker's domain) is now a VIOLATION of its own, whatever the refusal did,
    with the same exit code, and the report cites art. 122(1) of the Codice privacy, fetched from
    Normattiva, with ePrivacy art. 5(3). A request to a tracker before any choice is listed and not
    cited: it does not by itself show anything stored on the device. batch says the cause too.
  • corriere.it's refusal with a subscription was not seen, because it is a link. On 2026-10-17
    the wall (RCS's, in the page itself — not in an iframe, as the audit had recorded) offered
    "accetta e continua" and "preferenze" as buttons and "Rifiuta e abbonati" as an <a href="#">.
    The subscription label was looked for among buttons only, so the wall showed no refusal of any
    kind. Links are searched too; the report names the paid refusal and cites nothing.
  • Cookiebot was not recognised, and the report said there was no banner. On cookiebot.com on
    2026-10-17 the dialog offered "Deny", "Customize", "Allow all" (in English, the scanner's
    locale; "Rifiuta" and "Accetta tutti" in Italian, with the same ids), and CookieRadar knew
    neither the labels nor the ids, while its banner selectors are case-sensitive and missed
    "CybotCookiebotDialog". Didomi's notice names none of the words the hint looks for. Cookiebot's
    ids and the labels measured that day ("Deny", "Allow all", corriere.it's "Accetta e continua")
    are known now, the hint ignores case and knows Didomi's prefix, and when it recognises nothing
    the note says no banner was recognised instead of claiming none was there.
  • A banner shown only to a browser that is not headless was never seen. Headless Chromium
    announces "HeadlessChrome/", and on subito.it on 2026-10-17 the Didomi notice was not
    mounted for it and was for "Chrome/" from the same browser: the audit said
    UNVERIFIED, "no refusal could be applied", about a site that offers one. The sessions now
    announce the browser's own User-Agent as the build says it with a window, and the report
    states it. The test runs a real Chromium against the notice captured that day.
  • GDPR art. 4(11) was cited against banners that offer a refusal. On aranzulla.it (iubenda)
    the refusal is the banner's "×", whose text says "Chiudi questa informativa per continuare
    senza accettare"; on repubblica.it it is "Rifiuta e abbonati". Both were reported on
    2026-10-17 as "Accept was applied and no refusal control was found", with art. 4(11) and
    ePrivacy art. 5(3) cited. The close "×" of iubenda, Didomi, OneTrust and Cookiebot is now
    tried after every explicit refusal, visible only — repubblica.it keeps one in the page with
    display: none. A refusal sold with a subscription is named in the report, not clicked, and
    cites nothing. And "no refusal" now also needs Accept to have been the one control on the
    banner, counted just before the click: with others beside it, none recognised, the note gives
    their number and cites nothing. The tests run a real Chromium against the two banners as
    captured that day, trimmed, ids and order kept.
  • The local HTTPS server of the law-fetch tests allowed any TLS version. CodeQL raised a
    high py/insecure-protocol alert on it, which the new pull-request gate caught on #37. It now
    requires TLS 1.2 at least, and makes its certificate with cryptography, added to the test
    extra, instead of calling openssl, so the test can no longer skip itself.
  • On a pull request, Security Posture called live exceptions unused. CodeQL reports only what
    the change introduces on a pull request ref, so when it reported anything, an exception for a
    finding still open on main in an untouched file matched nothing and failed the gate
    (cookieradar #37, 2026-10-12). main's open alerts now count as history the record may match,
    like the closed ones; blocking is still decided on the pull request's own alerts. Simulated on
    #37's real alerts: the false "unused" goes, the real new alert stays.
  • SonarCloud failed main on the coverage of new code (78.6% against 80%) after the HTTPS-only
    law fetch: fetch_html without a client of its own and the redirect limit had no test. Both
    are now exercised against real servers on 127.0.0.1: a plain HTTP server that is never served
    in clear, and an HTTPS server, with a certificate made by openssl for the test, whose
    redirects loop until the limit stops them.
  • Security Posture judged every pull request by main's alerts. It listed the alerts without
    a ref, so GitHub answered for main, and its wait compared the scanners' runs with the merge
    commit, which none of them carries: on mailradar #39 it waited two seconds. It now waits for
    the runs of the branch head, Bandit included, and reads the open alerts of refs/pull/N/merge;
    the closed ones come from that ref and from main, so an exception main holds as settled is not
    called unused on a ref with no history. Checked against a recent pull request of each Radar
    with the real tool: the same verdict as main in all six.
  • The texts of the law arrived in clear. Cellar answers its https:// URL with a 303 to an
    http:// one (recorded on 2026-10-11 for the GDPR), and fetch_html followed it, so the act
    travelled without TLS and the SHA-256 printed beside a citation described bytes nothing had
    protected. Redirects are now followed by hand and a hop to http:// is taken over https://,
    which serves the same document byte for byte; if that fails, the fallback to EUR-Lex applies.
    Checked live: the GDPR came back whole over two HTTPS requests. The test replays Cellar's
    recorded 303.
  • The Saturday mutation run would have died on the NIS2 tests. mutmut copies only the
    paths in also_copy into mutants/, and tests/test_nis2_evidence.py reads docs/, which
    was not among them. Listed now, with a test that reads, from its own source, every root
    path those tests use and checks that mutmut copies it.
  • The licence gate had never refused anything. pip-licenses --fail-on="GPL;AGPL;LGPL"
    compares whole licence strings, and no package declares just "GPL": they declare "GNU
    Lesser General Public License v2 or later (LGPLv2+)" and the like. Measured on 2026-10-11
    with chardet 5.2.0 installed next to cookieradar: exit 0 without --partial-match, exit 1
    with it. The flag is there now; CookieRadar's own runtime dependencies pass it.

Security

  • CVE-2026-88647 in gnutls28 recorded in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml. A hostname
    verification bypass with no fix in any Debian suite, found by the scan of the 2026.44
    image; same chain as the five gnutls/krb5 entries of 2026-10-09 (libcups2t64, not
    loaded by the headless shell), reviewed on 2026-11-30.
  • The gnutls28 and krb5 entries now say what was checked, not only what was read. The
    six gnutls CVEs of 2026-10-08 were reproduced with the public PoC certificates against
    Debian's own packages (trixie 3.8.9-3+deb13u4, sid 3.8.13-1) and had no upstream issue
    anywhere on 2026-10-10; CVE-2026-107778 in krb5 gained Debian bug 1150461, a no-dsa for
    trixie and a fix on the upstream 1.22 branch the same day.
  • **The...
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CookieRadar 2026.44

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@github-actions github-actions released this 10 Oct 09:16
v2026.44
a44f517

Security

  • CVE-2026-95210, CVE-2026-95209, CVE-2026-95184, CVE-2026-67693 (gnutls28) and
    CVE-2026-107778 (krb5) recorded in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml.
    Docker Scout opened
    the five against 2026.43 on 2026-10-09, one of them critical; patchradar debian the
    same day says open in trixie, no fix in any suite, no Debian bug, and the tracker still
    asks whether the four gnutls reports are valid. Neither library is in the base image:
    playwright install-deps chromium brings them in for libcups2t64, which is the only
    package depending on them. Measured in the published image, Playwright's full chrome
    links cups and so loads both; the chrome-headless-shell that cookieradar runs — the
    only mode that works in an image with no display — maps none of gnutls, krb5 or cups.
    No TLS here goes through gnutls (httpx uses OpenSSL via _ssl, Chromium its BoringSSL)
    and nothing uses Kerberos. Reviewed with the other Chromium dependencies by 2026-11-30.

Fixed

  • The report says when it was made and by what. The README calls it "evidence of
    what the site did on a given day", and the file saved on 2026-10-09 for
    www.repubblica.it carried no day: the only dates in it were the "Version of:" lines
    under the legal citations, which exist only when something is cited, and nothing
    named the CookieRadar that produced it. Every report now opens with
    Audited on 2026-10-09 12:37 UTC with CookieRadar 2026.43, and the HTML file has a
    <title> with the site's host — Rich's export template has none, so ten reports
    open side by side were ten tabs called report.html.

  • The law section no longer says "no cookie banner was found" under a report that
    says "Banner found".
    Measured on 2026-10-09 on it.wikipedia.org, www.subito.it and
    www.muenchen.de: every session printed the tick, neither button was clicked, and the
    UNVERIFIED note denied the banner. Both lines came from one result. The heuristic
    cannot tell a Didomi notice from a footer link called "Dichiarazione sui cookie"
    (Wikipedia's match), and the note now says what it knows: something that looks like
    a banner was found, and no refusal control was recognised on it.

  • A page that never goes idle keeps its HTTP status. page.goto(wait_until= "networkidle") returns the response only when the wait succeeds; when the page keeps
    the network busy it raises a timeout and the status, which had arrived in the first
    second, was lost with it. Measured on 2026-10-09: zalando.it answered 403 from its
    edge with a full page whose scripts never went quiet, so the status was None,
    page_not_served saw nothing wrong, and the audit said "0 trackers before consent,
    UNVERIFIED" about an error page it never had; enel.it and poste.it, served with 200
    and never idle, showed no status in any session. The status is now taken from the
    main document's response as it arrives, last hop of a redirect, and goto only
    confirms it. tests/site/forbidden_busy.html, served with 403 by the test server
    under /forbidden/, reproduces the zalando.it case.

  • TrustArc and Usercentrics refusals are clicked, and so are "Non accetto",
    "Continua senza accettare" and "Solo gli essenziali".
    Measured on 2026-10-09:
    enel.it and poste.it (TrustArc) offer refusal in one click — #truste-consent-required
    "Continua senza accettare", whose banner says it leaves only technical cookies, and
    #truste-consent-required2 "Non accetto" — and the audit clicked "Accetta", found no
    refusal, and reported "Accept was applied and no refusal control was found" with
    GDPR art. 4(11) cited against both. zalando.it (Usercentrics) renders its banner in a
    shadow root with no ids; the refusal is [data-testid="uc-deny-all-button"] "Solo gli
    essenziali". The three banners are in tests/site/, captured from the real pages
    that day, and the sessions now click the refusal on each and the acceptance on none.

  • An error page in any of the three sessions means NOT MEASURED. page_not_served
    read the pre-consent status only. In the batch run of 2026-10-09 www.zalando.it got no
    response at all in the pre-consent session and the edge's 403 page in the post-reject
    one — with a Usercentrics banner over it and Google Tag Manager loading once "Solo gli
    essenziali" was clicked — and the verdict came out as VIOLATION, 2 trackers new after
    rejection
    , assembled from one session that saw nothing and one that saw an error page.
    The verdict rests on session 3; an error page there leaves it nothing to rest on. The
    report now names the session that got the error page, and the other sessions' tables
    say that no verdict rests on them.

Changed

  • The test matrix runs on 3.15-dev too, as an experimental row. 3.15.0 final is
    due 2026-10-09 (PEP 790) and the dependencies the suite stands on already ship
    cp315 wheels; actions/setup-python resolves 3.15-dev to the newest build, rc.3
    today and the final once it is out. The row is an include with
    continue-on-error, so it may fail without failing the run or the required
    Tests check; the classifiers still stop at 3.14 until 3.15 is final. patchradar
    has had the same row since 2026-08-20.

CookieRadar 2026.43

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@github-actions github-actions released this 08 Oct 15:25
v2026.43
2f2e395

Added

  • CVE-2026-77214 recorded in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml. Docker Scout and Snyk
    report the heap over-read in expat's XML_ParseBuffer; patchradar debian on
    2026-10-08 says fixed in sid only (2.9.0-1), open in trixie, bookworm and forky, no
    Debian bug yet. Recorded the way the other expat entries are, to be reviewed by
    2026-11-30, with who loads the system libexpat1 in the image: fontconfig and Mesa,
    for their own configuration files. CPython's pyexpat carries its own copy, and
    cookieradar parses no XML.

  • The files the build is told to include are checked to be there. apkradar lost its
    LICENSE out of the working tree on 2026-10-04 and the loss reached main: pyproject
    names the file, so python -m build failed with License file does not exist: LICENSE,
    and the PyPI publish and the image went down with it. cookieradar lost its own a few
    hours later, during a run of the suite. Neither suite noticed, because neither looked.

    What removes them is still not known, and these cases do not explain it. They stop it
    reaching a commit, which is the part that can be fixed without knowing.

    The expectation is read out of the declarations rather than written down as LICENSE,
    because the five Radar do not declare it the same way: patchradar states its licence as
    text and only its Dockerfile names the file, the other four name it in pyproject, and of
    those apkradar and mailradar do not copy it into the image. So two cases — every file
    pyproject names, and every path the Dockerfile copies — and between them each repository
    is covered, three of them twice.

    Checked by moving the file aside in all five: it fails where it should and passes where
    the declaration genuinely does not name it, and pointing pyproject at a file that is not
    there fails too.

Fixed

  • Two defences in release.sh that the tests did not actually measure. Found by
    mutating the script rather than by reading it.

    Replacing the existing-tag check's fail with an echo of the same words left every
    case green: the script carried on, bumped, committed, and only then did git tag
    refuse the tag that already existed. The release was still refused — one commit too
    late, which is the opposite of what the script promises, that a refusal leaves the
    version file modified and nothing else. The cases now check that it did not commit on
    its way to refusing.

    And git push --atomic was not measured at all; two separate pushes passed. With two
    pushes main arrives and the tag does not, so the repository carries a version bump
    that no release and no published artifact corresponds to — and the tag that would
    produce them cannot be pushed afterwards either, because the version it would be
    given is by then "already the current version". A pre-receive hook on the test
    remote now refuses tags, which is the way to make the second half fail on demand.

    Both mutations fail now, along with the three that already did.

  • The PyPI wait allows a margin once the index answers. apkradar's Docker build
    failed on 2026-10-03 with No matching distribution found fifteen seconds after
    the wait had reported the version available — 16:31:21 against 16:31:36. The poll is
    not wrong and not enough: it establishes that the file is reachable from the runner,
    while the build container, multi-platform through buildx, resolves the index again
    and can reach an edge still serving the old one.

    This is not the sleep 60 that stood in that step before polling and lost the race
    twice. That was a guess about how long publishing takes, made before knowing
    anything; this waits for the fact first and then allows a bounded margin for it to
    propagate, and says so in the log when it uses one.

    It narrows the window; it does not close it. What closes it is not asking the index
    during the build at all — which is what exeradar's Dockerfile already does, with
    pip install /app/src, and why exeradar has no wait script and did not hit this.
    cookieradar and patchradar are one word from that (_SOURCE=local); apkradar and
    mailradar would need the build argument added. That is the follow-up.

    Three cases hold the margin, and they were needed twice over. The two cases that
    already drove this script pass the retry interval as zero so they stay fast, and the
    new default made every success wait 45 seconds past their timeout — so the suite was
    red in all four repositories until those two were told to ask for no grace. Telling
    them that alone would have left the margin itself unmeasured, which is the shape of
    defect this script was written to fix in the first place. So: one case times a
    two-second grace and checks the log says why it waited, one checks that no grace
    waits for nothing and claims nothing, and one measures the default without the
    suite paying 45 seconds for it — started with no grace argument, the script must
    still be running three seconds after the index answered. All four ways of undoing
    the margin were checked against them: the default set to zero, the wait removed
    while the log still claims it, the log removed while the wait still happens, and the
    guard removed so zero waits anyway.

  • batch no longer crashes on a site it could not see. The verdict was turned into
    a label through a table with no entry for ERROR, so a site answering 403, or a
    bot-management challenge answering 200, ended in ❌ Error: <ExitCode.ERROR: 3>, and
    the report asked for with -o was never written. It now reads ⛔ NOT MEASURED with
    the reason and no tracker counts — as audit already did — and the report is saved.

  • Auditing a site that is itself on the tracker list no longer finds it a tracker of
    itself.
    linkedin.com, facebook.com, bing.com, tiktok.com: the site's own
    document was counted as the tracker linkedin.com in every session, so the verdict
    was always VIOLATION "persists from pre-consent". Requests to the audited site are
    first-party, which the README already put out of scope, and trackers is again the
    subset of external that its own comment says it is.

  • The accept selector button[id*='agree'] no longer clicks "disagree". A substring
    match: Didomi's didomi-notice-disagree-button sits next to its agree button, and
    the selectors are tried before the labels, so the post-accept session rejected and
    was recorded as accepted.

  • The site is the one the browser landed on, spelled as the browser spells it. The
    host compared against every request came from the address typed: müller.de against
    requests to xn--mller-kva.de, or example.com against a redirect to example.it,
    and every resource of the site came out as an unknown external host. The typed host
    is now converted to IDNA, and the main frame's navigation — redirects included —
    decides the site, in Chromium's own spelling (which also covers ß, where Python's
    IDNA 2003 codec and Chromium disagree). Checked against real Chromium on local pages.

  • No provision is cited for a challenge page. notes_of knew that an error page is
    not the site and did not know the same of a challenge served with 200, so the report
    said NOT MEASURED and, under the provisions, "no cookie banner was found". Both now get
    their own NOT MEASURED note, and findings_of draws no finding from either: a reject
    button on a page that is not the site no longer leads to citing a violation.

  • normalize_url refuses an address with no host. https:// passed, the browser
    refused to navigate, and an invalid address exited 2 (UNVERIFIED) instead of 3.

  • An unreadable --trackers database exits 3, not 1. Only ValueError was caught,
    so a .eno that could not be read escaped as a traceback with exit status 1 — which
    a pipeline reads as VIOLATION.

  • batch -o report names no longer collide where the filesystem ignores case.
    Example.com.txt and example.com.txt are one file on Windows and macOS, and the
    second report overwrote the first.

  • A trackerdb block left open is kept when another block follows it, not only at the
    end of the file, as the parser's docstring already promised.

  • Shell scripts are checked out with LF everywhere (.gitattributes). With
    core.autocrlf=true a Windows checkout wrote release.sh and wait_for_pypi.sh with
    CRLF, and bash stopped at set: pipefail\r: invalid option name.

  • pytest, as the README says to run it, no longer ends in three errors. The
    benchmarks need the CodSpeed runner, which only codspeed.yml installs; without it
    they are now skipped with that reason. And pyproject.toml no longer sends the reader
    to tests/test_benchmark_contract.py, a file that never existed.

  • README: audit --trackers is in the command reference, the version examples use
    the current scheme, and batch's NOT MEASURED is described.

Changed

  • The race with PyPI is closed rather than narrowed: the released image no longer asks
    the index.
    docker.yml installed cookieradar==<the new version> from PyPI and
    polled the index first to make that work. The poll is not wrong and not enough: it runs
    on the runner, while the multi-platform build resolves the index again, per platform,
    from whichever edge answers — apkradar lost that race on 2026-10-03 fifteen seconds
    after
    its poll had succeeded. Nothing that waits can close it. Not asking does, so the
    image is built from the source the tag points at.

    local is also the branch tests.yml already builds on every run, with the smoke test
    behind it, so the release moves onto the better exercised of the two paths rather than
    onto an untried one. This repository is the only one of the five where that was already
    true; in the other four the only thing that built the image automatically was the
    workflow that publishes it.

    Two things follow. A dispatched rebuild now chec...

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v2026.42

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@github-actions github-actions released this 04 Oct 09:51
v2026.42
2f386f5

What's Changed

  • fix(ci): a fixed tag for the image Snyk scans by @maksimtech in #20
  • fix(ci): mutation testing runs again — also_copy for what the tests read by @maksimtech in #22
  • ci: pin the runners to ubuntu-26.04, benchmarks to 24.04 by @maksimtech in #21

Full Changelog: v2026.41...v2026.42

v2026.41

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@github-actions github-actions released this 30 Sep 14:25
v2026.41
8ac9771

Full Changelog: v2026.40.1...v2026.41

v2026.40.1

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@github-actions github-actions released this 26 Sep 14:28
v2026.40.1
13d1c21

What's Changed

  • build(deps): bump actions/upload-artifact from 4 to 7 by @dependabot[bot] in #19

Full Changelog: v2026.40...v2026.40.1