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CookieRadar 2026.47

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@github-actions github-actions released this 15 Nov 11:02
· 12 commits to main since this release
v2026.47
fa09377

Added

  • scanner.verdict and scanner.Verdict: the verdict as a public function. It lived in
    cli._verdict, which a caller could not import, and APKRadar's --full decided it by itself,
    more narrowly: three of the four ways a site is not OK came out as compliant. The command line
    now uses the same function, and Verdict's values are its exit codes.

Changed

  • The image runs Python 3.14. It was built on python:3.12-slim-trixie: 3.12 has had security fixes
    only since April 2025, and 3.13 joined it in October 2026. 3.14 gets bug fixes until October 2027 and
    security fixes until October 2030; 3.15, a month old, was too new for the wheels the image needs.
    exeradar and patchradar were already built on 3.14. sbom.yml resolves the Python environment of a
    release with the image's interpreter, so it moves to 3.14 too, and tests/test_docker_python.py keeps
    the two together. Measured on 2026-11-13 on the rebuilt image: the same audit of a local page, on 3.12
    and on 3.14, gives the same verdict, provisions and report.

  • pip leaves the image once cookieradar is installed. The 3.14 base ships pip 26.2.2, and Trivy
    reported five high findings against the packages pip vendors: msgpack 1.1.2 (CVE-2026-114613,
    GHSA-6v7p-g79w-8964), urllib3 2.7.0 (CVE-2026-97687, -97689) and setuptools 70.3.0 (CVE-2025-47273).
    pip 26.3 still vendors that setuptools. Nothing in the image runs pip after the build, so the layer
    that installs cookieradar uninstalls it, and sbom.yml drops it from the venv the source SBOM
    describes, as tests/test_nis2_evidence.py already required of any package the image removes
    (tests/test_docker_pip.py).

  • Trivy's expat and libXi findings are recorded, measured in the rebuilt image. On 2026-11-09
    Trivy began reporting four expat CVEs (CVE-2026-115506, -113351, -118370, -117610) and two libXi
    ones (CVE-2026-109089, -109090) in the Chromium dependencies, and Security Posture failed. Measured
    that day in the image rebuilt from v2026.46: Chromium declares the system libexpat directly, which
    the entries had not said (they named fontconfig and Mesa alone), so the expat entries rest on what
    each flaw takes rather than on its reach, and the two Debian has fixed elsewhere keep the short
    date, for the stable update to ask for. libXi comes in through the accessibility bridge only and
    its flaws need an X server, which headless Chromium never connects to.

  • The sqlite3 findings say what Debian decided, and Trivy's two new ones are recorded. On
    2026-11-09 Trivy began reporting CVE-2026-119374 and CVE-2026-119379, which only Docker Scout had
    reported, and Security Posture failed on main. Both now have a Trivy entry beside the Scout one.
    The sqlite3 entries also said there was no fixed version anywhere and that they waited for Debian:
    Debian has since fixed the three CVEs in sid (3.54.1-1) and marked them no-dsa for trixie, so no
    trixie update will come. They stay accepted on the ground they already gave, that no code of the
    project reaches the flawed parts of SQLite, until 2026-12-31, when the question becomes a base
    image with a fixed sqlite3.

  • Dependabot proposes a release once it is 14 days old, and actions arrive as one pull request.
    The Radar take a dependency at least 14 days after its release unless a known vulnerability makes the
    older version the risk; without a cooldown Dependabot opened twelve pull requests across the Radar on
    2026-10-29 and 2026-11-02 for releases two to thirteen days old. .github/dependabot.yml now sets a
    14-day cooldown on every ecosystem — Dependabot's security updates are not subject to it — and groups
    the GitHub Actions updates into one weekly pull request. tests/test_dependabot_config.py holds both.

  • Trivy scans the image a pull request builds; Snyk is gone. As in maksimtech/apkradar#54: of what
    snyk.yml ran, only the container scan worked. Snyk Open Source stopped on SNYK-OS-PYTHON-0013
    ("Missing required packages") here too, so its check on new dependency issues let everything through;
    Snyk Code repeated CodeQL, Bandit and SonarCloud; and the free plan's monthly test quota, shared by the
    Radar, was spent. trivy.yml now builds the image and scans it before merge, with no token and no
    quota. The Snyk-sourced entries left SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml, their reasons moving into the entries
    of the scanners that still report the same CVEs; tests/test_trivy_workflow.py holds the image scan,
    and tests/test_workflow_set.py keeps snyk.yml retired.
    Its first run reported the nine base-image CVEs the other Radar record (util-linux ×4, ncurses,
    systemd, perl, sqlite3, acl), to wait for Debian, and seventeen in Chromium's and the virtual
    display's dependencies: libxml2 ×8 (CVE-2026-6653 critical), cups ×2, the X.Org server behind Xvfb ×5,
    libX11 and libXrender. Each entry says, measured in the published image, why it is not reached: Chromium
    does not link libxml2, the image has the cups client library and no print server, Xvfb is never
    started and headless Chromium talks to no X server. The fix-elsewhere ones keep a short review date
    and the Debian bug to ask on. The Snyk entries' reasons moved to the Docker Scout and Trivy entries of
    the same CVEs; expat CVE-2026-115506, which only Snyk reported, is noted in the header. With them, the
    three sqlite3 CVEs Docker Scout raised on main on 2026-11-02, which had turned Security Posture red.

  • The author address published on PyPI is the project alias, github@maksimtech.com. It was a
    personal mailbox, which PyPI shows to anyone and bulk senders harvest: on 2026-10-31 a cold "patch
    offer" from a mass-mailing account reached it. Releases already published keep the old address;
    the next one carries the alias. tests/test_package_metadata.py keeps it that way.

Fixed

  • Security Posture reads every page of alerts. The code scanning API returns at most a hundred alerts
    per call, and the gate read one page of each list. On 2026-11-13 #68 had 123 open alerts on its ref and
    main had 142: three exceptions whose findings sat past the hundredth read as matching nothing, and the
    gate failed on a product whose every alert was explained. Read the other way, an unexplained alert past
    the hundredth would not have been seen at all. Each of the four reads now goes through
    gh api --paginate --slurp and joins the pages; a failed read still fails, so an unreadable list is not
    taken for an empty one. tests/test_security_posture_workflow.py runs the step's own function against a
    stand-in gh that answers in two pages. Run against the real API on #68: 123 alerts read, verdict ok.

  • The image builds again: it installs the Playwright that uv.lock resolves. The Dockerfile installed
    playwright>=1.40.0, so each build took the newest release on PyPI. On 2026-11-12 that was 1.65.1,
    published the day before, whose Node driver needs libatomic.so.1: python:3.12-slim-trixie does not
    ship it, playwright install-deps chromium stopped with exit code 127, and Trivy and Security Posture
    failed on main with no image to scan. The build of 2026-11-09, on the same base image digest, had
    taken 1.64.1. The image now installs playwright==1.63.0, the version uv.lock resolves, and
    tests/test_docker_playwright.py fails when a lock update leaves the Dockerfile behind.
    docs/nis2-compliance.md said the image resolves every dependency at build time; it now names
    Playwright as the exception.

  • Docker Scout no longer fails on its own base-image advice. From 2026-10-24 every run of
    docker-scout.yml failed and GitHub mailed it on each push to main: the CVE scan worked, then the scout
    CLI crashed in the recommendations part (nil pointer in recommendations/markdown.go) on images built
    on python:3.12-slim-trixie. The scan is now a step of its own that writes the SARIF and fails the job if it
    fails; the recommendations are a second step with continue-on-error. tests/test_scout_steps.py
    holds the two apart. Same change as maksimtech/mailradar#76.

  • Docker Scout scans the image as soon as it is published, and Security Posture reads that scan.
    The scan reads latest from Docker Hub but ran only on a push to main, weekly or by hand: after the
    certifi release the gate stayed red on the replaced image until both were dispatched by hand.
    docker-scout.yml now follows the image workflow (workflow_run, successful runs only) and
    security-posture.yml follows the scan. docs/nis2-compliance.md now says so, and tests/test_scan_after_publish.py
    holds them together.

Security

  • The image no longer carries an X server. playwright install-deps chromium installs xvfb and
    xserver-common for headed browsers without a display; nothing in the image starts one, and nothing
    else installed depends on either (measured 2026-11-13). The first image scanned since the build broke
    brought six X.Org Server CVEs against them (CVE-2026-109091, -109092, -109093, -109095, -109096,
    -109903), fixed in sid and open in trixie. Both packages are now purged in the same layer, and only
    they: --auto-remove would also take Mesa and libvulkan, which Chromium may load. The five older
    X.Org findings accepted in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml close with them. --no-headless has no display
    in the container. tests/test_docker_xserver.py keeps both packages out.

  • Fourteen MIT krb5 CVEs are recorded in SECURITY-EXCEPTIONS.toml. MIT's announcement of
    2026-11-09 (fixed in krb5 1.22.3) has no fix in Debian, sid included (bug 1153598). Measured
    2026-11-13: krb5 comes in through libcups, which chrome-headless-shell does not declare; it names
    libgssapi_krb5 only to answer an HTTP Negotiate challenge, with no krb5.conf and no credential cache in
    the image. Three of the CVEs are in libgssrpc, which is not installed (this line said two until the
    Docker Scout entries below were written). Reviewed by 2026-11-30.

  • Docker Scout's reports of the krb5 CVEs are recorded too. Once #67 reached main, Security Posture
    failed there on six krb5 CVEs that Docker Scout reports on the published image, at the same version:
    five with a Trivy entry, and CVE-2026-112314, which Scout alone reports, from the same MIT
    denial-of-service group. Same reasons and the same review date. Checked against all 142 open alerts on
    main, read page by page, which the gate itself reads only the first hundred of.

  • The harfbuzz exception also covers Docker Scout's report of the same flaw (CVE-2026-113679),
    which appeared once the 2026.46 image was published; same reasons as SNYK-DEBIAN13-HARFBUZZ-21663516.