Skip to content

CookieRadar 2026.48

Latest

Choose a tag to compare

@github-actions github-actions released this 18 Nov 16:09
v2026.48
032b122

Changed

  • Two OpenSSL issues of 2026-11-17 are accepted until Debian ships 3.5.10. On 2026-11-18 Docker
    Scout reported CVE-2026-107493 and CVE-2026-124709 as high against the same openssl, and Security
    Posture failed again. OpenSSL rates both Low and fixes them in 3.5.10; Debian lists trixie and sid
    as vulnerable, with no fix. Neither is reachable here: one needs an application passing its own
    stack to PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex(), which OpenSSL and Python's ssl never do, the other a QUIC
    server. The advisory's third issue, CVE-2026-35190, is not reported by any scanner yet and has no
    entry, since an unused one fails the gate. Reviewed on 2026-12-15 with the four of 2026-11-10 below.

  • Four OpenSSL issues of 2026-11-10 are accepted until Debian ships 3.5.10. At the first scan of
    main on 2026-11-17 Docker Scout reported CVE-2026-95691, CVE-2026-95692, CVE-2026-88823 and
    CVE-2026-107496 as high against the base image's openssl 3.5.7-1~deb13u3, and Security Posture
    failed. OpenSSL rates all four Low and fixes them in 3.5.10; Debian has no trixie package with the
    fix yet. None is reachable here: they need the OpenSSL QUIC client, AES-GCM-SIV through EVP, or
    CMS_encrypt(), and Python's ssl exposes none of them, while the audited sites go through
    Chromium's own BoringSSL. The entries are reviewed on 2026-12-15; the rebuild that brings the DSA
    will make them fail the gate as unused.

  • The 49 exceptions due on 2026-11-30 are reviewed. Without the review, Security Posture would
    have failed on its own from 2026-12-01. Each entry was read again on 2026-11-17 against the Debian
    security tracker and archive, and against the image. 37 move on. libxml2, expat 2.9.0, krb5 and
    cups are still unfixed in trixie, or fixed only in sid, and move to 2026-12-31; acl, which is
    no-dsa and waits for a point release, moves to 2027-01-31. 12 go. Two expat CVEs were fixed by
    DSA-6566-1 and the image has the fix. harfbuzz is not affected in Debian. Four gnutls CVEs are
    rated unimportant by Debian, and one was rejected by its CNA. The four xorg-server entries cover
    packages the Dockerfile purges. krb5 CVE-2026-107778 stays: Docker Scout has been quiet on it
    since 2026-10-11, but the package has not changed. Run against the live alerts, the gate is green
    on 2026-11-17 and on 2026-12-01.

Fixed

  • A citation is "verified" only when the reference it cites is in the text downloaded now. The
    check looked at the article: with Cellar's page parsed and a point it cites, such as GDPR art.
    5(1)(a), missed by the parser, the reference fell back to the cache, old SHA-256 and date included,
    under "verified against Cellar"; with an empty cache the same label stood beside SHA256: not available. Every cited reference is now looked up in the text just parsed, and one that is missing
    makes the act a fetch failure: its citations come from the cache, labelled as such, or have no hash
    and say so. Ported from mailradar #103, as the five law modules below.

  • A failed download always reaches the EUR-Lex fallback and the cache. Only httpx.HTTPError was
    a fetch failure. A 303 to http://xn--/DOC_1 makes httpx raise idna.core.IDNAError, a
    ValueError, which skipped the fallback and ended the whole law check. httpx.InvalidURL and
    ValueError are now fetch failures too.

  • Redirects stay on the source's host. Any Location was followed, so a text served by another
    host was labelled "verified against Cellar". Cellar may redirect only to publications.europa.eu,
    EUR-Lex only to eur-lex.europa.eu and Normattiva only to www.normattiva.it, on the default port; the
    http:// hop Cellar makes is still taken over HTTPS. The hosts in docs/nis2-compliance.md are now
    the only ones the law check can reach, and the document says so.

  • A page is read up to 32 MiB, and a fetch ends after 120 seconds. The timeout bounded each read,
    not the whole, and nothing limited the size of the page. The body is now streamed, refused past
    MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES (32 MiB; the GDPR from Cellar is 823981 bytes) and abandoned past
    FETCH_DEADLINE (120 s, redirects included); either one is a fetch failure, so the fallbacks apply.

  • A change in the law is reported even when the cache cannot be written. The comparison with the
    previous text was made by the save, so with a read-only cache a law whose text changed was cited
    without the warning, and an unchanged wording was dated to the day of the audit. The merge is now
    law_cache.merge, made before the save and kept whether the save succeeds or not.

  • Errors and status lines name the source that was tried. A missing article always read "not
    found in the EUR-Lex page", for Normattiva and Cellar pages too, and the report's status line said
    "EUR-Lex unreachable" whatever had happened — for the GDPR, whose first source is Cellar, even when
    Cellar had answered. LawFetchError carries source and reached, ActStatus carries tried
    and failure, and the line says "GDPR: Cellar answered without the text cited" or "GDPR: Cellar
    and EUR-Lex unreachable".

  • A corrupt law cache is an empty one. A deeply nested law_cache.json made json.loads raise
    RecursionError, and the whole law check failed. It is now read as an empty cache.

  • Normattiva's "-bis" paragraphs have a reference of their own. Paragraph numbers were read as
    \d+, so paragraph 2-bis of art. 122 of the Codice privacy, and 3-bis and 4-bis of art. 21 of the
    Consumer Code, were part of the article's text and could not be cited; the later Latin numbers
    (-ter, -quater, ... -decies, -terdecies) are read too.

  • audit no longer lists trackers "loaded after rejection" when nothing was rejected. With a
    tracking cookie stored before any choice the verdict is VIOLATION whether or not the reject button
    was found, and the report then printed "N tracker(s) loaded after rejection" for the trackers of a
    session in which the refusal was never applied: on www.repubblica.it on 2026-11-17, a pay-to-refuse
    wall, five of them. The list is now printed only when the refusal was clicked, as batch and the
    law check already did.

  • A site that never loaded is no longer reported as measured. verdict ignored a session's error
    when there was no status: a navigation that failed outright (name not resolved, connection refused
    or reset, nothing before the timeout) left a session with no trackers and no cookie, which read as a
    clean one. On 2026-11-17 www.gnu.org's pre-consent session got net::ERR_CONNECTION_RESET while the
    other two loaded, and the verdict was OK; an unresolvable host exited with 2 and "reject button not
    found". A session with an error, no status and nothing from a document is now unreachable
    (scanner.unreachable). Every session unreachable is ⛔ NOT MEASURED, exit 3, in audit, batch
    and the law check; session 1 or 3 unreachable is never OK, and UNVERIFIED says which session never
    loaded. The README's exit codes say so.

  • A close "×" that subscribes is no longer clicked as a refusal. The close step ran before the
    check for a refusal sold with a subscription, and chose by selector alone. On www.ansa.it on
    2026-11-17 iubenda's .iubenda-cs-close-btn was labelled "Rifiuta e abbonati": it was clicked,
    Piano's checkout opened, and the session was measured as a refusal and cited. Every step that
    clicks now skips a control whose aria-label, text, value or title is a refusal sold with a
    subscription, and the English "Reject all and subscribe" (also "Reject", "Decline" or "Refuse" …
    "and subscribe") is recognised beside "Rifiuta e abbonati".

  • A tracker fired right after "Reject" is reported. The post-reject session waited two seconds
    after the click and only then emptied its lists before the reload, so every request in those two
    seconds was thrown away — among them a tag that fires on the consent update whatever the choice,
    which is the misconfiguration the session exists to find. The lists are now cut where they stood
    when the refusal was clicked: what the page loaded before it still does not count, what the click
    set off does.

  • A tag manager's library and a Consent Mode ping with storage denied are no longer cited after a
    refusal.
    Every tracker host contacted after "Reject" was a violation of GDPR art. 5(1)(a),
    ePrivacy art. 5(3), art. 7 and the Consumer Code, including the two kinds of request the README
    already called possibly lawful before any choice. On 2026-11-17, after a refusal that was clicked,
    www.köln.de loaded gtm.js, gtag/js and a GA4 collect with gcs=G100, and nothing else; it was
    a VIOLATION with four provisions cited. www.comune.milano.it loaded nine scripts from
    assets.adobedtm.com and no Adobe beacon. A domain whose every request after the refusal was a tag
    manager's library fetched as a script (Google Tag Manager, Adobe Launch, Tealium, TagCommander) or
    a Google ping with gcs=G100 is now reported as "Loaded after rejection, not cited", with the
    reason, and is not cited — unless the session holds a tracking cookie by name or a cookie on that
    domain. Beacons, pixels and granted pings stay violations, and so does a domain with any other
    request: aranzulla.it's doubleclick.net and googlesyndication.com still are. Violations has a
    not_cited field; scanner.not_cited_after_rejection names them. The README says what the rule is.

  • A listed site's own cookies are not "tracking stored before any choice". A cookie counted as
    tracking storage when its domain was on the tracker list, and linkedin.com is on it as a tracker of
    other sites: audited on its own domain, whose requests were already left out as first-party, its
    bcookie and lang made a VIOLATION citing art. 122(1) of the Codice privacy. A cookie now counts
    by its domain only when that domain is not the site's (is_same_site with the host the document
    came from, recorded as SessionResult.host); _ga, _fbp and the other names still count wherever
    they are set.

  • A refusal whose reload failed is no longer a clean session 3. After the click, session 3
    reloads the page; a reload that failed with anything but a timeout (connection reset, aborted)
    ended the session with the first load's status and the click recorded, so it read as a measured
    one with nothing in it: verdict OK, exit 0, "No trackers loaded after rejection", on a test page
    that loads doubleclick.net on every load. Such a session is now reload_failed: never OK
    (UNVERIFIED, unless something was already caught after the click), and audit, batch and the law
    check say the page could not be reloaded after the refusal.

  • A release no longer goes red because the index answered the check before it had caught up. After
    the upload, Publish to PyPI installs the new version into a fresh venv to prove it installs.
    That was a single pip install, given no retry on the ground that the job has one resolver.
    apkradar 2026.48 disproved it on 2026-11-16: the wait saw the version at 15:04:30 and the install
    three seconds later, on the same runner, was told it did not exist, on a release that was fine.
    The install now goes through .github/scripts/install_from_pypi.sh, which asks again (ten
    attempts, 30 s apart) until it succeeds or names the version it could not install: the same
    script, and the same tests/test_install_from_pypi.py, in all six Radar. It installs the wheel
    only (--only-binary :all:), as apkradar and patchradar already did: the check is about the file
    that was uploaded, not a build of the sdist.

  • Security Posture gives no verdict on a failed Docker Scout scan. It ran after every Scout run,
    failed ones included. On 2026-11-16 exeradar's Scout stopped on a 403 before scanning, and the
    gate went green on the previous scan's alerts. It now runs on a workflow_run only when the scan
    succeeded, as Scout itself does after the image workflow. Push, pull request, schedule and manual
    runs are unchanged.

  • Dependabot reads uv.lock for security updates. patchradar's uv.lock held opentelemetry-api
    1.45.1 with a Dependabot alert on it from 2026-11-14, and no pull request came, because no entry
    of the configuration read uv.lock. A uv entry with open-pull-requests-limit: 0 stops version
    updates for uv, so pip's remain the one weekly stream, and leaves security updates to arrive.

  • The documentation describes the release that is out, not 2026.44. On 2026-11-16, with 2026.47.1
    published, the README showed CookieRadar 2026.44 as the output of --version and
    maksimtech/cookieradar:v2026.44 as the image tag: the form was checked, the number was not. Both
    now show the placeholder YYYY.N, which does not age, and tests/test_version_contract.py refuses a
    real number there; requiring the current version instead would stop release.sh, which runs the
    suite after the bump and before anyone could edit the README. docs/nis2-compliance.md, revision 2,
    describes the image main builds: python:3.14-slim-trixie with Playwright 1.65.1, whose Chromium
    is build 1254, Chromium 158.0.8127.18, read from browsers.json in the Playwright 1.65.1 wheel on
    PyPI; revision 1 still named Playwright 1.63.0 and build 1243, the image of 2026.44. SECURITY.md
    says that Docker Scout scans each newly published image and that Security Posture follows the scan,
    as they have since 2026-10-24.