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Changed
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Two OpenSSL issues of 2026-11-17 are accepted until Debian ships 3.5.10. On 2026-11-18 Docker
Scout reported CVE-2026-107493 and CVE-2026-124709 as high against the same openssl, and Security
Posture failed again. OpenSSL rates both Low and fixes them in 3.5.10; Debian lists trixie and sid
as vulnerable, with no fix. Neither is reachable here: one needs an application passing its own
stack toPEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex(), which OpenSSL and Python's ssl never do, the other a QUIC
server. The advisory's third issue, CVE-2026-35190, is not reported by any scanner yet and has no
entry, since an unused one fails the gate. Reviewed on 2026-12-15 with the four of 2026-11-10 below. -
Four OpenSSL issues of 2026-11-10 are accepted until Debian ships 3.5.10. At the first scan of
main on 2026-11-17 Docker Scout reported CVE-2026-95691, CVE-2026-95692, CVE-2026-88823 and
CVE-2026-107496 as high against the base image's openssl 3.5.7-1~deb13u3, and Security Posture
failed. OpenSSL rates all four Low and fixes them in 3.5.10; Debian has no trixie package with the
fix yet. None is reachable here: they need the OpenSSL QUIC client, AES-GCM-SIV through EVP, or
CMS_encrypt(), and Python's ssl exposes none of them, while the audited sites go through
Chromium's own BoringSSL. The entries are reviewed on 2026-12-15; the rebuild that brings the DSA
will make them fail the gate as unused. -
The 49 exceptions due on 2026-11-30 are reviewed. Without the review, Security Posture would
have failed on its own from 2026-12-01. Each entry was read again on 2026-11-17 against the Debian
security tracker and archive, and against the image. 37 move on. libxml2, expat 2.9.0, krb5 and
cups are still unfixed in trixie, or fixed only in sid, and move to 2026-12-31; acl, which is
no-dsa and waits for a point release, moves to 2027-01-31. 12 go. Two expat CVEs were fixed by
DSA-6566-1 and the image has the fix. harfbuzz is not affected in Debian. Four gnutls CVEs are
rated unimportant by Debian, and one was rejected by its CNA. The four xorg-server entries cover
packages the Dockerfile purges. krb5 CVE-2026-107778 stays: Docker Scout has been quiet on it
since 2026-10-11, but the package has not changed. Run against the live alerts, the gate is green
on 2026-11-17 and on 2026-12-01.
Fixed
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A citation is "verified" only when the reference it cites is in the text downloaded now. The
check looked at the article: with Cellar's page parsed and a point it cites, such as GDPR art.
5(1)(a), missed by the parser, the reference fell back to the cache, old SHA-256 and date included,
under "verified against Cellar"; with an empty cache the same label stood besideSHA256: not available. Every cited reference is now looked up in the text just parsed, and one that is missing
makes the act a fetch failure: its citations come from the cache, labelled as such, or have no hash
and say so. Ported from mailradar #103, as the five law modules below. -
A failed download always reaches the EUR-Lex fallback and the cache. Only
httpx.HTTPErrorwas
a fetch failure. A 303 tohttp://xn--/DOC_1makes httpx raiseidna.core.IDNAError, a
ValueError, which skipped the fallback and ended the whole law check.httpx.InvalidURLand
ValueErrorare now fetch failures too. -
Redirects stay on the source's host. Any
Locationwas followed, so a text served by another
host was labelled "verified against Cellar". Cellar may redirect only to publications.europa.eu,
EUR-Lex only to eur-lex.europa.eu and Normattiva only to www.normattiva.it, on the default port; the
http:// hop Cellar makes is still taken over HTTPS. The hosts indocs/nis2-compliance.mdare now
the only ones the law check can reach, and the document says so. -
A page is read up to 32 MiB, and a fetch ends after 120 seconds. The timeout bounded each read,
not the whole, and nothing limited the size of the page. The body is now streamed, refused past
MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES(32 MiB; the GDPR from Cellar is 823981 bytes) and abandoned past
FETCH_DEADLINE(120 s, redirects included); either one is a fetch failure, so the fallbacks apply. -
A change in the law is reported even when the cache cannot be written. The comparison with the
previous text was made by the save, so with a read-only cache a law whose text changed was cited
without the warning, and an unchanged wording was dated to the day of the audit. The merge is now
law_cache.merge, made before the save and kept whether the save succeeds or not. -
Errors and status lines name the source that was tried. A missing article always read "not
found in the EUR-Lex page", for Normattiva and Cellar pages too, and the report's status line said
"EUR-Lex unreachable" whatever had happened — for the GDPR, whose first source is Cellar, even when
Cellar had answered.LawFetchErrorcarriessourceandreached,ActStatuscarriestried
andfailure, and the line says "GDPR: Cellar answered without the text cited" or "GDPR: Cellar
and EUR-Lex unreachable". -
A corrupt law cache is an empty one. A deeply nested
law_cache.jsonmadejson.loadsraise
RecursionError, and the whole law check failed. It is now read as an empty cache. -
Normattiva's "-bis" paragraphs have a reference of their own. Paragraph numbers were read as
\d+, so paragraph 2-bis of art. 122 of the Codice privacy, and 3-bis and 4-bis of art. 21 of the
Consumer Code, were part of the article's text and could not be cited; the later Latin numbers
(-ter, -quater, ... -decies, -terdecies) are read too. -
auditno longer lists trackers "loaded after rejection" when nothing was rejected. With a
tracking cookie stored before any choice the verdict is VIOLATION whether or not the reject button
was found, and the report then printed "N tracker(s) loaded after rejection" for the trackers of a
session in which the refusal was never applied: on www.repubblica.it on 2026-11-17, a pay-to-refuse
wall, five of them. The list is now printed only when the refusal was clicked, asbatchand the
law check already did. -
A site that never loaded is no longer reported as measured.
verdictignored a session's error
when there was no status: a navigation that failed outright (name not resolved, connection refused
or reset, nothing before the timeout) left a session with no trackers and no cookie, which read as a
clean one. On 2026-11-17 www.gnu.org's pre-consent session gotnet::ERR_CONNECTION_RESETwhile the
other two loaded, and the verdict was OK; an unresolvable host exited with 2 and "reject button not
found". A session with an error, no status and nothing from a document is now unreachable
(scanner.unreachable). Every session unreachable is⛔ NOT MEASURED, exit 3, inaudit,batch
and the law check; session 1 or 3 unreachable is never OK, and UNVERIFIED says which session never
loaded. The README's exit codes say so. -
A close "×" that subscribes is no longer clicked as a refusal. The close step ran before the
check for a refusal sold with a subscription, and chose by selector alone. On www.ansa.it on
2026-11-17 iubenda's.iubenda-cs-close-btnwas labelled "Rifiuta e abbonati": it was clicked,
Piano's checkout opened, and the session was measured as a refusal and cited. Every step that
clicks now skips a control whose aria-label, text, value or title is a refusal sold with a
subscription, and the English "Reject all and subscribe" (also "Reject", "Decline" or "Refuse" …
"and subscribe") is recognised beside "Rifiuta e abbonati". -
A tracker fired right after "Reject" is reported. The post-reject session waited two seconds
after the click and only then emptied its lists before the reload, so every request in those two
seconds was thrown away — among them a tag that fires on the consent update whatever the choice,
which is the misconfiguration the session exists to find. The lists are now cut where they stood
when the refusal was clicked: what the page loaded before it still does not count, what the click
set off does. -
A tag manager's library and a Consent Mode ping with storage denied are no longer cited after a
refusal. Every tracker host contacted after "Reject" was a violation of GDPR art. 5(1)(a),
ePrivacy art. 5(3), art. 7 and the Consumer Code, including the two kinds of request the README
already called possibly lawful before any choice. On 2026-11-17, after a refusal that was clicked,
www.köln.de loadedgtm.js,gtag/jsand a GA4 collect withgcs=G100, and nothing else; it was
a VIOLATION with four provisions cited. www.comune.milano.it loaded nine scripts from
assets.adobedtm.comand no Adobe beacon. A domain whose every request after the refusal was a tag
manager's library fetched as a script (Google Tag Manager, Adobe Launch, Tealium, TagCommander) or
a Google ping withgcs=G100is now reported as "Loaded after rejection, not cited", with the
reason, and is not cited — unless the session holds a tracking cookie by name or a cookie on that
domain. Beacons, pixels and granted pings stay violations, and so does a domain with any other
request: aranzulla.it's doubleclick.net and googlesyndication.com still are.Violationshas a
not_citedfield;scanner.not_cited_after_rejectionnames them. The README says what the rule is. -
A listed site's own cookies are not "tracking stored before any choice". A cookie counted as
tracking storage when its domain was on the tracker list, and linkedin.com is on it as a tracker of
other sites: audited on its own domain, whose requests were already left out as first-party, its
bcookieandlangmade a VIOLATION citing art. 122(1) of the Codice privacy. A cookie now counts
by its domain only when that domain is not the site's (is_same_sitewith the host the document
came from, recorded asSessionResult.host);_ga,_fbpand the other names still count wherever
they are set. -
A refusal whose reload failed is no longer a clean session 3. After the click, session 3
reloads the page; a reload that failed with anything but a timeout (connection reset, aborted)
ended the session with the first load's status and the click recorded, so it read as a measured
one with nothing in it: verdict OK, exit 0, "No trackers loaded after rejection", on a test page
that loads doubleclick.net on every load. Such a session is nowreload_failed: never OK
(UNVERIFIED, unless something was already caught after the click), andaudit,batchand the law
check say the page could not be reloaded after the refusal. -
A release no longer goes red because the index answered the check before it had caught up. After
the upload, Publish to PyPI installs the new version into a fresh venv to prove it installs.
That was a singlepip install, given no retry on the ground that the job has one resolver.
apkradar 2026.48 disproved it on 2026-11-16: the wait saw the version at 15:04:30 and the install
three seconds later, on the same runner, was told it did not exist, on a release that was fine.
The install now goes through.github/scripts/install_from_pypi.sh, which asks again (ten
attempts, 30 s apart) until it succeeds or names the version it could not install: the same
script, and the sametests/test_install_from_pypi.py, in all six Radar. It installs the wheel
only (--only-binary :all:), as apkradar and patchradar already did: the check is about the file
that was uploaded, not a build of the sdist. -
Security Posture gives no verdict on a failed Docker Scout scan. It ran after every Scout run,
failed ones included. On 2026-11-16 exeradar's Scout stopped on a 403 before scanning, and the
gate went green on the previous scan's alerts. It now runs on aworkflow_runonly when the scan
succeeded, as Scout itself does after the image workflow. Push, pull request, schedule and manual
runs are unchanged. -
Dependabot reads
uv.lockfor security updates. patchradar'suv.lockheld opentelemetry-api
1.45.1 with a Dependabot alert on it from 2026-11-14, and no pull request came, because no entry
of the configuration readuv.lock. Auventry withopen-pull-requests-limit: 0stops version
updates for uv, so pip's remain the one weekly stream, and leaves security updates to arrive. -
The documentation describes the release that is out, not 2026.44. On 2026-11-16, with 2026.47.1
published, the README showedCookieRadar 2026.44as the output of--versionand
maksimtech/cookieradar:v2026.44as the image tag: the form was checked, the number was not. Both
now show the placeholderYYYY.N, which does not age, andtests/test_version_contract.pyrefuses a
real number there; requiring the current version instead would stoprelease.sh, which runs the
suite after the bump and before anyone could edit the README.docs/nis2-compliance.md, revision 2,
describes the imagemainbuilds:python:3.14-slim-trixiewith Playwright 1.65.1, whose Chromium
is build 1254, Chromium 158.0.8127.18, read frombrowsers.jsonin the Playwright 1.65.1 wheel on
PyPI; revision 1 still named Playwright 1.63.0 and build 1243, the image of 2026.44.SECURITY.md
says that Docker Scout scans each newly published image and that Security Posture follows the scan,
as they have since 2026-10-24.