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fix: add github actions to verify PR name #24
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              | Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change | 
|---|---|---|
| @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ | ||
| name: Pull Request Name | ||
| on: | ||
| pull_request: | ||
| types: [opened, edited, synchronize, reopened] | ||
| branches: | ||
| - next | ||
| 
     | 
||
| jobs: | ||
| pull_request_name: | ||
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | ||
| steps: | ||
| - name: Obtain PR name | ||
| run: echo "PR_TITLE=${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}" >> $GITHUB_ENV | ||
| - name: Verify PR name | ||
| uses: actions/github-script@v6 | ||
| with: | ||
| script: | | ||
| if (!/^(fix|feat|perf):/.test(process.env.PR_TITLE)) { | ||
| throw new Error(`Please start the PR title with "fix:", "feat:" or "perf:". Current title: "${process.env.PR_TITLE}"`); | ||
| } | ||
      
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Shell-injection risk when echoing untrusted PR titles
github.event.pull_request.titleis fully user-controlled. By interpolating it straight into anechothat writes to$GITHUB_ENV, a malicious title containing new-lines or command substitutions could inject additional environment variables or even arbitrary shell commands.Use the workflow-native
env:mapping (orid+outputs) to avoid hitting the shell at all:This keeps the data path entirely inside the runner’s metadata expansion and eliminates injection vectors.
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🪛 actionlint (1.7.7)
12-12: "github.event.pull_request.title" is potentially untrusted. avoid using it directly in inline scripts. instead, pass it through an environment variable. see https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions for more details
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