The Origin of Risk

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> What drives individual risk-taking decisions and how do they affect aggregate risk?

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  - Choosing correlated TFPs creates aggregate risk

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- Because of endogenous risk, distortions can make GDP more volatile

We calibrate the model to the Spanish economy

- Removing distortions lead to a large decline in aggregate volatility

Most of macroeconomics takes risk as exogenous (at the micro and/or macro level)

- In models with individual firms, firm-level risk is generally exogenous but macro risk can be endogenous
  - Khan and Thomas (2008), Clementi and Palazzo (2016), Bloom et al. (2018), and many others
- In endogenous growth models, firms influence the growth rate of TFP but not its variance
  - Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Jones (1995)
- Growth models in which more complete markets push firms to adopt high-risk, high-reward projects,
  - Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Cole et al. (2016)
- Corporate finance literature where managers influence how risky a project is
  - Jensen and Meckling (1976), Ross (1977)
- Wedges in production network economies
  - Jones (2011), Baqaee and Farhi (2019), Liu (2019) and Bigio and La'O (2020)
- Technique choice in production networks
  - Oberfield (2018), Acemoglu and Azar (2020), Kopytov et al. (2024)

A model of endogenous risk

Static model with two types of agents

1. A representative household owns the firms, supplies labor and risk management resources

2. N firms produce differentiated goods using labor and intermediate inputs
   - Firm i has a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function

   $$F(\delta_i, L_i, X_i) = e^{a_i(\varepsilon, \delta_i)} \zeta_i L_i^{1-\sum_{j=1}^{N} \alpha_{ij}} \prod_{j=1}^{N} X_{ij}^{\alpha_{ij}}$$

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There are underlying sources of risk $\varepsilon = (\varepsilon_1, \ldots, \varepsilon_M)$ with $\varepsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \Sigma)$

- Examples: a river floods, discovery of a new drug, war between two countries, epidemic, etc.
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Managing risk (picking δ_i) requires risk management resources R_i supplied by the household

$$R_i = \kappa_i\left(\delta_i\right) = \frac{1}{2}\left(\delta_i - \delta_i^\circ\right)^\top H_i\left(\delta_i - \delta_i^\circ\right)$$

where δ_i° is the *natural* risk exposure ($R_i = 0$), and H_i is a positive definite matrix

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> There could be no risk at all! Risk is a choice driven by incentives.

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$$\mathcal{U}(Y)\,\mathcal{V}(R)$$

where $\mathcal{U}$ is CRRA with risk aversion $\rho \geq 1$, and disutility of risk management $\mathcal{V}(R)$ is   ▸ Details

$$\mathcal{V}(R) = \exp\left(-\eta\,(1-\rho)\,R\right)$$

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Budget constraint in each state of the world (set $W_L = 1$ from now on)

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} P_i C_i \leq W_L + W_R R + \Pi$$

Timing and distortions

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Cobb-Douglas marginal cost is

$$K_i \, (\delta_i, P) = \frac{1}{e^{a_i(\varepsilon, \delta_i)}} \prod_{j=1}^{N} P_j^{\alpha_{ij}}$$

Firms choose their risk exposure to maximize expected discounted profits

$$\delta_i^* \in \arg\max_{\delta_i} \mathrm{E}\left[\Lambda\left[P_i Q_i - K_i\left(\delta_i, P\right) Q_i - \kappa_i\left(\delta_i\right) W_R\right]\right]$$

where Q_i is *equilibrium* demand and Λ is the stochastic discount factor of the household.

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$$\delta_i^* \in \arg\min_{\delta_i} \underbrace{\mathrm{E}\left[K_i\left(\delta_i, P\right) Q_i\right]}_{(1)} + \underbrace{\mathrm{Cov}\left(K_i\left(\delta_i, P\right) Q_i, \frac{\Lambda}{\mathrm{E}\left[\Lambda\right]}\right)}_{(2)} + \underbrace{\kappa_i\left(\delta_i\right) W_R}_{(3)}$$

Firms prefer risk exposures δ_i with

1. high expected TFP (low expected unit costs K_i)
2. low covariance with GDP $=$ low correlation with GDP $+$ low variance of unit cost K_i
   - Rely on less volatile risk factors, or diversify by using offsetting risk factors
3. low risk management expenses $\kappa_i\left(\delta\right)$

Equilibrium definition

An *equilibrium* is a risk choice for every firm δ^* and a stochastic tuple $(P^*, W_R^*, C^*, L^*, R^*, X^*, Q^*)$ such that

1. (Optimal technique choice) For each i, factor demand L_i^*, X_i^* and R_i^*, and the risk exposure decision δ_i^* solves the firm's problem.

2. (Consumer maximization) The consumption vector C^* and the supply of risk managers R^* solve the household problem.

3. (Unit cost pricing) For each i, $P_i = (1 + \tau_i) K_i (\delta_i, P)$.

4. (Market clearing) For each i,

$$C_i^* + \sum_{j=1}^{N} X_{ji}^* = Q_i^* = F_i (\alpha_i^*, L_i^*, X_i^*), \quad \sum_{i=1}^{N} L_i^* = 1, \text{ and } \sum_{i=1}^{N} \kappa_i (\delta_i^*) = R^*.$$

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- Captures firm's importance as a supplier (share of production costs)

Two measures of supplier importance

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Revenue-based Domar weight:

$$\omega^\top = \beta^\top \mathcal{L} = \beta^\top \left(I - [\mathrm{diag}\,(1 + \tau)]^{-1} \alpha \right)^{-1}$$

- Also captures importance as a supplier (share of revenues)
- Declines with wedges τ
- Are equal to the firm's sales share in nominal GDP

$$\omega_i = \frac{P_i Q_i}{PY}$$

Define the aggregate risk exposure vector Δ as

$$\Delta := \delta^\top \tilde{\omega}$$

- Firms with high cost-based Domar weights contribute more to aggregate risk exposure

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> **Lemma**
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> (log) real GDP $y := \log Y$ is given by
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> $$y = \Delta^\top \varepsilon - \tilde{\omega}^\top \log(1 + \tau) - \log(\text{Labor share}(\omega, \tau))$$

- Without distortions ($\tau = 0$) we have Hulten's theorem: $y = \Delta^\top \varepsilon = \omega^\top a(\varepsilon, \delta)$
- Aggregate risk exposure determines how risky GDP is

Aggregate risk: $\mathrm{V}\left[y\right] = \Delta^{\top} \Sigma \Delta$

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Impact of Σ

- **Variance:** a marginal increase in Σ_{mm} raises $\mathrm{V}\left[y\right]$ by Δ_m^2
    - Both $\Delta_m \gg 0$ and $\Delta_m \ll 0$ are bad for $\mathrm{V}\left[y\right]$
- **Covariance:** with positive exposure to ε_m and ε_n, increasing Σ_{mn} raises $\mathrm{V}\left[y\right]$.
    - If instead $\Delta_m > 0$ and $\Delta_n < 0$, the shocks offset each other. Higher Σ_{mn} reduces $\mathrm{V}\left[y\right]$.

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Impact of Δ

$$\frac{d\,\mathrm{V}\left[y\right]}{d\Delta_m} = 2\,\mathrm{Cov}\left[y, \varepsilon_m\right] = 2\sum_n \Delta_n\,\mathrm{Cov}\left[\varepsilon_n, \varepsilon_m\right]$$

- Extra exposure to ε_m increases volatility if ε_m is positively correlated with GDP

Existence, uniqueness and efficiency

Planner's problem

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Define $\bar{\kappa}_{SP}(\Delta)$ as the smallest risk management utility cost needed to achieve Δ.

$$\bar{\kappa}_{SP}(\Delta) := \min_{\delta} - \log V\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} \kappa_i(\delta_i)\right), \quad \text{subject to } \Delta = \delta^\top \tilde{\omega}$$

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Planner's problem

The problem of the social planner can be written as

$$\mathcal{W}_{SP} := \max_{\Delta} \underbrace{\Delta^{\top}\mu}_{\mathrm{E}[y_{SP}]} - \frac{1}{2}(\rho - 1)\underbrace{\Delta^{\top}\Sigma\Delta}_{\mathrm{V}[y_{SP}]} - \bar{\kappa}_{SP}(\Delta)$$

The planner prefers aggregate risk exposure vectors Δ with

- 1) high expected GDP $\mathrm{E}[y_{SP}]$, 2) low GDP volatility $\mathrm{V}[y_{SP}]$, and 3) low risk management cost $\bar{\kappa}_{SP}$

Define $\bar{\kappa}(\Delta)$ as the perceived smallest risk management utility cost needed to achieve Δ.

$$\bar{\kappa}(\Delta) := \min_{\delta} -\log V\left(\sum_{i=1}^{N} g_i \kappa_i(\delta_i)\right), \quad \text{subject to } \Delta = \delta^\top \tilde{\omega}$$

where $g_i := \frac{\tilde{\omega}_i(1+\tau_i)}{\omega_i} \geq 1$ is the efficiency gap of firm i. If $\tau = 0$, then $g_i = 1$ for all i.

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Proposition (fictitious planner's problem)

There exists a unique equilibrium, and it solves

$$\mathcal{W}_{dist} := \max_{\Delta} \underbrace{\Delta^\top \mu - \tilde{\omega}^\top \log\left(1 + \tau\right) - \log\left(\text{Labor share}\left(\omega, \tau\right)\right)}_{\mathrm{E}[y]} - \frac{1}{2}\left(\rho - 1\right) \underbrace{\Delta^\top \Sigma \Delta}_{\mathrm{V}[y]} - \bar{\kappa}\left(\Delta\right).$$

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The equilibrium solves a distorted planning problem

- Still seeks to maximize $\mathrm{E}[y]$ and minimize $\mathrm{V}[y]$
- But distorted perception of the cost of managing risk ($\bar{\kappa}$ instead of $\bar{\kappa}_{SP}$)

Determinants of equilibrium risk

Lemma

The equilibrium aggregate risk exposure Δ solves

$$\underbrace{\mathcal{E}\left(\Delta\right)}_{\substack{\text{marginal} \\ \text{benefit of } \Delta}} = \underbrace{\nabla\bar{\kappa}\left(\Delta\right)}_{\substack{\text{marginal} \\ \text{cost of } \Delta}}$$

where the marginal value of aggregate risk exposure $\mathcal{E}$ is given by

$$\mathcal{E} = \mathrm{E}\left[\varepsilon\right] + \mathrm{Cov}\left[\lambda, \varepsilon\right],$$

and where $\lambda = \log\Lambda$ is the log of the stochastic discount factor.

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Equation for $\mathcal{E}$ implies that firms prefer risk factors with

- high expected value $\mu = \mathrm{E}\left[\varepsilon\right]$ and negative covariance with GDP $\left(\mathrm{Cov}\left[\lambda, \varepsilon\right] > 0\right)$

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We say that a risk factor is "good" if $\mathcal{E} > 0$ and "bad" if $\mathcal{E} < 0$

Lemma

The individual equilibrium risk exposure decisions are

$$\delta_i = \delta_i^\circ + \frac{1}{\eta} \frac{\omega_i}{1 + \tau_i} H_i^{-1} \mathcal{E}.$$

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Role of risk attractiveness $\mathcal{E}$ and risk management technology H_i

- Higher $\mathcal{E}_m$ always leads to higher δ_{im}
- Higher $\mathcal{E}_m$ can increase or decrease δ_{in} depending on $H_{i,mn}^{-1}$

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Role of firm size as measured by cost of goods sold $K_i Q_i = P_i Q_i / (1 + \tau_i) \propto \omega_i / (1 + \tau_i)$

- TFP multiplies the input bundle
- Risk management benefit grows with $K_i Q_i$ while its cost $\kappa_i W_R$ does not
- High Domar weight ω_i and low wedge τ_i firms manage risk more aggressively

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More elastic supply of risk resources (low η) leads to more aggressive risk management

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$$\Delta = \Delta^\circ + \mathcal{H}^{-1}\mathcal{E}^\circ,$$

where $\mathcal{E}^\circ = \mathcal{E}(\Delta^\circ)$ and where the $M \times M$ positive definite matrix $\mathcal{H}^{-1}$ is

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Role of natural risk attractiveness $\mathcal{E}^{\circ} = \mathcal{E}\left(\Delta^{\circ}\right) = \mu - (\rho - 1)\Sigma\Delta^{\circ}$

- Higher $\mathcal{E}_m^{\circ}$ always leads to higher Δ_m
- Higher $\mathcal{E}_m^{\circ}$ can increase or decrease Δ_n depending on $\mathcal{H}_{mn}^{-1}$
  - Global complements if $\mathcal{H}_{mn}^{-1} > 0$ and global substitutes if $\mathcal{H}_{mn}^{-1} < 0$

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where $\mathcal{E}^\circ = \mathcal{E}\left(\Delta^\circ\right)$ and where the $M \times M$ positive definite matrix $\mathcal{H}^{-1}$ is

$$\mathcal{H}^{-1} := \left(\nabla^2\bar{\kappa} + (\rho - 1)\Sigma\right)^{-1}.$$

Role of natural risk attractiveness $\mathcal{E}^\circ = \mathcal{E}\left(\Delta^\circ\right) = \mu - (\rho - 1)\Sigma\Delta^\circ$

- Higher $\mathcal{E}_m^\circ$ always leads to higher Δ_m
- Higher $\mathcal{E}_m^\circ$ can increase or decrease Δ_n depending on $\mathcal{H}_{mn}^{-1}$
  - Global complements if $\mathcal{H}_{mn}^{-1} > 0$ and global substitutes if $\mathcal{H}_{mn}^{-1} < 0$

Global substitution patterns depend on

- $\nabla^2\bar{\kappa}$: global impact of the local substitution patterns embedded in $(\kappa_1, \ldots, \kappa_N)$
- Σ: if $\Sigma_{mn} > 0$ an increase in Δ_m makes the planner reduce Δ_n to avoid agg. risk

> **Proposition**
>
> Let γ be either μ_m or Σ_{mn}. Then
> $$\frac{d\Delta}{d\gamma} = \mathcal{H}^{-1}\frac{\partial \mathcal{E}}{\partial \gamma}$$

- The vector $\partial \mathcal{E}/\partial \gamma$ captures the *direct* impact of γ on the attractiveness of risk factors $\boxed{\blacktriangleright \; \partial \mathcal{E}/\partial \gamma}$
- The matrix $\mathcal{H}^{-1}$ propagates that impact to exposure vector Δ

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Corollary

1. An increase in μ_m raises Δ_m
2. An increase in Σ_{mm} reduces Δ_m if $\Delta_m > 0$ and increases Δ_m if $\Delta_m < 0$

- A marginal increase in Σ_{mm} raises $\mathrm{V}[y]$ by $\Delta_m^2 \to$ When Σ_{mm} increases we want to reduce Δ_m^2

Example of substitution patterns

There are two regions both with their specific shocks

- Region 1: more productive in expectation (Risk 1 – good risk)
- Region 2: bigger shocks (Risk 2 – bad risk)

Firm 2 must decide where to locate plants

- Challenging to manage plants in different locations → risks are substitutes

Definition. An economy is diagonal if Σ and H_i are diagonal for every i

Impact of wedges

Definition. An economy is diagonal if Σ and H_i are diagonal for every i

---

Corollary

In a diagonal economy, a higher wedge τ_i

1. increases Δ_m for all m such that $\mathcal{E}_m < 0$ (bad risks)
2. reduces Δ_m for all m such that $\mathcal{E}_m > 0$ (good risks)

- Higher wedges make firms shrink $\rightarrow$ manage risk less aggressively

Definition. An economy is diagonal if Σ and H_i are diagonal for every i

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
(Blue: good risk; Red: bad risk)

Equilibrium and efficient risk exposure

When all firms are at their natural exposure δ° we have $\mathcal{E}^\circ = \mu - (\rho - 1) \Sigma \Delta^\circ$

> **Lemma**
>
> Equilibrium risk exposure is distorted such that $(\Delta - \Delta_{SP})^\top \mathcal{E}^\circ < 0$.

When all firms are at their natural exposure δ° we have $\mathcal{E}^\circ = \mu - (\rho - 1)\Sigma\Delta^\circ$

> **Lemma**
>
> Equilibrium risk exposure is distorted such that $(\Delta - \Delta_{SP})^\top \mathcal{E}^\circ < 0$.

- Wedges make firms inefficiently small $\rightarrow$ less risk management
- Eqm. is on *average* overexposed to bad risks ($\mathcal{E}^\circ < 0$) and underexposed to good risks ($\mathcal{E}^\circ > 0$)

Implications for GDP and Welfare

Use ∂ to denote changes in the economy with exogenous risk

> ### Proposition
>
> In a diagonal economy:
>
> $$\text{sign}\left(\frac{d\,\text{E}\,[y]}{d\mu_m} - \frac{\partial\,\text{E}\,[y]}{\partial\mu_m}\right) = \text{sign}\,(\mu_m) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{d\,\text{V}\,[y]}{d\Sigma_{mm}} - \frac{\partial\,\text{V}\,[y]}{\partial\Sigma_{mm}} < 0.$$

- Increasing μ_m raises $\Delta_m \rightarrow$ additional increase in $\text{E}\,[y]$ if $\mu_m > 0$ compared to fixed risk
- Increasing Σ_{mm} decreases $|\Delta| \rightarrow$ smaller increase in $\text{V}\,[y]$ than with fixed risk

Distortions can increase aggregate volatility

Proposition (single risk factor)

$$\text{sign}\left(\frac{d\,\text{E}\,[y]}{d\tau_i} - \frac{\partial\,\text{E}\,[y]}{\partial\tau_i}\right) = -\text{sign}\left(\mu\mathcal{E}\right) \qquad \text{and} \qquad \text{sign}\left(\frac{d\,\text{V}\,[y]}{d\tau_i} - \frac{\partial\,\text{V}\,[y]}{\partial\tau_i}\right) = -\text{sign}\left(\Delta\mathcal{E}\right).$$

Suppose $\mathcal{E} < 0$ (bad risk, e.g. business cycle): increasing τ_i makes firms more exposed to risk factor

- if $\mu < 0$ this leads to a decline in $\text{E}\,[y]$
- if $\Delta > 0$ the economy becomes even more exposed and $\text{V}\,[y]$ increases

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
Proposition

In a diagonal economy, raising τ_i hurts welfare more than under exogenous risk.

- A higher τ_i increases exposure to bad risks and lower exposure to good risks
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
(Blue: flexible risk; Red: fixed risk)

Reduced-form evidence

Model: firms with large Domar weights and small markups are less volatile and less corr. with GDP

▶ Details

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▸ Details

We test these predictions in the data

- Use detailed micro data from the near-universe of firms in Spain between 1995 and 2018 (Orbis) (7,513,081 firm-year observations)
- Compute markups using control function approach (De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012) ▸ Details
- Back out TFP growth as a residual

TFP growth volatility

(a) TFP volatility by Domar weight decile

(b) TFP volatility by markup decile

(c) Sensitivity of firm TFP to GDP by Domar weight decile

(d) Sensitivity of firm TFP to GDP by markup decile

▶ Details

Calibration

- S sectors with aggregator $Q_s = \prod_{i=1}^{N_s} e^{z_s} \left(\theta_{si}^{-1} Q_{si}\right)^{\theta_{si}}$ and sectoral shocks $z_s \sim$ iid $\mathcal{N}\left(\mu_s^z, \Sigma_s^z\right)$
- Firms have production function

$$Q_{si} = e^{\delta_{sit}\varepsilon_t + \gamma_{si}t + v_{sit}} \zeta_{si} L_{si}^{1-\sum_{s'} \hat{\alpha}_{ss'}} \prod_{s'=1}^{S} X_{si,s'}^{\hat{\alpha}_{ss'}}$$

  where $\hat{\alpha}_{ss'}$ are sectoral shares, $v_{sit} \sim$ iid $\mathcal{N}\left(\mu_{si}^v, \Sigma_{si}^v\right)$ and $\varepsilon_t \sim$ iid $\mathcal{N}\left(0, \Sigma\right)$
- Risk management cost function is parametrized as

$$\frac{1}{\eta} H_{si}^{-1} = a_s \tilde{\omega}_{si}^{b_s} + c_s$$

  Allows for a size effect on risk management costs

▶ Details

- We aim at replicating as much of the firm-level Spanish data as possible
- Our calibrated model has 62 sectors and 492,917 individual firms
- We invert parts of the model to exactly match some moments
    1. Sectoral consumption shares and input/output cost shares
    2. Firm shares in sectoral sales
    3. Variance of firm TFP growth
    4. Covariance of firm TFP growth and GDP growth
    5. Variance of GDP growth

▶ Details

What if we double the volatility Σ of the risk factor?

	Calibration	Doubling Σ	
		Fixed δ	Flexible δ
Agg. risk exposure Δ	0.014	0.014	0.011
Exposure value $\mathcal{E}$	-0.06	-0.11	-0.09
Std. Dev. of GDP growth	2.4%	3.1%	2.6%

- Fixed δ: Large increase in GDP variance; exposure to ε_t becomes more harmful ($\mathcal{E}$ declines)
- Flexible δ: Firms manage risk more aggressively which limits increase in $V[y]$

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> Impact of risk can be overestimated if reaction of agents is not taken into account

What if we set wedges τ to zero?

	Calibration	No wedges	
		Fixed δ	Flexible δ
Agg. risk exposure Δ	0.014	0.014	0.007
Exposure value $\mathcal{E}$	-0.06	-0.06	-0.03
Std. Dev. of GDP growth	2.4%	2.4%	1.7%

- Fixed δ: Since only impact of τ is through δ, there is no change.
- Flexible δ: Firms manage risk more aggressively so $V[y]$ declines

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Cov. firm TFP and GDP growth

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Distortions make GDP more volatile

Conclusion

Main contributions

- We construct a model of endogenous risk, at both the micro and macro levels.
- Model predicts which firms are more volatile and covary more with business cycle.
- Distortions lead to less aggressive risk management and can increase GDP volatility.

Future research

- What if there are entrepreneurs who cannot diversify their risk?
- Mechanisms would interact with capital/investment. Fully dynamic business cycle model.

The function $\zeta(\alpha_i)$ is

$$\zeta(\alpha_i) = \left[\left(1 - \sum_{j=1}^{n} \alpha_{ij}\right)^{1-\sum_{j=1}^{n}\alpha_{ij}} \prod_{j=1}^{n} \alpha_{ij}^{\alpha_{ij}} \right]^{-1}$$

This functional form allows for a simple expression for the unit cost K

Given the log-normal nature of uncertainty $\rho \lessgtr 1$ determines whether the agent is risk-averse or not. To see this, note that when $\log C$ normally distributed, maximizing

$$\mathrm{E}\left[C^{1-\rho}\right]$$

amounts to maximizing

$$\mathrm{E}\left[\log C\right] - \frac{1}{2}\left(\rho - 1\right)\mathrm{V}\left[\log C\right].$$

The direct impact of changes in (μ, Σ) is given by

$$\frac{\partial\mathcal{E}}{\partial\mu_m} = \mathbf{1}_m \qquad \text{and} \qquad \frac{\partial\mathcal{E}}{\partial\Sigma_{mn}} = -\frac{1}{2}\left(\rho - 1\right)\left(\Delta_m\mathbf{1}_n + \Delta_n\mathbf{1}_m\right).$$

(a) Low Σ (b) High Σ

Proposition

The response of the equilibrium aggregate risk exposure Δ to a change in wedge τ_i is given by

$$\frac{d\Delta}{d\tau_i} = \mathcal{T} \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N} \frac{\partial \left[\nabla^2 \bar{\kappa} \right]^{-1}}{\partial g_j} \frac{dg_j}{d\tau_i} \right) \mathcal{E}, \tag{1}$$

where the impact of g_j on $\left[\nabla^2 \bar{\kappa} \right]^{-1}$ is given by $\frac{\partial \left[\nabla^2 \bar{\kappa} \right]^{-1}}{\partial g_j} = -\frac{1}{\eta} \frac{\tilde{\omega}_j^2}{g_j^2} H_j^{-1}$, and where

$$\mathcal{T} := \left(I - \left[\nabla^2 \bar{\kappa} \right]^{-1} \frac{\partial \mathcal{E}}{\partial \Delta} \right)^{-1}.$$

Proposition

Let χ denote either μ_m, Σ_{mn}, or τ_i. Then the impact of a change in χ on the moments of log GDP are given by

$$\frac{d\,\mathrm{E}\,[y]}{d\chi} - \frac{\partial\,\mathrm{E}\,[y]}{\partial\chi} = \mu^\top \frac{d\Delta}{d\chi} \qquad \text{and} \qquad \frac{d\,\mathrm{V}\,[y]}{d\chi} - \frac{\partial\,\mathrm{V}\,[y]}{\partial\chi} = 2\Delta^\top \Sigma \frac{d\Delta}{d\chi},$$

where the use of a partial derivative indicates that Δ is kept fixed.

Implications for GDP

Simplified model

- Single risk factor $\varepsilon_t \sim$ iid $\mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma)$
- Firm level TFP is $\log TFP_{it} = \delta_{it}\varepsilon_t + \gamma_i t + v_{it}$ where γ_i is deterministic trend and $v_{it} \sim$ iid $\mathcal{N}(\mu_i^v, \Sigma_i^v)$

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Variance of firm-level TFP growth

$$\mathrm{V}[\log TFP_{it} - \log TFP_{it-1}] = 2\delta_i^2\Sigma + 2\Sigma_i^v$$

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Covariance of firm-level TFP growth with GDP growth

$$\mathrm{Cov}\left[\log TFP_{it} - \log TFP_{it-1}, y_t - y_{t-1}\right] = 2\Delta\Sigma\delta_i + 2\tilde{\omega}_i\Sigma_i^v.$$

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Model-implied firm risk exposure $(\mathcal{E} < 0)$

$$\delta_i = \delta_i^\circ + \frac{1}{\eta}\frac{\omega_i}{1 + \tau_i}H_i^{-1}\mathcal{E}$$

$\Rightarrow$ Firms with large Domar weights and small markups are less volatile and less corr. with GDP

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Markup estimation

- Assume Cobb-Douglas production function

$$\log Q_{it} = \alpha_{Li} \log L_{it} + \alpha_{Mi} \log M_{it} + \alpha_{Ki} \log K_{it} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

- Elasticities estimated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) with the Ackberg et al. (2015) correction.
  - Capital is the "state" variable, labor is the "free" variable and materials is the "proxy" variable.
- Production function estimated at NACE 2-digit sector level. As in De Loecker et al. (2020), we control for markups using firms' sales shares in the production function estimation.
- Following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we compute the markup as
  $1 + \tau_{it} = \hat{\alpha}_{Li} \Big/ \left(\frac{\text{Wage Bill}_{it}}{\text{Sales}_{it}} \right).$
- We compute TFP growth as

$$\Delta \log \text{TFP}_{it} = \Delta \log Q_{it} - \alpha_{Li} \Delta \log L_{it} - \alpha_{Mi} \Delta \log M_{it} - \alpha_{Ki} \Delta \log K_{it}$$
$$- \left(\Delta \log \left(1 + \tau_{it} \right) - \Delta \log \left(1 + \tau_{s(i)t} \right) \right).$$

The term $\Delta \log \left(1 + \tau_{it} \right) - \Delta \log \left(1 + \tau_{s(i)t} \right)$ accounts for the firm-specific markup growth net of the sectoral markup growth. This adjustment allows us to remove the change in firm-specific nominal price that are not taken into account by the sector-level price deflator.

33

TFP growth volatility

- We compute the standard deviation of TFP growth for each firm, $\sigma_i \left(\Delta \log TFP_{it} \right)$, and the time-series average of its markup and Domar weight.
- We construct deciles based on average Domar weights and markups, and create dummy variables, FE_{ji}^{Domar} and FE_{ji}^{Markup}, such that $FE_{ji}^{Domar} = 1$ if firm i's Domar weight is in decile j, and analogously for markups.
- We run the cross-sectional regression

$$\sigma_i \left(\Delta \log TFP_{it} \right) = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \beta_j^{Domar} FE_{ji}^{Domar} + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \beta_j^{Markup} FE_{ji}^{Markup} + \varepsilon_i,$$

and plot β_j^{Domar} in panel (a) and β_j^{Markup} in panel (b).

TFP growth volatility

- We construct deciles based on firms' Domar weights and markups each year.

- We then construct a set of dummy variables, FE_{jit}^{Domar} and FE_{jit}^{Markup}, such that $FE_{jit}^{Domar} = 1$ if firm i's Domar weight is in decile j in year t, and analogously for markups.

- We then run the following panel regression,

$$\Delta \log TFP_{it} = \sum_{j=1}^{10} \beta_j^{Domar} \left(FE_{jit}^{Domar} \times \Delta \log GDP_t \right) + \sum_{j=1}^{10} \beta_j^{Markup} \left(FE_{jit}^{Markup} \times \Delta \log GDP_t \right)$$

$$+ \alpha + \beta_0 \, \Delta \log GDP_t + \sum_{j=1}^{10} FE_{jit}^{Domar} + \sum_{j=1}^{10} FE_{jit}^{Markup} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where $\Delta \log TFP_{it}$ is the annual growth of firm i's log TFP and $\Delta \log GDP_t$ is the annual growth of Spanish log GDP.

- The coefficients of interest, β_j^{Domar} and β_j^{Markup}, are reported in the figure.

◄ Back

Model for the calibration

- Risk exposure

$$\delta_{si} = \delta_{si}^{\circ} + \frac{\tilde{\omega}_{si}}{g_{si}} \left(\frac{1}{\eta} H_{si}^{-1} \right) \mathcal{E}$$

- The variance of GDP growth is

$$\mathrm{V}\left[y_t - y_{t-1}\right] = 2\Sigma\Delta^2 + 2\tilde{\omega}_f^{\top}\Sigma^{\nu}\tilde{\omega}_f + 2\tilde{\omega}_s^{\top}\Sigma^z\tilde{\omega}_s.$$

- The variance of firm-level TFP growth is

$$\mathrm{V}\left[\log \mathit{TFP}_{si,t} - \log \mathit{TFP}_{si,t-1}\right] = 2\delta_{si}^2\Sigma + 2\Sigma_{si}^{\nu}.$$

- The covariance of firm-level TFP growth with GDP growth is

$$\mathrm{Cov}\left[y_t - y_{t-1}, \log \mathit{TFP}_{si,t} - \log \mathit{TFP}_{si,t-1}\right] = 2\Delta\Sigma\delta_{si} + 2\tilde{\omega}_{si}\Sigma_{si}^{\nu}.$$

Figure 1: Data distributions that the calibration matches exactly

(a) Sales share θ_{si}

(b) Wedges $1 + \tau_i$

Figure 2: Data distributions that the calibration matches exactly

**(a)** Correlation firm-level TFP and GDP growth

(b) Standard deviation of firm-level TFP growth

**Figure 3:** Domar weights of the firms in the data and in the model


(a) Revenue-based Domar weights

(b) Cost-based Domar weights

Figure 4: Estimated value of $\frac{1}{\eta} H_i^{-1}$ for each sector.

Notes. The scale of $\frac{1}{\eta} H_i^{-1}$ depends on our choice of ρ and Σ. We set $\rho = 5$ and $\Sigma = 1$ for this figure.

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Figure 5: Distribution of the estimated firm-level natural risk exposure δ_i° /

Notes. The scale of δ_i° depends on our choice of ρ and Σ. We set $\rho = 5$ and $\Sigma = 1$ for this figure.

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