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Security Test Plan
The test design for security and licence enforcement: the authentication and authorisation matrix, the licence gate matrix, leak tests, abuse cases from the threat model, and the automated scans. Part of the Testing Strategy. Requirements: TEST-006, TEST-008, TEST-013 on Spec: Conformance and Acceptance; SEC on Spec: Authentication and Authorisation; NFR-SEC and the OWASP mapping on Spec: Non-Functional Requirements; THR on Spec: Threat Model; SSC on Spec: Secure SDLC and Supply Chain.
All security tests run against CI-started instances, the test stack or staging, with generated vf_test_ keys and synthetic data. None targets the production API.
Each row is one handler test per operation class (data, service, OPTIONS) and one end-to-end case.
| Credential | Expected | Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| none |
401 missing-key with WWW-Authenticate
|
SEC-001, ERR-006 |
Authorization: Bearer with a valid key |
200 |
SEC-001 |
X-API-Key with a valid key |
200 |
SEC-001 |
| key in the query string or form body |
400 key-in-query, key not checked, flagged |
SEC-002 |
| malformed key, bad checksum, unknown id, wrong secret | identical 401 invalid-key bodies; no timing difference significant at p < 0.01 over 10 000 tries |
SEC-003, QAS-SEC-03 |
| expired key | 401 key-expired |
SEC-040 |
| revoked key |
401 key-revoked on every instance within the propagation target |
SEC-042, QAS-SEC-04 |
| rotated key, previous secret within overlap / after overlap |
200 / 401
|
SEC-041 |
vf_test_ key on a production-configured instance, and the reverse |
refused | SEC-004 |
| repeated failures from one address |
429 rate-limited after auth.failure_limit
|
SEC-052 |
The full product of scope × plan × use class × source family × terms acceptance over the fictional families of the fixture set (Test Data Management), which cover every licence class.
| Condition | Expected | Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| key lacks the operation's scope |
403 scope-denied, checked before parameters |
SEC-020 |
| family not in the plan | items of that family never returned | SEC-030 |
| use class not permitted by the family's terms | items never returned; restricted-purpose note verbatim when permitted | SEC-030, LIC-006 |
| terms not accepted, or accepted for an old terms version | items never returned | SEC-034 |
| some families permitted, some not | only permitted items, partial warning |
SEC-033 |
| no family permitted | 403 source-not-permitted |
SEC-033 |
| a forbidden row planted in storage | post-check aborts with 500 internal, violation metric incremented, nothing served |
SEC-032 |
| plan change | effective within auth.key_cache_ttl
|
SEC-022 |
The expected value of each cell comes from an independent table reviewed by the owner, not from the table the code reads, so that a wrong rule cannot make both sides agree. Pass criterion: zero forbidden items across the whole matrix (QAS-SEC-01). Mutation testing covers the gate code (issue #17).
| Test | Method | Pass |
|---|---|---|
| Planted-secret sweep | keys, the pepper and a canary secret are planted in headers, query strings, bodies and induced errors; every log sink, trace, metric label, error body and /v1/meta is searched |
zero occurrences (NFR-OBS-004, QAS-SEC-05, CFG-007) |
| Address truncation | requests from planted addresses; logs and access-store contents searched | only truncated prefixes (NFR-PRIV-002, RATE-015) |
| Error detail | induced storage, parsing and internal faults | no stack trace, statement text, storage name, hostname or key material in any problem (ERR-004) |
| Version disclosure | response headers on every status | no server or framework version (PROT-032) |
| Scope lint | the repository, the OpenAPI document and payload snapshots | no collection vocabulary, no internal storage names (LIC-010, DEV-044) |
| Risk | Test cases | Level |
|---|---|---|
| API1 Broken object level authorisation | opaque ids cannot be enumerated into data a plan may not see: every id-based operation run with keys of every plan over the gate matrix | Handler, Security |
| API2 Broken authentication | the authentication matrix (section 1); key format fuzzing (issue #16) | Handler, Security |
| API3 Broken object property level authorisation |
fields cannot add members; response schemas forbid additional properties; no storage name in any payload |
Contract |
| API4 Unrestricted resource consumption | every size limit (NFR-SIZE-001) at and above its bound; huge areas and long windows refused before work; page caps; overload scenario | Handler, Load |
| API5 Broken function level authorisation | no administrative function reachable on the public listener; metrics only on the operator listener | End to end, Security |
| API6 Unrestricted access to sensitive business flows | quota exhaustion and history-depth limits; bulk extraction by paging stopped by quota | Handler, Load |
| API7 Server-side request forgery | no parameter is used as an outbound address: URL-shaped values in every string parameter cause no outbound connection (egress denied and observed) | Security |
| API8 Security misconfiguration | security headers on every status (NFR-SEC-001); boot refusal of invalid configuration (CFG-003); TLS configuration scan of staging; CORS allow-list | Handler, Config, Security |
| API9 Improper inventory management | the served document equals the released one minus disabled operations (FR-SVC-005); disabled operations answer 404 feature-disabled and are absent from the document |
Contract |
| API10 Unsafe consumption of APIs | code maps are total, unknown codes become other with a metric (ENV-051); the post-check on every item |
Integration |
Every THR row has at least one test (TM-003, TEST-013).
| Threat | Test |
|---|---|
| THR-001 stolen key | revocation propagation test; secret-scanning pattern test with a planted vf_test_ key |
| THR-002 man in the middle | TLS scan of staging; HSTS header test |
| THR-003 volumetric flood | per-IP bucket test before key validation; spike scenario |
| THR-004 key guessing | uniform 401 and timing test; failure limit |
| THR-005 cursor or parameter manipulation | tamper corpus refused at 100 % (QAS-SEC-02); negative-direction contract suite; area bounds |
| THR-006 repudiation | metering per key and hour recorded; audit record written in the same transaction as each lifecycle action |
| THR-007 data outside its licence | the licence gate matrix and the post-check |
| THR-008 internal names in errors | error-detail leak test; scope lint |
| THR-009 keys in logs | planted-secret sweep |
| THR-010 expensive queries | size, area and window limits; deadline and cancellation tests |
| THR-011 cache poisoning or blow-up | cache key includes the permitted-family set: two keys with different plans never share an entry; byte bound test |
| THR-012 calling outside scope | scope checked before parameters |
| THR-013 metrics exposed | metrics path answers 404 on the public listener |
| THR-014 injection writes | read-only role write refused; SQL metacharacters in every parameter cause no error beyond 400; static rule for parameterised statements (NFR-SEC-003) |
| THR-015 store starvation | connection and statement limits of the role asserted; load scenario holds at most db.pool_max
|
| THR-016 key table theft | only MACs in the access store; pepper absent from it |
| THR-017 audit tampering | update and delete of audit rows refused for the service role |
| THR-018 unauthorised key issue | operator tool refuses without the access-store role; every action audited |
| THR-019 supply chain | dependency review, pinned actions lint, SBOM and signature verification at deploy, planted vulnerable dependency turns the pull request red |
| THR-020 key in a browser app | CORS allow-list tests; per-key quota limits damage |
| Abuse case | Expected |
|---|---|
| Enumerate all places by paging through a broad search | stopped by page caps and quota; no generic filter language (ENV-030) |
| Replay a cursor with widened filters | 400 invalid-cursor |
| Send a route of maximum points and length on every request | refused above geo.max_route_points or geo.max_route_km; admission refuses before storage when the budget is spent |
| Request the same expensive answer concurrently from many keys | single-flight and per-key in-flight limit |
| Rotate keys rapidly to reset quotas | quotas belong to the key id, not the secret |
Strip attribution with fields or the GeoJSON variant |
attribution and notes still present (LIC-004) |
Tools and thresholds are owned by issue #12; this plan states their place in testing.
| Category | Examples | When | Blocks |
|---|---|---|---|
| SAST | CodeQL, SonarCloud | every pull request, weekly on main | high or critical |
| Secret scanning | push protection, gitleaks | always | any finding |
| Dependencies | Dependabot, govulncheck, Snyk, dependency review with licence policy | every pull request, weekly | high or critical; disallowed licence (SSC-003) |
| Container | Trivy, Hadolint | every pull request, release | critical |
| DAST | OWASP ZAP baseline per pull request, full scan weekly, against a CI-started instance | per pull request and weekly | high |
| Schema-driven fuzzing | Schemathesis | per pull request, long run nightly | any 5xx or schema violation |
| Repository | OpenSSF Scorecard | weekly | below 7.0 (SSC-012) |
One tool per kind of check: a second tool reporting the same class of finding is not added (Spec: Secure SDLC and Supply Chain). Each scan fails closed: a scan that read zero files, zero dependencies or zero endpoints is a failure (TST-011). Remediation deadlines are those of SSC-015.
ViaFrei API: a public, keyed, read-only REST API to live German mobility data. Design phase; nothing on these pages is a measurement of a running service. Data on viafrei.de and in every API answer is attributed to its publishers under their licences.
About
Design
- Domain Model
- API Design
- Architecture Overview
- Security and Access Keys
- Rate Limits and Priority
- Performance and Caching
- Configuration
- Observability
Data Model
Technical specification
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Technical Specification
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Testing
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Engineering
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Reference