Skip to content

Spec Secure SDLC and Supply Chain

mavrovde edited this page Nov 8, 2026 · 4 revisions

Spec: Secure SDLC and Supply Chain

Part of the Technical Specification. Requirement prefix: SSC. Frameworks: NIST SP 800-218 (Secure Software Development Framework, SSDF 1.1), SLSA 1.0, OpenSSF Scorecard, OWASP ASVS 5.0. The concrete tools of the process are on Development Process; this page states what they must achieve.

1. SSDF practice mapping

SSDF group Practice How it is met
PO, Prepare the organisation PO.1 security requirements This specification: SEC, NFR-SEC, NFR-PRIV, THR
PO.3 toolchains Pinned CI actions, reproducible builds (SSC-005, SSC-006)
PO.5 secure environments Protected default branch, least-privilege CI tokens (SSC-010), a local stack published on loopback only (SSC-019)
PS, Protect the software PS.1 protect code Branch protection, signed commits on release tags (SSC-011)
PS.2 verify integrity Signed images, provenance (SSC-007, SSC-008)
PS.3 archive releases Every release keeps its image digest, SBOM, provenance and OpenAPI document (SSC-009)
PW, Produce well-secured software PW.1 design Threat model (TM-001)
PW.4 reuse vetted components Dependency policy (SSC-001 to SSC-004)
PW.5, PW.6 secure coding and build Coding standards ([[Spec: Development Workflow
PW.7, PW.8 review and test Required review, static analysis, fuzzing, security tests ([[Spec: Test Strategy
RV, Respond to vulnerabilities RV.1 identify Private vulnerability reporting, scanning (SSC-013, SSC-014)
RV.2 assess and fix Remediation deadlines (SSC-015)
RV.3 root cause Postmortem for security incidents ([[Spec: Operations

2. Dependencies

ID Requirement Verification
SSC-001 Every dependency MUST be declared in a lockfile with exact versions and integrity hashes; builds MUST fail if the lockfile is out of date. Lint
SSC-002 A new direct dependency MUST be justified in its pull request (purpose, alternatives, maintenance state) and MUST have an OpenSSF Scorecard of at least 5.0 or an ADR accepting the gap. Review
SSC-003 Licence policy: dependencies MUST carry a licence from the allow-list (MIT, Apache-2.0, BSD-2-Clause, BSD-3-Clause, ISC, MPL-2.0, Unicode-3.0, Zlib, CC0-1.0, 0BSD). GPL, AGPL, SSPL, BUSL and unlicensed packages MUST be refused by the dependency review check; LGPL MAY be accepted by ADR for dynamically linked components only. Lint
SSC-004 Dependencies MUST be updated at least monthly by automated grouped pull requests; security updates MUST be raised within one day of disclosure. Ops

3. Build, artefacts and provenance

ID Requirement Verification
SSC-005 CI actions and base images MUST be pinned by digest, not by tag. Lint
SSC-006 Builds MUST be reproducible from the tagged source: same source and lockfile give the same image content (timestamps normalised). Ops
SSC-007 Every released image MUST carry an SBOM in CycloneDX 1.5 or later (JSON) and SPDX 2.3 or later, attached as attestations and published as release assets. Ops
SSC-008 Every released image MUST be signed (keyless, with a transparency-log entry) and carry build provenance meeting SLSA Build Level 3 as the target (hosted, isolated build; non-falsifiable provenance); Level 2 is the minimum for the first release. Ops
SSC-009 Deployment MUST verify the signature and provenance of the image digest before it runs; an unverified image MUST NOT be deployed. Ops
SSC-010 CI tokens MUST have least privilege per job (read-only by default, write only where publishing); no long-lived cloud or registry credential MAY be stored where short-lived federation is available. Review
SSC-011 The default branch MUST be protected (required checks, required review, no force push, linear history); release tags MUST be protected from deletion and rewrite. Ops
SSC-012 The repository MUST keep an OpenSSF Scorecard of at least 7.0, checked weekly. Ops
SSC-019 A local container stack or helper script MUST publish a port only on a loopback address by default, and the database MUST NOT publish a port at all, so a developer machine exposes nothing to its network without an explicit override. Lint

4. Secrets and vulnerabilities

ID Requirement Verification
SSC-013 Secret scanning with push protection MUST be enabled, with a custom pattern for the key prefixes vf_live_ and vf_test_; a detected live key MUST be revoked at once. Ops
SSC-014 Static analysis (SAST), dependency vulnerability scanning and image scanning MUST run on every pull request and on the default branch weekly. Ops
SSC-015 Remediation deadlines from disclosure or detection: critical 2 days, high 7 days, medium 30 days, low with the next minor release; an exception requires an ADR with a review date. Ops
SSC-016 A security policy (SECURITY.md) MUST describe private reporting, the response target (acknowledgement within 3 working days) and coordinated disclosure (90 days by default). Docs
SSC-017 No secret MAY be committed, baked into an image, printed by CI or included in a test fixture; test fixtures use generated, clearly fake values. Security
SSC-018 Security-relevant changes (authentication, the licence gate, cryptography, limits) MUST receive a second review by a maintainer who did not write them. Review

5. Tools and thresholds

These are the checks that meet SSC-003, SSC-005, SSC-010, SSC-012, SSC-014 and SSC-017 today. Each runs on every pull request and on every push to main; the Security workflow also runs weekly (Monday). Every tool is pinned by version, and every container image and action by digest or commit (SSC-005). A tool that can write SARIF uploads it to GitHub code scanning under its own category, so its findings are listed in the Security tab and annotated on the pull request; a pull request from a fork runs every check and uploads nothing. The repository file docs/security-checks.md holds the same list next to the workflows.

Area Tool Fails the build on SARIF in code scanning
Quality gate, coverage, duplication, hotspots SonarCloud (CI-based analysis with the merged Go coverage profile) the quality gate of the project (check SonarCloud Code Analysis) no (SonarCloud's own check)
SAST CodeQL for Go, security-extended queries an alert at error level yes
SAST in the linter golangci-lint 2.15.0 with gosec any finding no (log)
Secrets GitHub secret scanning with push protection; gitleaks 8.30.1 over the whole history a detected secret (redacted in the log and the report) gitleaks: yes
Dependencies Snyk Open Source (CLI 1.1308.1, checksum verified) high or critical yes
Dependencies, reachable code govulncheck 1.9.0 a vulnerable function that is called yes
Dependencies, new in a pull request GitHub dependency review a high advisory, or a licence outside the SSC-003 allow-list no (pull request comment)
Dependencies, updates Dependabot version and security updates (opens pull requests) alerts are in the Security tab
Licences go-licenses 2.0.1 over every module a licence outside the SSC-003 allow-list no (report artifact)
Image Trivy 0.76.0 image on the built image HIGH or CRITICAL with a fix yes
Dockerfile Hadolint 2.15.1 a warning or worse yes
Workflows, scripts actionlint 1.7.7 with shellcheck any finding no (log)
OpenAPI document Spectral 6.17.0 with the ruleset of [[Spec: API Lifecycle and Governance Spec-API-Lifecycle-and-Governance]] a warning or worse
OpenAPI changes oasdiff 1.34.0 against the base branch and the last released document a breaking change no (log)
API fuzzing Schemathesis against the compose stack a failed property no (log)
DAST OWASP ZAP API scan, driven by the service's OpenAPI document, against the API container of the compose stack only, on every pull request, on main and weekly a rule at FAIL level; warnings are in the report artifact yes (converted from the ZAP report, located on the OpenAPI document)
Posture OpenSSF Scorecard, main and weekly (score; target 7.0, SSC-012) yes

One tool per kind of check (owner decision, 2026-11-08). A second tool that reports the same class of finding is not run: it doubles every finding and spends the run on repeated work. The test that holds the SARIF uploads to the set above fails on an upload under any other category.

Kind of check Kept Removed, and why
SAST CodeQL security-extended, with gosec in the linter Semgrep: its Go and OWASP rulesets cover classes CodeQL and gosec already report; its secrets, Dockerfile and workflow rulesets repeat gitleaks, Hadolint and actionlint
Dependency vulnerabilities govulncheck (reachable code) and Snyk Open Source (a required check, the whole dependency graph) OSV-Scanner and Trivy fs: the same advisories over the same go.mod
Container image Trivy image Snyk Container: the same advisories, and a second metered test per run
Secrets push protection (new pushes) and gitleaks (the whole history, which push protection does not scan) the Trivy fs and Checkov secret scanners
Dockerfile Hadolint Checkov's Dockerfile framework
Workflows actionlint with shellcheck, and the workflow conformance tests (pinned actions, least privilege, timeouts) Checkov's GitHub Actions framework
DAST OWASP ZAP and Schemathesis none: ZAP tests security rules, Schemathesis the contract of every operation

No DAST job reaches production: ZAP and Schemathesis are pinned to the API container of a compose stack started inside the job, with synthetic fixtures (TST-010). Each scanner was proved once to turn a pull request red, on a throwaway branch with a planted vulnerable dependency, a planted secret and a planted SQL injection pattern.

Home

About

Design

Data Model

Technical specification

Testing

Engineering

Technology choice

Reference

Clone this wiki locally