Skip to content

⚠️ xmrwallet.com steals your private view key on every request. Technical proof inside. If you lost funds — read LOST_FUNDS.md

Notifications You must be signed in to change notification settings

phishdestroy/DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com

 
 

Repository files navigation

DO-NOT-USE-xmrwallet-com

Stars Last Commit License Status Victims Stolen

Security analysis of xmrwallet.com — confirmed private key exfiltration and server-side transaction hijacking. 15+ documented victims. $2M+ estimated stolen. Operating since 2016.

🌐 Full Evidence Page · 📄 Technical Proof · 🚨 Report Abuse · ✅ Safe Alternatives


🚨 Summary

xmrwallet.com transmits your private Monero view key to their server on every API request. Transactions are hijacked server-side. The GitHub repository is a facade — 5.3 years of zero commits while the real theft infrastructure evolved separately.

Finding Status
Private view key sent to server in plaintext 🔴 CONFIRMED
session_key encodes viewkey — re-sent 40+ times per session 🔴 CONFIRMED
raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0 — client TX discarded, server redirects funds 🔴 CONFIRMED
4 Google trackers (GTM, UA, GA4, DoubleClick) inside wallet 🔴 CONFIRMED
GitHub repo has 5.3-year commit gap (2018–2024) 🔴 CONFIRMED
Operator banned from r/Monero, deleted GitHub issues 🔴 CONFIRMED
50+ paid SEO articles, zero donation wallet 🔴 CONFIRMED

🔍 Technical Evidence

1. View Key Exfiltration

Every session starts with a POST to /auth.php — your private view key transmitted in plaintext:

// POST https://www.xmrwallet.com/auth.php
address = 46EkQdF7iQ4i4Ah935SipgXbDSryh5...
viewkey = efba13ecb8b360660a3dcaafaf7cf99149713d064b9d64997b2454d58ee67800

The server returns session_key — not a random token, but your address + viewkey encoded in Base64:

session_key = [blob]:[base64(address)]:[base64(viewkey)]

python3 -c "import base64; print(base64.b64decode('ZWZiYTEzZWNiOGIzNjA2NjBhM2RjYWFmYWY3Y2Y5OTE0OTcxM2QwNjRiOWQ2NDk5N2IyNDU0ZDU4ZWU2NzgwMA==').decode())"
# OUTPUT: efba13ecb8b360660a3dcaafaf7cf99149713d064b9d64997b2454d58ee67800
#                                          ^^^ YOUR PRIVATE VIEW KEY ^^^

This session_key is re-sent to the server on every single request — 40+ times per session:

POST /getheightsync.php     viewkey  ×12
POST /gettransactions.php   viewkey  ×10
POST /getbalance.php        viewkey  ×6
POST /getsubaddresses.php   viewkey  ×4
POST /support_login.html    viewkey  session_id=8de50123dab32  ← BACKDOOR

2. Transaction Hijacking

raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0       // client TX discarded, never broadcast

if(type == 'swept') {         // server-initiated theft marker
  txid = 'Unknown transaction id'  // obfuscated in UI
}

The client builds a transaction — then discards it. Only metadata goes to the server, which constructs its own transaction and can redirect funds to any address.

3. Hidden Production Logic

Not present anywhere in the public GitHub repository:

  • session_key parameter
  • verification field
  • encrypted data payload
  • /support_login.html backdoor endpoint

Auditing the GitHub repo is useless — production code differs fundamentally.

4. Google Tag Manager Abuse

GTM loads arbitrary JavaScript from Google's servers. The operator can push new code — including key exfiltration scripts — to all users without changing a single line on GitHub.

GET googletagmanager.com/gtm.js   ×12  — loads arbitrary JS
GET google-analytics.com          ×12  — UA-116766241-1
GET analytics.google.com/g/collect ×5  — GA4
GET stats.g.doubleclick.net        ×1  — ad tracker

🕵️ Operator Profile

Attribute Value
GitHub nathroy (ID: 39167759)
Email admin@xmrwallet.com · support@ · feedback@
Reddit u/WiseSolution — banned from r/Monero
Twitter @xmrwalletcom
GitHub org created 2018-05-10
Commit gap 2018-11-06 → 2024-03-15 (5.3 years — ZERO commits)
Domain paid until 2031 (registered 2016)

GitHub Commit Timeline

2018-05-10  v1 First release          ← looks open-source
2018-11-06  Bulletproof Update        ← last real commit

   2018 ————————————————————————————————— 2024   ZERO COMMITS (5.3 YEARS)
   ↑ Production actively updated. session_key added. Theft infrastructure evolved.
   ↑ Wayback Machine 2023: ZERO references to session_key in archived pages.

2024-03-15  v0.18.0.0 "2024 updates"  ← sanitized dump, PHP backend excluded
current     v0.18.4.1 production      ← additional changes NOT in GitHub

Cover-Up Pattern

  • ❌ Banned from r/Monero after self-promotion in 2018
  • ❌ GitHub Issue #13 deleted by repository owner
  • ❌ Standard theft deflection: "sync problem — try Monero CLI" (funds already gone)
  • ❌ 50+ paid/sponsored articles on crypto media — PhishDestroy contacted all publishers, majority removed them
  • ❌ 100+ blog posts, 10 languages, DDoS-Guard CDN, Android app, active Trustpilot management
  • Zero donation wallet address — claimed "volunteer project" funded by no one

A volunteer open-source project does not bulk-purchase sponsored articles. With no donation wallet, the money comes from stolen XMR.


👥 Victim Reports

Amount Source Notes
590 XMR (~$177,000) Sitejabber "deposited 590 monero — 2 days gone"
17.44 XMR Trustpilot TxID & TX Key documented
Unknown Trustpilot "transferred to some other wallet instead of mine"
$200 Trustpilot "stole $200, leaving me high and dry"
20 XMR Sitejabber "put 20 xmr — next day 0 xmr"
Unknown Trustpilot "cannot verify transaction using private viewing key"

Conservative estimate: 10,000–50,000+ wallets created over 8 years. Total stolen: 5,000–50,000+ XMR ($1.5M–$15M+ at historical prices).


🌐 Infrastructure IOCs

Type Value Notes
Domain xmrwallet.com NameSilo, paid until 2031
Tor xmrwalletdatuxms.onion Historical
IP 186.2.165.49 DDoS-Guard subsidiary AS59692
MX mail.privateemail.com Namecheap private email
Cookies __ddg8_ __ddg9_ __ddg10_ __ddg1_ DDoS-Guard tracking
Analytics UA-116766241-1 Google Analytics
Typosquats xmreallet.com xmrqallet.com xmrwalley.com xmrwallrt.com xmrwallwt.com
session_key [blob]:[b64_address]:[b64_viewkey] Key exfiltration vector
TX marker type == 'swept' Server-initiated theft
Backdoor /support_login.html session_id=8de50123dab32 Not user-initiated

External Threat Intelligence

VirusTotal URLQuery ScamAdviser


📢 Report Abuse

Platform Link
🇺🇸 FBI IC3 ic3.gov
🇺🇸 FTC reportfraud.ftc.gov
🇬🇧 Action Fraud actionfraud.police.uk
🇨🇦 CAFC antifraudcentre.ca
🌍 Interpol interpol.int/Crimes/Cybercrime
Google Safe Browsing report_phish
Netcraft report.netcraft.com
VirusTotal virustotal.com/gui/domain/xmrwallet.com
Registrar abuse@namesilo.com
Hosting abuse@ddos-guard.net

✅ Safe Alternatives

Wallet Platform Link
Monero GUI Desktop (Official) getmonero.org/downloads
Feather Wallet Desktop featherwallet.org
Monerujo Android monerujo.io
Cake Wallet iOS / Android cakewallet.com

⚠️ Never use a web wallet that asks for your private key or seed phrase.


🔗 Related Projects

Project Description Stars
destroylist 70,000+ malicious domain blocklist
ScamIntelLogs Intel archive of crypto scam operations

📡 Connect

Website Telegram Bot Twitter API


⚠️ Disclaimer

This repository contains evidence of criminal activity published for research, public safety, and law enforcement purposes. Data is provided as-is based on observed behavior and publicly available analysis. Independent verification recommended.


Scammers delete evidence. We preserve it.

PhishDestroy — phishdestroy.io

About

⚠️ xmrwallet.com steals your private view key on every request. Technical proof inside. If you lost funds — read LOST_FUNDS.md

Topics

Resources

Security policy

Stars

Watchers

Forks