Security analysis of xmrwallet.com — confirmed private key exfiltration and server-side transaction hijacking. 15+ documented victims. $2M+ estimated stolen. Operating since 2016.
🌐 Full Evidence Page · 📄 Technical Proof · 🚨 Report Abuse · ✅ Safe Alternatives
xmrwallet.com transmits your private Monero view key to their server on every API request. Transactions are hijacked server-side. The GitHub repository is a facade — 5.3 years of zero commits while the real theft infrastructure evolved separately.
| Finding | Status |
|---|---|
| Private view key sent to server in plaintext | 🔴 CONFIRMED |
session_key encodes viewkey — re-sent 40+ times per session |
🔴 CONFIRMED |
raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0 — client TX discarded, server redirects funds |
🔴 CONFIRMED |
| 4 Google trackers (GTM, UA, GA4, DoubleClick) inside wallet | 🔴 CONFIRMED |
| GitHub repo has 5.3-year commit gap (2018–2024) | 🔴 CONFIRMED |
| Operator banned from r/Monero, deleted GitHub issues | 🔴 CONFIRMED |
| 50+ paid SEO articles, zero donation wallet | 🔴 CONFIRMED |
Every session starts with a POST to /auth.php — your private view key transmitted in plaintext:
// POST https://www.xmrwallet.com/auth.php
address = 46EkQdF7iQ4i4Ah935SipgXbDSryh5...
viewkey = efba13ecb8b360660a3dcaafaf7cf99149713d064b9d64997b2454d58ee67800
The server returns session_key — not a random token, but your address + viewkey encoded in Base64:
session_key = [blob]:[base64(address)]:[base64(viewkey)]
python3 -c "import base64; print(base64.b64decode('ZWZiYTEzZWNiOGIzNjA2NjBhM2RjYWFmYWY3Y2Y5OTE0OTcxM2QwNjRiOWQ2NDk5N2IyNDU0ZDU4ZWU2NzgwMA==').decode())"
# OUTPUT: efba13ecb8b360660a3dcaafaf7cf99149713d064b9d64997b2454d58ee67800
# ^^^ YOUR PRIVATE VIEW KEY ^^^
This session_key is re-sent to the server on every single request — 40+ times per session:
POST /getheightsync.php viewkey ×12
POST /gettransactions.php viewkey ×10
POST /getbalance.php viewkey ×6
POST /getsubaddresses.php viewkey ×4
POST /support_login.html viewkey session_id=8de50123dab32 ← BACKDOOR
raw_tx_and_hash.raw = 0 // client TX discarded, never broadcast
if(type == 'swept') { // server-initiated theft marker
txid = 'Unknown transaction id' // obfuscated in UI
}The client builds a transaction — then discards it. Only metadata goes to the server, which constructs its own transaction and can redirect funds to any address.
3. Hidden Production Logic
Not present anywhere in the public GitHub repository:
session_keyparameterverificationfield- encrypted
datapayload /support_login.htmlbackdoor endpoint
Auditing the GitHub repo is useless — production code differs fundamentally.
GTM loads arbitrary JavaScript from Google's servers. The operator can push new code — including key exfiltration scripts — to all users without changing a single line on GitHub.
GET googletagmanager.com/gtm.js ×12 — loads arbitrary JS
GET google-analytics.com ×12 — UA-116766241-1
GET analytics.google.com/g/collect ×5 — GA4
GET stats.g.doubleclick.net ×1 — ad tracker
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| GitHub | nathroy (ID: 39167759) |
| admin@xmrwallet.com · support@ · feedback@ | |
| u/WiseSolution — banned from r/Monero | |
| @xmrwalletcom | |
| GitHub org created | 2018-05-10 |
| Commit gap | 2018-11-06 → 2024-03-15 (5.3 years — ZERO commits) |
| Domain paid until | 2031 (registered 2016) |
2018-05-10 v1 First release ← looks open-source
2018-11-06 Bulletproof Update ← last real commit
2018 ————————————————————————————————— 2024 ZERO COMMITS (5.3 YEARS)
↑ Production actively updated. session_key added. Theft infrastructure evolved.
↑ Wayback Machine 2023: ZERO references to session_key in archived pages.
2024-03-15 v0.18.0.0 "2024 updates" ← sanitized dump, PHP backend excluded
current v0.18.4.1 production ← additional changes NOT in GitHub
- ❌ Banned from r/Monero after self-promotion in 2018
- ❌ GitHub Issue #13 deleted by repository owner
- ❌ Standard theft deflection: "sync problem — try Monero CLI" (funds already gone)
- ❌ 50+ paid/sponsored articles on crypto media — PhishDestroy contacted all publishers, majority removed them
- ❌ 100+ blog posts, 10 languages, DDoS-Guard CDN, Android app, active Trustpilot management
- ❌ Zero donation wallet address — claimed "volunteer project" funded by no one
A volunteer open-source project does not bulk-purchase sponsored articles. With no donation wallet, the money comes from stolen XMR.
| Amount | Source | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 590 XMR (~$177,000) | Sitejabber | "deposited 590 monero — 2 days gone" |
| 17.44 XMR | Trustpilot | TxID & TX Key documented |
| Unknown | Trustpilot | "transferred to some other wallet instead of mine" |
| $200 | Trustpilot | "stole $200, leaving me high and dry" |
| 20 XMR | Sitejabber | "put 20 xmr — next day 0 xmr" |
| Unknown | Trustpilot | "cannot verify transaction using private viewing key" |
Conservative estimate: 10,000–50,000+ wallets created over 8 years. Total stolen: 5,000–50,000+ XMR ($1.5M–$15M+ at historical prices).
| Type | Value | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Domain | xmrwallet.com |
NameSilo, paid until 2031 |
| Tor | xmrwalletdatuxms.onion |
Historical |
| IP | 186.2.165.49 |
DDoS-Guard subsidiary AS59692 |
| MX | mail.privateemail.com |
Namecheap private email |
| Cookies | __ddg8_ __ddg9_ __ddg10_ __ddg1_ |
DDoS-Guard tracking |
| Analytics | UA-116766241-1 |
Google Analytics |
| Typosquats | xmreallet.com xmrqallet.com xmrwalley.com xmrwallrt.com xmrwallwt.com |
|
| session_key | [blob]:[b64_address]:[b64_viewkey] |
Key exfiltration vector |
| TX marker | type == 'swept' |
Server-initiated theft |
| Backdoor | /support_login.html session_id=8de50123dab32 |
Not user-initiated |
| Platform | Link |
|---|---|
| 🇺🇸 FBI IC3 | ic3.gov |
| 🇺🇸 FTC | reportfraud.ftc.gov |
| 🇬🇧 Action Fraud | actionfraud.police.uk |
| 🇨🇦 CAFC | antifraudcentre.ca |
| 🌍 Interpol | interpol.int/Crimes/Cybercrime |
| Google Safe Browsing | report_phish |
| Netcraft | report.netcraft.com |
| VirusTotal | virustotal.com/gui/domain/xmrwallet.com |
| Registrar | abuse@namesilo.com |
| Hosting | abuse@ddos-guard.net |
| Wallet | Platform | Link |
|---|---|---|
| Monero GUI | Desktop (Official) | getmonero.org/downloads |
| Feather Wallet | Desktop | featherwallet.org |
| Monerujo | Android | monerujo.io |
| Cake Wallet | iOS / Android | cakewallet.com |
⚠️ Never use a web wallet that asks for your private key or seed phrase.
| Project | Description | Stars |
|---|---|---|
| destroylist | 70,000+ malicious domain blocklist | |
| ScamIntelLogs | Intel archive of crypto scam operations |
This repository contains evidence of criminal activity published for research, public safety, and law enforcement purposes. Data is provided as-is based on observed behavior and publicly available analysis. Independent verification recommended.
Scammers delete evidence. We preserve it.
PhishDestroy — phishdestroy.io
