June 2026: Miasma Attack — 32 Red Hat Packages With Valid SLSA Provenance Compromised

[piiiico]

The attack

On June 1, 2026, 32 packages under the @redhat-cloud-services npm namespace were republished with credential-stealing malware after a Red Hat employee's GitHub account was compromised.

Key detail: Every malicious version carried valid SLSA provenance attestations. The attacker used the legitimate CI/CD pipeline via orphan commits, so provenance was technically correct — the pipeline built it, the attestations were signed.

Source: Wiz Research — Miasma: Supply Chain Attack Targeting RedHat npm Packages

Commit behavioral scores

Package	Score	Publishers	Weekly DL	Scorecard	Provenance
frontend-components	83	5	14K	6.0	✓
vulnerabilities-client	83	7	707	5.1	✓
rbac-client	81	5	14K	5.1	✓
insights-client	80	5	203	5.1	✓
chrome	65	5	525	6.0	✓

These are not low-scoring packages. Multiple publishers, years of history, active Scorecard ratings. The structural behavioral scores looked safe.

What this proves

Provenance tells you WHO published. It doesn't tell you WHETHER to trust them. When the publisher's credentials are stolen, provenance validates the attacker's deployment.

The signal that would have caught this is temporal: 32 packages all updated within 3 hours vs. their normal weekly cadence. That's the delta behavioral monitoring is built for.

Full analysis: 32 Red Hat Packages Had Valid Provenance. All 32 Were Compromised.

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Try it yourself:

npx proof-of-commitment @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components @redhat-cloud-services/chrome @redhat-cloud-services/rbac-client