### SOC 690S: Machine Learning in Causal Inference

Week 5: Causal Inference from Directed Acyclic Graphs

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Wee	k Date	Topic	<b>Proble</b> Assign	
1	Aug 2	6 Introduction: Motivation and Linear Regression		
2	Sep 2	Foundation: Machine Learning Basics		
3	Sep 9	Foundation: Machine Learning Advanced	1	
4	Sep 16	Foundation: Potential Outcome Framework		
5	Sep 23	Foundation: Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)	2	1
6	Sep 30	Core: Instrumental Variable Estimation		
8	Oct 7	Core: PSM and Doubly Robust Estimation	3	2
7	Oct 14	Fall break		
9	Oct 21	In-class midterm		
10	Oct 28	Core: Regression Discontinuity Design	4	3
11		Core: Panel Data and Difference-in-Difference		
12	Nov 1	l Advanced: Heterogeneous Treatment Effect	5	4
13		Advanced: Unstructured Data Feature Engineering		
14		5 Advanced: Causal Reasoning in Machine Learning		5
		Take-home final		

## Causal Inference via Linear Structural Equations

### Structural Equation Model for Causal Inference

• Early conceptions of causality, most notably by Sewall Wright (a geneticist), used a *structural* approach to link variables





Fig. 1.—Diagram illustrating the interrelations among the factors which determine the weight of guinea pigs at birth and at weaning (33 days).

### Structural Equation Model for Causal Inference

- This structural approach became known as path analysis, though most researchers did not interpret it under the framework of potential outcome
- Sociologists such as Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan carried forward *path analysis* in the mid- and late-20th century



### Structural Equation Model for Causal Inference

- Most applied researchers who used *path analysis* did not interpret it under the potential outcome framework for causal identification
- Judea Pearl introduced a formal graphical language (*directed acyclic graphs*, or DAG) in the 90s that linked *structural equation models* to precise rules for causal identification
- Pearl's framework provided clear conditions (*e.g.*, backdoor and frontdoor criteria) that determine when causal effects are identifiable from observational data
- We will start from a simple structural equation model to motivate the use of DAG

- We start with a simple model of a household's demand for gasoline
- We model log-demand *y* given the log-price *p*

$$y(p) := \delta p$$

• where  $\delta$  is the elasticity of demand. Demand is random across households, and we may model this randomness as U—a stochastic shock that describes variation of demand across households

$$Y(p) = \delta p + U, \quad E[U] = 0$$

• Y(p) plays the *same* role as Rubin's potential outcome, *i.e.*,

$$E[Y(p_1) - Y(p_0)] = \delta(p_1 - p_0)$$

- We may want to introduce covariates to capture other observable factors that may be associated with demand
- We may think there are observable parts of the stochastic shock (*U*), characterized by *X*, which help predict household demand; *X* may include family size, income, number of cars, or geographic location

$$U = X'\beta + \epsilon_Y$$

• where  $\epsilon_Y$  is independent of X and has mean zero

$$Y(p) := \delta p + X'\beta + \epsilon_Y, \quad \epsilon_Y \perp \!\!\!\perp X$$

• This is a structural model of potential economic outcome; if log-price is set to p, then a household with X can be predicted to purchase  $\delta p + X'\beta$  log-units of gasoline

• In reality, the observed log-price *P* may depend on household characteristics *X* 

$$P(X) := X'v + \epsilon_p, \quad \epsilon_p \perp \perp X$$

- where  $\epsilon_p$  is independent of X and has mean zero
- For example, households located in different regions would experience different gas prices
- $\epsilon_p \perp \!\!\! \perp X$  assumes that household characteristics are determined well before gasoline prices faced by individual households are set

- We also assume that households are otherwise *price-takers*, meaning the observed *P* is determined *outside* of the model conditioning on *X*
- For example, log-price P is independent of the stochastic shock of demand not captured by X

$$P \perp \!\!\!\perp \epsilon_Y \mid X$$

 This is the assumption of conditional exogeneity—the econometric analog of conditional ignorability

• Under these assumptions and equations, we have a triangular structural equation model (TSEM)

$$Y := \delta P + X'\beta + \epsilon_Y$$

$$P := X'v + \epsilon_P$$

$$X$$

- $\epsilon_Y$ ,  $\epsilon_P$ , and X are mutually independent and determined *outside* of the model
- In SEM, they are called *exogeneous* variables
- *Y* and *P* are determined *within* the model and are called the *endogeneous* variables


- What do we mean by the model being *structural*
- Each of the equation is assumed to model counterfactual scenarios

$$Y(p, x) := \delta p + x'\beta + \epsilon_Y$$
  
$$P(x) := x'v + \epsilon_P$$

- The conceptual operation of "setting" the variables to their potential or counterfactual values is assumed to leave the structure intact
  - The structural parameters are supposed to be invariant to changes in the distribution of exogeneous variables—X,  $\epsilon_{P}$ —that have been generated outside of the model
- We can therefore use these structural parameters to generate *counterfactual* predictions
- The structural parameters  $\delta$  and v can be identified by linear regression

$$Y := \delta P + X'\beta + \epsilon_Y$$
$$P := X'v + \epsilon_P$$

- This simple TSEM can be graphically depicted as a causal diagram
- Observed variables are shown as nodes, and causal paths are represented by directed arrows



- The graph initiates with the *root nodes* X,  $\epsilon_P$ ,  $\epsilon_Y$
- The absence of links between the root nodes indicates orthogonality
- Understanding the orthogonality structure between nodes is an important input into identification of structural parameters through (linear) projection
- The nodes X and  $\epsilon_P$  are parents of P; the nodes P, X, and  $\epsilon_Y$  are parents of Y
- The node *Y* is a *collider*, as two or more other variables (two causal arrows in the graph) "collide" at that variable

• The main effect of interest,  $\delta$ , or the structural causal effect of P on Y, is identified after adjusting for X


$$Y(p) := \delta p + X'\beta + \epsilon_Y, \quad \epsilon_Y \perp \!\!\!\perp X, p$$

• In the language of the DAG, there are two paths connecting P and Y

$$P \rightarrow X$$
 and  $P \leftarrow X \rightarrow Y$ 

- The second path is called a backdoor path—there is a common cause for P and Y
- Figuratively speaking, controlling for X is said to be "closing the backdoor path" (or satisfying the backdoor criterion), shutting down the non-causal sources of statistical dependence between P and Y

- Going back to the structural model; how do household characteristics impact gasoline demand
- The direct effect  $\beta$  via  $X \to Y$
- The indirect effect  $v\delta$  via  $X \to P \to Y$
- The total effect of X on Y is  $v\delta + \beta$ , which can be identified by projection of Y on X
- There are no backdoor paths from X to Y; no adjustments are needed to identify the total effect of X on Y



• We can also verify it by plugging in *P* 

$$Y = \delta(X'v + \epsilon_P) + X'\beta + \epsilon_Y$$
$$= (v\delta + \beta)'X + (\epsilon_Y + \delta\epsilon_P)$$
$$\epsilon_Y + \delta\epsilon_P \perp X$$

• Therefore,  $v\delta + \beta$  coincides with the projection coefficient in the projection of *Y* on *X* 

• We can also verify it by plugging in *P* 

$$Y = \delta(X'v + \epsilon_P) + X'\beta + \epsilon_Y$$
$$= (v\delta + \beta)'X + (\epsilon_Y + \delta\epsilon_P)$$
$$\epsilon_Y + \delta\epsilon_P \perp X$$

- Therefore,  $v\delta + \beta$  coincides with the projection coefficient in the projection of Y on X
- Conditioning on *P* would allow us to identify the direct of *X*, *i.e.*,  $\beta$ , but would prevent us from identifying the total effect  $v\delta + \beta$

- A set of variables *Z* satisfies the *backdoor criterion* relative to an ordered pair of variables (*D*, *Y*) in a DAG if
  - No node in *Z* is a descendant of *D*; and
  - Z blocks every path between D and Y that contains an arrow into D (i.e., every "backdoor path" from D to Y)

- A set of variables *Z* satisfies the *backdoor criterion* relative to an ordered pair of variables (*D*, *Y*) in a DAG if
  - No node in Z is a descendant of D; and
  - Z blocks every path between D and Y that contains an arrow into D (i.e., every "backdoor path" from D to Y)
- If *Z* satisfies the backdoor criterion, then the causal effect of *D* on *Y* is identifiable by conditioning on *Z*:

$$P(Y(d)) = P(Y \mid do(D = d)) = \int P(Y \mid D = d, Z = z) f(z) dz$$

- do(D = d) means that we intervene in the system and set D = d as a potential treatment
- The distribution of the potential outcome Y(d) is obtained by averaging the observed distribution of Y among units with D = d across strata of Z, weighted by the prevalence of each stratum

## From Backdoor Criterion to Conditional Ignorability

- The *backdoor criterion* is closely linked with the potential outcome framework and the *conditional ignorability* assumption
- Under *conditional ignorability*, conditioning on covariates X (*i.e.*, within the same value or strata of X), treatments are as if randomly assigned

$$D \perp \!\!\! \perp Y(d) \mid X$$


- In reality, there could be a large array of covariates, and "if 'good' is taken to mean 'best' fit, it is tempting to include anything in  $X_i$  that helps predict treatment." (Wooldridge, 2005)
- The *backdoor criterion* provides the set of covariates to control for causal identification; its satisfaction is equivalent to fulfilling the *conditional ignorability* assumption

# From Backdoor Criterion to Conditional Ignorability


- *The First Law of Causal Inference*: DAGs (and corresponding SEM) is equivalent to the potential outcome framework
- In the above case (replacing *P* by *D* as a typical notation for treatment), conditioning on *X* satisfies the *backdoor criterion*


$$Y(d) \perp \perp D \mid X$$
  
$$E[Y(d) \mid X] = E[Y(d) \mid D = d, X]$$


• This is also known as *d-sepration*; conditioning on X *d-separates* the actual treatment D and potential or counterfactual outcome Y(d)




Scenario 1









Scenario 4





## The Impact of 401(k) Eligibility on Financial Outcome

- 401(k) eligbility (*D*) might affect an individual's net financial assets (*Y*) both directly and indirectly through the employer's matching contribution (*M*)
- Worker-level (X) and firm-level (F) characteristics and latent factors (U) may additionally structure the model



## Conditional Ignorability from DAG

• In the case of 401(k) eligibility on financial outcome, conditioning on *F* and *X* satisfies the *backdoor criterion* 


$$Y(d) \perp \perp D \mid F, X$$

$$E[Y(d) \mid F, X] = E[Y(d) \mid D = d, F, X]$$

• This is also known as *d-sepration*; conditioning on F and X *d-separates* the actual treatment D and potential or counterfactual outcome Y(d)

## d-Separation from DAG and Conditional Ignorability

- The *actual* realization of treatment *D* is still a function of *F* and *X*
- D is *independent* of the potential outcome Y(d) given F and X



# When Conditioning Can Go Wrong: Collider Bias

• Consider the following SEM

$$T := \epsilon_T$$
  
 $B := \epsilon_B$   
 $C := T + B + \epsilon_C$ 

• where  $\epsilon_T$ ,  $\epsilon_B$ , and  $\epsilon_C$  are independent  $\mathcal{N}(0,1)$  shocks; E[T] = 0,  $E[T \mid B = b] = 0$ 



- Conditioning on *collider* C will create spurious dependence between B and T;  $E[T \mid B, C] \neq 0$
- Remember  $T = C B \epsilon_C$ ,  $E[T \mid B, C]$  is the predicted value of T after linear projection of T on C B


$$E[T \mid B, C] = \frac{Cov(T, (C - B))}{V(C - B)}(C - B)$$
$$= \frac{Cov(T, T + \epsilon_C)}{V(T + \epsilon_C)}(C - B)$$
$$= \frac{1}{2}(C - B)$$


$$E[T \mid B, C] = E[E[T \mid B = b, C]]$$
$$= E\left[\frac{1}{2}(C - b)\right]$$
$$= -\frac{b}{2}$$

- Controlling for *C*, the predictive effect of *B* on *T* is 1/2; this is *not* a causal effect (spurious)
- This is the *collider bias*, which is known as a form of sample selection bias (Heckman selection bias)

# When Conditioning Can Go Wrong: Collider Bias

• Conditioning on a collider *C* opens associations among its parents *and all their ancestors* 





## When Conditioning Can Go Wrong: Collider Bias


- In some cases, regression on a collider can be useful for *predictive* tasks
- Suppose the preceding SEM provides a simplified version of actors and actresses in Hollywood
- *T* denotes talent, *C* celebrity (success or popularity), and *B* bonhomie (approachability or friendliness
- Now if we condition on C (say the person remains in Hollywood C > 0), B and T will be negatively correlated
- For those without bonhomie characters, they have to be very talented to remain in Hollywood; a prediction of talent is possible within Hollywood

## Collider Bias: Birth-Weight Paradox

- In a study conducted in 1991 in the US, it was found that infants born to smokers have:
  - Higher risk of low birth-weight (LBW)
  - Higher infant mortality
- However, among infants with LBW, mortality is *lower* for infants of smokers than for infants of non-smokers
- The naive interpretation is that smoking may be protective conditional on having LBW
- However, the more plausible explanation is LBW is a collider

## Collider Bias: Birth-Weight Paradox

• *U* could be unobserved competing risks that can cause LBW and higher mortality



## Collider Bias: Birth-Weight Paradox

$$Y := S + B + \kappa U + \epsilon_Y$$

$$B := S + U + \epsilon_B$$

$$S := \epsilon_S$$

$$U := \epsilon_U$$


- where  $\epsilon_{II}$ ,  $\epsilon_{Y}$ ,  $\epsilon_{S}$ , and  $\epsilon_{B}$  are independent  $\mathcal{N}(0,1)$  shocks
- If we project *Y* on *S*, we recover the correct positive causal effect of 2
- However, when we project Y on S and B, we learn a CEF of the form

$$E[Y \mid S, B] = S + B + (1 - \kappa/2)S + (1 + \kappa/2)B$$

• If the competing risks *U* increase infant mortality a lot, *i.e.*,  $\kappa \gg 1$ , the project recovers an erroneous large negative effect  $1 - \kappa/2$  of smoking on morality ◆□▶ ◆□▶ ◆重▶ ◆重 ◆の○○


## Collider Bias and Pearl's Classic Example

We want to estimate the causal effect of *D* on *Y*, *i.e.*, the mapping *d* → *Y*(*d*)



## Collider Bias and Pearl's Classic Example


We want to estimate the causal effect of *D* on *Y*, *i.e.*, the mapping *d* → *Y*(*d*)



# Deeper Dive in DAG, Good and Bad Controls

#### Good and Bad Controls from DAG

- Sometimes we have causes of only treatment or only outcome
- In Scenario 1, including *Z* can reduce estimation variance; in scenario 2, including *Z* may increase estimation variance



### Good and Bad Controls: Single Cause

- In scenario 3, adjusting for *Z* can exacerbate the bias stemming from unobserved confounding
- Controlling for Z removes exogeneous variation in the treatment D that is useful for identifying the causal effect but leaves the confounded variation
- The resulting estimated effect may be essentially driven by the unobserved confounder and be heavily biased


## Good and Bad Controls: Single Cause

- In scenario 3, adjusting for *Z* can exacerbate the bias stemming from unobserved confounding
- Controlling for Z removes exogeneous variation in the treatment D that is useful for identifying the causal effect but leaves the confounded variation
- The resulting estimated effect may be essentially driven by the unobserved confounder and be heavily biased
- Indeed, variables like Z are known as *instrumental* variables
- These variables can be thought as inducing natural experiments that can be leveraged for causal identification in the presence of unobserved confounding
- Importantly, instruments should not be used in an identification by adjustment strategy

#### Good and Bad Controls: Post-Treatment Variables


- Explicitly adjusting for post-treatment variables is almost always a bad idea
- In many cases, post-treatment variables are included implicitly (and should be thought carefully) through *e.g.*, data and sample collection and variable definition
- For example, when estimating the effect of education on wages using data on *employed* individuals, we are implicitly conditioning on *employment*, which is a post-treatment variable and can lead to selection bias

#### Good and Bad Controls: Post-Treatment Variables




#### Good and Bad Controls: Post-Treatment Variables

- *M* is a bad control even for the *controlled direct effect*
- Outcome of the outcome is also a bad control



#### Front-Door Criterion

#### The Front-Door Criterion



- The frontdoor criterion has the following setup
  - All directed paths from *X* to *Y* go through *M*
  - There is *no* unblocked backdoor paths from *X* to *M*
  - All backdoor paths from *M* to *Y* are blocked by *X*

#### The Front-Door Criterion

• The causal effect of *X* on *Y* is then given by

$$P(Y(x)) = P(Y \mid do(X = x))$$

$$= \sum_{m} P(Y \mid do(X = x), M = m) P(M = m \mid do(X = x))$$

$$= \sum_{m} P(Y \mid do(M = m)) P(M = m \mid X = x)$$

$$= \sum_{m} P(M = m \mid X = x) \left[ \sum_{x'} P(Y \mid M = m, X = x') P(X = x') \right]$$

#### The Front-Door Criterion: The APC Problem

• Standard APC regression:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_A A_i + \beta_P P_t + \beta_C C_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

- $Y_{it}$ : outcome for individual i in period t.
- $A_i$ : age of individual i
- $P_t$ : calendar period t
- $C_i$ : birth cohort of i (C = P A)
- Because C = P A, the three predictors are perfectly collinear; parameters  $\beta_A$ ,  $\beta_P$ ,  $\beta_C$  are not separately identified

## Mechanism-Based Identification using The Front-Door Criterion

- Without very strong assumption in APC identification, effect of historical period (*X*) on attitudes (*Y*) is unidentifiable
- However, we may use front-door criterion by finding *all* mechanisms where *X* affects *Y* 
  - Period (*P*) affects exposure to new information, institutions, or policies
     (*M*)
  - These mechanisms then shape individual outcomes *Y*

$$P(Y \mid do(X)) = \sum_{m} P(M = m \mid X) \sum_{p'} P(Y \mid M = m, X = x') P(X = x')$$

# Critiques of Mechanism-Based Identification (Front-Door)

- Complete mediation is unrealistic; it requires that all effects of *X* on *Y* pass through the observed mechanism *M*; in practice, period or policy may affect outcomes via multiple unmeasured channels
- No hidden confounding is a strong assumption; we assume  $X \to M$  is unconfounded and that  $M \to Y$  can be identified by adjusting for X