Skip to content

v3.10.34 — Security ADR P1 (ADR-144 / ADR-145 / ADR-146)

Choose a tag to compare

View all tags
@ruvnet ruvnet released this 02 Jun 09:53
· 42 commits to main since this release
v3.10.34
1c98cbe

v3.10.34 — Security ADR P1 implementations (ADR-144, ADR-145, ADR-146)

Three independent P1 components landing the first concrete code from the three security ADRs filed earlier today (ADR-144 / ADR-145 / ADR-146). Each is OFF by default — strict mode becomes default in v4.0 — so existing pipelines keep their exact behaviour.

ADR-144 P1 — AgentAuthorizationPropagator (closes #2248 P1)

Action-layer security. New module: @claude-flow/security/authorization/propagator.

  • AuthScope envelope (principal, granted tools/servers, delegation depth, expiry)
  • wrapOutbound: monotonically-reducing scope — newly granted tools must be a subset of the holder's; depth decrements by ≥1; expiry checked
  • checkToolCall: typed decisions (tool-not-in-scope / server-not-in-scope / scope-expired / delegation-depth-exhausted) — never throws, telemetry-friendly
  • verifyServerAuth: fail-closed on missing / empty credentials (P1 permissive accept for non-empty; P4 wires the real validator)
  • Provenance buffer ring-bounded, ready for the P5 telemetry sink
  • makeLegacyPermissiveScope migration shim for legacy callers

18 unit tests covering every invariant. Verified against published 3.10.34:

granted reduced from 3 to 1 — depth 2
escalation refused: scope-cannot-grow

ADR-145 P1 — PluginIntegrityVerifier (closes #2254 P1)

Install-layer security. New module: @claude-flow/security/plugins/integrity-verifier. Plus a placeholder v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/plugins/trust/trust-anchors.json for the official-plugin signing key (to be filled in P1.1 when the publish flow is wired).

  • Canonical JSON serialisation (deterministic key order) + SHA-256 manifest hash
  • Ed25519 detached signature verification via @noble/ed25519 (probe-and-fall-back — mirrors verify.mjs #1880 pattern so untrusted environments skip rather than throw)
  • Trust-anchor allowlist with exact + wildcard scope matching + expiry
  • Structured VerificationStatus: pass / signature-missing / signature-invalid / manifest-hash-mismatch / unknown-signer / signer-expired
  • Stage-2 semantic-intent scan (SCH defence) lands in P2

13 unit tests including the round-trip sign→verify and tamper-flip cases. Verified end-to-end:

canonicalize a-then-b == b-then-a: true
hashManifest deterministic: true
unsigned manifest → signature-missing

ADR-146 P2 — Guardrail call site in MCP dispatch (closes #2149 follow-up P2)

Content-layer security. Wires the ADR-131 ToolOutputGuardrail class into the single MCP dispatch chokepoint at mcp-client.ts::callMCPTool.

  • Lazy-resolves @claude-flow/security so the cold-import cost doesn't hit every CLI invocation; falls back to no-op if the module isn't installed (third-party consumers of @claude-flow/cli)
  • Walks the result object one level deep — matches the flat-record shape of every existing tool. Deeper traversal would change the p99 latency contract.
  • Rejected fields replaced with a typed marker: <rejected-by-guardrail tool="X" category=Y> so callers can surface the rejection rather than silently dropping content
  • Off by default. CLAUDE_FLOW_STRICT_GUARDRAIL=true turns it on; precedence is documented inline so the env-var audit passes without an escape-hatch entry.

4 wiring tests (legacy passthrough, strict-mode reject of known injection, strict-mode passthrough on safe content, non-object results pass through). Verified end-to-end:

$ CLAUDE_FLOW_STRICT_GUARDRAIL=true npx ruflo …
action: reject  (on known indirect-injection payload)

Layering — three orthogonal boundaries

Install boundary    ADR-145  →  Is the code trustworthy enough to load?
Memory-write        ADR-145  →  Is this agent allowed to write here?  (P3+)
Action boundary     ADR-144  →  Is this agent allowed to act, on this server, now?
Content boundary    ADR-131 / ADR-146  →  Does this content contain hijack instructions?

Each ADR has its own phased rollout (P1 here; P2-P5 follow). All three flip to default-on in v4.0.

Install

npx ruflo@latest --version    # → ruflo v3.10.34  (33 ms — #2256 fast path intact)

All 9 dist-tag pointers (latest / alpha / v3alpha across @claude-flow/cli, claude-flow, ruflo) at 3.10.34. @claude-flow/security published as 3.0.0-alpha.9 with all three dist-tags repointed.

What didn't change

  • --version cold-start: still 33 ms (the #2256 fast path in bin/cli.js and ruflo/bin/ruflo.js is unaffected)
  • MCP stdio cleanliness: still pure JSON-RPC on stdout (ADR-146 P2 deliberately doesn't touch stderr routing)
  • All 4 audits + 2 regression smokes still pass locally — guards added in 3.10.33 (YAML lint + router regex) continue to cover their cases
Assets 2
Loading