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SigSieve v1.0.0

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@semihbugrasezer semihbugrasezer released this 09 Nov 13:02
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
71ae5e9

SigSieve v1.0.0

First stable release. SigSieve filters SSH agent requests so that forwarded
connections see only allowlisted identities. Optional destination binding
restricts signing to approved SSH destination host keys. Private keys stay
in the upstream agent.

Runtime behavior is unchanged from v1.0.0-rc.1. See the
CHANGELOG.

No independent external security review or audit has been performed.
The maintainer waived the external technical review gate (S11). Design or
implementation mistakes may remain despite internal AI-assisted review,
tests and fuzzing.

Source

  • Tag v1.0.0: annotated tag object 11597ef257faeddfdebc94cdc3e71194911bcfe3, not signed
  • Commit 71ae5e95e666eeb3cb1b94b25ba6b0b8571eca35 (merge of PR #62, on main)

Install

macOS Apple Silicon with Homebrew:

brew install semihbugrasezer/sigsieve/sigsieve
sigsieve --version   # sigsieve 1.0.0

Existing Homebrew users: brew update && brew upgrade sigsieve.
The formula builds from the tagged source archive (SHA-256
a2aabcaf89148179cc9aaf56270cbeae8c6d7acb9a617a7495c09e1367e6a04c, tap commit
7fd385e). That checksum identifies the source, not a GitHub-built binary;
build provenance applies only to the prebuilt archives below.

Prebuilt archives: download the archive and its .sha256 file for your
platform, check them and verify the build provenance before installing, as
described in INSTALL.md.
The worked example in INSTALL.md still uses v0.1.0-alpha.4; use v1.0.0 and
the values below instead.

shasum -a 256 -c sigsieve-v1.0.0-<target>.tar.gz.sha256
gh attestation verify sigsieve-v1.0.0-<target>.tar.gz \
  --repo semihbugrasezer/sigsieve \
  --signer-workflow semihbugrasezer/sigsieve/.github/workflows/release.yml \
  --source-ref refs/tags/v1.0.0 \
  --source-digest 71ae5e95e666eeb3cb1b94b25ba6b0b8571eca35 \
  --deny-self-hosted-runners

Installation needs no sudo and no SSH key changes.

Supported platforms

Platform Status
macOS Apple Silicon (arm64) Prebuilt archive and Homebrew (source build). Binary is not notarized.
Linux x86_64 Prebuilt archive for Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 or newer
Linux arm64 Source build only
Intel macOS, Windows Not validated
Homebrew on Linux Not tested

No crates.io package is published.

Release files

File SHA-256
sigsieve-v1.0.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz 50fb2a0f1026e820ac369dbf8ddce48f8c0b3622a7dd4938879c4b725eec1142
sigsieve-v1.0.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.cdx.json f3944ee6019d8c8f55b791adf2d078088219a06d8250133dfa13301fff3d3d34
sigsieve-v1.0.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz 998b6a3e412468f065645a84d94c693adb4fb24eb08c36702ee81b9883f9da26
sigsieve-v1.0.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.cdx.json bd90dde5f8a4b3428a51e393604e9babce04f2aac0897e9fd3545b21cbaae356

Each file has a .sha256 sidecar. The .cdx.json files are CycloneDX SBOMs.
All eight files come from release run
42286504497
and are unchanged.

Verification

All on commit 71ae5e9:

Check Result
CI (macOS arm64, Linux x86_64 and arm64, MSRV 1.88, supply chain, secret scan) success
Release rehearsal success
Fuzzing: 4 targets × 3,600 s, about 392 million runs 0 crashes
F-46 cross-user peer check (Linux) VERIFIED
Release build (11 jobs, provenance and SBOM attestations) success
Verify release on Linux x86_64: checksums, SBOMs, provenance, native smoke test PASS
Verify release on macOS arm64, native smoke test PASS (maintainer-reported)
Release files re-downloaded on macOS: checksums and gh attestation verify for both archives and both SBOMs PASS
Homebrew lifecycle with the published 1.0.0 formula on macOS arm64 PASS (maintainer-reported)
Real Secretive device test with the 1.0.0 binary 13/13 (maintainer-reported)

The v1.0.0-rc.1 device test covered one configuration: one P-256 test key,
Secretive 4.0.0, macOS 27.2 arm64, two localhost SSH servers. It also confirmed
that a cancelled Touch ID prompt refuses the destination as expected. Other
Secretive versions, other devices and production services have not been
tested.

Security notes and limitations

  • No external review. See the start of these notes (S11 waived).
  • Replay (F-22, F-47). Only one destination-bound signing attempt is
    permitted per verified session ID and key, within a 300-second,
    256-entry window. This bounds replay; it does not prevent replay at
    the protocol level. A failed or cancelled Touch ID request cannot be retried
    in the same session; open a new connection.
  • Forwarding exposure. A compromised remote host can still use an
    explicitly allowed key while agent forwarding is active.
  • macOS cross-user check. The F-46 upstream peer-UID check is verified
    on Linux only. The macOS cross-user check has not been run.
  • Release permissions (S12). The automation account has no write,
    maintain or admin role on the repository, release tag rules have no
    automation bypass, and immutable releases are enabled for the repository
    (to be confirmed for this release after publication). Automation runs
    under the maintainer's macOS user. During tag creation, maintainer
    credentials were accessible to local automation. Local credential
    isolation was not enforced. The release tag, source commit and build
    artifacts were subsequently verified. No independent external security
    audit has been performed.
  • The tag is not signed and the macOS binary is not notarized.

Full lists: LIMITATIONS.md,
FINDINGS,
RELEASE_CHECKLIST.

Reporting vulnerabilities

Use private vulnerability reporting.
The channel was tested end to end on 2026-11-06.

SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.4

Pre-release

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@semihbugrasezer semihbugrasezer released this 02 Nov 22:55
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.

SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.4

Experimental pre-release — macOS ARM64 and Linux x86_64

Important

Security erratum — F-47 (known limitation, added 2026-11-03). An earlier
version of these notes said a replayed authorized session can cause at most
one upstream signature per recorded session. That is not guaranteed. A
replayed authorized SSH session can cause additional upstream signatures:
varying the requested username bypasses the duplicate-attempt cache.
Signing attempts remain subject to SigSieve's signing budget and resource
limits. The signatures observed in testing remain bound to the recorded SSH
session; this finding does not demonstrate authentication to a different
SSH session. It is tracked as
F-47,
and SigSieve does not provide a complete defense against recorded-session
replay. The release files and tag are unchanged.

SigSieve is a local SSH-agent filtering proxy that lets you forward selected
SSH identities while keeping your existing agent and private keys.

It is free, open source and MIT-licensed. No accounts, SaaS service or
telemetry are required.

What changed since v0.1.0-alpha.3

Behaviour changes

  • run refuses an untrusted upstream. sigsieve run now exits with
    code 2 when the upstream path is not a Unix socket, or the socket or the
    agent process serving it belongs to another user. Before, it warned and
    served requests that could only fail. A missing or not-yet-listening
    socket still only warns. A supervisor that restarts on failure will now
    restart run.
  • --secretive requires an absolute HOME. An empty or relative
    HOME used to resolve the socket against the working directory.
  • New warnings for a fingerprint given both as an allowed key and an
    allowed destination, and for duplicate destination entries.
  • Clearer doctor output. The self-test announces its synthetic probe
    before the expected denial, gives path-free hints for unusable upstreams
    (no socket, permission denied, stale socket, socket not yours), and warns
    when the allowlist is empty (exit code unchanged).

Security findings closed

  • F-46 — upstream peer-uid check verified on Linux. A new two-user
    test on a disposable GitHub-hosted VM shows that an agent run by another
    user, behind a socket file owned by the SigSieve user, is refused by the
    kernel peer credential, and that the test fails when that check is
    removed. macOS has no cross-user test.
  • F-45 — release tags must be on main. release.yml and
    scripts/verify-release.sh refuse a tag whose commit is not on main.

Tests

  • Destination binding and session isolation through the served socket with
    a real recorded OpenSSH session; a binding on one connection never
    authorizes another.
  • Real-OpenSSH agent lifecycle: a real ssh-agent killed and restarted
    under a running proxy, concurrent allowed and forbidden sessions, an
    upstream lost mid-request, and replay of a real session's frames.
  • A test-harness timing fix for the throwaway sshds.

See the CHANGELOG for the full list.

Supported platforms

Prebuilt archives:

  • macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
  • Linux x86_64 (Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 baseline)

Linux ARM64 is covered by CI but is source-build only. Windows and Intel
macOS are not validated release targets.

Verification

Release commit:
5ea37b73ce7ed5dd33f3ac405c3ae4ad4da68751

All four fuzz targets completed a 3,600-second campaign each, with
287,516,615 reported executions and no reported crashes or sanitizer
failures.

Both release archives passed checksum, build provenance, SBOM provenance,
SBOM attestation, archive integrity and native smoke-test verification
(scripts/verify-release.sh, RESULT: PASS). macOS ARM64 verification was
performed locally; Linux x86_64 verification ran on GitHub-hosted Ubuntu.

To verify the downloads yourself, including offline, see
VERIFY_OFFLINE.md.

Security notice

Experimental security software. Not independently audited.

Internal reviews, including AI-assisted ones, are not an independent audit.

Identity filtering does not prevent a compromised remote host from
requesting signatures with an allowed key while forwarding is active.
Destination binding narrows authorized SSH authentication but does not
eliminate misuse at approved destinations. Replay of a recorded authorized
session is reduced, not prevented (F-22, F-47; see the erratum above).

Real-device evidence is limited to the tested configuration. Compatibility
with other agents, devices and SSH servers is not guaranteed.

Read the security model and
known limitations before use.

Installation

The README and INSTALL guide inside this tag and its archives still describe
installing v0.1.0-alpha.3. Use the instructions below for this release;
the repository documentation will be updated after publication.

Prebuilt binary (macOS ARM64 or Linux x86_64). Needs the GitHub CLI
(gh). Verifies the checksum, a pinned digest and GitHub build provenance
before installing to ~/.local/bin:

(
  set -eu
  repo=semihbugrasezer/sigsieve
  tag=v0.1.0-alpha.4
  commit=5ea37b73ce7ed5dd33f3ac405c3ae4ad4da68751
  case "$(uname -s)/$(uname -m)" in
    Darwin/arm64)
      target=aarch64-apple-darwin
      expected_sha=cf3dbde8703a6f3e9eaa34dff5b83d4e651b80a2d875150c35a26ef2bbc61cf0 ;;
    Linux/x86_64)
      target=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
      expected_sha=da3a05419bef31800b1781df58977b69df96dc9dacbe250780ff73e1a5801011 ;;
    *) echo "No verified binary for this OS/architecture; build from source." >&2; exit 1 ;;
  esac
  name="sigsieve-$tag-$target"
  work=$(mktemp -d)
  trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
  cd "$work"
  gh release download "$tag" -R "$repo" \
    -p "$name.tar.gz" -p "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
  if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    shasum -a 256 -c "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
    printf '%s  %s\n' "$expected_sha" "$name.tar.gz" | shasum -a 256 -c -
  else
    sha256sum -c "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
    printf '%s  %s\n' "$expected_sha" "$name.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c -
  fi
  gh attestation verify "$name.tar.gz" --repo "$repo" \
    --signer-workflow "$repo/.github/workflows/release.yml" \
    --source-ref "refs/tags/$tag" \
    --source-digest "$commit" \
    --deny-self-hosted-runners
  tar -tzf "$name.tar.gz"  # optional: inspect archive entries
  tar -xzf "$name.tar.gz"
  "$name/sigsieve" --version
  mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"
  install -m 755 "$name/sigsieve" "$HOME/.local/bin/sigsieve"
  "$HOME/.local/bin/sigsieve" --version
)

From source, at the same immutable release commit:

(
  set -e
  git clone https://github.com/semihbugrasezer/sigsieve.git
  cd sigsieve
  git checkout v0.1.0-alpha.4
  test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = 5ea37b73ce7ed5dd33f3ac405c3ae4ad4da68751
  cargo install --locked --path .
  sigsieve --version
)

This needs Rust 1.99.1 (pinned by the checkout) and OpenSSH 8.4+; proxy-jump
sessions need 8.7+. Keep ordinary SSH access available while evaluating it.
There is no published Homebrew package yet.

Downloads

This release is immutable: its files and tag cannot be changed after
publication.

Each platform archive has a CycloneDX SBOM sidecar, and every archive and
SBOM has a matching .sha256 file (8 files). Both archives contain the
executable, license, third-party notices, README and changelog.

SHA-256 File
cf3dbde8703a6f3e9eaa34dff5b83d4e651b80a2d875150c35a26ef2bbc61cf0 sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.4-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz
65a57cb8260ded85ad57846bac6b24983ca73585b51cac756cb930b9992d6c7c sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.4-aarch64-apple-darwin.cdx.json
da3a05419bef31800b1781df58977b69df96dc9dacbe250780ff73e1a5801011 sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.4-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
d5b4c0d3d6bf72d6913934cb5a105886490381e6c6dc4a199cb7bc1758f8dfd6 sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.4-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.cdx.json

SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.3 — Experimental Pre-release

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@semihbugrasezer semihbugrasezer released this 01 Nov 18:42
Immutable release. Only release title and notes can be modified.
60c9b37

SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.3

Experimental pre-release — macOS ARM64 and Linux x86_64

SigSieve is a local SSH-agent filtering proxy that lets you forward selected
SSH identities while keeping your existing agent and private keys.

It is free, open source and MIT-licensed. No accounts, SaaS service or
telemetry are required.

What changed since v0.1.0-alpha.2

The proxy's runtime code is unchanged. The only changes under src/ are
in test code. This release changes how releases are built, attested and
verified, and adds tests and documentation.

Release integrity

  • Artifact binding (F-42). The release attest job no longer trusts
    artifacts by name. Each artifact must be the exact one (ID, zip digest,
    archive SHA-256) its producing job reported. Zip entries are checked
    before extraction (regular files with exact expected names only), and
    extraction is capped at 256 MiB.
  • SBOM sidecars. Each archive now has a CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM sidecar
    (.cdx.json). Each SBOM gets build provenance, and each archive gets an
    SBOM attestation.
  • SBOM fixes found before tagging (F-43, F-44).
    • SBOMs carry a deterministic serialNumber, required by the attestation
      action. Without it, this release's SBOM attestation would have failed.
    • The release job now checks that the SBOM lists every dependency Cargo
      resolves for the target.
  • Secret scanning. CI runs a pinned, checksum-verified gitleaks secret
    scan.

Tests

  • A real-OpenSSH destination-binding negative matrix, including refused plain
    publickey to an allowed destination and an RSA destination host key
    refused even when allowed.
  • A throwaway gpg-agent --enable-ssh-support used as upstream.
  • MSRV is declared as Rust 1.88 and tested in CI.
  • The packaged crate's own tests run in CI. Nothing is published to
    crates.io.

Documentation

  • A five-minute quickstart with a throwaway agent and synthetic keys.
  • Governance, offline verification (docs/VERIFY_OFFLINE.md), an external
    review and user-trial protocol (results pending), and design notes.

See the CHANGELOG for the full list.

Supported platforms

Prebuilt archives:

  • macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
  • Linux x86_64 (Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 baseline)

Linux ARM64 is covered by CI but is source-build only. Windows and Intel
macOS are not validated release targets.

Verification

Release commit:
60c9b3777ce41cedc035c373836a8c0ea5c7e4cd

All four fuzz targets completed a 3,600-second campaign each, with
264,681,077 reported executions and no reported crashes or sanitizer
failures.

Both release archives passed checksum, build provenance, SBOM provenance,
SBOM attestation, archive integrity and native smoke-test verification
(scripts/verify-release.sh, RESULT: PASS). macOS ARM64 verification was
performed locally; Linux x86_64 verification ran on GitHub-hosted Ubuntu.

To verify the downloads yourself, including offline, see
VERIFY_OFFLINE.md.

Security notice

Experimental security software. Not independently audited.

Internal reviews, including AI-assisted ones, are not an independent audit.

Identity filtering does not prevent a compromised remote host from
requesting signatures with an allowed key while forwarding is active.
Destination binding narrows authorized SSH authentication but does not
eliminate misuse at approved destinations.

Real-device evidence is limited to the tested configuration. Compatibility
with other agents, devices and SSH servers is not guaranteed.

Read the security model and
known limitations before use.

Installation

The README and INSTALL guide inside this tag and its archives were frozen
before tagging and still describe installing v0.1.0-alpha.2. Use the
instructions below for this release; the repository documentation will be
updated after publication.

Prebuilt binary (macOS ARM64 or Linux x86_64). Needs the GitHub CLI
(gh). Verifies the checksum, a pinned digest and GitHub build provenance
before installing to ~/.local/bin:

(
  set -eu
  repo=semihbugrasezer/sigsieve
  tag=v0.1.0-alpha.3
  commit=60c9b3777ce41cedc035c373836a8c0ea5c7e4cd
  case "$(uname -s)/$(uname -m)" in
    Darwin/arm64)
      target=aarch64-apple-darwin
      expected_sha=18a6cd645f99012fe128961a42c489495e816f1b3664c56b788dc61a50b6f5b2 ;;
    Linux/x86_64)
      target=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
      expected_sha=889a6a166402fe768b9ace765504dd83b9466fc2be3d1399725631664aa41169 ;;
    *) echo "No verified binary for this OS/architecture; build from source." >&2; exit 1 ;;
  esac
  name="sigsieve-$tag-$target"
  work=$(mktemp -d)
  trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
  cd "$work"
  gh release download "$tag" -R "$repo" \
    -p "$name.tar.gz" -p "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
  if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    shasum -a 256 -c "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
    printf '%s  %s\n' "$expected_sha" "$name.tar.gz" | shasum -a 256 -c -
  else
    sha256sum -c "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
    printf '%s  %s\n' "$expected_sha" "$name.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c -
  fi
  gh attestation verify "$name.tar.gz" --repo "$repo" \
    --signer-workflow "$repo/.github/workflows/release.yml" \
    --source-ref "refs/tags/$tag" \
    --source-digest "$commit" \
    --deny-self-hosted-runners
  tar -tzf "$name.tar.gz"  # optional: inspect archive entries
  tar -xzf "$name.tar.gz"
  "$name/sigsieve" --version
  mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"
  install -m 755 "$name/sigsieve" "$HOME/.local/bin/sigsieve"
  "$HOME/.local/bin/sigsieve" --version
)

From source, at the same immutable release commit:

(
  set -e
  git clone https://github.com/semihbugrasezer/sigsieve.git
  cd sigsieve
  git checkout v0.1.0-alpha.3
  test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = 60c9b3777ce41cedc035c373836a8c0ea5c7e4cd
  cargo install --locked --path .
  sigsieve --version
)

This needs Rust 1.99.1 (pinned by the checkout) and OpenSSH 8.4+; proxy-jump
sessions need 8.7+. Keep ordinary SSH access available while evaluating it.
There is no published Homebrew package yet.

The bundled CHANGELOG lists this version as "not yet tagged (experimental
pre-release candidate)". It reflects the frozen pre-tag candidate: the tag
points at that exact verified commit, and changing the file would have
required re-running every check on a new commit.

Downloads

This release is immutable: its files and tag cannot be changed after
publication.

Each platform archive has a CycloneDX SBOM sidecar, and every archive and
SBOM has a matching .sha256 file (8 files). Both archives contain the
executable, license, third-party notices, README and changelog.

SHA-256 File
18a6cd645f99012fe128961a42c489495e816f1b3664c56b788dc61a50b6f5b2 sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.3-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz
6c6e11c207021632759860db01e509e45306f3be08be21879f03931dc69bdc6e sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.3-aarch64-apple-darwin.cdx.json
889a6a166402fe768b9ace765504dd83b9466fc2be3d1399725631664aa41169 sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.3-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
6216c8c6b57318a86fbef7aba8982cd75b6484ca27f74d15f625bca0b767e1a1 sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.3-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.cdx.json

SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.2 — Experimental Pre-release

Choose a tag to compare

@semihbugrasezer semihbugrasezer released this 28 Oct 18:45
fc7484b

SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.2

Experimental pre-release — macOS ARM64 and Linux x86_64

SigSieve is a local SSH-agent filtering proxy that lets you forward selected SSH identities while keeping your existing agent and private keys.

It is free, open source and MIT-licensed. No accounts, SaaS service or telemetry are required.

Highlights

  • Forward only explicitly allowlisted SSH identities using SHA-256 fingerprints.
  • Optional destination binding restricts SSH authentication to approved destination host keys.
  • Integrates with existing OpenSSH agents and Secretive.
  • Local doctor and connect --dry-run checks help validate a configuration before use.
  • Security-focused agent protocol validation, resource limits and fail-closed behavior.

Supported platforms

Prebuilt archives:

  • macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
  • Linux x86_64 (Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 baseline)

Linux ARM64 is covered by CI but is currently source-build only.

Windows and Intel macOS are not validated release targets.

Verification

Release commit:
fc7484be0371242f517b6628b0f7dcc3a9a12a29

All four fuzz targets completed a 3,600-second campaign each, with 312,653,669 reported executions and no reported crashes or sanitizer failures.

Both release archives passed checksum, build provenance, archive integrity and native smoke-test verification. macOS ARM64 verification was performed locally; Linux x86_64 verification ran on GitHub-hosted Ubuntu.

An owner-assisted Secretive test on macOS passed 9/9 checks, including allowed-key signing, hostbound authentication to an allowed destination, forbidden-destination refusal and generic-signing refusal in destination-binding mode. No unexpected authentication prompts were observed for the forbidden operations.

Security notice

Experimental security software. Not independently audited.

Identity filtering does not prevent a compromised remote host from requesting signatures with an allowed key while forwarding is active. Destination binding narrows authorized SSH authentication but does not eliminate misuse at approved destinations.

Real-device evidence is limited to the tested configuration. Compatibility with other agents, devices and SSH servers is not guaranteed.

Read the security model and known limitations before use.

Installation and documentation

See the version-specific README for source installation, first-use instructions and alternatives.

There is no published Homebrew package yet.

The tag points to the verified candidate commit rather than the later main head. Subsequent documentation-only changes from PR #24 are not included in these archives.

Downloads

Each platform archive has a matching .sha256 checksum file. Both archives contain the executable, license, third-party notices, README and changelog.