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SigSieve v1.0.0
SigSieve v1.0.0
First stable release. SigSieve filters SSH agent requests so that forwarded
connections see only allowlisted identities. Optional destination binding
restricts signing to approved SSH destination host keys. Private keys stay
in the upstream agent.
Runtime behavior is unchanged from v1.0.0-rc.1. See the
CHANGELOG.
No independent external security review or audit has been performed.
The maintainer waived the external technical review gate (S11). Design or
implementation mistakes may remain despite internal AI-assisted review,
tests and fuzzing.
Source
- Tag
v1.0.0: annotated tag object11597ef257faeddfdebc94cdc3e71194911bcfe3, not signed - Commit
71ae5e95e666eeb3cb1b94b25ba6b0b8571eca35(merge of PR #62, onmain)
Install
macOS Apple Silicon with Homebrew:
brew install semihbugrasezer/sigsieve/sigsieve
sigsieve --version # sigsieve 1.0.0Existing Homebrew users: brew update && brew upgrade sigsieve.
The formula builds from the tagged source archive (SHA-256
a2aabcaf89148179cc9aaf56270cbeae8c6d7acb9a617a7495c09e1367e6a04c, tap commit
7fd385e). That checksum identifies the source, not a GitHub-built binary;
build provenance applies only to the prebuilt archives below.
Prebuilt archives: download the archive and its .sha256 file for your
platform, check them and verify the build provenance before installing, as
described in INSTALL.md.
The worked example in INSTALL.md still uses v0.1.0-alpha.4; use v1.0.0 and
the values below instead.
shasum -a 256 -c sigsieve-v1.0.0-<target>.tar.gz.sha256
gh attestation verify sigsieve-v1.0.0-<target>.tar.gz \
--repo semihbugrasezer/sigsieve \
--signer-workflow semihbugrasezer/sigsieve/.github/workflows/release.yml \
--source-ref refs/tags/v1.0.0 \
--source-digest 71ae5e95e666eeb3cb1b94b25ba6b0b8571eca35 \
--deny-self-hosted-runnersInstallation needs no sudo and no SSH key changes.
Supported platforms
| Platform | Status |
|---|---|
| macOS Apple Silicon (arm64) | Prebuilt archive and Homebrew (source build). Binary is not notarized. |
| Linux x86_64 | Prebuilt archive for Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 or newer |
| Linux arm64 | Source build only |
| Intel macOS, Windows | Not validated |
| Homebrew on Linux | Not tested |
No crates.io package is published.
Release files
| File | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
sigsieve-v1.0.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz |
50fb2a0f1026e820ac369dbf8ddce48f8c0b3622a7dd4938879c4b725eec1142 |
sigsieve-v1.0.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.cdx.json |
f3944ee6019d8c8f55b791adf2d078088219a06d8250133dfa13301fff3d3d34 |
sigsieve-v1.0.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz |
998b6a3e412468f065645a84d94c693adb4fb24eb08c36702ee81b9883f9da26 |
sigsieve-v1.0.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.cdx.json |
bd90dde5f8a4b3428a51e393604e9babce04f2aac0897e9fd3545b21cbaae356 |
Each file has a .sha256 sidecar. The .cdx.json files are CycloneDX SBOMs.
All eight files come from release run
42286504497
and are unchanged.
Verification
All on commit 71ae5e9:
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| CI (macOS arm64, Linux x86_64 and arm64, MSRV 1.88, supply chain, secret scan) | success |
| Release rehearsal | success |
| Fuzzing: 4 targets × 3,600 s, about 392 million runs | 0 crashes |
| F-46 cross-user peer check (Linux) | VERIFIED |
| Release build (11 jobs, provenance and SBOM attestations) | success |
| Verify release on Linux x86_64: checksums, SBOMs, provenance, native smoke test | PASS |
| Verify release on macOS arm64, native smoke test | PASS (maintainer-reported) |
Release files re-downloaded on macOS: checksums and gh attestation verify for both archives and both SBOMs |
PASS |
| Homebrew lifecycle with the published 1.0.0 formula on macOS arm64 | PASS (maintainer-reported) |
| Real Secretive device test with the 1.0.0 binary | 13/13 (maintainer-reported) |
The v1.0.0-rc.1 device test covered one configuration: one P-256 test key,
Secretive 4.0.0, macOS 27.2 arm64, two localhost SSH servers. It also confirmed
that a cancelled Touch ID prompt refuses the destination as expected. Other
Secretive versions, other devices and production services have not been
tested.
Security notes and limitations
- No external review. See the start of these notes (S11 waived).
- Replay (F-22, F-47). Only one destination-bound signing attempt is
permitted per verified session ID and key, within a 300-second,
256-entry window. This bounds replay; it does not prevent replay at
the protocol level. A failed or cancelled Touch ID request cannot be retried
in the same session; open a new connection. - Forwarding exposure. A compromised remote host can still use an
explicitly allowed key while agent forwarding is active. - macOS cross-user check. The F-46 upstream peer-UID check is verified
on Linux only. The macOS cross-user check has not been run. - Release permissions (S12). The automation account has no write,
maintain or admin role on the repository, release tag rules have no
automation bypass, and immutable releases are enabled for the repository
(to be confirmed for this release after publication). Automation runs
under the maintainer's macOS user. During tag creation, maintainer
credentials were accessible to local automation. Local credential
isolation was not enforced. The release tag, source commit and build
artifacts were subsequently verified. No independent external security
audit has been performed. - The tag is not signed and the macOS binary is not notarized.
Full lists: LIMITATIONS.md,
FINDINGS,
RELEASE_CHECKLIST.
Reporting vulnerabilities
Use private vulnerability reporting.
The channel was tested end to end on 2026-11-06.
SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.4
SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.4
Experimental pre-release — macOS ARM64 and Linux x86_64
Important
Security erratum — F-47 (known limitation, added 2026-11-03). An earlier
version of these notes said a replayed authorized session can cause at most
one upstream signature per recorded session. That is not guaranteed. A
replayed authorized SSH session can cause additional upstream signatures:
varying the requested username bypasses the duplicate-attempt cache.
Signing attempts remain subject to SigSieve's signing budget and resource
limits. The signatures observed in testing remain bound to the recorded SSH
session; this finding does not demonstrate authentication to a different
SSH session. It is tracked as
F-47,
and SigSieve does not provide a complete defense against recorded-session
replay. The release files and tag are unchanged.
SigSieve is a local SSH-agent filtering proxy that lets you forward selected
SSH identities while keeping your existing agent and private keys.
It is free, open source and MIT-licensed. No accounts, SaaS service or
telemetry are required.
What changed since v0.1.0-alpha.3
Behaviour changes
runrefuses an untrusted upstream.sigsieve runnow exits with
code 2 when the upstream path is not a Unix socket, or the socket or the
agent process serving it belongs to another user. Before, it warned and
served requests that could only fail. A missing or not-yet-listening
socket still only warns. A supervisor that restarts on failure will now
restartrun.--secretiverequires an absoluteHOME. An empty or relative
HOMEused to resolve the socket against the working directory.- New warnings for a fingerprint given both as an allowed key and an
allowed destination, and for duplicate destination entries. - Clearer
doctoroutput. The self-test announces its synthetic probe
before the expected denial, gives path-free hints for unusable upstreams
(no socket, permission denied, stale socket, socket not yours), and warns
when the allowlist is empty (exit code unchanged).
Security findings closed
- F-46 — upstream peer-uid check verified on Linux. A new two-user
test on a disposable GitHub-hosted VM shows that an agent run by another
user, behind a socket file owned by the SigSieve user, is refused by the
kernel peer credential, and that the test fails when that check is
removed. macOS has no cross-user test. - F-45 — release tags must be on
main.release.ymland
scripts/verify-release.shrefuse a tag whose commit is not onmain.
Tests
- Destination binding and session isolation through the served socket with
a real recorded OpenSSH session; a binding on one connection never
authorizes another. - Real-OpenSSH agent lifecycle: a real
ssh-agentkilled and restarted
under a running proxy, concurrent allowed and forbidden sessions, an
upstream lost mid-request, and replay of a real session's frames. - A test-harness timing fix for the throwaway sshds.
See the CHANGELOG for the full list.
Supported platforms
Prebuilt archives:
- macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
- Linux x86_64 (Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 baseline)
Linux ARM64 is covered by CI but is source-build only. Windows and Intel
macOS are not validated release targets.
Verification
Release commit:
5ea37b73ce7ed5dd33f3ac405c3ae4ad4da68751
- Release build — PASS
- Release rehearsal — PASS
- Candidate CI — PASS
- F-46 cross-user test on the candidate — VERIFIED
- Four-target fuzz campaign — PASS
- Linux native release verification — PASS
All four fuzz targets completed a 3,600-second campaign each, with
287,516,615 reported executions and no reported crashes or sanitizer
failures.
Both release archives passed checksum, build provenance, SBOM provenance,
SBOM attestation, archive integrity and native smoke-test verification
(scripts/verify-release.sh, RESULT: PASS). macOS ARM64 verification was
performed locally; Linux x86_64 verification ran on GitHub-hosted Ubuntu.
To verify the downloads yourself, including offline, see
VERIFY_OFFLINE.md.
Security notice
Experimental security software. Not independently audited.
Internal reviews, including AI-assisted ones, are not an independent audit.
Identity filtering does not prevent a compromised remote host from
requesting signatures with an allowed key while forwarding is active.
Destination binding narrows authorized SSH authentication but does not
eliminate misuse at approved destinations. Replay of a recorded authorized
session is reduced, not prevented (F-22, F-47; see the erratum above).
Real-device evidence is limited to the tested configuration. Compatibility
with other agents, devices and SSH servers is not guaranteed.
Read the security model and
known limitations before use.
Installation
The README and INSTALL guide inside this tag and its archives still describe
installing v0.1.0-alpha.3. Use the instructions below for this release;
the repository documentation will be updated after publication.
Prebuilt binary (macOS ARM64 or Linux x86_64). Needs the GitHub CLI
(gh). Verifies the checksum, a pinned digest and GitHub build provenance
before installing to ~/.local/bin:
(
set -eu
repo=semihbugrasezer/sigsieve
tag=v0.1.0-alpha.4
commit=5ea37b73ce7ed5dd33f3ac405c3ae4ad4da68751
case "$(uname -s)/$(uname -m)" in
Darwin/arm64)
target=aarch64-apple-darwin
expected_sha=cf3dbde8703a6f3e9eaa34dff5b83d4e651b80a2d875150c35a26ef2bbc61cf0 ;;
Linux/x86_64)
target=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
expected_sha=da3a05419bef31800b1781df58977b69df96dc9dacbe250780ff73e1a5801011 ;;
*) echo "No verified binary for this OS/architecture; build from source." >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
name="sigsieve-$tag-$target"
work=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
cd "$work"
gh release download "$tag" -R "$repo" \
-p "$name.tar.gz" -p "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
shasum -a 256 -c "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
printf '%s %s\n' "$expected_sha" "$name.tar.gz" | shasum -a 256 -c -
else
sha256sum -c "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
printf '%s %s\n' "$expected_sha" "$name.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c -
fi
gh attestation verify "$name.tar.gz" --repo "$repo" \
--signer-workflow "$repo/.github/workflows/release.yml" \
--source-ref "refs/tags/$tag" \
--source-digest "$commit" \
--deny-self-hosted-runners
tar -tzf "$name.tar.gz" # optional: inspect archive entries
tar -xzf "$name.tar.gz"
"$name/sigsieve" --version
mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"
install -m 755 "$name/sigsieve" "$HOME/.local/bin/sigsieve"
"$HOME/.local/bin/sigsieve" --version
)From source, at the same immutable release commit:
(
set -e
git clone https://github.com/semihbugrasezer/sigsieve.git
cd sigsieve
git checkout v0.1.0-alpha.4
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = 5ea37b73ce7ed5dd33f3ac405c3ae4ad4da68751
cargo install --locked --path .
sigsieve --version
)This needs Rust 1.99.1 (pinned by the checkout) and OpenSSH 8.4+; proxy-jump
sessions need 8.7+. Keep ordinary SSH access available while evaluating it.
There is no published Homebrew package yet.
Downloads
This release is immutable: its files and tag cannot be changed after
publication.
Each platform archive has a CycloneDX SBOM sidecar, and every archive and
SBOM has a matching .sha256 file (8 files). Both archives contain the
executable, license, third-party notices, README and changelog.
| SHA-256 | File |
|---|---|
cf3dbde8703a6f3e9eaa34dff5b83d4e651b80a2d875150c35a26ef2bbc61cf0 |
sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.4-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz |
65a57cb8260ded85ad57846bac6b24983ca73585b51cac756cb930b9992d6c7c |
sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.4-aarch64-apple-darwin.cdx.json |
da3a05419bef31800b1781df58977b69df96dc9dacbe250780ff73e1a5801011 |
sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.4-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz |
d5b4c0d3d6bf72d6913934cb5a105886490381e6c6dc4a199cb7bc1758f8dfd6 |
sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.4-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.cdx.json |
SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.3 — Experimental Pre-release
SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.3
Experimental pre-release — macOS ARM64 and Linux x86_64
SigSieve is a local SSH-agent filtering proxy that lets you forward selected
SSH identities while keeping your existing agent and private keys.
It is free, open source and MIT-licensed. No accounts, SaaS service or
telemetry are required.
What changed since v0.1.0-alpha.2
The proxy's runtime code is unchanged. The only changes under src/ are
in test code. This release changes how releases are built, attested and
verified, and adds tests and documentation.
Release integrity
- Artifact binding (F-42). The release
attestjob no longer trusts
artifacts by name. Each artifact must be the exact one (ID, zip digest,
archive SHA-256) its producing job reported. Zip entries are checked
before extraction (regular files with exact expected names only), and
extraction is capped at 256 MiB. - SBOM sidecars. Each archive now has a CycloneDX 1.5 SBOM sidecar
(.cdx.json). Each SBOM gets build provenance, and each archive gets an
SBOM attestation. - SBOM fixes found before tagging (F-43, F-44).
- SBOMs carry a deterministic
serialNumber, required by the attestation
action. Without it, this release's SBOM attestation would have failed. - The release job now checks that the SBOM lists every dependency Cargo
resolves for the target.
- SBOMs carry a deterministic
- Secret scanning. CI runs a pinned, checksum-verified gitleaks secret
scan.
Tests
- A real-OpenSSH destination-binding negative matrix, including refused plain
publickeyto an allowed destination and an RSA destination host key
refused even when allowed. - A throwaway
gpg-agent --enable-ssh-supportused as upstream. - MSRV is declared as Rust 1.88 and tested in CI.
- The packaged crate's own tests run in CI. Nothing is published to
crates.io.
Documentation
- A five-minute quickstart with a throwaway agent and synthetic keys.
- Governance, offline verification (
docs/VERIFY_OFFLINE.md), an external
review and user-trial protocol (results pending), and design notes.
See the CHANGELOG for the full list.
Supported platforms
Prebuilt archives:
- macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
- Linux x86_64 (Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 baseline)
Linux ARM64 is covered by CI but is source-build only. Windows and Intel
macOS are not validated release targets.
Verification
Release commit:
60c9b3777ce41cedc035c373836a8c0ea5c7e4cd
- Release build — PASS
- Release rehearsal — PASS
- Candidate CI — PASS
- Four-target fuzz campaign — PASS
- Linux native release verification — PASS
All four fuzz targets completed a 3,600-second campaign each, with
264,681,077 reported executions and no reported crashes or sanitizer
failures.
Both release archives passed checksum, build provenance, SBOM provenance,
SBOM attestation, archive integrity and native smoke-test verification
(scripts/verify-release.sh, RESULT: PASS). macOS ARM64 verification was
performed locally; Linux x86_64 verification ran on GitHub-hosted Ubuntu.
To verify the downloads yourself, including offline, see
VERIFY_OFFLINE.md.
Security notice
Experimental security software. Not independently audited.
Internal reviews, including AI-assisted ones, are not an independent audit.
Identity filtering does not prevent a compromised remote host from
requesting signatures with an allowed key while forwarding is active.
Destination binding narrows authorized SSH authentication but does not
eliminate misuse at approved destinations.
Real-device evidence is limited to the tested configuration. Compatibility
with other agents, devices and SSH servers is not guaranteed.
Read the security model and
known limitations before use.
Installation
The README and INSTALL guide inside this tag and its archives were frozen
before tagging and still describe installing v0.1.0-alpha.2. Use the
instructions below for this release; the repository documentation will be
updated after publication.
Prebuilt binary (macOS ARM64 or Linux x86_64). Needs the GitHub CLI
(gh). Verifies the checksum, a pinned digest and GitHub build provenance
before installing to ~/.local/bin:
(
set -eu
repo=semihbugrasezer/sigsieve
tag=v0.1.0-alpha.3
commit=60c9b3777ce41cedc035c373836a8c0ea5c7e4cd
case "$(uname -s)/$(uname -m)" in
Darwin/arm64)
target=aarch64-apple-darwin
expected_sha=18a6cd645f99012fe128961a42c489495e816f1b3664c56b788dc61a50b6f5b2 ;;
Linux/x86_64)
target=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
expected_sha=889a6a166402fe768b9ace765504dd83b9466fc2be3d1399725631664aa41169 ;;
*) echo "No verified binary for this OS/architecture; build from source." >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
name="sigsieve-$tag-$target"
work=$(mktemp -d)
trap 'rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
cd "$work"
gh release download "$tag" -R "$repo" \
-p "$name.tar.gz" -p "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
shasum -a 256 -c "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
printf '%s %s\n' "$expected_sha" "$name.tar.gz" | shasum -a 256 -c -
else
sha256sum -c "$name.tar.gz.sha256"
printf '%s %s\n' "$expected_sha" "$name.tar.gz" | sha256sum -c -
fi
gh attestation verify "$name.tar.gz" --repo "$repo" \
--signer-workflow "$repo/.github/workflows/release.yml" \
--source-ref "refs/tags/$tag" \
--source-digest "$commit" \
--deny-self-hosted-runners
tar -tzf "$name.tar.gz" # optional: inspect archive entries
tar -xzf "$name.tar.gz"
"$name/sigsieve" --version
mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"
install -m 755 "$name/sigsieve" "$HOME/.local/bin/sigsieve"
"$HOME/.local/bin/sigsieve" --version
)From source, at the same immutable release commit:
(
set -e
git clone https://github.com/semihbugrasezer/sigsieve.git
cd sigsieve
git checkout v0.1.0-alpha.3
test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = 60c9b3777ce41cedc035c373836a8c0ea5c7e4cd
cargo install --locked --path .
sigsieve --version
)This needs Rust 1.99.1 (pinned by the checkout) and OpenSSH 8.4+; proxy-jump
sessions need 8.7+. Keep ordinary SSH access available while evaluating it.
There is no published Homebrew package yet.
The bundled CHANGELOG lists this version as "not yet tagged (experimental
pre-release candidate)". It reflects the frozen pre-tag candidate: the tag
points at that exact verified commit, and changing the file would have
required re-running every check on a new commit.
Downloads
This release is immutable: its files and tag cannot be changed after
publication.
Each platform archive has a CycloneDX SBOM sidecar, and every archive and
SBOM has a matching .sha256 file (8 files). Both archives contain the
executable, license, third-party notices, README and changelog.
| SHA-256 | File |
|---|---|
18a6cd645f99012fe128961a42c489495e816f1b3664c56b788dc61a50b6f5b2 |
sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.3-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz |
6c6e11c207021632759860db01e509e45306f3be08be21879f03931dc69bdc6e |
sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.3-aarch64-apple-darwin.cdx.json |
889a6a166402fe768b9ace765504dd83b9466fc2be3d1399725631664aa41169 |
sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.3-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz |
6216c8c6b57318a86fbef7aba8982cd75b6484ca27f74d15f625bca0b767e1a1 |
sigsieve-v0.1.0-alpha.3-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.cdx.json |
SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.2 — Experimental Pre-release
SigSieve v0.1.0-alpha.2
Experimental pre-release — macOS ARM64 and Linux x86_64
SigSieve is a local SSH-agent filtering proxy that lets you forward selected SSH identities while keeping your existing agent and private keys.
It is free, open source and MIT-licensed. No accounts, SaaS service or telemetry are required.
Highlights
- Forward only explicitly allowlisted SSH identities using SHA-256 fingerprints.
- Optional destination binding restricts SSH authentication to approved destination host keys.
- Integrates with existing OpenSSH agents and Secretive.
- Local
doctorandconnect --dry-runchecks help validate a configuration before use. - Security-focused agent protocol validation, resource limits and fail-closed behavior.
Supported platforms
Prebuilt archives:
- macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
- Linux x86_64 (Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 baseline)
Linux ARM64 is covered by CI but is currently source-build only.
Windows and Intel macOS are not validated release targets.
Verification
Release commit:
fc7484be0371242f517b6628b0f7dcc3a9a12a29
- Release build — PASS
- Release rehearsal — PASS
- Candidate CI — PASS
- Four-target fuzz campaign — PASS
- Linux native release verification — PASS
All four fuzz targets completed a 3,600-second campaign each, with 312,653,669 reported executions and no reported crashes or sanitizer failures.
Both release archives passed checksum, build provenance, archive integrity and native smoke-test verification. macOS ARM64 verification was performed locally; Linux x86_64 verification ran on GitHub-hosted Ubuntu.
An owner-assisted Secretive test on macOS passed 9/9 checks, including allowed-key signing, hostbound authentication to an allowed destination, forbidden-destination refusal and generic-signing refusal in destination-binding mode. No unexpected authentication prompts were observed for the forbidden operations.
Security notice
Experimental security software. Not independently audited.
Identity filtering does not prevent a compromised remote host from requesting signatures with an allowed key while forwarding is active. Destination binding narrows authorized SSH authentication but does not eliminate misuse at approved destinations.
Real-device evidence is limited to the tested configuration. Compatibility with other agents, devices and SSH servers is not guaranteed.
Read the security model and known limitations before use.
Installation and documentation
See the version-specific README for source installation, first-use instructions and alternatives.
There is no published Homebrew package yet.
The tag points to the verified candidate commit rather than the later main head. Subsequent documentation-only changes from PR #24 are not included in these archives.
Downloads
Each platform archive has a matching .sha256 checksum file. Both archives contain the executable, license, third-party notices, README and changelog.