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SigSieve v1.0.0
First stable release. SigSieve filters SSH agent requests so that forwarded
connections see only allowlisted identities. Optional destination binding
restricts signing to approved SSH destination host keys. Private keys stay
in the upstream agent.
Runtime behavior is unchanged from v1.0.0-rc.1. See the
CHANGELOG.
No independent external security review or audit has been performed.
The maintainer waived the external technical review gate (S11). Design or
implementation mistakes may remain despite internal AI-assisted review,
tests and fuzzing.
Source
- Tag
v1.0.0: annotated tag object11597ef257faeddfdebc94cdc3e71194911bcfe3, not signed - Commit
71ae5e95e666eeb3cb1b94b25ba6b0b8571eca35(merge of PR #62, onmain)
Install
macOS Apple Silicon with Homebrew:
brew install semihbugrasezer/sigsieve/sigsieve
sigsieve --version # sigsieve 1.0.0Existing Homebrew users: brew update && brew upgrade sigsieve.
The formula builds from the tagged source archive (SHA-256
a2aabcaf89148179cc9aaf56270cbeae8c6d7acb9a617a7495c09e1367e6a04c, tap commit
7fd385e). That checksum identifies the source, not a GitHub-built binary;
build provenance applies only to the prebuilt archives below.
Prebuilt archives: download the archive and its .sha256 file for your
platform, check them and verify the build provenance before installing, as
described in INSTALL.md.
The worked example in INSTALL.md still uses v0.1.0-alpha.4; use v1.0.0 and
the values below instead.
shasum -a 256 -c sigsieve-v1.0.0-<target>.tar.gz.sha256
gh attestation verify sigsieve-v1.0.0-<target>.tar.gz \
--repo semihbugrasezer/sigsieve \
--signer-workflow semihbugrasezer/sigsieve/.github/workflows/release.yml \
--source-ref refs/tags/v1.0.0 \
--source-digest 71ae5e95e666eeb3cb1b94b25ba6b0b8571eca35 \
--deny-self-hosted-runnersInstallation needs no sudo and no SSH key changes.
Supported platforms
| Platform | Status |
|---|---|
| macOS Apple Silicon (arm64) | Prebuilt archive and Homebrew (source build). Binary is not notarized. |
| Linux x86_64 | Prebuilt archive for Ubuntu 24.04 / glibc 2.39 or newer |
| Linux arm64 | Source build only |
| Intel macOS, Windows | Not validated |
| Homebrew on Linux | Not tested |
No crates.io package is published.
Release files
| File | SHA-256 |
|---|---|
sigsieve-v1.0.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz |
50fb2a0f1026e820ac369dbf8ddce48f8c0b3622a7dd4938879c4b725eec1142 |
sigsieve-v1.0.0-aarch64-apple-darwin.cdx.json |
f3944ee6019d8c8f55b791adf2d078088219a06d8250133dfa13301fff3d3d34 |
sigsieve-v1.0.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz |
998b6a3e412468f065645a84d94c693adb4fb24eb08c36702ee81b9883f9da26 |
sigsieve-v1.0.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.cdx.json |
bd90dde5f8a4b3428a51e393604e9babce04f2aac0897e9fd3545b21cbaae356 |
Each file has a .sha256 sidecar. The .cdx.json files are CycloneDX SBOMs.
All eight files come from release run
42286504497
and are unchanged.
Verification
All on commit 71ae5e9:
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
| CI (macOS arm64, Linux x86_64 and arm64, MSRV 1.88, supply chain, secret scan) | success |
| Release rehearsal | success |
| Fuzzing: 4 targets × 3,600 s, about 392 million runs | 0 crashes |
| F-46 cross-user peer check (Linux) | VERIFIED |
| Release build (11 jobs, provenance and SBOM attestations) | success |
| Verify release on Linux x86_64: checksums, SBOMs, provenance, native smoke test | PASS |
| Verify release on macOS arm64, native smoke test | PASS (maintainer-reported) |
Release files re-downloaded on macOS: checksums and gh attestation verify for both archives and both SBOMs |
PASS |
| Homebrew lifecycle with the published 1.0.0 formula on macOS arm64 | PASS (maintainer-reported) |
| Real Secretive device test with the 1.0.0 binary | 13/13 (maintainer-reported) |
The v1.0.0-rc.1 device test covered one configuration: one P-256 test key,
Secretive 4.0.0, macOS 27.2 arm64, two localhost SSH servers. It also confirmed
that a cancelled Touch ID prompt refuses the destination as expected. Other
Secretive versions, other devices and production services have not been
tested.
Security notes and limitations
- No external review. See the start of these notes (S11 waived).
- Replay (F-22, F-47). Only one destination-bound signing attempt is
permitted per verified session ID and key, within a 300-second,
256-entry window. This bounds replay; it does not prevent replay at
the protocol level. A failed or cancelled Touch ID request cannot be retried
in the same session; open a new connection. - Forwarding exposure. A compromised remote host can still use an
explicitly allowed key while agent forwarding is active. - macOS cross-user check. The F-46 upstream peer-UID check is verified
on Linux only. The macOS cross-user check has not been run. - Release permissions (S12). The automation account has no write,
maintain or admin role on the repository, release tag rules have no
automation bypass, and immutable releases are enabled for the repository
(to be confirmed for this release after publication). Automation runs
under the maintainer's macOS user. During tag creation, maintainer
credentials were accessible to local automation. Local credential
isolation was not enforced. The release tag, source commit and build
artifacts were subsequently verified. No independent external security
audit has been performed. - The tag is not signed and the macOS binary is not notarized.
Full lists: LIMITATIONS.md,
FINDINGS,
RELEASE_CHECKLIST.
Reporting vulnerabilities
Use private vulnerability reporting.
The channel was tested end to end on 2026-11-06.