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25 changes: 25 additions & 0 deletions data_sources/linux_auditd_cwd.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
name: Linux Auditd Cwd
id: a9ef851b-d864-478b-b1b3-76535d7ff7fc
version: 1
date: '2025-12-02'
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
description: This type is used to record the working directory from which the process that invoked the system call specified in the first record was executed. The purpose of this record is to record the current process's location in case a relative path winds up being captured in the associated PATH record. This way the absolute path can be reconstructed.
source: auditd
sourcetype: auditd
separator: type
separator_value: CWD
configuration: https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
supported_TA:
- name: Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux
url: https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833
version: 10.2.0
fields:
- cwd
- date_hour
- date_mday
- date_minute
- date_month
- date_second
- msg
- type
example_log: 'type=CWD msg=audit(11/20/2025 16:57:48.909:110027) : cwd=/etc/ssh'
136 changes: 84 additions & 52 deletions detections/endpoint/linux_auditd_doas_conf_file_creation.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,78 +1,110 @@
name: Linux Auditd Doas Conf File Creation
id: 61059783-574b-40d2-ac2f-69b898afd6b4
version: 7
date: '2025-06-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
version: 8
date: '2025-11-27'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation of the doas.conf file on
a Linux host. This file is used by the doas utility to allow standard users to perform
tasks as root, similar to sudo. The detection leverages Linux Auditd data, focusing
on the creation of the doas.conf file. This activity is significant because it can
indicate an attempt to gain elevated privileges, potentially by an adversary. If
confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands with root
commands with root privileges, leading to full system compromise.
description: |
The following analytic detects the creation of the doas.conf file on a Linux host.
This file is used by the doas utility to allow standard users to perform tasks as root, similar to sudo.
The detection leverages Linux Auditd data, focusing on the creation of the doas.conf file.
This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to gain elevated privileges, potentially by an adversary. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute commands with root commands with root privileges, leading to full system compromise.
data_source:
- Linux Auditd Path
search: '`linux_auditd` type=PATH name ="/etc/doas.conf*"
| rename host as dest
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by name nametype ogid type dest
- Linux Auditd Path
- Linux Auditd Cwd
search: |
`linux_auditd`
(
(type=PATH nametype="CREATE")
OR
type=CWD
)
| rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"

| stats
values(type) as types
values(name) as names
values(nametype) as nametype
values(cwd) as cwd_list
values(_time) as event_times
by audit_id host

| eval current_working_directory = coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list, 0), "N/A")
| eval candidate_paths = mvmap(names, if(match(names, "^/"), names, current_working_directory + "/" + names))
| eval matched_paths = mvfilter(match(candidate_paths, "/etc/doas.conf.*"))
| eval match_count = mvcount(matched_paths)
| eval reconstructed_path = mvindex(matched_paths, 0)
| eval e_time = mvindex(event_times, 0)
| where match_count > 0
| rename host as dest

| stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime
values(nametype) as nametype
by current_working_directory
reconstructed_path
match_count
dest
audit_id

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_auditd_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`'
how_to_implement: To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd
| table nametype current_working_directory reconstructed_path dest audit_id match_count firstTime lastTime
| `linux_auditd_doas_conf_file_creation_filter`
how_to_implement: |
To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd
data, that consist SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line
executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems. These logs should be ingested
and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833),
which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data. The next step
involves normalizing the field names to match the field names set by the Splunk
Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources
and enhance the efficiency of data modeling. This approach enables effective monitoring
and detection of linux endpoints where auditd is deployed
known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can execute this command.
and enhance the efficiency of data modeling and make sure the type=CWD record type is activate in your auditd configuration.
This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of linux endpoints where auditd is deployed.
known_false_positives: |
Administrator or network operator can execute this command.
Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
- https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas
- https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/
- https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Doas
- https://www.makeuseof.com/how-to-install-and-use-doas/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$")
starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories)
as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic)
as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$")
starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories)
as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic)
as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: A [$type$] event occurred on host - [$dest$] to create a doas.conf file.
message: A $reconstructed_path$ file was created on host - [$dest$]
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 64
- field: dest
type: system
score: 64
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Linux Privilege Escalation
- Linux Persistence Techniques
- Compromised Linux Host
- Linux Privilege Escalation
- Linux Persistence Techniques
- Compromised Linux Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1548.003
- T1548.003
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/linux_audited_doas_conf/linux_path_doas_config.log
source: auditd
sourcetype: auditd
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1548.003/auditd_path_cwd_doas_conf/path_doas.log
source: auditd
sourcetype: auditd
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,81 +1,111 @@
name: Linux Auditd Possible Access Or Modification Of Sshd Config File
id: acb3ea33-70f7-47aa-b335-643b3aebcb2f
version: 7
date: '2025-06-10'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
version: 8
date: '2025-11-27'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Nasreddine Bencherchali, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: The following analytic detects suspicious access or modification of the
sshd_config file on Linux systems. It leverages data from Linux Auditd, focusing
on command-line executions involving processes like "cat," "nano," "vim," and "vi"
accessing the sshd_config file. This activity is significant because unauthorized
changes to sshd_config can allow threat actors to redirect port connections or use
unauthorized keys, potentially compromising the system. If confirmed malicious,
this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent backdoor
access, posing a severe security risk.
description: |
The following analytic detects access, deletion or modification of the ssh_config file on Linux systems.
It leverages data from Linux Auditd, focusing on events of type PATH with a nametype of ("NORMAL", "CREATE", "DELETE").
This activity could be significant because unauthorized changes to ssh_config can allow threat actors to redirect port connections or use unauthorized keys, potentially compromising the system.
Correlate this with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent backdoor access, posing a severe security risk.
data_source:
- Linux Auditd Path
search: '`linux_auditd` type=PATH name="/etc/ssh/ssh_config*"
- Linux Auditd Path
- Linux Auditd Cwd
search: |
`linux_auditd`
(
(type=PATH nametype IN ("NORMAL", "CREATE", "DELETE"))
OR
type=CWD
)
| rex "msg=audit\([^)]*:(?<audit_id>\d+)\)"

| stats
values(type) as types
values(name) as names
values(nametype) as nametype
values(cwd) as cwd_list
values(_time) as event_times
by audit_id, host

| eval current_working_directory = coalesce(mvindex(cwd_list, 0), "N/A")
| eval candidate_paths = mvmap(names, if(match(names, "^/"), names, current_working_directory + "/" + names))
| eval matched_paths = mvfilter(match(candidate_paths, "/etc/ssh/ssh_config.*"))
| eval match_count = mvcount(matched_paths)
| eval reconstructed_path = mvindex(matched_paths, 0)
| eval e_time = mvindex(event_times, 0)
| where match_count > 0
| rename host as dest
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by name nametype ogid type dest

| stats count min(e_time) as firstTime max(e_time) as lastTime
values(nametype) as nametype
by current_working_directory
reconstructed_path
match_count
dest
audit_id

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_auditd_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`'
how_to_implement: To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd
| `linux_auditd_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`
how_to_implement: |
To implement this detection, the process begins by ingesting auditd
data, that consist SYSCALL, TYPE, EXECVE and PROCTITLE events, which captures command-line
executions and process details on Unix/Linux systems. These logs should be ingested
and processed using Splunk Add-on for Unix and Linux (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/833),
which is essential for correctly parsing and categorizing the data. The next step
involves normalizing the field names to match the field names set by the Splunk
Common Information Model (CIM) to ensure consistency across different data sources
and enhance the efficiency of data modeling. This approach enables effective monitoring
and detection of linux endpoints where auditd is deployed
known_false_positives: Administrator or network operator can use this commandline
for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
and enhance the efficiency of data modeling and make sure the type=CWD record type is activate in your auditd configuration.
This approach enables effective monitoring and detection of linux endpoints where auditd is deployed.
known_false_positives: |
Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes.
Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/
drilldown_searches:
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$")
starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories)
as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic)
as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"
search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$")
starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories)
as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic)
as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
latest_offset: $info_max_time$
rba:
message: A [$type$] has been accessed/modified on host - [$dest$] to modify the
sshd_config file.
message: $reconstructed_path$ has been accessed with type $nametype$ on host - [$dest$]
risk_objects:
- field: dest
type: system
score: 25
- field: dest
type: system
score: 25
threat_objects: []
tags:
analytic_story:
- Linux Living Off The Land
- Linux Privilege Escalation
- Linux Persistence Techniques
- Compromised Linux Host
- Linux Living Off The Land
- Linux Privilege Escalation
- Linux Persistence Techniques
- Compromised Linux Host
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
- T1098.004
- T1098.004
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/linux_auditd_nopasswd/linux_path_ssh_config.log
source: auditd
sourcetype: auditd
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data:
https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1098.004/auditd_path_ssh_config/path_ssh_config.log
source: auditd
sourcetype: auditd
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