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Repaired broken USB ID 0x15E to 0x015E #22

Merged
merged 1 commit into from
Jul 2, 2013
Merged

Repaired broken USB ID 0x15E to 0x015E #22

merged 1 commit into from
Jul 2, 2013

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mdminhazulhaque
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The USB device with ID 0x015E is known as Huwai WIXUBB116. The module works fine when the ID is changed to 0x015E.

The USB device with ID 0x015E is known as Huwai WIXUBB116. The module works fine when the ID is changed to 0x015E.
@davispuh
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that doesn't change anything...
0x15E is equal to 0x015E (and also equal to 0x0000015E)

http://ideone.com/wzJoG

tklauser pushed a commit to tklauser/linux that referenced this pull request Sep 18, 2012
…d reasons

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     torvalds#6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     torvalds#7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     torvalds#8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     torvalds#9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
wrobelda referenced this pull request in wrobelda/linux-sunxi Sep 19, 2012
wrobelda referenced this pull request in wrobelda/linux-sunxi Sep 19, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     linux-sunxi#1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     linux-sunxi#2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     linux-sunxi#3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     linux-sunxi#4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     linux-sunxi#5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     linux-sunxi#6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     linux-sunxi#7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     linux-sunxi#8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     linux-sunxi#9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    linux-sunxi#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    linux-sunxi#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    linux-sunxi#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    linux-sunxi#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    linux-sunxi#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    linux-sunxi#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    linux-sunxi#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    linux-sunxi#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    linux-sunxi#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    linux-sunxi#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    linux-sunxi#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    linux-sunxi#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    linux-sunxi#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    linux-sunxi#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    linux-sunxi#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    linux-sunxi#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
heftig referenced this pull request in zen-kernel/zen-kernel Sep 29, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    #10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    #11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    #12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    #13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    #14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    #15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    #16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    #17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    #18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    #19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    #20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    #21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    #22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    #23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    #24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    #25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
koenkooi pushed a commit to koenkooi/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 2, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
koenkooi pushed a commit to koenkooi/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
noamc referenced this pull request in Mellanox/linux Oct 16, 2012
…fpga] IPI fixes

1. IPI was not going from cpu1 -> cpu0. Turns out that the IRQ mode
   programmed IDU_IRQ_MOD_TCPU_ALLRECP mismatched in value in kernel and
   ISS. kernel (per IDU specs) defines it as '3' whereas ISS believes it
   shd be 7 (which is clearly a BUG).

2. the IDU IRQs are hardwaired hence need to be setup as IRQF_PERCPU to
    disallow any irq-affinity changes.

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
koenkooi pushed a commit to koenkooi/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 17, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
hknkkn pushed a commit to hknkkn/linux-dynticks that referenced this pull request Oct 29, 2012
Printing the "start_ip" for every secondary cpu is very noisy on a large
system - and doesn't add any value. Drop this message.

Console log before:
Booting Node   0, Processors  #1
smpboot cpu 1: start_ip = 96000
 #2
smpboot cpu 2: start_ip = 96000
 #3
smpboot cpu 3: start_ip = 96000
 #4
smpboot cpu 4: start_ip = 96000
       ...
 torvalds#31
smpboot cpu 31: start_ip = 96000
Brought up 32 CPUs

Console log after:
Booting Node   0, Processors  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 torvalds#6 torvalds#7 Ok.
Booting Node   1, Processors  torvalds#8 torvalds#9 torvalds#10 torvalds#11 torvalds#12 torvalds#13 torvalds#14 torvalds#15 Ok.
Booting Node   0, Processors  torvalds#16 torvalds#17 torvalds#18 torvalds#19 torvalds#20 torvalds#21 torvalds#22 torvalds#23 Ok.
Booting Node   1, Processors  torvalds#24 torvalds#25 torvalds#26 torvalds#27 torvalds#28 torvalds#29 torvalds#30 torvalds#31
Brought up 32 CPUs

Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@amd64.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f452eb42507460426@agluck-desktop.sc.intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
koenkooi pushed a commit to koenkooi/linux that referenced this pull request Oct 31, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
vineetgarc referenced this pull request in foss-for-synopsys-dwc-arc-processors/linux Oct 31, 2012
1. IPI was not going from cpu1 -> cpu0. Turns out that the IRQ mode
   programmed IDU_IRQ_MOD_TCPU_ALLRECP mismatched in value in kernel and
   ISS. kernel (per IDU specs) defines it as '3' whereas ISS believes it
   shd be 7 (which is clearly a BUG).

2. the IDU IRQs are hardwaired hence need to be setup as IRQF_PERCPU to
    disallow any irq-affinity changes.

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
koenkooi pushed a commit to koenkooi/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 14, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
kees pushed a commit to kees/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 16, 2012
…d reasons

BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1035435

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     torvalds#6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     torvalds#7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     torvalds#8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     torvalds#9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Herton Ronaldo Krzesinski <herton.krzesinski@canonical.com>
koenkooi pushed a commit to koenkooi/linux that referenced this pull request Nov 21, 2012
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
vineetgarc referenced this pull request in foss-for-synopsys-dwc-arc-processors/linux Dec 31, 2012
1. IPI was not going from cpu1 -> cpu0. Turns out that the IRQ mode
   programmed IDU_IRQ_MOD_TCPU_ALLRECP mismatched in value in kernel and
   ISS. kernel (per IDU specs) defines it as '3' whereas ISS believes it
   shd be 7 (which is clearly a BUG).

2. the IDU IRQs are hardwaired hence need to be setup as IRQF_PERCPU to
    disallow any irq-affinity changes.

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com>
cianmcgovern pushed a commit to cianmcgovern/linux that referenced this pull request Mar 10, 2013
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d0 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     torvalds#6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     torvalds#7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     torvalds#8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     torvalds#9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    torvalds#10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    torvalds#11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    torvalds#12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    torvalds#13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    torvalds#14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    torvalds#15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    torvalds#16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    torvalds#17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    torvalds#18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    torvalds#19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    torvalds#20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    torvalds#21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    torvalds#22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    torvalds#23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    torvalds#24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    torvalds#25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
@torvalds torvalds merged commit 9045893 into torvalds:master Jul 2, 2013
torvalds pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 10, 2013
Several people reported the warning: "kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:729!"
and the stack trace is:

	#7 [ffff880214d25c10] mod_timer+501 at ffffffff8106d905
	#8 [ffff880214d25c50] br_multicast_del_pg.isra.20+261 at ffffffffa0731d25 [bridge]
	#9 [ffff880214d25c80] br_multicast_disable_port+88 at ffffffffa0732948 [bridge]
	#10 [ffff880214d25cb0] br_stp_disable_port+154 at ffffffffa072bcca [bridge]
	#11 [ffff880214d25ce8] br_device_event+520 at ffffffffa072a4e8 [bridge]
	#12 [ffff880214d25d18] notifier_call_chain+76 at ffffffff8164aafc
	#13 [ffff880214d25d50] raw_notifier_call_chain+22 at ffffffff810858f6
	#14 [ffff880214d25d60] call_netdevice_notifiers+45 at ffffffff81536aad
	#15 [ffff880214d25d80] dev_close_many+183 at ffffffff81536d17
	#16 [ffff880214d25dc0] rollback_registered_many+168 at ffffffff81537f68
	#17 [ffff880214d25de8] rollback_registered+49 at ffffffff81538101
	#18 [ffff880214d25e10] unregister_netdevice_queue+72 at ffffffff815390d8
	#19 [ffff880214d25e30] __tun_detach+272 at ffffffffa074c2f0 [tun]
	#20 [ffff880214d25e88] tun_chr_close+45 at ffffffffa074c4bd [tun]
	#21 [ffff880214d25ea8] __fput+225 at ffffffff8119b1f1
	#22 [ffff880214d25ef0] ____fput+14 at ffffffff8119b3fe
	#23 [ffff880214d25f00] task_work_run+159 at ffffffff8107cf7f
	#24 [ffff880214d25f30] do_notify_resume+97 at ffffffff810139e1
	#25 [ffff880214d25f50] int_signal+18 at ffffffff8164f292

this is due to I forgot to check if mp->timer is armed in
br_multicast_del_pg(). This bug is introduced by
commit 9f00b2e (bridge: only expire the mdb entry
when query is received).

Same for __br_mdb_del().

Tested-by: poma <pomidorabelisima@gmail.com>
Reported-by: LiYonghua <809674045@qq.com>
Reported-by: Robert Hancock <hancockrwd@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <amwang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
swarren pushed a commit to swarren/linux-tegra that referenced this pull request Sep 11, 2013
When booting secondary CPUs, announce_cpu() is called to show which cpu has
been brought up. For example:

[    0.402751] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors  #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 OK
[    0.525667] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors  torvalds#6 torvalds#7 torvalds#8 torvalds#9 torvalds#10 torvalds#11 OK
[    0.755592] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors  torvalds#12 torvalds#13 torvalds#14 torvalds#15 torvalds#16 torvalds#17 OK
[    0.890495] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors  torvalds#18 torvalds#19 torvalds#20 torvalds#21 torvalds#22 torvalds#23

But the last "OK" is lost, because 'nr_cpu_ids-1' represents the maximum
possible cpu id. It should use the maximum present cpu id in case not all
CPUs booted up.

Signed-off-by: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Cc: <wangyijing@huawei.com>
Cc: <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1378378676-18276-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@huawei.com
[ tweaked the changelog, removed unnecessary line break, tweaked the format to align the fields vertically. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
swarren pushed a commit to swarren/linux-tegra that referenced this pull request Oct 1, 2013
If memory allocation of in pcpu_embed_first_chunk() fails, the
allocated memory is not released correctly. In the release loop also
the non-allocated elements are released which leads to the following
kernel BUG on systems with very little memory:

[    0.000000] kernel BUG at mm/bootmem.c:307!
[    0.000000] illegal operation: 0001 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[    0.000000] Modules linked in:
[    0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.10.0 torvalds#22
[    0.000000] task: 0000000000a20ae0 ti: 0000000000a08000 task.ti: 0000000000a08000
[    0.000000] Krnl PSW : 0400000180000000 0000000000abda7a (__free+0x116/0x154)
[    0.000000]            R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:0 W:0 P:0 AS:0 CC:0 PM:0 EA:3
...
[    0.000000]  [<0000000000abdce2>] mark_bootmem_node+0xde/0xf0
[    0.000000]  [<0000000000abdd9c>] mark_bootmem+0xa8/0x118
[    0.000000]  [<0000000000abcbba>] pcpu_embed_first_chunk+0xe7a/0xf0c
[    0.000000]  [<0000000000abcc96>] setup_per_cpu_areas+0x4a/0x28c

To fix the problem now only allocated elements are released. This then
leads to the correct kernel panic:

[    0.000000] Kernel panic - not syncing: Failed to initialize percpu areas.
...
[    0.000000] Call Trace:
[    0.000000] ([<000000000011307e>] show_trace+0x132/0x150)
[    0.000000]  [<0000000000113160>] show_stack+0xc4/0xd4
[    0.000000]  [<00000000007127dc>] dump_stack+0x74/0xd8
[    0.000000]  [<00000000007123fe>] panic+0xea/0x264
[    0.000000]  [<0000000000b14814>] setup_per_cpu_areas+0x5c/0x28c

tj: Flipped if conditional so that it doesn't need "continue".

Signed-off-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
swarren pushed a commit to swarren/linux-tegra that referenced this pull request Oct 14, 2013
As the new x86 CPU bootup printout format code maintainer, I am
taking immediate action to improve and clean (and thus indulge
my OCD) the reporting of the cores when coming up online.

Fix padding to a right-hand alignment, cleanup code and bind
reporting width to the max number of supported CPUs on the
system, like this:

 [    0.074509] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors:      #1  #2  #3  #4  #5  torvalds#6  torvalds#7 OK
 [    0.644008] smpboot: Booting Node   1, Processors:  torvalds#8  torvalds#9 torvalds#10 torvalds#11 torvalds#12 torvalds#13 torvalds#14 torvalds#15 OK
 [    1.245006] smpboot: Booting Node   2, Processors: torvalds#16 torvalds#17 torvalds#18 torvalds#19 torvalds#20 torvalds#21 torvalds#22 torvalds#23 OK
 [    1.864005] smpboot: Booting Node   3, Processors: torvalds#24 torvalds#25 torvalds#26 torvalds#27 torvalds#28 torvalds#29 torvalds#30 torvalds#31 OK
 [    2.489005] smpboot: Booting Node   4, Processors: torvalds#32 torvalds#33 torvalds#34 torvalds#35 torvalds#36 torvalds#37 torvalds#38 torvalds#39 OK
 [    3.093005] smpboot: Booting Node   5, Processors: torvalds#40 torvalds#41 torvalds#42 torvalds#43 torvalds#44 torvalds#45 torvalds#46 torvalds#47 OK
 [    3.698005] smpboot: Booting Node   6, Processors: torvalds#48 torvalds#49 torvalds#50 torvalds#51 #52 #53 torvalds#54 torvalds#55 OK
 [    4.304005] smpboot: Booting Node   7, Processors: torvalds#56 torvalds#57 #58 torvalds#59 torvalds#60 torvalds#61 torvalds#62 torvalds#63 OK
 [    4.961413] Brought up 64 CPUs

and this:

 [    0.072367] smpboot: Booting Node   0, Processors:    #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 torvalds#6 torvalds#7 OK
 [    0.686329] Brought up 8 CPUs

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Libin <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130927143554.GF4422@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
swarren pushed a commit to swarren/linux-tegra that referenced this pull request Oct 14, 2013
Turn it into (for example):

[    0.073380] x86: Booting SMP configuration:
[    0.074005] .... node   #0, CPUs:          #1   #2   #3   #4   #5   torvalds#6   torvalds#7
[    0.603005] .... node   #1, CPUs:     torvalds#8   torvalds#9  torvalds#10  torvalds#11  torvalds#12  torvalds#13  torvalds#14  torvalds#15
[    1.200005] .... node   #2, CPUs:    torvalds#16  torvalds#17  torvalds#18  torvalds#19  torvalds#20  torvalds#21  torvalds#22  torvalds#23
[    1.796005] .... node   #3, CPUs:    torvalds#24  torvalds#25  torvalds#26  torvalds#27  torvalds#28  torvalds#29  torvalds#30  torvalds#31
[    2.393005] .... node   #4, CPUs:    torvalds#32  torvalds#33  torvalds#34  torvalds#35  torvalds#36  torvalds#37  torvalds#38  torvalds#39
[    2.996005] .... node   #5, CPUs:    torvalds#40  torvalds#41  torvalds#42  torvalds#43  torvalds#44  torvalds#45  torvalds#46  torvalds#47
[    3.600005] .... node   torvalds#6, CPUs:    torvalds#48  torvalds#49  torvalds#50  torvalds#51  #52  #53  torvalds#54  torvalds#55
[    4.202005] .... node   torvalds#7, CPUs:    torvalds#56  torvalds#57  #58  torvalds#59  torvalds#60  torvalds#61  torvalds#62  torvalds#63
[    4.811005] .... node   torvalds#8, CPUs:    torvalds#64  torvalds#65  torvalds#66  torvalds#67  torvalds#68  torvalds#69  #70  torvalds#71
[    5.421006] .... node   torvalds#9, CPUs:    torvalds#72  torvalds#73  torvalds#74  torvalds#75  torvalds#76  torvalds#77  torvalds#78  torvalds#79
[    6.032005] .... node  torvalds#10, CPUs:    torvalds#80  torvalds#81  torvalds#82  torvalds#83  torvalds#84  torvalds#85  torvalds#86  torvalds#87
[    6.648006] .... node  torvalds#11, CPUs:    torvalds#88  torvalds#89  torvalds#90  torvalds#91  torvalds#92  torvalds#93  torvalds#94  torvalds#95
[    7.262005] .... node  torvalds#12, CPUs:    torvalds#96  torvalds#97  torvalds#98  torvalds#99 torvalds#100 torvalds#101 torvalds#102 torvalds#103
[    7.865005] .... node  torvalds#13, CPUs:   torvalds#104 torvalds#105 torvalds#106 torvalds#107 torvalds#108 torvalds#109 torvalds#110 torvalds#111
[    8.466005] .... node  torvalds#14, CPUs:   torvalds#112 torvalds#113 torvalds#114 torvalds#115 torvalds#116 torvalds#117 torvalds#118 torvalds#119
[    9.073006] .... node  torvalds#15, CPUs:   torvalds#120 torvalds#121 torvalds#122 torvalds#123 torvalds#124 torvalds#125 torvalds#126 torvalds#127
[    9.679901] x86: Booted up 16 nodes, 128 CPUs

and drop useless elements.

Change num_digits() to hpa's division-avoiding, cell-phone-typed
version which he went at great lengths and pains to submit on a
Saturday evening.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: huawei.libin@huawei.com
Cc: wangyijing@huawei.com
Cc: fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: guohanjun@huawei.com
Cc: paul.gortmaker@windriver.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20130930095624.GB16383@pd.tnic
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
torvalds pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 2, 2013
…culation

Currently mx53 (CortexA8) running at 1GHz reports:
Calibrating delay loop... 663.55 BogoMIPS (lpj=3317760)

Tom Evans verified that alignments of 0x0 and 0x8 run the two instructions of __loop_delay in one clock cycle (1 clock/loop), while alignments of 0x4 and 0xc take 3 clocks to run the loop twice. (1.5 clock/loop)

The original object code looks like this:

00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>:
  10:	e3e01000 	mvn	r1, #0
  14:	e51f201c 	ldr	r2, [pc, #-28]	; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8>
  18:	e5922000 	ldr	r2, [r2]
  1c:	e0800921 	add	r0, r0, r1, lsr #18
  20:	e1a00720 	lsr	r0, r0, #14
  24:	e0822b21 	add	r2, r2, r1, lsr #22
  28:	e1a02522 	lsr	r2, r2, #10
  2c:	e0000092 	mul	r0, r2, r0
  30:	e0800d21 	add	r0, r0, r1, lsr #26
  34:	e1b00320 	lsrs	r0, r0, #6
  38:	01a0f00e 	moveq	pc, lr

0000003c <__loop_delay>:
  3c:	e2500001 	subs	r0, r0, #1
  40:	8afffffe 	bhi	3c <__loop_delay>
  44:	e1a0f00e 	mov	pc, lr

After adding the 'align 3' directive to __loop_delay (align to 8 bytes):

00000010 <__loop_const_udelay>:
  10:	e3e01000 	mvn	r1, #0
  14:	e51f201c 	ldr	r2, [pc, #-28]	; 0 <__loop_udelay-0x8>
  18:	e5922000 	ldr	r2, [r2]
  1c:	e0800921 	add	r0, r0, r1, lsr #18
  20:	e1a00720 	lsr	r0, r0, #14
  24:	e0822b21 	add	r2, r2, r1, lsr #22
  28:	e1a02522 	lsr	r2, r2, #10
  2c:	e0000092 	mul	r0, r2, r0
  30:	e0800d21 	add	r0, r0, r1, lsr #26
  34:	e1b00320 	lsrs	r0, r0, #6
  38:	01a0f00e 	moveq	pc, lr
  3c:	e320f000 	nop	{0}

00000040 <__loop_delay>:
  40:	e2500001 	subs	r0, r0, #1
  44:	8afffffe 	bhi	40 <__loop_delay>
  48:	e1a0f00e 	mov	pc, lr
  4c:	e320f000 	nop	{0}

, which now reports:
Calibrating delay loop... 996.14 BogoMIPS (lpj=4980736)

Some more test results:

On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz, before the patch:
Calibrating delay loop... 351.43 BogoMIPS (lpj=1757184)

On mx31 (ARM1136) running at 532 MHz after the patch:
Calibrating delay loop... 528.79 BogoMIPS (lpj=2643968)

Also tested on mx6 (CortexA9) and on mx27 (ARM926), which shows the same
BogoMIPS value before and after this patch.

Reported-by: Tom Evans <tom_usenet@optusnet.com.au>
Suggested-by: Tom Evans <tom_usenet@optusnet.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <fabio.estevam@freescale.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
gregnietsky pushed a commit to Distrotech/linux that referenced this pull request Apr 9, 2014
commit 2cab86b upstream.

Sometime the ASCONF_ACK parameters can equal to the fourfold of
ASCONF parameters, this only happend in some special case:

  ASCONF parameter is :
    Unrecognized Parameter (4 bytes)
  ASCONF_ACK parameter should be:
    Error Cause Indication parameter (8 bytes header)
     + Error Cause (4 bytes header)
       + Unrecognized Parameter (4bytes)

Four 4bytes Unrecognized Parameters in ASCONF chunk will cause panic.

Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.38-next+ torvalds#22 Bochs Bochs
EIP: 0060:[<c0717eae>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
EIP is at skb_put+0x60/0x70
EAX: 00000077 EBX: c09060e2 ECX: dec1dc30 EDX: c09469c0
ESI: 00000000 EDI: de3c8d40 EBP: dec1dc58 ESP: dec1dc2c
 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=dec1c000 task=c09aef20 task.ti=c0980000)
Stack:
 c09469c0 e1894fa4 00000044 00000004 de3c8d00 de3c8d00 de3c8d44 de3c8d40
 c09060e2 de25dd80 de3c8d40 dec1dc7c e1894fa4 dec1dcb0 00000040 00000004
 00000000 00000800 00000004 00000004 dec1dce0 e1895a2b dec1dcb4 de25d960
Call Trace:
 [<e1894fa4>] ? sctp_addto_chunk+0x4e/0x89 [sctp]
 [<e1894fa4>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x4e/0x89 [sctp]
 [<e1895a2b>] sctp_process_asconf+0x32f/0x3d1 [sctp]
 [<e188d554>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0xf8/0x173 [sctp]
 [<e1890b02>] sctp_do_sm+0xb8/0x159 [sctp]
 [<e18a2248>] ? sctp_cname+0x0/0x52 [sctp]
 [<e189392d>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xac/0xe3 [sctp]
 [<e1897d76>] sctp_inq_push+0x2d/0x30 [sctp]
 [<e18a21b2>] sctp_rcv+0x7a7/0x83d [sctp]
 [<c077a95c>] ? ipv4_confirm+0x118/0x125
 [<c073a970>] ? nf_iterate+0x34/0x62
 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194
 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194
 [<c0747992>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf5/0x194
 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194
 [<c0747a6e>] NF_HOOK.clone.1+0x3d/0x44
 [<c0747ab3>] ip_local_deliver+0x3e/0x44
 [<c074789d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x194
 [<c074775c>] ip_rcv_finish+0x29f/0x2c7
 [<c07474bd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x0/0x2c7
 [<c0747a6e>] NF_HOOK.clone.1+0x3d/0x44
 [<c0747cae>] ip_rcv+0x1f5/0x233
 [<c07474bd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x0/0x2c7
 [<c071dce3>] __netif_receive_skb+0x310/0x336
 [<c07221f3>] netif_receive_skb+0x4b/0x51
 [<e0a4ed3d>] cp_rx_poll+0x1e7/0x29c [8139cp]
 [<c072275e>] net_rx_action+0x65/0x13a
 [<c0445a54>] __do_softirq+0xa1/0x149
 [<c04459b3>] ? __do_softirq+0x0/0x149
 <IRQ>
 [<c0445891>] ? irq_exit+0x37/0x72
 [<c040a7e9>] ? do_IRQ+0x81/0x95
 [<c07b3670>] ? common_interrupt+0x30/0x38
 [<c0428058>] ? native_safe_halt+0xa/0xc
 [<c040f5d7>] ? default_idle+0x58/0x92
 [<c0408fb0>] ? cpu_idle+0x96/0xb2
 [<c0797989>] ? rest_init+0x5d/0x5f
 [<c09fd90c>] ? start_kernel+0x34b/0x350
 [<c09fd0cb>] ? i386_start_kernel+0xba/0xc1

Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yjwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
ystk pushed a commit to ystk/linux-ltsi-work that referenced this pull request Apr 29, 2014
Mike Galbraith captered the following:
| >torvalds#11 [ffff88017b243e90] _raw_spin_lock at ffffffff815d2596
| >torvalds#12 [ffff88017b243e90] rt_mutex_trylock at ffffffff815d15be
| >torvalds#13 [ffff88017b243eb0] get_next_timer_interrupt at ffffffff81063b42
| >torvalds#14 [ffff88017b243f00] tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick at ffffffff810bd1fd
| >torvalds#15 [ffff88017b243f70] tick_nohz_irq_exit at ffffffff810bd7d2
| >torvalds#16 [ffff88017b243f90] irq_exit at ffffffff8105b02d
| >torvalds#17 [ffff88017b243fb0] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd
| >--- <IRQ stack> ---
| >torvalds#18 [ffff88017a2a9bc8] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd
| >    [exception RIP: task_blocks_on_rt_mutex+51]
| >torvalds#19 [ffff88017a2a9ce0] rt_spin_lock_slowlock at ffffffff815d183c
| >torvalds#20 [ffff88017a2a9da0] lock_timer_base.isra.35 at ffffffff81061cbf
| >torvalds#21 [ffff88017a2a9dd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815cf1ce
| >torvalds#22 [ffff88017a2a9e50] rcu_gp_kthread at ffffffff810f9bbb
| >torvalds#23 [ffff88017a2a9ed0] kthread at ffffffff810796d5
| >torvalds#24 [ffff88017a2a9f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff815da04c

lock_timer_base() does a try_lock() which deadlocks on the waiter lock
not the lock itself.
This patch takes the waiter_lock with trylock so it should work from interrupt
context as well. If the fastpath doesn't work and the waiter_lock itself is
taken then it seems that the lock itself taken.
This patch also adds a "rt_spin_try_unlock" to keep lockdep happy. If we
managed to take the wait_lock in the first place we should also be able
to take it in the unlock path.

Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
ystk pushed a commit to ystk/linux-ltsi-work that referenced this pull request May 23, 2014
Mike Galbraith captered the following:
| >torvalds#11 [ffff88017b243e90] _raw_spin_lock at ffffffff815d2596
| >torvalds#12 [ffff88017b243e90] rt_mutex_trylock at ffffffff815d15be
| >torvalds#13 [ffff88017b243eb0] get_next_timer_interrupt at ffffffff81063b42
| >torvalds#14 [ffff88017b243f00] tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick at ffffffff810bd1fd
| >torvalds#15 [ffff88017b243f70] tick_nohz_irq_exit at ffffffff810bd7d2
| >torvalds#16 [ffff88017b243f90] irq_exit at ffffffff8105b02d
| >torvalds#17 [ffff88017b243fb0] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd
| >--- <IRQ stack> ---
| >torvalds#18 [ffff88017a2a9bc8] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd
| >    [exception RIP: task_blocks_on_rt_mutex+51]
| >torvalds#19 [ffff88017a2a9ce0] rt_spin_lock_slowlock at ffffffff815d183c
| >torvalds#20 [ffff88017a2a9da0] lock_timer_base.isra.35 at ffffffff81061cbf
| >torvalds#21 [ffff88017a2a9dd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815cf1ce
| >torvalds#22 [ffff88017a2a9e50] rcu_gp_kthread at ffffffff810f9bbb
| >torvalds#23 [ffff88017a2a9ed0] kthread at ffffffff810796d5
| >torvalds#24 [ffff88017a2a9f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff815da04c

lock_timer_base() does a try_lock() which deadlocks on the waiter lock
not the lock itself.
This patch takes the waiter_lock with trylock so it should work from interrupt
context as well. If the fastpath doesn't work and the waiter_lock itself is
taken then it seems that the lock itself taken.
This patch also adds a "rt_spin_try_unlock" to keep lockdep happy. If we
managed to take the wait_lock in the first place we should also be able
to take it in the unlock path.

Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
damentz referenced this pull request in zen-kernel/zen-kernel May 29, 2014
Mike Galbraith captered the following:
| >#11 [ffff88017b243e90] _raw_spin_lock at ffffffff815d2596
| >#12 [ffff88017b243e90] rt_mutex_trylock at ffffffff815d15be
| >#13 [ffff88017b243eb0] get_next_timer_interrupt at ffffffff81063b42
| >#14 [ffff88017b243f00] tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick at ffffffff810bd1fd
| >#15 [ffff88017b243f70] tick_nohz_irq_exit at ffffffff810bd7d2
| >#16 [ffff88017b243f90] irq_exit at ffffffff8105b02d
| >#17 [ffff88017b243fb0] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd
| >--- <IRQ stack> ---
| >#18 [ffff88017a2a9bc8] reschedule_interrupt at ffffffff815db3dd
| >    [exception RIP: task_blocks_on_rt_mutex+51]
| >#19 [ffff88017a2a9ce0] rt_spin_lock_slowlock at ffffffff815d183c
| >#20 [ffff88017a2a9da0] lock_timer_base.isra.35 at ffffffff81061cbf
| >#21 [ffff88017a2a9dd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff815cf1ce
| >#22 [ffff88017a2a9e50] rcu_gp_kthread at ffffffff810f9bbb
| >#23 [ffff88017a2a9ed0] kthread at ffffffff810796d5
| >#24 [ffff88017a2a9f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff815da04c

lock_timer_base() does a try_lock() which deadlocks on the waiter lock
not the lock itself.
This patch takes the waiter_lock with trylock so it should work from interrupt
context as well. If the fastpath doesn't work and the waiter_lock itself is
taken then it seems that the lock itself taken.
This patch also adds "rt_spin_unlock_after_trylock_in_irq" to keep lockdep
happy. If we managed to take the wait_lock in the first place we should also
be able to take it in the unlock path.

Cc: stable-rt@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <bitbucket@online.de>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing that referenced this pull request May 16, 2024
… non head_frag

The crashed kernel version is 5.16.20, and I have not test this patch
because I dont find a way to reproduce it, and the mailine may be
has the same problem.

When using bpf based NAT, hits a kernel BUG_ON at function skb_segment(),
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len). The bpf calls the bpf_skb_adjust_room
to decrease the gso_size, and then call bpf_redirect send packet out.

call stack:
...
   [exception RIP: skb_segment+3016]
    RIP: ffffffffb97df2a8  RSP: ffffa3f2cce08728  RFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 000000000000007d  RBX: 00000000fffff7b3  RCX: 0000000000000011
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff895ea32c76c0  RDI: 00000000000008c1
    RBP: ffffa3f2cce087f8   R8: 000000000000088f   R9: 0000000000000011
    R10: 000000000000090c  R11: ffff895e47e68000  R12: ffff895eb2022f00
    R13: 000000000000004b  R14: ffff895ecdaf2000  R15: ffff895eb2023f00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#9 [ffffa3f2cce08720] skb_segment at ffffffffb97ded63
torvalds#10 [ffffa3f2cce08800] tcp_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d0320
torvalds#11 [ffffa3f2cce08860] tcp4_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d07a3
torvalds#12 [ffffa3f2cce08880] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#13 [ffffa3f2cce088e0] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#14 [ffffa3f2cce08918] skb_udp_tunnel_segment at ffffffffb98daa59
torvalds#15 [ffffa3f2cce08980] udp4_ufo_fragment at ffffffffb98db471
torvalds#16 [ffffa3f2cce089b0] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#17 [ffffa3f2cce08a10] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#18 [ffffa3f2cce08a48] __skb_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f388e
torvalds#19 [ffffa3f2cce08a78] validate_xmit_skb at ffffffffb97f3d6e
torvalds#20 [ffffa3f2cce08ab8] __dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f4614
torvalds#21 [ffffa3f2cce08b50] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f5030
torvalds#22 [ffffa3f2cce08b60] __bpf_redirect at ffffffffb98199a8
torvalds#23 [ffffa3f2cce08b88] skb_do_redirect at ffffffffb98205cd
...

The skb has the following properties:
    doffset = 66
    list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list
    list_skb->head_frag = true
    skb->len = 2441 && skb->data_len = 2250
    skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 17
    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 75
    skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0...16].bv_len = 125
    list_skb->len = 125
    list_skb->data_len = 0

3962 struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
3963                             netdev_features_t features)
3964 {
3965         struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
3966         struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
...
4181                 while (pos < offset + len) {
4182                         if (i >= nfrags) {
4183                                 i = 0;
4184                                 nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
4185                                 frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
4186                                 frag_skb = list_skb;

After segment the head_skb's last frag, the (pos == offset+len), so break the
while at line 4181, run into this BUG_ON(), not segment the head_frag frag_list
skb.

Since commit 13acc94(net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb),
it is allowed to segment the head_frag frag_list skb.

In commit 3dcbdb1 (net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size
mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list), it is cleared the NETIF_F_SG if it
has non head_frag skb. It is not cleared the NETIF_F_SG only with one head_frag
frag_list skb.

Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing that referenced this pull request May 16, 2024
… non head_frag

The crashed kernel version is 5.16.20, and I have not test this patch
because I dont find a way to reproduce it, and the mailine may be
has the same problem.

When using bpf based NAT, hits a kernel BUG_ON at function skb_segment(),
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len). The bpf calls the bpf_skb_adjust_room
to decrease the gso_size, and then call bpf_redirect send packet out.

call stack:
...
   [exception RIP: skb_segment+3016]
    RIP: ffffffffb97df2a8  RSP: ffffa3f2cce08728  RFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 000000000000007d  RBX: 00000000fffff7b3  RCX: 0000000000000011
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff895ea32c76c0  RDI: 00000000000008c1
    RBP: ffffa3f2cce087f8   R8: 000000000000088f   R9: 0000000000000011
    R10: 000000000000090c  R11: ffff895e47e68000  R12: ffff895eb2022f00
    R13: 000000000000004b  R14: ffff895ecdaf2000  R15: ffff895eb2023f00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#9 [ffffa3f2cce08720] skb_segment at ffffffffb97ded63
torvalds#10 [ffffa3f2cce08800] tcp_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d0320
torvalds#11 [ffffa3f2cce08860] tcp4_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d07a3
torvalds#12 [ffffa3f2cce08880] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#13 [ffffa3f2cce088e0] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#14 [ffffa3f2cce08918] skb_udp_tunnel_segment at ffffffffb98daa59
torvalds#15 [ffffa3f2cce08980] udp4_ufo_fragment at ffffffffb98db471
torvalds#16 [ffffa3f2cce089b0] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#17 [ffffa3f2cce08a10] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#18 [ffffa3f2cce08a48] __skb_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f388e
torvalds#19 [ffffa3f2cce08a78] validate_xmit_skb at ffffffffb97f3d6e
torvalds#20 [ffffa3f2cce08ab8] __dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f4614
torvalds#21 [ffffa3f2cce08b50] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f5030
torvalds#22 [ffffa3f2cce08b60] __bpf_redirect at ffffffffb98199a8
torvalds#23 [ffffa3f2cce08b88] skb_do_redirect at ffffffffb98205cd
...

The skb has the following properties:
    doffset = 66
    list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list
    list_skb->head_frag = true
    skb->len = 2441 && skb->data_len = 2250
    skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 17
    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 75
    skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0...16].bv_len = 125
    list_skb->len = 125
    list_skb->data_len = 0

3962 struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
3963                             netdev_features_t features)
3964 {
3965         struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
3966         struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
...
4181                 while (pos < offset + len) {
4182                         if (i >= nfrags) {
4183                                 i = 0;
4184                                 nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
4185                                 frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
4186                                 frag_skb = list_skb;

After segment the head_skb's last frag, the (pos == offset+len), so break the
while at line 4181, run into this BUG_ON(), not segment the head_frag frag_list
skb.

Since commit 13acc94(net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb),
it is allowed to segment the head_frag frag_list skb.

In commit 3dcbdb1 (net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size
mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list), it is cleared the NETIF_F_SG if it
has non head_frag skb. It is not cleared the NETIF_F_SG only with one head_frag
frag_list skb.

Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing that referenced this pull request May 16, 2024
… non head_frag

The crashed kernel version is 5.16.20, and I have not test this patch
because I dont find a way to reproduce it, and the mailine may be
has the same problem.

When using bpf based NAT, hits a kernel BUG_ON at function skb_segment(),
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len). The bpf calls the bpf_skb_adjust_room
to decrease the gso_size, and then call bpf_redirect send packet out.

call stack:
...
   [exception RIP: skb_segment+3016]
    RIP: ffffffffb97df2a8  RSP: ffffa3f2cce08728  RFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 000000000000007d  RBX: 00000000fffff7b3  RCX: 0000000000000011
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff895ea32c76c0  RDI: 00000000000008c1
    RBP: ffffa3f2cce087f8   R8: 000000000000088f   R9: 0000000000000011
    R10: 000000000000090c  R11: ffff895e47e68000  R12: ffff895eb2022f00
    R13: 000000000000004b  R14: ffff895ecdaf2000  R15: ffff895eb2023f00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#9 [ffffa3f2cce08720] skb_segment at ffffffffb97ded63
torvalds#10 [ffffa3f2cce08800] tcp_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d0320
torvalds#11 [ffffa3f2cce08860] tcp4_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d07a3
torvalds#12 [ffffa3f2cce08880] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#13 [ffffa3f2cce088e0] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#14 [ffffa3f2cce08918] skb_udp_tunnel_segment at ffffffffb98daa59
torvalds#15 [ffffa3f2cce08980] udp4_ufo_fragment at ffffffffb98db471
torvalds#16 [ffffa3f2cce089b0] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#17 [ffffa3f2cce08a10] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#18 [ffffa3f2cce08a48] __skb_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f388e
torvalds#19 [ffffa3f2cce08a78] validate_xmit_skb at ffffffffb97f3d6e
torvalds#20 [ffffa3f2cce08ab8] __dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f4614
torvalds#21 [ffffa3f2cce08b50] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f5030
torvalds#22 [ffffa3f2cce08b60] __bpf_redirect at ffffffffb98199a8
torvalds#23 [ffffa3f2cce08b88] skb_do_redirect at ffffffffb98205cd
...

The skb has the following properties:
    doffset = 66
    list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list
    list_skb->head_frag = true
    skb->len = 2441 && skb->data_len = 2250
    skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 17
    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 75
    skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0...16].bv_len = 125
    list_skb->len = 125
    list_skb->data_len = 0

3962 struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
3963                             netdev_features_t features)
3964 {
3965         struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
3966         struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
...
4181                 while (pos < offset + len) {
4182                         if (i >= nfrags) {
4183                                 i = 0;
4184                                 nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
4185                                 frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
4186                                 frag_skb = list_skb;

After segment the head_skb's last frag, the (pos == offset+len), so break the
while at line 4181, run into this BUG_ON(), not segment the head_frag frag_list
skb.

Since commit 13acc94(net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb),
it is allowed to segment the head_frag frag_list skb.

In commit 3dcbdb1 (net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size
mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list), it is cleared the NETIF_F_SG if it
has non head_frag skb. It is not cleared the NETIF_F_SG only with one head_frag
frag_list skb.

Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing that referenced this pull request May 16, 2024
… non head_frag

The crashed kernel version is 5.16.20, and I have not test this patch
because I dont find a way to reproduce it, and the mailine may be
has the same problem.

When using bpf based NAT, hits a kernel BUG_ON at function skb_segment(),
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len). The bpf calls the bpf_skb_adjust_room
to decrease the gso_size, and then call bpf_redirect send packet out.

call stack:
...
   [exception RIP: skb_segment+3016]
    RIP: ffffffffb97df2a8  RSP: ffffa3f2cce08728  RFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 000000000000007d  RBX: 00000000fffff7b3  RCX: 0000000000000011
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff895ea32c76c0  RDI: 00000000000008c1
    RBP: ffffa3f2cce087f8   R8: 000000000000088f   R9: 0000000000000011
    R10: 000000000000090c  R11: ffff895e47e68000  R12: ffff895eb2022f00
    R13: 000000000000004b  R14: ffff895ecdaf2000  R15: ffff895eb2023f00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#9 [ffffa3f2cce08720] skb_segment at ffffffffb97ded63
torvalds#10 [ffffa3f2cce08800] tcp_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d0320
torvalds#11 [ffffa3f2cce08860] tcp4_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d07a3
torvalds#12 [ffffa3f2cce08880] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#13 [ffffa3f2cce088e0] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#14 [ffffa3f2cce08918] skb_udp_tunnel_segment at ffffffffb98daa59
torvalds#15 [ffffa3f2cce08980] udp4_ufo_fragment at ffffffffb98db471
torvalds#16 [ffffa3f2cce089b0] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#17 [ffffa3f2cce08a10] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#18 [ffffa3f2cce08a48] __skb_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f388e
torvalds#19 [ffffa3f2cce08a78] validate_xmit_skb at ffffffffb97f3d6e
torvalds#20 [ffffa3f2cce08ab8] __dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f4614
torvalds#21 [ffffa3f2cce08b50] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f5030
torvalds#22 [ffffa3f2cce08b60] __bpf_redirect at ffffffffb98199a8
torvalds#23 [ffffa3f2cce08b88] skb_do_redirect at ffffffffb98205cd
...

The skb has the following properties:
    doffset = 66
    list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list
    list_skb->head_frag = true
    skb->len = 2441 && skb->data_len = 2250
    skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 17
    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 75
    skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0...16].bv_len = 125
    list_skb->len = 125
    list_skb->data_len = 0

3962 struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
3963                             netdev_features_t features)
3964 {
3965         struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
3966         struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
...
4181                 while (pos < offset + len) {
4182                         if (i >= nfrags) {
4183                                 i = 0;
4184                                 nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
4185                                 frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
4186                                 frag_skb = list_skb;

After segment the head_skb's last frag, the (pos == offset+len), so break the
while at line 4181, run into this BUG_ON(), not segment the head_frag frag_list
skb.

Since commit 13acc94(net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb),
it is allowed to segment the head_frag frag_list skb.

In commit 3dcbdb1 (net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size
mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list), it is cleared the NETIF_F_SG if it
has non head_frag skb. It is not cleared the NETIF_F_SG only with one head_frag
frag_list skb.

Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing that referenced this pull request May 16, 2024
… non head_frag

The crashed kernel version is 5.16.20, and I have not test this patch
because I dont find a way to reproduce it, and the mailine may be
has the same problem.

When using bpf based NAT, hits a kernel BUG_ON at function skb_segment(),
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len). The bpf calls the bpf_skb_adjust_room
to decrease the gso_size, and then call bpf_redirect send packet out.

call stack:
...
   [exception RIP: skb_segment+3016]
    RIP: ffffffffb97df2a8  RSP: ffffa3f2cce08728  RFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 000000000000007d  RBX: 00000000fffff7b3  RCX: 0000000000000011
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff895ea32c76c0  RDI: 00000000000008c1
    RBP: ffffa3f2cce087f8   R8: 000000000000088f   R9: 0000000000000011
    R10: 000000000000090c  R11: ffff895e47e68000  R12: ffff895eb2022f00
    R13: 000000000000004b  R14: ffff895ecdaf2000  R15: ffff895eb2023f00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#9 [ffffa3f2cce08720] skb_segment at ffffffffb97ded63
torvalds#10 [ffffa3f2cce08800] tcp_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d0320
torvalds#11 [ffffa3f2cce08860] tcp4_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d07a3
torvalds#12 [ffffa3f2cce08880] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#13 [ffffa3f2cce088e0] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#14 [ffffa3f2cce08918] skb_udp_tunnel_segment at ffffffffb98daa59
torvalds#15 [ffffa3f2cce08980] udp4_ufo_fragment at ffffffffb98db471
torvalds#16 [ffffa3f2cce089b0] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#17 [ffffa3f2cce08a10] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#18 [ffffa3f2cce08a48] __skb_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f388e
torvalds#19 [ffffa3f2cce08a78] validate_xmit_skb at ffffffffb97f3d6e
torvalds#20 [ffffa3f2cce08ab8] __dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f4614
torvalds#21 [ffffa3f2cce08b50] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f5030
torvalds#22 [ffffa3f2cce08b60] __bpf_redirect at ffffffffb98199a8
torvalds#23 [ffffa3f2cce08b88] skb_do_redirect at ffffffffb98205cd
...

The skb has the following properties:
    doffset = 66
    list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list
    list_skb->head_frag = true
    skb->len = 2441 && skb->data_len = 2250
    skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 17
    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 75
    skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0...16].bv_len = 125
    list_skb->len = 125
    list_skb->data_len = 0

3962 struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
3963                             netdev_features_t features)
3964 {
3965         struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
3966         struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
...
4181                 while (pos < offset + len) {
4182                         if (i >= nfrags) {
4183                                 i = 0;
4184                                 nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
4185                                 frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
4186                                 frag_skb = list_skb;

After segment the head_skb's last frag, the (pos == offset+len), so break the
while at line 4181, run into this BUG_ON(), not segment the head_frag frag_list
skb.

Since commit 13acc94(net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb),
it is allowed to segment the head_frag frag_list skb.

In commit 3dcbdb1 (net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size
mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list), it is cleared the NETIF_F_SG if it
has non head_frag skb. It is not cleared the NETIF_F_SG only with one head_frag
frag_list skb.

Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing that referenced this pull request May 16, 2024
… non head_frag

The crashed kernel version is 5.16.20, and I have not test this patch
because I dont find a way to reproduce it, and the mailine may be
has the same problem.

When using bpf based NAT, hits a kernel BUG_ON at function skb_segment(),
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len). The bpf calls the bpf_skb_adjust_room
to decrease the gso_size, and then call bpf_redirect send packet out.

call stack:
...
   [exception RIP: skb_segment+3016]
    RIP: ffffffffb97df2a8  RSP: ffffa3f2cce08728  RFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 000000000000007d  RBX: 00000000fffff7b3  RCX: 0000000000000011
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff895ea32c76c0  RDI: 00000000000008c1
    RBP: ffffa3f2cce087f8   R8: 000000000000088f   R9: 0000000000000011
    R10: 000000000000090c  R11: ffff895e47e68000  R12: ffff895eb2022f00
    R13: 000000000000004b  R14: ffff895ecdaf2000  R15: ffff895eb2023f00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#9 [ffffa3f2cce08720] skb_segment at ffffffffb97ded63
torvalds#10 [ffffa3f2cce08800] tcp_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d0320
torvalds#11 [ffffa3f2cce08860] tcp4_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d07a3
torvalds#12 [ffffa3f2cce08880] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#13 [ffffa3f2cce088e0] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#14 [ffffa3f2cce08918] skb_udp_tunnel_segment at ffffffffb98daa59
torvalds#15 [ffffa3f2cce08980] udp4_ufo_fragment at ffffffffb98db471
torvalds#16 [ffffa3f2cce089b0] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#17 [ffffa3f2cce08a10] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#18 [ffffa3f2cce08a48] __skb_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f388e
torvalds#19 [ffffa3f2cce08a78] validate_xmit_skb at ffffffffb97f3d6e
torvalds#20 [ffffa3f2cce08ab8] __dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f4614
torvalds#21 [ffffa3f2cce08b50] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f5030
torvalds#22 [ffffa3f2cce08b60] __bpf_redirect at ffffffffb98199a8
torvalds#23 [ffffa3f2cce08b88] skb_do_redirect at ffffffffb98205cd
...

The skb has the following properties:
    doffset = 66
    list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list
    list_skb->head_frag = true
    skb->len = 2441 && skb->data_len = 2250
    skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 17
    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 75
    skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0...16].bv_len = 125
    list_skb->len = 125
    list_skb->data_len = 0

3962 struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
3963                             netdev_features_t features)
3964 {
3965         struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
3966         struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
...
4181                 while (pos < offset + len) {
4182                         if (i >= nfrags) {
4183                                 i = 0;
4184                                 nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
4185                                 frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
4186                                 frag_skb = list_skb;

After segment the head_skb's last frag, the (pos == offset+len), so break the
while at line 4181, run into this BUG_ON(), not segment the head_frag frag_list
skb.

Since commit 13acc94(net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb),
it is allowed to segment the head_frag frag_list skb.

In commit 3dcbdb1 (net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size
mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list), it is cleared the NETIF_F_SG if it
has non head_frag skb. It is not cleared the NETIF_F_SG only with one head_frag
frag_list skb.

Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing that referenced this pull request May 16, 2024
… non head_frag

The crashed kernel version is 5.16.20, and I have not test this patch
because I dont find a way to reproduce it, and the mailine may be
has the same problem.

When using bpf based NAT, hits a kernel BUG_ON at function skb_segment(),
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len). The bpf calls the bpf_skb_adjust_room
to decrease the gso_size, and then call bpf_redirect send packet out.

call stack:
...
   [exception RIP: skb_segment+3016]
    RIP: ffffffffb97df2a8  RSP: ffffa3f2cce08728  RFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 000000000000007d  RBX: 00000000fffff7b3  RCX: 0000000000000011
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff895ea32c76c0  RDI: 00000000000008c1
    RBP: ffffa3f2cce087f8   R8: 000000000000088f   R9: 0000000000000011
    R10: 000000000000090c  R11: ffff895e47e68000  R12: ffff895eb2022f00
    R13: 000000000000004b  R14: ffff895ecdaf2000  R15: ffff895eb2023f00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#9 [ffffa3f2cce08720] skb_segment at ffffffffb97ded63
torvalds#10 [ffffa3f2cce08800] tcp_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d0320
torvalds#11 [ffffa3f2cce08860] tcp4_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d07a3
torvalds#12 [ffffa3f2cce08880] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#13 [ffffa3f2cce088e0] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#14 [ffffa3f2cce08918] skb_udp_tunnel_segment at ffffffffb98daa59
torvalds#15 [ffffa3f2cce08980] udp4_ufo_fragment at ffffffffb98db471
torvalds#16 [ffffa3f2cce089b0] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#17 [ffffa3f2cce08a10] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#18 [ffffa3f2cce08a48] __skb_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f388e
torvalds#19 [ffffa3f2cce08a78] validate_xmit_skb at ffffffffb97f3d6e
torvalds#20 [ffffa3f2cce08ab8] __dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f4614
torvalds#21 [ffffa3f2cce08b50] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f5030
torvalds#22 [ffffa3f2cce08b60] __bpf_redirect at ffffffffb98199a8
torvalds#23 [ffffa3f2cce08b88] skb_do_redirect at ffffffffb98205cd
...

The skb has the following properties:
    doffset = 66
    list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list
    list_skb->head_frag = true
    skb->len = 2441 && skb->data_len = 2250
    skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 17
    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 75
    skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0...16].bv_len = 125
    list_skb->len = 125
    list_skb->data_len = 0

3962 struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
3963                             netdev_features_t features)
3964 {
3965         struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
3966         struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
...
4181                 while (pos < offset + len) {
4182                         if (i >= nfrags) {
4183                                 i = 0;
4184                                 nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
4185                                 frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
4186                                 frag_skb = list_skb;

After segment the head_skb's last frag, the (pos == offset+len), so break the
while at line 4181, run into this BUG_ON(), not segment the head_frag frag_list
skb.

Since commit 13acc94(net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb),
it is allowed to segment the head_frag frag_list skb.

In commit 3dcbdb1 (net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size
mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list), it is cleared the NETIF_F_SG if it
has non head_frag skb. It is not cleared the NETIF_F_SG only with one head_frag
frag_list skb.

Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
kuba-moo pushed a commit to linux-netdev/testing that referenced this pull request May 17, 2024
… non head_frag

The crashed kernel version is 5.16.20, and I have not test this patch
because I dont find a way to reproduce it, and the mailine may be
has the same problem.

When using bpf based NAT, hits a kernel BUG_ON at function skb_segment(),
BUG_ON(skb_headlen(list_skb) > len). The bpf calls the bpf_skb_adjust_room
to decrease the gso_size, and then call bpf_redirect send packet out.

call stack:
...
   [exception RIP: skb_segment+3016]
    RIP: ffffffffb97df2a8  RSP: ffffa3f2cce08728  RFLAGS: 00010293
    RAX: 000000000000007d  RBX: 00000000fffff7b3  RCX: 0000000000000011
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffff895ea32c76c0  RDI: 00000000000008c1
    RBP: ffffa3f2cce087f8   R8: 000000000000088f   R9: 0000000000000011
    R10: 000000000000090c  R11: ffff895e47e68000  R12: ffff895eb2022f00
    R13: 000000000000004b  R14: ffff895ecdaf2000  R15: ffff895eb2023f00
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 torvalds#9 [ffffa3f2cce08720] skb_segment at ffffffffb97ded63
torvalds#10 [ffffa3f2cce08800] tcp_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d0320
torvalds#11 [ffffa3f2cce08860] tcp4_gso_segment at ffffffffb98d07a3
torvalds#12 [ffffa3f2cce08880] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#13 [ffffa3f2cce088e0] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#14 [ffffa3f2cce08918] skb_udp_tunnel_segment at ffffffffb98daa59
torvalds#15 [ffffa3f2cce08980] udp4_ufo_fragment at ffffffffb98db471
torvalds#16 [ffffa3f2cce089b0] inet_gso_segment at ffffffffb98e6de0
torvalds#17 [ffffa3f2cce08a10] skb_mac_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f3741
torvalds#18 [ffffa3f2cce08a48] __skb_gso_segment at ffffffffb97f388e
torvalds#19 [ffffa3f2cce08a78] validate_xmit_skb at ffffffffb97f3d6e
torvalds#20 [ffffa3f2cce08ab8] __dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f4614
torvalds#21 [ffffa3f2cce08b50] dev_queue_xmit at ffffffffb97f5030
torvalds#22 [ffffa3f2cce08b60] __bpf_redirect at ffffffffb98199a8
torvalds#23 [ffffa3f2cce08b88] skb_do_redirect at ffffffffb98205cd
...

The skb has the following properties:
    doffset = 66
    list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list
    list_skb->head_frag = true
    skb->len = 2441 && skb->data_len = 2250
    skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 17
    skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = 75
    skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0...16].bv_len = 125
    list_skb->len = 125
    list_skb->data_len = 0

3962 struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb,
3963                             netdev_features_t features)
3964 {
3965         struct sk_buff *segs = NULL;
3966         struct sk_buff *tail = NULL;
...
4181                 while (pos < offset + len) {
4182                         if (i >= nfrags) {
4183                                 i = 0;
4184                                 nfrags = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->nr_frags;
4185                                 frag = skb_shinfo(list_skb)->frags;
4186                                 frag_skb = list_skb;

After segment the head_skb's last frag, the (pos == offset+len), so break the
while at line 4181, run into this BUG_ON(), not segment the head_frag frag_list
skb.

Since commit 13acc94(net: permit skb_segment on head_frag frag_list skb),
it is allowed to segment the head_frag frag_list skb.

In commit 3dcbdb1 (net: gso: Fix skb_segment splat when splitting gso_size
mangled skb having linear-headed frag_list), it is cleared the NETIF_F_SG if it
has non head_frag skb. It is not cleared the NETIF_F_SG only with one head_frag
frag_list skb.

Signed-off-by: Fred Li <dracodingfly@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NipaLocal <nipa@local>
intel-lab-lkp pushed a commit to intel-lab-lkp/linux that referenced this pull request May 23, 2024
…uddy pages

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning. And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
ioworker0 pushed a commit to ioworker0/linux that referenced this pull request May 24, 2024
…uddy pages

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning.  And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ioworker0 pushed a commit to ioworker0/linux that referenced this pull request May 24, 2024
…uddy pages

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning.  And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
ioworker0 pushed a commit to ioworker0/linux that referenced this pull request May 24, 2024
…uddy pages

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning.  And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 3, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Kaz205 pushed a commit to Kaz205/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 5, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 6, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 6, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 9, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 9, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
hdeller pushed a commit to hdeller/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
staging-kernelci-org pushed a commit to kernelci/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
staging-kernelci-org pushed a commit to kernelci/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 769e6a1 ]

ui_browser__show() is capturing the input title that is stack allocated
memory in hist_browser__run().

Avoid a use after return by strdup-ing the string.

Committer notes:

Further explanation from Ian Rogers:

My command line using tui is:
$ sudo bash -c 'rm /tmp/asan.log*; export
ASAN_OPTIONS="log_path=/tmp/asan.log"; /tmp/perf/perf mem record -a
sleep 1; /tmp/perf/perf mem report'
I then go to the perf annotate view and quit. This triggers the asan
error (from the log file):
```
==1254591==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-use-after-return on address
0x7f2813331920 at pc 0x7f28180
65991 bp 0x7fff0a21c750 sp 0x7fff0a21bf10
READ of size 80 at 0x7f2813331920 thread T0
    #0 0x7f2818065990 in __interceptor_strlen
../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:461
    #1 0x7f2817698251 in SLsmg_write_wrapped_string
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x98251)
    #2 0x7f28176984b9 in SLsmg_write_nstring
(/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libslang.so.2+0x984b9)
    #3 0x55c94045b365 in ui_browser__write_nstring ui/browser.c:60
    #4 0x55c94045c558 in __ui_browser__show_title ui/browser.c:266
    #5 0x55c94045c776 in ui_browser__show ui/browser.c:288
    torvalds#6 0x55c94045c06d in ui_browser__handle_resize ui/browser.c:206
    torvalds#7 0x55c94047979b in do_annotate ui/browsers/hists.c:2458
    torvalds#8 0x55c94047fb17 in evsel__hists_browse ui/browsers/hists.c:3412
    torvalds#9 0x55c940480a0c in perf_evsel_menu__run ui/browsers/hists.c:3527
    torvalds#10 0x55c940481108 in __evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3613
    torvalds#11 0x55c9404813f7 in evlist__tui_browse_hists ui/browsers/hists.c:3661
    torvalds#12 0x55c93ffa253f in report__browse_hists tools/perf/builtin-report.c:671
    torvalds#13 0x55c93ffa58ca in __cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1141
    torvalds#14 0x55c93ffaf159 in cmd_report tools/perf/builtin-report.c:1805
    torvalds#15 0x55c94000c05c in report_events tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:374
    torvalds#16 0x55c94000d96d in cmd_mem tools/perf/builtin-mem.c:516
    torvalds#17 0x55c9400e44ee in run_builtin tools/perf/perf.c:350
    torvalds#18 0x55c9400e4a5a in handle_internal_command tools/perf/perf.c:403
    torvalds#19 0x55c9400e4e22 in run_argv tools/perf/perf.c:447
    torvalds#20 0x55c9400e53ad in main tools/perf/perf.c:561
    torvalds#21 0x7f28170456c9 in __libc_start_call_main
../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#22 0x7f2817045784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#23 0x55c93ff544c0 in _start (/tmp/perf/perf+0x19a4c0) (BuildId:
84899b0e8c7d3a3eaa67b2eb35e3d8b2f8cd4c93)

Address 0x7f2813331920 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 32 in frame
    #0 0x55c94046e85e in hist_browser__run ui/browsers/hists.c:746

  This frame has 1 object(s):
    [32, 192) 'title' (line 747) <== Memory access at offset 32 is
inside this variable
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom
stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
```
hist_browser__run isn't on the stack so the asan error looks legit.
There's no clean init/exit on struct ui_browser so I may be trading a
use-after-return for a memory leak, but that seems look a good trade
anyway.

Fixes: 05e8b08 ("perf ui browser: Stop using 'self'")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Gainey <ben.gainey@arm.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>
Cc: Li Dong <lidong@vivo.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Paran Lee <p4ranlee@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Cc: Sun Haiyong <sunhaiyong@loongson.cn>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Yanteng Si <siyanteng@loongson.cn>
Cc: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240507183545.1236093-2-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
intersectRaven pushed a commit to intersectRaven/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2024
…uddy pages

commit 8cf360b upstream.

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning.  And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2024
…uddy pages

[ Upstream commit 8cf360b ]

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning.  And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
mj22226 pushed a commit to mj22226/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2024
…uddy pages

commit 8cf360b upstream.

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning.  And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging-kernelci-org pushed a commit to kernelci/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 21, 2024
…uddy pages

commit 8cf360b upstream.

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning.  And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
staging-kernelci-org pushed a commit to kernelci/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 21, 2024
…uddy pages

[ Upstream commit 8cf360b ]

When I did memory failure tests recently, below panic occurs:

page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/page-flags.h:1009!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:__del_page_from_free_list+0x151/0x180
RSP: 0018:ffffa49c90437998 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000035 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c8
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: ffff8dd8dfd1c9c0
RBP: ffffd901233b8000 R08: ffffffffab5511f8 R09: 0000000000008c69
R10: 0000000000003c15 R11: ffffffffab5511f8 R12: ffff8dd8fffc0c80
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8dd8fffc0c80 R15: 0000000000000009
FS:  00007ff916304740(0000) GS:ffff8dd8dfd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055eae50124c8 CR3: 00000008479e0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rmqueue_pcplist+0x23b/0x520
 get_page_from_freelist+0x26b/0xe40
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x113/0x1120
 __folio_alloc_noprof+0x11/0xb0
 alloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x5a/0x130
 __alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio+0xe7/0x140
 alloc_pool_huge_folio+0x68/0x100
 set_max_huge_pages+0x13d/0x340
 hugetlb_sysctl_handler_common+0xe8/0x110
 proc_sys_call_handler+0x194/0x280
 vfs_write+0x387/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff916114887
RSP: 002b:00007ffec8a2fd78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055eae500e350 RCX: 00007ff916114887
RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000055eae500e390 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055eae50104c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000055eae50104c0
R10: 0000000000000077 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000004
R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 00007ff916216b80 R15: 00007ff916216a00
 </TASK>
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

And before the panic, there had an warning about bad page state:

BUG: Bad page state in process page-types  pfn:8cee00
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x8cee00
flags: 0x6fffe0000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7fff)
page_type: 0xffffff7f(buddy)
raw: 06fffe0000000000 ffffd901241c0008 ffffd901240f8008 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000009 00000000ffffff7f 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
Modules linked in: mce_inject hwpoison_inject
CPU: 8 PID: 154211 Comm: page-types Not tainted 6.9.0-rc4-00499-g5544ec3178e2-dirty torvalds#22
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x83/0xa0
 bad_page+0x63/0xf0
 free_unref_page+0x36e/0x5c0
 unpoison_memory+0x50b/0x630
 simple_attr_write_xsigned.constprop.0.isra.0+0xb3/0x110
 debugfs_attr_write+0x42/0x60
 full_proxy_write+0x5b/0x80
 vfs_write+0xcd/0x550
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f189a514887
RSP: 002b:00007ffdcd899718 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f189a514887
RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 00007ffdcd899730 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffdcd8997a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffdcd8994b2
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdcda199a8
R13: 0000000000404af1 R14: 000000000040ad78 R15: 00007f189a7a5040
 </TASK>

The root cause should be the below race:

 memory_failure
  try_memory_failure_hugetlb
   me_huge_page
    __page_handle_poison
     dissolve_free_hugetlb_folio
     drain_all_pages -- Buddy page can be isolated e.g. for compaction.
     take_page_off_buddy -- Failed as page is not in the buddy list.
	     -- Page can be putback into buddy after compaction.
    page_ref_inc -- Leads to buddy page with refcnt = 1.

Then unpoison_memory() can unpoison the page and send the buddy page back
into buddy list again leading to the above bad page state warning.  And
bad_page() will call page_mapcount_reset() to remove PageBuddy from buddy
page leading to later VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageBuddy(page)) when trying to
allocate this page.

Fix this issue by only treating __page_handle_poison() as successful when
it returns 1.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240523071217.1696196-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: ceaf8fb ("mm, hwpoison: skip raw hwpoison page in freeing 1GB hugepage")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <nao.horiguchi@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
shunghsiyu pushed a commit to shunghsiyu/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 27, 2024
commit fde2a38 upstream.

Add support precision backtracking in the presence of subprogram frames in
jump history.

This means supporting a few different kinds of subprogram invocation
situations, all requiring a slightly different handling in precision
backtracking handling logic:
  - static subprogram calls;
  - global subprogram calls;
  - callback-calling helpers/kfuncs.

For each of those we need to handle a few precision propagation cases:
  - what to do with precision of subprog returns (r0);
  - what to do with precision of input arguments;
  - for all of them callee-saved registers in caller function should be
    propagated ignoring subprog/callback part of jump history.

N.B. Async callback-calling helpers (currently only
bpf_timer_set_callback()) are transparent to all this because they set
a separate async callback environment and thus callback's history is not
shared with main program's history. So as far as all the changes in this
commit goes, such helper is just a regular helper.

Let's look at all these situation in more details. Let's start with
static subprogram being called, using an exxerpt of a simple main
program and its static subprog, indenting subprog's frame slightly to
make everything clear.

frame 0				frame 1			precision set
=======				=======			=============

 9: r6 = 456;
10: r1 = 123;						fr0: r6
11: call pc+10;						fr0: r1, r6
				22: r0 = r1;		fr0: r6;     fr1: r1
				23: exit		fr0: r6;     fr1: r0
12: r1 = <map_pointer>					fr0: r0, r6
13: r1 += r0;						fr0: r0, r6
14: r1 += r6;						fr0: r6
15: exit

As can be seen above main function is passing 123 as single argument to
an identity (`return x;`) subprog. Returned value is used to adjust map
pointer offset, which forces r0 to be marked as precise. Then
instruction torvalds#14 does the same for callee-saved r6, which will have to be
backtracked all the way to instruction torvalds#9. For brevity, precision sets
for instruction torvalds#13 and torvalds#14 are combined in the diagram above.

First, for subprog calls, r0 returned from subprog (in frame 0) has to
go into subprog's frame 1, and should be cleared from frame 0. So we go
back into subprog's frame knowing we need to mark r0 precise. We then
see that insn torvalds#22 sets r0 from r1, so now we care about marking r1
precise.  When we pop up from subprog's frame back into caller at
insn torvalds#11 we keep r1, as it's an argument-passing register, so we eventually
find `10: r1 = 123;` and satify precision propagation chain for insn torvalds#13.

This example demonstrates two sets of rules:
  - r0 returned after subprog call has to be moved into subprog's r0 set;
  - *static* subprog arguments (r1-r5) are moved back to caller precision set.

Let's look at what happens with callee-saved precision propagation. Insn torvalds#14
mark r6 as precise. When we get into subprog's frame, we keep r6 in
frame 0's precision set *only*. Subprog itself has its own set of
independent r6-r10 registers and is not affected. When we eventually
made our way out of subprog frame we keep r6 in precision set until we
reach `9: r6 = 456;`, satisfying propagation. r6-r10 propagation is
perhaps the simplest aspect, it always stays in its original frame.

That's pretty much all we have to do to support precision propagation
across *static subprog* invocation.

Let's look at what happens when we have global subprog invocation.

frame 0				frame 1			precision set
=======				=======			=============

 9: r6 = 456;
10: r1 = 123;						fr0: r6
11: call pc+10; # global subprog			fr0: r6
12: r1 = <map_pointer>					fr0: r0, r6
13: r1 += r0;						fr0: r0, r6
14: r1 += r6;						fr0: r6;
15: exit

Starting from insn torvalds#13, r0 has to be precise. We backtrack all the way
to insn torvalds#11 (call pc+10) and see that subprog is global, so was already
validated in isolation. As opposed to static subprog, global subprog
always returns unknown scalar r0, so that satisfies precision
propagation and we drop r0 from precision set. We are done for insns torvalds#13.

Now for insn torvalds#14. r6 is in precision set, we backtrack to `call pc+10;`.
Here we need to recognize that this is effectively both exit and entry
to global subprog, which means we stay in caller's frame. So we carry on
with r6 still in precision set, until we satisfy it at insn torvalds#9. The only
hard part with global subprogs is just knowing when it's a global func.

Lastly, callback-calling helpers and kfuncs do simulate subprog calls,
so jump history will have subprog instructions in between caller
program's instructions, but the rules of propagating r0 and r1-r5
differ, because we don't actually directly call callback. We actually
call helper/kfunc, which at runtime will call subprog, so the only
difference between normal helper/kfunc handling is that we need to make
sure to skip callback simulatinog part of jump history.
Let's look at an example to make this clearer.

frame 0				frame 1			precision set
=======				=======			=============

 8: r6 = 456;
 9: r1 = 123;						fr0: r6
10: r2 = &callback;					fr0: r6
11: call bpf_loop;					fr0: r6
				22: r0 = r1;		fr0: r6      fr1:
				23: exit		fr0: r6      fr1:
12: r1 = <map_pointer>					fr0: r0, r6
13: r1 += r0;						fr0: r0, r6
14: r1 += r6;						fr0: r6;
15: exit

Again, insn torvalds#13 forces r0 to be precise. As soon as we get to `23: exit`
we see that this isn't actually a static subprog call (it's `call
bpf_loop;` helper call instead). So we clear r0 from precision set.

For callee-saved register, there is no difference: it stays in frame 0's
precision set, we go through insn torvalds#22 and torvalds#23, ignoring them until we
get back to caller frame 0, eventually satisfying precision backtrack
logic at insn torvalds#8 (`r6 = 456;`).

Assuming callback needed to set r0 as precise at insn torvalds#23, we'd
backtrack to insn torvalds#22, switching from r0 to r1, and then at the point
when we pop back to frame 0 at insn torvalds#11, we'll clear r1-r5 from
precision set, as we don't really do a subprog call directly, so there
is no input argument precision propagation.

That's pretty much it. With these changes, it seems like the only still
unsupported situation for precision backpropagation is the case when
program is accessing stack through registers other than r10. This is
still left as unsupported (though rare) case for now.

As for results. For selftests, few positive changes for bigger programs,
cls_redirect in dynptr variant benefitting the most:

[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ ./veristat -C ~/subprog-precise-before-results.csv ~/subprog-precise-after-results.csv -f @veristat.cfg -e file,prog,insns -f 'insns_diff!=0'
File                                      Program        Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns     (DIFF)
----------------------------------------  -------------  ---------  ---------  ----------------
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.linked1.o          on_event            2060       2002      -58 (-2.82%)
test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked1.o    cls_redirect       15660       2914  -12746 (-81.39%)
test_cls_redirect_subprogs.bpf.linked1.o  cls_redirect       61620      59088    -2532 (-4.11%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked1.o           syncookie_tc      109980      86278  -23702 (-21.55%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked1.o           syncookie_xdp      97716      85147  -12569 (-12.86%)

Cilium progress don't really regress. They don't use subprogs and are
mostly unaffected, but some other fixes and improvements could have
changed something. This doesn't appear to be the case:

[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ ./veristat -C ~/subprog-precise-before-results-cilium.csv ~/subprog-precise-after-results-cilium.csv -e file,prog,insns -f 'insns_diff!=0'
File           Program                         Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns (DIFF)
-------------  ------------------------------  ---------  ---------  ------------
bpf_host.o     tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6       4983       5003  +20 (+0.40%)
bpf_lxc.o      tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6       4983       5003  +20 (+0.40%)
bpf_overlay.o  tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6       4983       5003  +20 (+0.40%)
bpf_xdp.o      tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv6            12475      12504  +29 (+0.23%)
bpf_xdp.o      tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6       6363       6371   +8 (+0.13%)

Looking at (somewhat anonymized) Meta production programs, we see mostly
insignificant variation in number of instructions, with one program
(syar_bind6_protect6) benefitting the most at -17%.

[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ ./veristat -C ~/subprog-precise-before-results-fbcode.csv ~/subprog-precise-after-results-fbcode.csv -e prog,insns -f 'insns_diff!=0'
Program                   Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns     (DIFF)
------------------------  ---------  ---------  ----------------
on_request_context_event        597        585      -12 (-2.01%)
read_async_py_stack           43789      43657     -132 (-0.30%)
read_sync_py_stack            35041      37599    +2558 (+7.30%)
rrm_usdt                        946        940       -6 (-0.63%)
sysarmor_inet6_bind           28863      28249     -614 (-2.13%)
sysarmor_inet_bind            28845      28240     -605 (-2.10%)
syar_bind4_protect4          154145     147640    -6505 (-4.22%)
syar_bind6_protect6          165242     137088  -28154 (-17.04%)
syar_task_exit_setgid         21289      19720    -1569 (-7.37%)
syar_task_exit_setuid         21290      19721    -1569 (-7.37%)
do_uprobe                     19967      19413     -554 (-2.77%)
tw_twfw_ingress              215877     204833   -11044 (-5.12%)
tw_twfw_tc_in                215877     204833   -11044 (-5.12%)

But checking duration (wall clock) differences, that is the actual time taken
by verifier to validate programs, we see a sometimes dramatic improvements, all
the way to about 16x improvements:

[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ ./veristat -C ~/subprog-precise-before-results-meta.csv ~/subprog-precise-after-results-meta.csv -e prog,duration -s duration_diff^ | head -n20
Program                                   Duration (us) (A)  Duration (us) (B)  Duration (us) (DIFF)
----------------------------------------  -----------------  -----------------  --------------------
tw_twfw_ingress                                     4488374             272836    -4215538 (-93.92%)
tw_twfw_tc_in                                       4339111             268175    -4070936 (-93.82%)
tw_twfw_egress                                      3521816             270751    -3251065 (-92.31%)
tw_twfw_tc_eg                                       3472878             284294    -3188584 (-91.81%)
balancer_ingress                                     343119             291391      -51728 (-15.08%)
syar_bind6_protect6                                   78992              64782      -14210 (-17.99%)
ttls_tc_ingress                                       11739               8176       -3563 (-30.35%)
kprobe__security_inode_link                           13864              11341       -2523 (-18.20%)
read_sync_py_stack                                    21927              19442       -2485 (-11.33%)
read_async_py_stack                                   30444              28136        -2308 (-7.58%)
syar_task_exit_setuid                                 10256               8440       -1816 (-17.71%)

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505043317.3629845-9-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
shunghsiyu pushed a commit to shunghsiyu/linux that referenced this pull request Jun 28, 2024
commit fde2a38 upstream.

Add support precision backtracking in the presence of subprogram frames in
jump history.

This means supporting a few different kinds of subprogram invocation
situations, all requiring a slightly different handling in precision
backtracking handling logic:
  - static subprogram calls;
  - global subprogram calls;
  - callback-calling helpers/kfuncs.

For each of those we need to handle a few precision propagation cases:
  - what to do with precision of subprog returns (r0);
  - what to do with precision of input arguments;
  - for all of them callee-saved registers in caller function should be
    propagated ignoring subprog/callback part of jump history.

N.B. Async callback-calling helpers (currently only
bpf_timer_set_callback()) are transparent to all this because they set
a separate async callback environment and thus callback's history is not
shared with main program's history. So as far as all the changes in this
commit goes, such helper is just a regular helper.

Let's look at all these situation in more details. Let's start with
static subprogram being called, using an exxerpt of a simple main
program and its static subprog, indenting subprog's frame slightly to
make everything clear.

frame 0				frame 1			precision set
=======				=======			=============

 9: r6 = 456;
10: r1 = 123;						fr0: r6
11: call pc+10;						fr0: r1, r6
				22: r0 = r1;		fr0: r6;     fr1: r1
				23: exit		fr0: r6;     fr1: r0
12: r1 = <map_pointer>					fr0: r0, r6
13: r1 += r0;						fr0: r0, r6
14: r1 += r6;						fr0: r6
15: exit

As can be seen above main function is passing 123 as single argument to
an identity (`return x;`) subprog. Returned value is used to adjust map
pointer offset, which forces r0 to be marked as precise. Then
instruction torvalds#14 does the same for callee-saved r6, which will have to be
backtracked all the way to instruction torvalds#9. For brevity, precision sets
for instruction torvalds#13 and torvalds#14 are combined in the diagram above.

First, for subprog calls, r0 returned from subprog (in frame 0) has to
go into subprog's frame 1, and should be cleared from frame 0. So we go
back into subprog's frame knowing we need to mark r0 precise. We then
see that insn torvalds#22 sets r0 from r1, so now we care about marking r1
precise.  When we pop up from subprog's frame back into caller at
insn torvalds#11 we keep r1, as it's an argument-passing register, so we eventually
find `10: r1 = 123;` and satify precision propagation chain for insn torvalds#13.

This example demonstrates two sets of rules:
  - r0 returned after subprog call has to be moved into subprog's r0 set;
  - *static* subprog arguments (r1-r5) are moved back to caller precision set.

Let's look at what happens with callee-saved precision propagation. Insn torvalds#14
mark r6 as precise. When we get into subprog's frame, we keep r6 in
frame 0's precision set *only*. Subprog itself has its own set of
independent r6-r10 registers and is not affected. When we eventually
made our way out of subprog frame we keep r6 in precision set until we
reach `9: r6 = 456;`, satisfying propagation. r6-r10 propagation is
perhaps the simplest aspect, it always stays in its original frame.

That's pretty much all we have to do to support precision propagation
across *static subprog* invocation.

Let's look at what happens when we have global subprog invocation.

frame 0				frame 1			precision set
=======				=======			=============

 9: r6 = 456;
10: r1 = 123;						fr0: r6
11: call pc+10; # global subprog			fr0: r6
12: r1 = <map_pointer>					fr0: r0, r6
13: r1 += r0;						fr0: r0, r6
14: r1 += r6;						fr0: r6;
15: exit

Starting from insn torvalds#13, r0 has to be precise. We backtrack all the way
to insn torvalds#11 (call pc+10) and see that subprog is global, so was already
validated in isolation. As opposed to static subprog, global subprog
always returns unknown scalar r0, so that satisfies precision
propagation and we drop r0 from precision set. We are done for insns torvalds#13.

Now for insn torvalds#14. r6 is in precision set, we backtrack to `call pc+10;`.
Here we need to recognize that this is effectively both exit and entry
to global subprog, which means we stay in caller's frame. So we carry on
with r6 still in precision set, until we satisfy it at insn torvalds#9. The only
hard part with global subprogs is just knowing when it's a global func.

Lastly, callback-calling helpers and kfuncs do simulate subprog calls,
so jump history will have subprog instructions in between caller
program's instructions, but the rules of propagating r0 and r1-r5
differ, because we don't actually directly call callback. We actually
call helper/kfunc, which at runtime will call subprog, so the only
difference between normal helper/kfunc handling is that we need to make
sure to skip callback simulatinog part of jump history.
Let's look at an example to make this clearer.

frame 0				frame 1			precision set
=======				=======			=============

 8: r6 = 456;
 9: r1 = 123;						fr0: r6
10: r2 = &callback;					fr0: r6
11: call bpf_loop;					fr0: r6
				22: r0 = r1;		fr0: r6      fr1:
				23: exit		fr0: r6      fr1:
12: r1 = <map_pointer>					fr0: r0, r6
13: r1 += r0;						fr0: r0, r6
14: r1 += r6;						fr0: r6;
15: exit

Again, insn torvalds#13 forces r0 to be precise. As soon as we get to `23: exit`
we see that this isn't actually a static subprog call (it's `call
bpf_loop;` helper call instead). So we clear r0 from precision set.

For callee-saved register, there is no difference: it stays in frame 0's
precision set, we go through insn torvalds#22 and torvalds#23, ignoring them until we
get back to caller frame 0, eventually satisfying precision backtrack
logic at insn torvalds#8 (`r6 = 456;`).

Assuming callback needed to set r0 as precise at insn torvalds#23, we'd
backtrack to insn torvalds#22, switching from r0 to r1, and then at the point
when we pop back to frame 0 at insn torvalds#11, we'll clear r1-r5 from
precision set, as we don't really do a subprog call directly, so there
is no input argument precision propagation.

That's pretty much it. With these changes, it seems like the only still
unsupported situation for precision backpropagation is the case when
program is accessing stack through registers other than r10. This is
still left as unsupported (though rare) case for now.

As for results. For selftests, few positive changes for bigger programs,
cls_redirect in dynptr variant benefitting the most:

[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ ./veristat -C ~/subprog-precise-before-results.csv ~/subprog-precise-after-results.csv -f @veristat.cfg -e file,prog,insns -f 'insns_diff!=0'
File                                      Program        Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns     (DIFF)
----------------------------------------  -------------  ---------  ---------  ----------------
pyperf600_bpf_loop.bpf.linked1.o          on_event            2060       2002      -58 (-2.82%)
test_cls_redirect_dynptr.bpf.linked1.o    cls_redirect       15660       2914  -12746 (-81.39%)
test_cls_redirect_subprogs.bpf.linked1.o  cls_redirect       61620      59088    -2532 (-4.11%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked1.o           syncookie_tc      109980      86278  -23702 (-21.55%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.linked1.o           syncookie_xdp      97716      85147  -12569 (-12.86%)

Cilium progress don't really regress. They don't use subprogs and are
mostly unaffected, but some other fixes and improvements could have
changed something. This doesn't appear to be the case:

[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ ./veristat -C ~/subprog-precise-before-results-cilium.csv ~/subprog-precise-after-results-cilium.csv -e file,prog,insns -f 'insns_diff!=0'
File           Program                         Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns (DIFF)
-------------  ------------------------------  ---------  ---------  ------------
bpf_host.o     tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6       4983       5003  +20 (+0.40%)
bpf_lxc.o      tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6       4983       5003  +20 (+0.40%)
bpf_overlay.o  tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6       4983       5003  +20 (+0.40%)
bpf_xdp.o      tail_handle_nat_fwd_ipv6            12475      12504  +29 (+0.23%)
bpf_xdp.o      tail_nodeport_nat_ingress_ipv6       6363       6371   +8 (+0.13%)

Looking at (somewhat anonymized) Meta production programs, we see mostly
insignificant variation in number of instructions, with one program
(syar_bind6_protect6) benefitting the most at -17%.

[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ ./veristat -C ~/subprog-precise-before-results-fbcode.csv ~/subprog-precise-after-results-fbcode.csv -e prog,insns -f 'insns_diff!=0'
Program                   Insns (A)  Insns (B)  Insns     (DIFF)
------------------------  ---------  ---------  ----------------
on_request_context_event        597        585      -12 (-2.01%)
read_async_py_stack           43789      43657     -132 (-0.30%)
read_sync_py_stack            35041      37599    +2558 (+7.30%)
rrm_usdt                        946        940       -6 (-0.63%)
sysarmor_inet6_bind           28863      28249     -614 (-2.13%)
sysarmor_inet_bind            28845      28240     -605 (-2.10%)
syar_bind4_protect4          154145     147640    -6505 (-4.22%)
syar_bind6_protect6          165242     137088  -28154 (-17.04%)
syar_task_exit_setgid         21289      19720    -1569 (-7.37%)
syar_task_exit_setuid         21290      19721    -1569 (-7.37%)
do_uprobe                     19967      19413     -554 (-2.77%)
tw_twfw_ingress              215877     204833   -11044 (-5.12%)
tw_twfw_tc_in                215877     204833   -11044 (-5.12%)

But checking duration (wall clock) differences, that is the actual time taken
by verifier to validate programs, we see a sometimes dramatic improvements, all
the way to about 16x improvements:

[vmuser@archvm bpf]$ ./veristat -C ~/subprog-precise-before-results-meta.csv ~/subprog-precise-after-results-meta.csv -e prog,duration -s duration_diff^ | head -n20
Program                                   Duration (us) (A)  Duration (us) (B)  Duration (us) (DIFF)
----------------------------------------  -----------------  -----------------  --------------------
tw_twfw_ingress                                     4488374             272836    -4215538 (-93.92%)
tw_twfw_tc_in                                       4339111             268175    -4070936 (-93.82%)
tw_twfw_egress                                      3521816             270751    -3251065 (-92.31%)
tw_twfw_tc_eg                                       3472878             284294    -3188584 (-91.81%)
balancer_ingress                                     343119             291391      -51728 (-15.08%)
syar_bind6_protect6                                   78992              64782      -14210 (-17.99%)
ttls_tc_ingress                                       11739               8176       -3563 (-30.35%)
kprobe__security_inode_link                           13864              11341       -2523 (-18.20%)
read_sync_py_stack                                    21927              19442       -2485 (-11.33%)
read_async_py_stack                                   30444              28136        -2308 (-7.58%)
syar_task_exit_setuid                                 10256               8440       -1816 (-17.71%)

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505043317.3629845-9-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
[shung-hsi.yu: use of is_callback_calling_kfunc() is entirely dropped because
commit 5d92ddc ("bpf: Add callback validation to kfunc verifier logic") is
not present]
Signed-off-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
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