feat(webui): 侧边栏布局、版本信息与快捷键优化

[DearEmma]

1. 修改左侧边栏，根据使用频率和场景调整菜单顺序

2. 修改版本信息放置文字和中英文切换按钮

3. 调整边栏宽度使其更美观

4. 增加 Alt+N 快捷键

5. 增加 /new 快捷键

[duguwanglong]

1. flocks/server/app.py calls asyncio.run(Config.get()) at module import time, which effectively turns importing app into a "sync-context-only" operation. The repository already contains usages that import app from within an async context, and such scenarios will immediately raise RuntimeError: asyncio.run() cannot be called from a running event loop. I also produced a minimal reproduction and confirmed that nesting asyncio.run() inside a running event loop triggers this error. Worse still, this caches HOME / FLOCKS_* related configuration too early, changing the behavior of existing tests and isolated environments.

@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_create_skill_writes_to_plugins_path(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
    """POST /skills should write to ~/.flocks/plugins/skills/, not ~/.flocks/skills/."""
    from httpx import AsyncClient, ASGITransport
    from flocks.server.app import app

    # Redirect home directory to tmp_path so we don't pollute real ~/.flocks
    monkeypatch.setenv("HOME", str(tmp_path))
    monkeypatch.setattr(os.path, "expanduser", lambda p: str(tmp_path) if p == "~" else p.replace("~", str(tmp_path)))

    async with AsyncClient(transport=ASGITransport(app=app), base_url="http://test") as client:

2. In flocks/server/app.py, the CORS rule generated when _FLOCKS_WEBUI_HOST == "0.0.0.0" is too permissive. The regex in the PR essentially allows "any host, as long as the port matches", rather than restricting to the actual WebUI address exposed by the current machine. This means an attacker can simply serve a page at evil.example:<same-port> and read backend responses, which effectively re-widens the cross-origin surface that the previous commit just tightened. This issue is in direct conflict with the PR's stated security goal.

3. The newly added metacharacter rejection for /api/file/search in flocks/server/routes/file.py incorrectly rejects legitimate filenames without actually improving security. The underlying search implementation is already subprocess.run(cmd, shell=False), with arguments passed via argv, so there is no shell interpolation involved. Characters such as $, `, | were already safe to search for; now they are returned as 400, which is a compatibility regression.

        try:
            # Use find command for file search
            cwd = os.getcwd()
            
            # Build find command
            cmd = ["find", ".", "-name", f"*{query}*"]
            
            if type == "file":
                cmd.extend(["-type", "f"])
            elif type == "directory":
                cmd.extend(["-type", "d"])
            
            # Exclude common directories
            excludes = [".git", "node_modules", "__pycache__", ".venv", "venv"]
            for exclude in excludes:
                cmd.extend(["-not", "-path", f"*/{exclude}/*"])
            
            result = subprocess.run(
                cmd,
                cwd=cwd,
                capture_output=True,
                text=True,
                timeout=5,
            )

Additional Concerns

/api/file/find/text has been switched from grep regex semantics to grep -F fixed-string matching, but the API documentation still says "Search pattern". If any external caller depends on regex behavior, this is a breaking change — and this PR does not add any tests to lock in the new behavior.