fix: address security review - SSRF protection, credential logging, memory leak, type safety by Copilot · Pull Request #2 · AkkiaLab/StickerHub

Copilot · 2026-02-13T11:32:47Z

Addresses security and code quality issues from PR #1 code review: webhook URL credential leakage in logs, SSRF vulnerability via unrestricted webhook POST, memory leak in pending request cleanup, and loose type safety on target_mode parameter.

Security Fixes

SSRF Protection with Flexible Configuration:
- Add FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS config using JSON format (e.g., ["open.feishu.cn","open.larksuite.com"])
- Not set: Uses default whitelist ["open.feishu.cn", "open.larksuite.com"]
- Set to []: Disables whitelist (allows any domain - use with caution)
- Set to custom list: Uses specified whitelist
- Domain validation uses hostname (not netloc), allowing any port on whitelisted domains
Enhanced Credential Logging Protection:
- Extract mask_url() utility that validates URLs have proper scheme and hostname
- Uses parsed.hostname instead of parsed.netloc to avoid leaking userinfo, port info
- Returns [url_masked] for non-standard URLs
- Masks previous_webhook in success logs to prevent credential leakage
Memory Leak Fix: Add _cleanup_pending_webhook_requests() calls to handle_bind(), handle_bind_mode_callback(), and handle_message() to prevent unbounded dictionary growth from abandoned flows.

Code Quality

Type Safety: Change target_mode from str to Literal["bot", "webhook"] in TargetPlatformSender protocol and FeishuSender implementation for compile-time validation.
Test Coverage:
- Add tests for webhook TTL cleanup and domain whitelist enforcement (SSRF protection)
- Add tests for hostname-based validation with custom port support
- Add tests for disabled whitelist mode
DRY: Extract URL masking constants and logic to shared utils/url_masking.py module.
Configuration: Add get_webhook_allowed_hosts() method to Settings to handle default/custom/disabled whitelist logic cleanly.

# Before: webhook URL with token logged in plaintext
logger.debug("target=%s", target)  # logs full webhook URL with secret token

# After: token sanitized using hostname only
safe_target = mask_url(target)  # https://open.feishu.cn/open-apis/bot/v2...k/abc123
logger.debug("target=%s", safe_target)

Configuration Examples

# Use default whitelist (recommended)
FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS=

# Disable whitelist (allows any domain - use with caution)
FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS=[]

# Custom whitelist with JSON format
FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS=["open.feishu.cn","custom.domain.com"]

Security Validation: CodeQL analysis passes with 0 alerts.

✨ Let Copilot coding agent set things up for you — coding agent works faster and does higher quality work when set up for your repo.

…tection, memory leak, and type safety Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

…ogging, fix test naming Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

…uplication Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

… messages Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot · 2026-02-13T11:45:39Z

Just as a heads up, I was blocked by some firewall rules while working on your feedback. Expand below for details.

Warning

Firewall rules blocked me from connecting to one or more addresses (expand for details)

I tried to connect to the following addresses, but was blocked by firewall rules:

astral.sh
- Triggering command: /usr/bin/curl curl -LsSf REDACTED (dns block)

If you need me to access, download, or install something from one of these locations, you can either:

Configure Actions setup steps to set up my environment, which run before the firewall is enabled
Add the appropriate URLs or hosts to the custom allowlist in this repository's Copilot coding agent settings (admins only)

Copilot

Pull request overview

本 PR 针对 StickerHub 的飞书 webhook 绑定链路，修复安全审计与代码质量问题（SSRF 防护、日志凭据泄露、pending 请求清理、类型收紧），并补充相应测试与文档/配置示例，降低 webhook 绑定的安全与运维风险。

Changes:

新增 webhook 域名白名单配置并在 webhook URL 归一化时做校验，降低 SSRF 风险
抽取 URL 脱敏工具 mask_url()，避免日志中输出 webhook token
增加 pending webhook 绑定请求的清理逻辑与测试；收紧 target_mode 类型到 Literal["bot", "webhook"]

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 11 out of 11 changed files in this pull request and generated 4 comments.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
`src/stickerhub/services/binding.py`	注入 webhook allowed hosts，URL 归一化增加白名单校验，并在失败日志中脱敏输出
`src/stickerhub/utils/url_masking.py`	新增通用 URL 脱敏工具供日志使用
`src/stickerhub/config.py`	新增 `FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS` 配置项映射到 Settings
`src/stickerhub/main.py`	将 Settings 中的 allowed hosts 传入 `BindingService`
`src/stickerhub/core/ports.py`	`TargetPlatformSender.send()` 的 `target_mode` 改为 `Literal` 收紧类型
`src/stickerhub/adapters/telegram_source.py`	在多个入口调用 pending webhook 请求清理，避免字典无界增长
`src/stickerhub/adapters/feishu_sender.py`	发送前对 webhook target 做脱敏日志输出
`tests/test_telegram_source.py`	增加 webhook pending 清理的单测
`tests/test_binding_sqlite.py`	增加 webhook 域名白名单（SSRF 防护）相关单测
`README.md` / `.env.example`	记录新增配置项及示例

Copilot · 2026-02-13T12:05:25Z

src/stickerhub/utils/url_masking.py

+        if parsed.path and len(parsed.path) > PATH_MASK_THRESHOLD:
+            masked_path = (
+                f"{parsed.path[:PATH_PREFIX_LENGTH]}...{parsed.path[-PATH_SUFFIX_LENGTH:]}"
+            )
+        else:
+            masked_path = parsed.path
+        return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}{masked_path}"


mask_url() 目前对很多“非标准 URL”输入不会真正脱敏：urlparse() 很少抛异常，像 "token_only" 这类字符串会被格式化成 ://token_only 原样写入日志；另外使用 parsed.netloc 可能把 user:pass@host 这类 userinfo 直接打到日志里。建议在拼接返回值前显式校验 scheme/hostname，并使用 parsed.hostname（且忽略/剔除 userinfo、端口、query/fragment），否则直接返回固定占位符。

Suggested change

if parsed.path and len(parsed.path) > PATH_MASK_THRESHOLD:

masked_path = (

f"{parsed.path[:PATH_PREFIX_LENGTH]}...{parsed.path[-PATH_SUFFIX_LENGTH:]}"

)

else:

masked_path = parsed.path

return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}{masked_path}"

# 仅在解析结果有明确的协议和主机名时才返回拼接后的 URL

if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.hostname:

return "[url_masked]"

if parsed.path and len(parsed.path) > PATH_MASK_THRESHOLD:

masked_path = (

f"{parsed.path[:PATH_PREFIX_LENGTH]}...{parsed.path[-PATH_SUFFIX_LENGTH:]}"

)

else:

masked_path = parsed.path

# 仅使用 hostname，避免将 userinfo、端口等敏感信息写入日志

return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.hostname}{masked_path}"

已修复，commit 7851551 和 fb62662。

现在 mask_url() 会：

验证 URL 有明确的 scheme 和 hostname，否则返回 [url_masked]

仅使用 parsed.hostname，避免 userinfo、端口等敏感信息泄露

对非标准 URL（如 "token_only"）返回固定占位符而非原样输出

Copilot · 2026-02-13T12:05:26Z

src/stickerhub/config.py

+    feishu_webhook_allowed_hosts: list[str] = Field(
+        default=["open.feishu.cn", "open.larksuite.com"],
+        alias="FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS",
+    )
    log_level: str = Field(default="INFO", alias="LOG_LEVEL")


FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS 在 README/.env.example 里说明为“逗号分隔、留空用默认值”，但这里字段类型是 list[str]：从 .env 读到 FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS=（空字符串）或 a,b（非 JSON）时，pydantic-settings 通常会解析失败并导致启动报错。建议在 SettingsConfigDict 配置 env_ignore_empty=True 并设置 env_parse_delimiter=","（或将该字段改成 str | None 后自行 split+strip）。

已修复，commit 7851551。

现在使用 JSON 格式解析 FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS：

不设置：使用默认白名单 ["open.feishu.cn", "open.larksuite.com"]

设为 []：禁用白名单校验

设为 JSON 数组：如 ["open.feishu.cn","custom.domain.com"]

示例配置：

# 使用默认白名单 FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS= # 禁用白名单（谨慎使用） FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS=[] # 自定义白名单 FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS=["open.feishu.cn","custom.domain.com"]

Copilot · 2026-02-13T12:05:26Z

src/stickerhub/services/binding.py

    if not parsed.netloc:
        return None
+
+    # 域名白名单校验（SSRF 防护）
+    if parsed.netloc.lower() not in [host.lower() for host in allowed_hosts]:
+        return None
+


域名白名单校验使用了 parsed.netloc 做精确匹配；netloc 会包含端口（如 open.feishu.cn:443），也可能包含 userinfo，从而导致合法 URL 被误拒或校验语义不清。建议改用 parsed.hostname 做白名单匹配，并根据需要显式允许/禁止端口（例如仅允许空端口或 443）。

Suggested change

if not parsed.netloc:

return None

# 域名白名单校验（SSRF 防护）

if parsed.netloc.lower() not in [host.lower() for host in allowed_hosts]:

return None

# 必须有合法主机名

if not parsed.hostname:

return None

# 仅允许默认端口或 443，避免通过非常规端口绕过校验

if parsed.port not in (None, 443):

return None

# 域名白名单校验（SSRF 防护）——仅基于 hostname，而非包含端口的 netloc

hostname = parsed.hostname.lower()

if hostname not in [host.lower() for host in allowed_hosts]:

return None

已修复，commit 7851551 和 fb62662。

现在域名白名单校验：

使用 parsed.hostname 而非 parsed.netloc 进行匹配

不限制端口（任何端口都可以通过校验）

已添加测试验证带自定义端口的 URL（如 https://open.feishu.cn:8443/...）可以正常通过

Copilot · 2026-02-13T12:05:26Z

src/stickerhub/services/binding.py

+        normalized_url = _normalize_feishu_webhook_url(webhook_url, self._webhook_allowed_hosts)
        if not normalized_url:
+            # 脱敏 URL 用于日志
+            masked_url = mask_url(webhook_url)
            logger.warning(
-                "Webhook 绑定失败: 平台=%s user=%s 原因=URL格式不合法",
+                "Webhook 绑定失败: 平台=%s user=%s 原因=URL格式不合法或域名不在白名单内 url=%s",
                source_platform,
                source_user_id,
+                masked_url,


handle_bind_webhook() 虽然在失败日志里对输入 URL 做了脱敏，但后续成功日志仍会输出 details.get("previous_webhook")（旧 webhook URL），这通常包含敏感 token，依然会造成凭据泄露。建议对 previous_webhook 同样使用 mask_url() 后再记录，或只记录是否存在/哈希摘要而不记录 URL 本身。

已修复，commit 7851551。

现在成功日志中的 previous_webhook 会先使用 mask_url() 脱敏后再记录，防止旧凭据泄露：

previous_webhook_masked = ( mask_url(details["previous_webhook"]) if details.get("previous_webhook") else None ) logger.info("... previous_webhook=%s ...", previous_webhook_masked)

AkkiaS7 · 2026-02-13T12:11:31Z

@copilot apply changes based on the comments in this thread

只按照hotname验证白名单不要限制端口，额外提供关闭白名单验证的配置
env域名白名单用json List[str]的形式

…option to disable whitelist, use JSON format for env config Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot · 2026-02-13T12:16:35Z

@copilot apply changes based on the comments in this thread

只按照hotname验证白名单不要限制端口，额...

已完成所有修改，commits 7851551 和 fb62662。

主要变更

域名白名单仅验证 hostname，不限制端口
- 使用 parsed.hostname 替代 parsed.netloc
- 任何端口都可通过验证
- 已添加测试验证自定义端口支持
提供关闭白名单验证的配置
- 不设置：使用默认白名单 ["open.feishu.cn", "open.larksuite.com"]
- 设为 []：完全禁用白名单校验
- 设为自定义列表：使用指定白名单

使用 JSON 格式配置域名白名单

# .env 文件示例
FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS=["open.feishu.cn","custom.domain.com"]
# 或禁用白名单
FEISHU_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_HOSTS=[]

其他安全改进
- URL 脱敏使用 hostname 避免泄露 userinfo/端口
- 成功日志中的 previous_webhook 也进行脱敏
- 对非标准 URL 返回固定占位符

安全验证：CodeQL 分析通过，0 个告警

Initial plan

507f703

Copilot AI assigned Copilot and AkkiaS7 Feb 13, 2026

Copilot AI mentioned this pull request Feb 13, 2026

feat: 添加飞书 webhook 绑定功能，支持选择绑定方式 #1

Merged

Copilot started work on behalf of AkkiaS7 February 13, 2026 11:33 View session

Copilot AI and others added 6 commits February 13, 2026 11:36

fix: address security review comments - webhook URL logging, SSRF pro…

0754b68

…tection, memory leak, and type safety Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

test: add coverage for webhook cleanup and domain whitelist validation

98fc36e

Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

refactor: address code review feedback - extract constants, improve l…

e4c058e

…ogging, fix test naming Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

refactor: use consistent constants for URL masking across modules

f02f5b8

Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

refactor: extract URL masking to shared utility module to eliminate d…

060d5df

…uplication Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

fix: improve exception handling and avoid exposing whitelist in error…

48c6045

… messages Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot AI changed the title ~~[WIP] Add Feishu webhook binding support in Telegram bot~~ fix: address security review - SSRF protection, credential logging, memory leak, type safety Feb 13, 2026

Copilot finished work on behalf of AkkiaS7 February 13, 2026 11:45

Copilot AI requested a review from AkkiaS7 February 13, 2026 11:45

AkkiaS7 marked this pull request as ready for review February 13, 2026 11:59

Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings February 13, 2026 11:59

Copilot started reviewing on behalf of AkkiaS7 February 13, 2026 11:59 View session

Copilot AI reviewed Feb 13, 2026

View reviewed changes

Copilot started work on behalf of AkkiaS7 February 13, 2026 12:11 View session

Copilot AI and others added 2 commits February 13, 2026 12:14

fix: improve URL masking, use hostname for whitelist validation, add …

7851551

…option to disable whitelist, use JSON format for env config Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

refactor: simplify whitelist check logic and clarify docstring

fb62662

Co-authored-by: AkkiaS7 <68485070+AkkiaS7@users.noreply.github.com>

Copilot finished work on behalf of AkkiaS7 February 13, 2026 12:17

fix pre-commit error

529f000

AkkiaS7 merged commit 433000e into dev Feb 13, 2026
1 check passed

AkkiaS7 deleted the copilot/sub-pr-1 branch February 13, 2026 12:22

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Security Fixes

Code Quality

Configuration Examples

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Copilot AI commented Feb 13, 2026

I tried to connect to the following addresses, but was blocked by firewall rules:

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AkkiaS7 commented Feb 13, 2026

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主要变更

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Copilot AI commented Feb 13, 2026 •

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