C Annotations for Concurrent Information Flow Security

Alexander Blyth

June 2021

Contents

| 1 | Top | Topic Definition | | | |
|---|-----|--|----|--|--|
| 2 | Bac | kground | 6 | | |
| | 2.1 | Information Security | 6 | | |
| | 2.2 | Information Flow Control | 9 | | |
| | 2.3 | Information Flow Security in Concurrency | 10 | | |
| | 2.4 | Compilers and Security | 11 | | |
| | 2.5 | Annotations | 12 | | |
| | 2.6 | Related Work | 13 | | |
| 3 | Арр | oroach | 15 | | |
| | 3.1 | Test Cases | 16 | | |
| | 3.2 | Quality Analysis | 18 | | |
| | 3.3 | Efficiency and Optimisation | 18 | | |
| | 3.4 | Tool Development | 19 | | |
| 4 | Exe | cution | 20 | | |

| | 4.1 | 4.1 CompCert AIS Annotations | | | | | 20 | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|------------------------------|---------------------|-----------|-------|----------|----|--|------|----|--|-----|
| | | 4.1.1 Qua | ality Analysis | | | | | | | | | 25 |
| | 4.2 | CompCert | Builtin Annotatio | ns | | | | | | | | 30 |
| | 4.3 | .3 Inline Assembly | | | | | | | | 30 | | |
| | | 4.3.1 Qua | ality Analysis | | | | | | | | | 38 |
| | | 4.3.2 Too | l Assisted Annota | tions | | | | | | | | 39 |
| | 4.4 | LLVM Con | npiler Modification | 1 | | | | | | | | 44 |
| Aı | open | dices | | | | | | | | | | 48 |
| \mathbf{A} | Test | C Progra | ms | | | | | | | | | 49 |
| В | Con | npCert An | notated C Prog | rams | | | | | | | | 56 |
| \mathbf{C} | C CompCert Assembly Output | | | | | | 64 | | | | | |
| D CompCert Annotated Assembly Output | | | | | | 95 | | | | | | |
| ${f E}$ | Inline Assembly Annotated C Programs 13 | | | | | 132 | | | | | | |
| F | Inli | no Assamb | ly Annotated A | ggombly C | hitmi | - | | | | | | 140 |

Abstract - Information flow security in concurrency is difficult due to the increasing complexity introduced with multiple threads. Additionally, compiler optimisations can break security guarantees that have been verified in source code. In this paper, we propose a thesis to explore these issues through providing annotations in C source code that propagate through to the binary or assembly. These annotations could then be used to guide a static analysis of information flow security in concurrency. This approach involves (1) capturing C source code annotations provided by the user about the security policy of data and variables and (2) passing these annotations down to lower representations where static analysis tools can be utilised to identify security vulnerabilities in the produced binary.

Chapter 1

Topic Definition

This paper describes the motivation, background knowledge and plan for the proposed thesis Compiler Annotation Solutions for Concurrent Information Flow Security.

There is a high degree of complexity in verifying security guarantees in concurrent programs [19][27][29]. Additionally, aggressive compiler optimisations can modify the binary output in unexpected ways [7]. To preserve the security of a program, the flow of sensitive information must be protected to avoid flowing in to untrusted sources [2]. This is where static analysis tools can be used to verify the integrity of security guarantees and the flow of sensitive information. In this thesis, we look to explore a solution to information flow security in concurrent programs through analysing the output after aggressive compiler optimisations.

We propose a tool to analyse C programs to detect security violations in information flow control. This tool will preserve annotations provided by the programmer in source code through lowering passes and aggressive compiler optimisations. The tool will work alongside the *Weakest Precondition for Information Flow* (wpif) transformer described by Winter et al. [31] to allow the programmer to assess the security of information flow in their concurrent programs.

Similar tools for propagating annotations and properties through compiler optimisations have been explored [30] [25] [18], however, these tools focus on either generic solutions for propagating properties or to assist the static analysis of the Worst Case Execution

Time.

Chapter 2

Background

Vulnerabilities in software can lead to catastrophic consequences when manipulated by attackers. In an open-source cryptographic software library (OpenSSL) used by an estimated two-thirds of web servers [16] a security flaw called Heartbleed was discovered. Secure secrets such as financial data, encryption keys, or anything else stored in the server's memory could be leaked. Normally, one would send a Heartbeat request with a text string payload and the length of the payload. For example, a message of "hello" could be sent with the length of the message, 5. However, due to a improper input validation (buffer over-read), one could send a length longer that the string they actually sent. This would cause the server to respond with the original message and anything that was in the allocated memory at the time, including any potentially sensitive information. An example of this is shown in figure 2.1 [13].

Heartbleed was one of the most dangerous security bugs ever, and calls for major reflection by everyone in industry and research [2].

2.1 Information Security

Computer security is defined as a preservation of **integrity**, **availability** and **confidentiality** of information, and extends to include not only software but hardware, firmware, information, data and telecommunications [15]. Confidentiality requires that data is not




Figure 2.1: The Heartbleed bug. [13]

available to unauthorised users, and that individuals can control what information can be collected and disclosed to others. Data integrity requires that only authorised sources can modify data, and that the system can perform tasks without interference from outside sources. Finally, availability of a system requires that service is not denied to authorised users. Together, these principles create the CIA triad [28]. To enforce a secure system, all three principles must be upheld.

Modern programs are becoming increasingly complex with potential for networking, multi-threading and storage permissions and more. As such, security mechanisms must be put in place to verify and enforce the information security requirements. The adequacy of a security mechanism depends on the adversary model. The adversary model is a formal definition of the attacker and their abilities in a system, and defines who we are protecting against [10]. Ideally we would like to design a system to protect against the strongest adversary or attacker, however, this is often not required or even possible. Instead, we must consider the security policy, security mechanism and strongest adversary model to make a system secure [2].

Standard security processes that handle access control such as a firewall or antivirus software can fail as they do not constrain where information is allowed to flow, meaning that once access is granted it can propagate to insecure processes where it can be accessed

```
secret := 0xCODE mod 2
public := 1
if secret = 1
public := 0
```

Figure 2.2: Implicit flow of data to a public variable

by attackers. Where a large system is being used, it is often the case that not all components of the codebase can be trusted, often containing potentially malicious code [24]. Take for example your modern-day web project. Where a package manager such as Node Package Manager (npm) could be used to utilise open-source packages to speed up development progress, it could also inadvertently introduce security vulnerabilities. Rewriting all packages used to ensure security would be time-consuming and expensive and is not a viable option. Instead, controlling where information can flow and preventing secure data from flowing into untrusted sources or packages can maintain confidentiality of a system.

One may suggest runtime monitoring the flow of data to prevent leakage of secure data. Aside from the obvious computational and memory overhead, this method can have its own issues. Although it can detect an *explicit* flow of data from a secure variable to a public variable, it is unable to detect *implicit* data flow, where the state of secure data can be inferred from the state of public data or a public variable [9]. Take for example figure 2.2. In this example, a public, readable variable is initially set to the value of 1. There is also a secret variable which may contain a key, password or some other secret that must be kept secure from any attackers. Depending on the value of the secret variable an attacker can infer information about this variable depending on whether the value of the public variable is updated to a value of 0. Assuming that the inner workings of the system is known by the attacker, information about the secret variable can be leaked *implicitly* and inferred by the state of public variables.

Security concerns do not only exist at the application level. In a huge codebase such as an OS, different low-level bugs can be exploited to gain access to data, such as by using buffer overflows to inject viruses or trojans [1].




Figure 2.3: Permitted flow of data

2.2 Information Flow Control

As seen by the issues that can be introduced via implicit and explicit flow of data, there is room to improve on the existing techniques imposed by current security measures. To protect confidentiality, secure or sensitive information must be prevented from flowing into public on insecure variables. Additionally, to protect integrity, untrusted data from public sources must be prevented from flowing into secure or trusted destinations [2]. An information flow security policy can be introduced to classify or label data, or more formally, a set of security levels to which each object is bound by across a multi-level security lattice [8]. In this thesis, we will focus primarily on preserving confidentiality.

Many security levels can be identified to classify different classes of objects, however, for now we will consider two security levels: high and low. Data labelled as high signifies that the data is secret, and low data is classified as non-sensitive data, such that it does not need to be protected from an attacker or adversary. Variables that can hold data in a program can additionally be classified as high or low as a security classification. A variable's security classification shows the highest classification of data it can safely contain [31]. A high variable can hold both high and low data, whereas a low variable which is visible to an attacker can only safely hold low data. As mentioned previously, confidentiality must be upheld by preventing high or secret data from flowing to low or public variables where an attacker can observe it. The permitted flow of data can be observed in 2.3. Note that high data is not allowed to flow into low variables.

2.3 Information Flow Security in Concurrency

Controlling the flow of information is a difficult problem, however, this is only exacerbated in concurrent programs, which are a well known source of security issues [19][27][29]. Research has been conducted into concurrent programs to explore ways the security of concurrent programs can be verified. Mantel et al. [20] introduced the concept of assumption and guarantee conditions, where assumptions are made about how concurrent threads access shared memory and guarantees are made about how an individual thread access shared memory that other threads may rely upon. Each thread can be observed individually using assumptions over the environment behaviour of other threads that can be then used to prove a guarantee about that individual thread. As two concurrent threads can interleave their steps and behaviour, there is a lot of complexity and possibilities for the overall behaviour. This concept of assumptions (or rely) and guarantee conditions can reduce the complexity of understanding interleaving behaviour in threads and assist in verifying the correctness of information flow security in concurrency. However, this approach is limited in the types of assumptions and guarantees it supports. Building on this, Murray et al. [12] [21] provide information flow logic on how to handle dynamic, value-dependent security levels in concurrent programs. In this case, the security level of a particular variable may depend on one or more other variables in the program. As such, the variable's security level can change as the state of the program changes. This logic is essential where the security level of data depends on its source. However, this approach is not sufficient when analysing non-blocking programs. The approach relies heavily on locks which block particular threads from executing. This in turn leads to slower processing due to blocked threads [23].

To overcome information flow security in non-blocking concurrent threads, Winter et al. [31] explores verifying security properties such as non-interference through the use of general rely/guarantee conditions using backwards, weakest precondition reasoning. Such an analysis would additionally handle implicit flows as shown in figure 2.3. Ideally a tool could be created to verify security policies required for sensitive processes. Users of this system could provide rely/guarantee conditions for each thread as well as security levels for data and variables i.e. high or low data and variables. Working backwards through the execution of the program, violations of the security policy will be detected. Detected

```
crypt() {
    key := 0xCODE // Read key
    ... // Work with the key
    key := 0x0 // Clear memory
}
```

Figure 2.4: Implicit flow of data to a public variable [7]

violations could be due to an incorrect assumption of the rely and guarantee conditions or a failure to uphold the security policy. This thesis will focus on the compilation stage of this tool.

2.4 Compilers and Security

Compilers are well known to be a weak link between source code and the hardware executing it. Source code that has been verified to provide a security guarantee, potentially using formal techniques, may not hold those security guarantees when being executed. This is caused by compiler optimisations that may be technically correct, however, a compiler has no notion of timing behaviour or on the expected state of memory after executing a statement [7]. This problem is known as the *correctness security gap*. One example of the correctness security gap is caused by an optimisation called dead store elimination. Figure 2.4 was derived from CWE-14 [6] and CWE-733 [5] and used by D'Silva et al. [7]. Here a secret key was retrieved and stored in a local variable to perform some work. After completing the work, and to prevent sensitive data from flowing into untrusted sources, the key is wiped from memory by assigning it the value 0x0.

From the perspective of the source code, a programmer would expect the sensitive data from key to be scrubbed after exiting the function. However, key is a variable local to the function. As key is not read after exiting the function, the statement that assigns key to a value of 0x0 will be removed as part of dead store elimination. This results in lingering memory that could be exploited by an attacker. In GCC, with compiler optimisations on, dead store elimination is performed by default [22]. Additionally, dead store elimination has been proven to be functionally correct [3][17].

This leads to the question, what security guarantees in source code are being violated by compiler optimisations? Although one could analyse each individual compiler optimisation to check for potential security violations in source code, defensively programming against the compiler can be counter-initiative. Additionally, compilers are getting better at optimising away tricks programmers write to work against the compiler, and thus is not a future-proof solution [26]. One might also suggest turning compiler optimisations off, however, this leads to slower code. In a concurrent system where execution time is critical, turning compiler optimisations off is not a viable option. Instead an alternative solution is to perform a static analysis on binary or assembly for security violations. As compilation has already been executed, such analysis would reveal security guarantee violations that result due to compiler optimisations.

2.5 Annotations

This project can take two routes; the proposed tool will be required to run an analysis on either binary or assembly. For either route, annotations used to guide a static security analysis will need to be provided by the user in the C programs they write. The tool will then be required to propagate these annotations down to compiled forms, i.e. binary or assembly. From here, a static analysis can be conducted as described by Winter et al. [31]. Ideally these annotations can be propagated through with little to no modification of the C Compiler being used as to reduce complexity and increase modularity and reusability of such a a tool. However, it is unclear as to whether passing annotations down with no modification to the compiler is currently possible. In this thesis, this issue will be explored.

Running a static analysis on a binary can be difficult due to the low level nature of a binary file. As such, to sufficiently perform such an analysis, the binary would be required to be decompiled to a higher-level form, such as an assembly file. From here a static analysis could be conducted. The alternative approach would be to perform the analysis directly on the compiled assembly output files rather than reducing these to binary. Currently, it is unclear as to what compiler optimisations are made when reducing an assembly file to binary, and will be explored further throughout the lifetime of this thesis. The




Figure 2.5: The static analysis options after compilation.

flow of information can be viewed in Figure 2.5, where formats a static analysis can be performed are outlined in a dashed line. In GCC, "temporary" intermediate files can be stored using the flag *save-temps* [14]. These stored files can then be used for analysis.

2.6 Related Work

In safety-critical real-time software such as flight control systems, it is required to analyse the Worst Case Execution Time (WCET). This kind of analysis can be conducted using static analysis tools to estimate safe upper bounds. In the case of AbsInt's aiT tool this analysis is conducted alongside compiler annotations to assist where loop bounds cannot be computed statically. In these cases, the user can provide annotations to guide the analysis tools [25]. This tool builds on an existing annotation mechanism that exist in CompCert, a C compiler that has been formally verified for use in life-critical and mission-critical software [4][18]. CompCert annotations are not limited to WCET analysis. A general mechanism for attaching free-form annotations that propagate through to assembly files can be achieved with CompCert. This approach is able to reliably transmit

compiler annotations through to binary through method calls which are carried through compilation and the linked executable without using external annotation files. CompCert prints annotation strings as a comment in the generated assembly code, and an additional tool is used to parse these comments and generate annotations. However, due to its treatment as an external function, annotations cannot be placed at the top level of a compilation unit, unlike a variable declaration. Compiler optimisations can additionally cause further issues when trying to preserve annotations through compilation. If dead code is eliminated, annotations associated with that code can be lost as well. Extra care needs to be taken to avoid these optimisations destroying links between properties and the code they refer to during such transformations.

TODO: Include further documentation on how to use Compiler & inline assembly

A similar approach to CompCert is used by The ENTRA (Whole-Systems ENergy TRAnsparency). As part of providing a common assertion language, pragmas are used to propagate information through to comments in the assembler files. Information is retained in LLVM IR and ISA representations. However, these annotations are not stored in the final binary and thus comments must be extracted from assembler files [11].

Vu et al. [30] explore capturing and propagating properties from the source code level though though lowering passes and intermediate representations. Their goal was to maintain these properties to binary through aggressive compiler optimisations. As compilers only care about functional correctness, they have no notion of the link between properties and the code it refers to. Thus, there is no way to constrain transformations to preserve this link or to update these properties after the transformation. As such, they approached the problem to create a generic solution, modifying a LLVM compiler with virtually no optimisation changes. This was done by creating a library in LLVM. The properties were stored in strings, and these strings were parsed to build a list of observed variables and memory location. A LLVM pass was inserted to store all these properties in metadata. After each optimisation pass, a verification pass was inserted to check the presence of metadata representing the properties, variables amd memory locations. If an optimisation pass had cased the verification to fail the programmer would then be notified, to which they could annotate differently or disable the optimisation.

Chapter 3

Approach

The approach was set out by first analysing existing methods of preserving annotations through intermediate representations. These include the:

- compCert Verified C Compiler,
- GNU Extension for Extended Inline Assembly, and
- Modifying the LLVM compiler to preserve annotations throughout intermediate representations.

Each of these approaches will be analysed individually for viability across each of the test cases outlined in section 3.1. For approaches that pass all necessary test cases, a further analysis will be conducted into its suitability and development of any necessary tools to assist in the preservation technique, as outlined in sections 3.2 and 3.4. Finally, an analysis on the runtime efficiency of the program will be conducted to assess the success of the annotations with various levels of optimisation. The approach for this analysis is outlined in 3.3.

3.1 Test Cases

A suite of test C programs (See Appendix A) were created to assist in guiding the process of evaluating each approach as a possible means of preserving annotations. Each program has inline comments documenting the annotation that should be preserved and its location within the program. Additionally, each program aims to test a separate element required to perform a static wpif analysis. Namely, these are to preserve the following through to the assembly output:

- 1. comments,
- 2. simple and complex variables (e.g. struct elements and volatile global variables),
- 3. security policies,
- 4. predicates on the initial state, and
- 5. loop invariants.

Each test was conducted to assess the viability of each approach of preserving annotations. If the approach cannot preserve all the required annotations described in the aforementioned list, then it is not viable for a wpif analysis and another technique must be explored.

The justification for each of the test files are as follows:

comment.c

This test case is primarily a stepping stone to testing more complex scenarios. Here we have a generic comment "critical comment" and we are looking to preserve it through to the assembly. As well as preserving the comment itself, the location of the comment within the source code is to be preserved.

variable.c

The test file *variable.c* builds off *comment.c*, however, we are additionally looking to preserve annotations about local variables within the program. Here multiple variable types are tested:

- int,
- char,
- unsigned int,
- short,
- long,
- float, and
- double.

With each of these variables their type data is included as an annotation. This test is particularly interesting as with higher levels of optimisation we can observe how the annotations behave when a variable is optimised out.

volatile.c

This test program looks at how the technique handles volatile variables. A variable declared as volatile tells the program its value could change unexpectedly. This is especially important when dealing with concurrent programs. If the technique cannot handle volatile variables it is unable to be used for a wpif analysis.

loop.c

This test program tests how the annotator handles loops and loop invariants. It contains security policies, predicates on the initial state and loop invariants.

rooster.c

The test program, *rooster.c* delves into a more complex program, combining several features of the previous tests. It contains annotations within functions and global variables.

password.c

This program tests how annotations are preserved within structs, a user-defined data type. Additionally, password.c is a more complex program with multiple functions.

deadStoreElimination.c

Testing dead store elimination is a bit more complex, as it requires comparing the com-

piled output before and after compiler optimisations are turned on. Here, the test program simulates the program described in section 2.4.

pread.c

The program pread.c is a culmination of all the previous test cases, and is similar to loop.c, however, the global variables within it are volatile. It requires all the necessary components for a wpif analysis.

3.2 Quality Analysis

Although a method of preserving c annotations may be able to successfully pass all the test cases, it is important to avoid modifying the assembly instructions. The reason for performing a static analysis on the compiled output is due to the optimisations performed by the compiler. As such, it is important to ensure that preserved annotations do not remove or undo any optimisations that may have been performed by the compiler.

The methodology for testing quality in this manner is to compare the compiled assembly output for a program with annotations on to the compiled assembly output for the same program without annotations. If unnecessary assembly instructions have been added, it is indicative that the annotations has modified the program in unintended ways.

3.3 Efficiency and Optimisation

In the case that the annotations have introduced additional statements into the compiled assembly output, understanding the extent of these changes is important. Here, a efficiency analysis can be conducted on the assembly. Using big O notation, an upper bound can be placed on the program. Doing so allows for a comparison of the efficiency of the annotated and non-annotated assembly.

Let A(n) be the function describing the annotated assembly, and B(n) be the function describing the non-annotated assembly. Then,

$$A(n) \in \Theta(g(n))$$

$$B(n) \in \Theta(h(n))$$

If the non-annotated assembly has a lower bound than the annotated assembly, such that

$$h(n) \in O(g(n)), and$$

$$q(n) \notin O(h(n))$$

then the annotations have modified the program in a way that reduces runtime efficiency. It is important to detect when this has happened, as it indicates the annotations have reversed the intended compiler optimisations.

In the case where the annotation process has resulted in additional assembly instructions inserted into the compiled output, however, they do not reduce runtime efficiency in terms of big O notation, a empirical analysis of the runtime duration of a program can be conducted to assess the disadvantage of the annotated program.

3.4 Tool Development

In cases where it is appropriate, a tool may be developed to assist in the annotating process. This tool may either:

- assist in the annotating process,
- verify the correctness of the annotations, or
- perform additional analysis on the compiled output.

If the approach of modifying the LLVM compiler is pursued, developing such a tool to assist the annotating process will be necessary.

Chapter 4

Execution

Experimentation began with the CompCert compiler and the provided assembly annotation tools, outlined in section 4.1. It was found that the CompCert compiler could not handle all cases necessary for the wpif analysis, specifically volatile variables. As a result, the testing moved on to other techniques. Following this, the GNU C extension for inline assembly was explored as a possibility to preserve annotations in C in section 4.3. This technique prevailed and was found to be excellent in handling assembly annotations by injecting comments in to the compiled assembly output. This technique was enhanced by developing a python program to inject inline assembly into the source C files to allow for enhanced analysis and furthermore avoids restricting the program to GNU extension supporting compilers. As a result of the success, modifying the compiler was not explored due to success documented in other research such as the work conducted by Vu et al. [30]. This allowed for further development and improvement of the inline assembly method.

4.1 CompCert AIS Annotations

CompCert is unfortunately not a free tool, however, for research purposes it can be used freely. The specifications of the CompCert install can be seen in Table 4.1.

Testing was initially conducted using the *comment.c* test file. The goal is to propagate the comment down to assembly where it can be used and interpreted. To do so, the

| OS Name | Ubuntu 20.04.2 LTS |
|------------------|--|
| OS Type | 64-bit |
| Processor | Intel® Core TM i7-6700K CPU @ $4.00\text{GHz} \times 8$ |
| Instruction Set | x86-64 |
| CompCert Version | The CompCert C verified compiler, version 3.7 |

Table 4.1: CompCert install specifications

comment in the source code needs to be replaced with a call to generate an annotation in the compiled assembly. Fortunately, with the CompCert compiler, this functionality is builtin. This assembly annotation is created through the use of the __builtin_ais_annot function described in 2.6. The following builtin annotation was placed in line 2, within the main function in *comment.c.*

```
__builtin_ais_annot("%here Critical Comment");
```

Listing 4.1: comment.c

Within this annotation, **%here** is used to represent the location within the program. If the location is not important, **%here** can be omitted. The comment, **"Critical Comment"**, has been included to represent some kind of critical comment that is required to conduct a static analysis on the output. To compile the source to assembler only the following command was used:

```
$ ccomp comment.c -00 -S
```

Here -O0 is used to specify to perform no optimisations during compilation. The full compiled output can be seen in Appendix D. Below is a snippet of the compiled assembly.

```
cfi_endproc
type main, @function
size main, - main
section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
ascii "# file:comment.c line:2 function:main\n"
byte 7,8
quad .L100
ascii " Critical Comment\n"
```

Listing 4.2: comment-O0.s

The annotation is stored within assembler directives. Assembler directives are not a part

of the processor instruction set, however, are a part of the assembler syntax. Assembler directives all start a period (.). On line 19 a new section has been created, named "__compcert_ais_annotations". Following the declaration of the section is an ascii string, locating the source of the annotation within the source program *comment.c.* Line 23 provides the comment we aimed to preserve with our annotation. Thus, CompCert has shown an initial success in preserving annotations in the form of comments.

Additionally, one major benefit of compCert annotations is that they do not modify the source program, as they are inserted at the end of the program as an assembler directive metadata.

When experimenting with annotated variables, the first issues began to arise. The test file *variable.c* contains several variables with their types to preserve to assembly. The annotations behaved as expected for the types:

- \bullet int,
- char,
- short,
- long, and
- any signed or unsigned variations of the above mentioned types.

However, the CompCert annotations does not support floating point types. Upon compiling *variable.c* the following errors were generated.

```
variable.c:13: error: floating point types for parameter '%e1' are not
   supported in ais annotations
variable.c:15: error: floating point types for parameter '%e1' are not
   supported in ais annotations
2 errors detected.
```

This result shows that it is impossible to use the CompCert embedded program annotations for floating point types, vastly restricting its potential use as a technique for a wpif analysis.

It was discovered soon after that the CompCert annotations are unable to handle volatile variables, generating the follow error upon compiling *volatile.c.*

```
volatile.c:4: error: access to volatile variable 'x' for parameter
   '%e1' is not supported in ais annotations
1 error detected.
```

Unfortunately, this result shows that the CompCert AIS annotations approach is not suitable for wpif analysis. The wpif analysis requires use of volatile variables. This is because the primary purpose of the wpif technique is to verify security policy across concurrent programs. Shared variables within concurrent programs can change at any time, and as such it is imperative that shared variables are marked as volatile. As the CompCert AIS annotations cannot handle volatile variables, annotations required for wpif analysis cannot be generated.

Aside from the aforementioned issues, the CompCert AIS annotations performed excellently in generating annotations. The location of global variables in memory are easily identified, as shown in *rooster.c.* The CompCert AIS annotations must be placed within a method and called as if it was its own function. This creates some confusion when dealing with global variables. However, placing annotations on global variables at the start of main is a perfectly valid method of preserving these annotations. As the location of the annotation within the program is no longer important, the **%here** format specifier can be omitted.

```
.cfi_endproc
    .type main, Ofunction
85
    .size main, . - main
86
    .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
87
    .ascii "# file:rooster.c line:6 function:fun\n"
88
    .byte 7,8
    .quad .L100
90
    .ascii " CRITICAL COMMENT\n"
91
    .ascii "# file:rooster.c line:26 function:main\n"
    .byte 7,8
93
    .quad .L107
94
    .ascii " L(mem("
95
    .byte 7,8
96
```

Listing 4.3: rooster-O0.s

From rooster.c, the comment "CRITICAL COMMENT" has been annotated from lines 88 to 91, and the comment "EXCEPTIONAL" has been annotated from lines 99 to 102. Most notably, the global variable goose has been annotated from lines 92 to 98. Reconstructed, the string "L(mem(goose, 4)) = medium" has been preserved. Thus, the CompCert annotations can successfully preserve annotations on global variables.

Another interesting problem faced when working with CompCert AIS annotations is found when working with structs. If the programmer wants to annotate a member of a struct for all structs of that type, each instance of that type of struct must be annotated when using CompCert AIS annotations. This is because CompCert treats __builtin_ais_annot() as a call to an external function. As such, an annotation cannot be created from outside a method, similar to when dealing with global variables. An example of this process can be seen in password.c. Within the program, each instantiation of the struct user_t requires another annotation.

```
user_t* user_admin = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
      strcpy(user_admin->name, "admin");
      strcpy(user_admin->password, "4dm1n__4eva");
19
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = high", user_admin->password);
      user_admin->balance = 1000000;
21
      user_t* user_alice = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
23
      strcpy(user_alice->name, "alice");
24
      strcpy(user_alice->password, "!alice12!_veuje@@hak");
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = high", user_alice->password);
26
      user_alice->balance = 783;
27
28
      user_t* user_abdul = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
29
      strcpy(user_abdul ->name, "abdul");
30
```

```
strcpy(user_abdul->password, "passw0rd123");
   __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = high", user_abdul->password);
user_abdul->balance = 2;
```

Listing 4.4: password.c

The compiled output is as expected, with an annotation within the assembly for each of the annotations created within the source file.

```
"__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
    .ascii "# file:password.c line:20 function:setup_users\n"
321
    .byte 7,8
    .quad .L100
323
    .ascii " L((reg(\rbp\") + 264)) = high\n"
    .ascii "# file:password.c line:26 function:setup_users\n"
325
    .byte 7,8
326
    .quad .L101
    .ascii " L((reg(\"r12\") + 264)) = high\n"
328
    .ascii "# file:password.c line:32 function:setup_users\n"
329
    .byte 7,8
    .quad .L102
331
    .ascii " L((reg(\rbx\rdot) + 264)) = high\n"
```

Listing 4.5: password-O0.s

As seen in the assembly annotations, the location of the struct members have been preserved. Line 324 contains the annotation L((reg("rbp") + 264)) = high. This annotation notifies that the variable stored in register rbp with an offset of 264 has a security classification of high. Thus, another success for CompCert AIS annotations.

4.1.1 Quality Analysis

To complete a quality analysis, a comparison of the assembly will need to be conducted with and without annotations. The CompCert assembly output can be seen in Appendix C. As we are primarily concerned with the annotated assembly after aggressive optimisations have been performed, the assembly with optimisation level 3 will be compared. To begin with, the assembly for *comment.c* will be compared. Performing a diff on the

annotated and non annotated assembly produces the following diff:

```
1 2c2
2 < # Command line: comment.c -S -03 -o compCert/out/comment-03.s
3 ---
4 > # Command line: comment.c -03 -S
5 11a12
6 > .L100:
7 17a19,23
8 > .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","",@note
9 > .ascii "# file:comment.c line:2 function:main\n"
10 > .byte 7,8
11 > .quad .L100
12 > .ascii " Critical Comment\n"
```

Listing 4.6: comment-O3.s diff

The diff explains some interesting differences in the assembly. To begin with, an additional label .L100: has been inserted. The only other notable difference is in the compert annotations. The reason behind the additional label is to allow the location of the annotation to be identified, as can be seen in line 11 of the diff. Thus, this shows a success. There is no difference in the compiled output, even with aggressive compiler optimisations turned on.

Next, variable-O3.s will be compared.

```
1 2c2
2 < # Command line: variable.c -S -03 -o compCert/out/variable-03.s
3 ---
4 > # Command line: variable.c -S -03
5 11a12,16
6 > .L100:
7 > .L101:
8 > .L102:
9 > .L103:
10 > .L104:
11 17a23,43
12 > .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","",@note
13 > .ascii "# file:variable.c line:3 function:main\n"
14 > .byte 7,8
```

```
15 >
      .quad .L100
      .ascii " -10 = int n"
16 >
      .ascii "# file:variable.c line:5 function:main\n"
      .byte 7,8
18 >
      .quad .L101
19 >
      .ascii " 98 = char n"
20 >
      .ascii "# file:variable.c line:7 function:main\n"
21 >
      .byte 7,8
22 >
      .quad .L102
23 >
      .ascii " -98 = unsigned int\n"
24 >
      .ascii "# file:variable.c line:9 function:main\n"
25 >
      .byte 7,8
26 >
      .quad .L103
27 >
      .ascii " 1 = short n"
28 >
      .ascii "# file:variable.c line:11 function:main\n"
29 >
      .byte 7,8
30 >
      .quad .L104
31 >
32 >
      .ascii " 4294967296 = long n"
```

Listing 4.7: variable-O3.s diff

Similar to before, additional labels .L100: to .L104: have been inserted to identify the annotations from within the source code. However, with aggressive optimisations turned on, an interesting change has occurred to the annotations. As the variables have been optimised out of the compiled assembly, the annotations no longer make sense. Line 16 of the diff shows the annotation for variable a from *comment.c.* However, as the variable has been completely optimised out, rather than the location of the register being preserved in the annotation, only the value stored within a has been preserved. In this case, that value was -10.

Although the annotations do not interfere with the compiler optimisations, the compiler optimisations have rendered the annotations useless. Unfortunately, in cases such as these, there is not much to be done.

Another interesting case arises when a loop is optimised out by the compiler. Take for example count.c

```
int main() {
```

```
int count = 0;

// here count is always zero

for(int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
    __builtin_ais_annot("try loop %here bound: %e1;", count);
}

return 0;

}</pre>
```

Listing 4.8: count.c

As count will always be zero, the loop will be optimised out when optimisations are turned on. As CompCert treats __builtin_ais_annot() as a call to an external function, it too will be optimised out with aggressive compiler optimisations. Let's compare the assembly with and without compiler optimisations.

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
# Command line: count.c -S -00 -o annotated/count-00.s
    .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
6 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
11
   xorl %ecx, %ecx
        %eax, %eax
   xorl
14 . L100:
   cmpl %ecx, %eax
   jge .L101
17 . L102:
   leal 1(%eax), %eax
   jmp .L100
20 . L101:
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
23
```

```
cfi_endproc
type main, @function
size main, - main
section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
ascii "# file:count.c line:5 function:main\ntry loop "
byte 7,8
quad .L102
ascii " bound: reg(\"rcx\");\n"
```

Listing 4.9: count-O0.s

With optimisations turned off, the annotation is preserved, as seen from lines 27-31. Following the annotation, the location of the annotation can be located with label .L102. However, with compiler optimisations, it would be expected that .L100 and .L102 will be optimised out. This can be seen in *count-O3.s*.

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: count.c -S -O3 -o annotated/count-O3.s
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
6 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
11
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
13
   ret
14
   .cfi_endproc
   .type main, @function
16
.size main, . - main
```

Listing 4.10: count-O3.s

As expected, the optimised assembly has completely removed the annotation. In the case of a wpif analysis, this is not a large concern. Although preserving loop invariants is necessary, if the loop is optimised out by the compiler it is no longer of concern and the

annotations are no longer necessary.

4.2 CompCert Builtin Annotations

Upon revisiting CompCert AIS annotations, it became apparent that the form of annotations being experimented on previously, namely AIS annotations, were not the only form of C annotations available to CompCert. The CompCert AIS annotations are built on top of the CompCert builtin annotations. The AIS annotations are built primarily for worst case execution time analysis, and thus it was assumed that these annotations would be the most suitable for wpif purposes. However, Similar to the AIS annotations, the CompCert builtin annotations can be called upon using a method call.

4.3 Inline Assembly

Extended asm is a GNU Extension supported by many compilers. As such, it presents itself as an excellent method for preserving annotations to assembly. As it allows programmers to write assembly code within the C program, it provides an opportunity to hook in to this functionality and utilise it for annotation purposes. To begin with, a very simple program will be experimented on to find the limits of inline assembly and to assess if it is fit for wpif analysis purposes. To begin with, *comment.c* will be used.

Within the assembly, an inline comment can be created by inserting a # at the beginning of the line or comment. The goal with this test is to try and preserve the annotation "CRITICAL COMMENT" to assembly by inserting it as a comment within the assembly. The following line was inserted within the main method of *comment.c.* All the source files used for the inline assembly method can be seen in Appendix E.

```
asm("# CRITICAL COMMENT");
```

Listing 4.11: comment.c

Here, the call to insert inline assembly is treated as a call to a method, similar to CompCert. The first argument takes the AssemblerTemplate. The AssemblerTemplate is

the template used for formatting the input operands, output operands and the goto parameters. In this case only a comment is inserted in assembly, and as such the input operands and output operands parameters are omitted. The full compiled output can be seen in Appendix F.

```
@main
6 main:
    .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
    pushq %rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
    .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
11
    movq %rsp, %rbp
12
    .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
13
          $0, -4(\%rbp)
    movl
    #APP
15
    # CRITICAL COMMENT
    #NO_APP
17
          %eax, %eax
    xorl
18
          %rbp
    popq
    .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
20
    retq
21
```

Listing 4.12: comment-O0.s

Lines 15 to 17 show the annotation preserved within the assembly. As can be seen, the compiler does not understand the extent of the assembly provided to it. As such, it treats it as a 'black box', and inserts it where relevant within the assembly instructions. In comparison to CompCert its placement within the assembly is inconvenient. As it is not neatly packaged at the bottom of the assembly it must be parsed out. To distinguish assembly comments from important annotations, the string "annotation: " will be inserted before any annotations to allow for easier parsing. Thus, the annotation described from comment.c would be inserted as:

```
asm ("# annotation: CRITICAL COMMENT");
```

Following, the compiled output would be:

```
#APP
# annotation: CRITICAL COMMENT
```

```
#NO_APP
```

One may suggest using the APP and NO_APP comments above and below our annotation to identify it, however, these comments are system and compiler dependent. As such, a more robust solution has been used here.

Following this success, annotating the location of a variable is the next challenge. With extended asm input and output operands are available to allow programmers to work with variables. The goal is to use these mechanisms to identify the location of variables alongside their annotated data. To begin with, the location of a simple integer will be attempted to be preserved. The format of the extended asm is as follows:

```
asm asm-qualifiers ( AssemblerTemplate
    : OutputOperands
    : InputOperands
    : Clobbers
    : GotoLabels)
```

Where asm-qualifiers, OutputOperands, InputOperands, Clobbers and GotoLabels are optional parameters. In this experimentation, asm-qualifiers will not be used as any inline assembly generated will not modify the value of any variables nor jump to any labels.

Previously the AssemblerTemplate was used as a string. However, the string can be templated to locate the value of a variable. Take the following example:

```
asm("# annotation: %0 = int" : "=m"(a))
```

Here %0 is used to refer to the first output operand, a. Output constraints must begin with either a '=' or a '+'. A constraint beginning with a '=' is for variable overwriting an existing value, whereas a '+' is used when reading and writing. Constraints are used to specify what operands are permitted. In this case, 'm' is used, signifying a memory operand is allowed, with any kind of address the machine supports. Compiling the inline assembly with no optimisations creates the following annotation.

```
30 #APP
31 # annotation: -20(%rbp) = int
```

32 #NO_APP

Listing 4.13: variable-O0.s

This annotation was created without modifying any additional assembly instructions, seemingly a success. However, when optimisations are turned on an interesting result occurs.

```
# @main
6 main:
    .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
                                             # kill: def $edi killed $edi
     def $rdi
          $-10, -4(\% rsp)
   movl
   #APP
11
   # annotation: -4(\%rsp) = int
   #NO_APP
13
         -4(%rsp), %eax
   movl
          %edi, %eax
    addl
          $134217635, %eax
                                     # imm = 0x7FFFFA3
    addl
16
```

Listing 4.14: variable-O3.s

Although the annotation is preserved to assembly, a number of optimisations performed by the compiler have been reverted to allow the location of the variable a to be preserved. This is because the compiler does not understand what the inline assembly does outside of what information has been provided to it. In this case, the compiler was provided inline assembly that used some kind of memory operand with the intention to overwrite it. Thus, the compiler was required to remove optimisations to allow the the rewritten value of a to be propagated through the program successfully.

This appears like a failure of the inline assembly method, however, constructing the statement differently should allow for less modification of the assembly by the compiler. Rather than instructing the compiler that the assembly overwrites the existing value, '+' can be used to instruct it that our assembly reads and writes. The following statement is inserted in the C source.

```
asm("# annotation: %0 = int" : "+m"(a))
```

However, this results in the same outcome as Listing 4.14. The issue occurring here is caused due to the output operand. As the inline asm is notifying the compiler that the value is modified, it removes optimisations to allow this. Instead, using an input operand may allow the optimisation to run, as instead the compiler has been notified that only the value is being read. The following asm is inserted in *variable.c.*

```
asm("# annotation: %0 = int" : : "m"(a))
```

The '+' constraint has been removed from the operand as it no longer applies to an input operand. Listing 4.15 shows the assembly with no optimisations.

```
$0, -4(\%rbp)
    movl
          %edi, -8(%rbp)
    movl
          %rsi, -16(%rbp)
    movq
25
          $-10, -20(%rbp)
26
    movl
    #APP
    # annotation: -20(\%rbp) = int
28
    #NO_APP
    movsd .LCPIO_0(%rip), %xmm0
                                     \# xmm0 = mem[0],zero
30
    movss .LCPIO_1(%rip), %xmm1
                                     # xmm1 = mem[0],zero,zero,zero
31
    xorl
          %eax, %eax
```

Listing 4.15: variable-O0.s

Here, the annotation can be seen in line 28, with the location of the variable successfully identified. However, interestingly the instructions from lines 30-32 were previously above the instructions from lines 23-26. Although this makes no difference to the runtime of the program, it is an interesting change caused by the inline asm.

Additionally, the optimised assembly using the input operands has the same issue as before from Listing 4.14.

```
#NO_APP

movl -4(%rsp), %eax

addl %edi, %eax

addl $134217635, %eax # imm = 0x7FFFFA3

retq
```

Listing 4.16: variable-O3.s

Further investigation revealed that the issue arises as the inline asm specifies the location of the operand must be in memory with the constraint "m"(a). Rather than limiting the location to memory, allowing any operand available to be used allows for more optimisations to be performed by the compiler. As such, the following line of asm was tested.

```
asm("# annotation: %0 = int" : : "X"(a))
```

Here the constraint "X"(a) specifies that any operand whatsoever is allowed. The resulting optimised assembly is as follows.

```
.text
   .file "variable.c"
    .section
             .rodata.cst4,"aM",@progbits,4
                               # -- Begin function main
    .p2align
5 .LCPI0_0:
   .long 1078530011
                                   # float 3.14159274
             .rodata.cst8,"aM",@progbits,8
    .section
   .p2align 3
9 .LCPI0_1:
   .quad 4608627556095693531
                                   # double 1.3208849398808329
   .text
   .globl
   .p2align 4, 0x90
    .type main, @function
15 main:
                                            # @main
   .cfi_startproc
17 # %bb.0:
                                            # kill: def $edi killed $edi
     def $rdi
   #APP
   # annotation: \$-10 = int
```

```
#NO_APP
    #APP
22
    # annotation: $98 = char
    #NO_APP
24
    #APP
    # annotation: $-98 = unsigned int
26
    #NO_APP
    #APP
    # annotation: $1 = short
29
    #NO_APP
    #APP
31
    # annotation: $4294967296 = long
32
    #NO_APP
    movss .LCPIO_0(%rip), %xmm0
                                    # xmm0 = mem[0],zero,zero,zero
34
    #APP
    # annotation: %xmm0 = float
36
    #NO_APP
37
    movsd .LCPIO_1(%rip), %xmm0
                                    # xmm0 = mem[0], zero
    #APP
39
    # annotation: %xmm0 = double
    #NO_APP
41
   leal
         134217625(%rdi), %eax
42
    retq
44 .Lfunc_end0:
    .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
    .cfi_endproc
46
                                             # -- End function
47
            "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 "
    .section
              ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
49
    .addrsig
```

Listing 4.17: variable-O3.s

Each of the different types of annotations were additionally annotated using the same method. Some interesting results occur from this annotation technique. To begin with, because all variables have been optimised away, the location of the simple variables have instead been replaced with their value. For example, line 20 shows that the value of -10 was stored in an integer. This behaviour is identical to that observed by the CompCert

annotations. Additionally, an interesting scenario occurs when working with floating point numbers. Although they too have been fully optimised out, because the inline asm has required reading their values, their value has been placed within a register designated for floating point arithmetic.

The next goal was to attempt preserving annotations from more complex variables. To begin with, a volatile, global variable will be annotated. The test file *volatile.c* was experimented on.

```
volatile int x;

int main() {
    asm("# annotation: %0 = High" : : "X"(x));
    return x + 1;

6 }
```

Listing 4.18: volatile.c

On line 4, an asm statement has been inserted, containing the same format and information as with *variable.c.* However, the variable x is instead a volatile variable. The annotated assembly with full optimisation is listed below.

```
.text
    .file "volatile.c"
                                     # -- Begin function main
    .globl main
    .p2align 4, 0x90
    .type main, @function
                                            # @main
6 main:
    .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
   movl x(%rip), %eax
   #APP
   # annotation: %eax = High
   #NO_APP
   movl x(%rip), %eax
13
   addl
          $1, %eax
   retq
16 .Lfunc_end0:
  .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
```

```
.cfi_endproc
18
                                              # -- End function
19
    .type x,@object
                                     # @x
20
    .comm x,4,4
21
    .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
               ".note.GNU-stack","", @progbits
    .section
23
    .addrsig
24
    .addrsig_sym x
```

Listing 4.19: volatile-O3.s

Line 11 successfully shows the annotation referencing the global variable x. However, an additional move statement has been inserted on line 9. This additional move statement was quite puzzling, however, it is inserted due to the nature of the inline asm. As the compiler does not know or understand the assembly created by the programmer, additional move statements may need to be inserted by the compiler. By working backwards, the location of x can be located within memory at the location x(%rip). Because the constraint 'X' has been provided, any operand whatsoever is permitted. As a result, the compiler chose a register as the solution to fill the annotation's requirements. As such, an unnecessary move statement has been inserted. In such a case, the programmer should observe the result and update the asm restraint to only allow memory locations. Doing so results in the preferred behaviour with only the annotation inserted into the assembly.

This form of inline asm was used to test annotations across the remaining test files. The annotated assembly can be viewed in Appendix F.

4.3.1 Quality Analysis

Although the annotated assembly does contain additional move statements, the program still behaves as expected. However, it does result in heightened difficulty to parse the true location of the variable. For a large program with many annotations, systematically identifying where each variable is stored and modifying the constraints until move statements are eliminated is time consuming and impractical. Therefore, an analysis of the program with the additional move statements preserved will be performed. One proposed

method of handling this issue is to build a tool to assist in this parsing and analysis. This tool is covered in section 4.3.2.

To analyse the affect of these additional move statements inserted, big O notation will be used. From the comprehensive testing done, no compiler optimisations were removed when annotations were addeded. Thus, for this analysis, it will be assumed that no optimisations will be reverted when annotations are added. Let A(n) be the function describing the annotated assembly, and B(n) be the function describing the non-annotated assembly. Then,

$$B(n) \in \Theta(h(n))$$

As move statements are constant, any move statement is an element of $\Theta(1)$. Thus, for m annotations added to the program,

$$A(n,m) \in \Theta(m \cdot h(n))$$

As can be seen, in the worst case, the program runtime increases linearly with each annotation added. For time critical or concurrent programs, this is unacceptable. Ideally, a static analysis should be possible without slowing the program for each annotation added. The added move statements are only used to perform the analysis and to identify the location of variables within the program. Therefore, one should be able to compile the program with and without annotations. Assuming all optimisations are performed with annotations turned on, an analysis conducted on a program will still be valid when annotations are turned off. As such, a tool can be created to assist in this annotation and analysis process.

4.3.2 Tool Assisted Annotations

To allow for the program to compile without annotations, the annotations need to be stored where they cannot affect the program output. Littering the program with extended asm statements results in a difficult and tedious process of removing them once the program is ready to be compiled. Instead, annotations can be written by the programmer using inline comments. As these comments will be ignored by the compiler, the program can be compiled on any compiler supporting their C version. To reference a variable within the annotation, the variable name can be wrapped in a var keyword. An example of an annotated file can be seen below in *pread.c.*

```
volatile int z;
volatile int x;
4 int main() {
      // security policies:
      // annotation: L(var(z)) = true
      // annotation: L(var(x)) = var(z) \% 2 == 0
      // annotation: var(x) < var(x),</pre>
      int r1 = 0;
      int r2 = 0;
      // annotation: _P_0: var(r1) \% 2 == 0
      // annotation: _Gamma_0: var(r1) -> LOW, var(r2) -> LOW
      // annotation: L(var(r2)) = false
13
14
      while(1) {
          do {
               // annotation: _invariant: var(r1) \% 2 == 0 /\ var(r1) <= z
17
               // annotation: _{Gamma}: var(r1) -> LOW, var(r2) -> (var(r1)
     == var(z)), var(z) \rightarrow LOW
               do {
19
                   // annotation: _invariant: var(r1) <= var(z)</pre>
20
                   // annotation: _Gamma: var(r1) -> LOW
21
                   r1 = z;
               } while (r1 %2 != 0);
23
               r2 = x;
          } while (z != r1);
      }
26
      return r2;
28 }
```

Listing 4.20: pread.c

Annotations have been listed with an inline comment beginning with // annotation:. Following the declaration of a variable, the annotation can be listed in whatever format the programmer prefers. Line 6 shows the security policy for the variable z, denoting that its security policy is always high. Whereas, on line 7, the security policy of the variable x is dependant on the value of variable z. Also shown in this example are all the necessary annotations required for a wpif analysis.

The goal of the tool is to preserve these annotations stored in these comments. The approach for this technique is to parse the annotation comments from the source file. Once parsed, these comments can be converted to extended asm calls in the source file and recompiled. The annotated and non-annotated sources can then be compared to reconstruct the location of variables.

To develop this tool, a python program *annotator.py* was created. The program takes in three arguments;

- the file to compile,
- the location for the annotated output, and
- the optimisation level to compile at.

The program then creates a clone of the source file to modify. The clone is compiled to create an assembly output without annotations. This file is stored in a temporary file until it is ready to be used. The cloned source file is then transpiled. All annotations are located and transformed into extended asm. Any special characters that would break extended asm rules are appropriately escaped to allow for their preservation to assembly. This code is then injected into the cloned source file, ready for recompilation. An example of a transpiled source file can be seen in Listing 4.21.

```
volatile int z;
volatile int x;

int main() {
    // security policies:
    asm("# annotation: L(%0) = true" : : "X"(z));
```

```
7 \text{ asm}("\# \text{ annotation: } L(\%0) = \%1 \%\% 2 == 0" : : "X"(x), "X"(z));
8 \operatorname{asm}("# \operatorname{annotation}: \%0 < \%1," : : "X"(x), "X"(x));
      int r1 = 0;
      int r2 = 0;
11 asm("# annotation: _P_0: %0 %% 2 == 0" : : "X"(r1));
12 asm("# annotation: _Gamma_0: %0 -> LOW, %1 -> LOW" : : "X"(r1),
      "X"(r2));
13 asm("# annotation: L(%0) = false" : : "X"(r2));
      while(1) {
           do {
17 \text{ asm}("# \text{ annotation: } _invariant: %0 %% 2 == 0 /\\ %1 <= z" : : "X"(r1),
      "X"(r1));
18 asm("# annotation: _Gamma: \%0 \rightarrow LOW, \%1 \rightarrow (\%2 == \%3), \%4 \rightarrow LOW" : :
      "X"(r1), "X"(r2), "X"(r1), "X"(z), "X"(z));
                do {
20 asm("# annotation: _invariant: %0 <= %1" : : "X"(r1), "X"(z));
21 asm("# annotation: _Gamma: %0 -> LOW" : : "X"(r1));
                     r1 = z;
                } while (r1 %2 != 0);
23
                r2 = x;
           } while (z != r1);
      }
      return r2;
27
28 }
```

Listing 4.21: pread-transpiled.c

As can be seen, each of these annotations follow the annotation style developed earlier in this section. Each reference of a var has been appropriately replaced with a variable constraint and corresponding operand. Once again, the transpiled source file is compiled to assembly, and the results of the assembly are compared against the non-annotated counterpart. If the only difference in each of the assembly outputs is the annotations, the process is complete and the program exits. However, if there is a difference, the programmer is notified and the difference of the two compiled sources are listed.

The annotator program uses the clang compiler, however, because of the decoupled nature of the program, any compiler supporting extended asm could be used by the

program.

TODO:

1. Install specifications

Tool building:

- 1. not locating variable as requires parsing left for future work
- 2. Source Code documentation

4.4 LLVM Compiler Modification

the final technique of modifying the LLVM compiler was not experimented on. This was primarily due to two reasons. To begin with, the primary objective of this thesis is to explore techniques that do not modify the compiler, and instead work alongside the functionality of the compiler to preserve annotations. It is well known and documented that modifying the compiler to preserve annotations is possible and successful, as in the case of Vu et al. [30] Additionally, earlier success through the technique of using inline assembly allowed for more time to be allocated to exploring and improving this technique, as seen in 4.3. Therefore, evaluating compiler modification for static analysis purposes was not performed in this research.

Bibliography

- [1] Pieter Agten et al. "Recent developments in low-level software security". In: *IFIP International Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practice*. Springer. 2012, pp. 1–16.
- [2] Musard Balliu. "Logics for information flow security: from specification to verification". PhD thesis. KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2014.
- [3] Nick Benton. "Simple relational correctness proofs for static analyses and program transformations". In: *ACM SIGPLAN Notices* 39.1 (2004), pp. 14–25.
- [4] CompCert The CompCert C compiler. Accessed: 2020-09-01. 2020. URL: http://compcert.inria.fr/compcert-C.html.
- [5] Compiler Optimization Removal or Modification of Security-critical Code. Accessed: 2020-09-01. 2008. URL: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/733.html.
- [6] Compiler Removal of Code to Clear Buffers. Accessed: 2020-09-01. 2006. URL: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/14.html.
- [7] Vijay D'Silva, Mathias Payer, and Dawn Song. "The correctness-security gap in compiler optimization". In: 2015 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops. IEEE. 2015, pp. 73–87.
- [8] Dorothy E Denning. "A lattice model of secure information flow". In: Communications of the ACM 19.5 (1976), pp. 236–243.
- [9] Dorothy E Denning and Peter J Denning. "Certification of programs for secure information flow". In: Communications of the ACM 20.7 (1977), pp. 504–513.
- [10] Quang Do, Ben Martini, and Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo. "The role of the adversary model in applied security research". In: Computers & Security 81 (2019), pp. 156–181.

- [11] K Eder, K Georgiou, and N Grech. Common Assertion Language. ENTRA Project: Whole-Systems Energy Transparency (FET project 318337). Deliverable 2.1. 2013.
- [12] Gidon Ernst and Toby Murray. "SecCSL: Security concurrent separation logic". In: International Conference on Computer Aided Verification. Springer. 2019, pp. 208–230.
- [13] File:Simplified Heartbleed explanation.svg Wikimedia Commons. Accessed: 2020-09-02. 2014. URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Simplified_Heartbleed_explanation.svg#mediaviewer/File:Simplified_Heartbleed_explanation.svg.
- [14] GCC Developer Options. Accessed: 2020-09-02. URL: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Developer-Options.html.
- [15] Barbara Guttman and Edward A Roback. An introduction to computer security: the NIST handbook. Diane Publishing, 1995.
- [16] Heartbleed Bug. Accessed: 2020-09-02. 2020. URL: https://heartbleed.com/.
- [17] Xavier Leroy. "Formal certification of a compiler back-end or: programming a compiler with a proof assistant". In: Conference record of the 33rd ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages. 2006, pp. 42–54.
- [18] Xavier Leroy et al. "CompCert-a formally verified optimizing compiler". In: 2016.
- [19] Heiko Mantel, Matthias Perner, and Jens Sauer. "Noninterference under weak memory models". In: 2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. IEEE. 2014, pp. 80–94.
- [20] Heiko Mantel, David Sands, and Henning Sudbrock. "Assumptions and guarantees for compositional noninterference". In: 2011 IEEE 24th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. IEEE. 2011, pp. 218–232.
- [21] Toby Murray, Robert Sison, and Kai Engelhardt. "COVERN: A logic for compositional verification of information flow control". In: 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE. 2018, pp. 16–30.
- [22] Options That Control Optimization. Accessed: 2020-09-01. URL: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Optimize-Options.html.

- [23] Sundeep Prakash, Yann-Hang Lee, and Theodore Johnson. "Non-blocking algorithms for concurrent data structures". MA thesis. Citeseer, 1991.
- [24] Andrei Sabelfeld and Andrew C Myers. "Language-based information-flow security". In: *IEEE Journal on selected areas in communications* 21.1 (2003), pp. 5–19.
- [25] Bernhard Schommer et al. "Embedded program annotations for WCET analysis". In: 18th International Workshop on Worst-Case Execution Time Analysis (WCET 2018). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik. 2018.
- [26] Laurent Simon, David Chisnall, and Ross Anderson. "What you get is what you C: Controlling side effects in mainstream C compilers". In: 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE. 2018, pp. 1–15.
- [27] Graeme Smith, Nicholas Coughlin, and Toby Murray. "Value-Dependent Information-Flow Security on Weak Memory Models". In: *International Symposium on Formal Methods*. Springer. 2019, pp. 539–555.
- [28] William Stallings et al. Computer security: principles and practice. Pearson Education Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 2012.
- [29] Jeffrey A Vaughan and Todd Millstein. "Secure information flow for concurrent programs under total store order". In: 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. IEEE. 2012, pp. 19–29.
- [30] Son Tuan Vu et al. "Secure delivery of program properties through optimizing compilation". In: *Proceedings of the 29th International Conference on Compiler Construction*. 2020, pp. 14–26.
- [31] Kirsten Winter, Graeme Smith, and Nicholas Coughlin. "Information flow security in the presence of fine-grained concurrency". Unpublished. Aug. 2020.

Appendices

Appendix A

Test C Programs

A.1 comment.c

```
int main() {
    // Critical Comment
    return 0;
4 }
```

A.2 variable.c

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    // a = int
    // b = char

// c = unsigned int

// d = short

// e = long

// x = float

// y = double

int a = -10;

char b = 'b';

unsigned int c = -b;

short d = 0x1;

long e = 4294967296;

float x = 3.141592653589793;
```

```
double y = x / 2.3784;
return (int)(e / 32) + (int)a + (int)c + (int)d + (int) x + (int)
y + argc;
```

A.3 volatile.c

```
volatile int x;

int main() {
    // L(x) = High
    return x + 1;
}
```

A.4 loop.c

```
1 int z;
2 int x;
4 // security policies
5 // {L(z)=true}
6 // \{L(x)=z \% 2 == 0\}
8 // predicates on initial state
9 // {_P_0: r1 % 2 == 0}
10 // {_Gamma_0: r1 -> LOW, r2 -> LOW}
12 int main() {
    int r1 = 0;
  // {L(r2)=False}
     int r2 = 0;
16
    while(1) {
17
     do {
18
         // {_invariant: r1 % 2 == 0 /\ r1 <= z}
         // {_Gamma: r1 -> LOW, r2 -> (r1 == z), z -> LOW}
         do {
21
             // {_invariant: r1 <= z}
```

```
// {_Gamma: r1 -> LOW}

r1 = z;

while (r1 %2 != 0);

r2 = x;

while (z != r1);

return r2;

}
```

A.5 rooster.c

```
1 int rooster;
2 int drake;
3 // MEDIUM
4 int goose;
6 int fun(int a, int b, int c) {
      // CRITICAL COMMENT
     static int count = 0;
     int sum = a + b + c;
     if (sum < 0) {</pre>
         return sum;
11
      }
     if (a < b && b < c) {</pre>
13
         while (a != b) {
             a++;
15
              count++;
16
              while (b != c) {
                 c--;
                  count++;
              }
20
         }
21
      }
     return count;
23
24 }
26 int main(void) {
// EXCEPTIONAL
```

```
28     rooster = 1;
29     drake = 5;
30     goose = 10;
31     int result;
32     result = fun(rooster, drake, goose);
33     return 0;
34 }
```

A.6 password.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
2 #include <stdlib.h>
3 #include <string.h>
5 #define BUFF_LEN 256
7 typedef struct user_t user_t;
9 struct user_t {
    user_t* next;
     char name[BUFF_LEN];
     // L(password) = High
     char password[BUFF_LEN];
     size_t balance;
14
15 };
17 user_t* setup_users() {
     user_t* user_admin = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
     strcpy(user_admin->name, "admin");
     strcpy(user_admin->password, "4dm1n__4eva");
     user_admin->balance = 1000000;
22
     user_t* user_alice = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
     strcpy(user_alice->name, "alice");
24
     strcpy(user_alice->password, "!alice12!_veuje@@hak");
     user_alice->balance = 783;
26
27
     user_t* user_abdul = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
```

```
strcpy(user_abdul->name, "abdul");
      strcpy(user_abdul ->password, "passw0rd123");
30
      user_abdul->balance = 2;
32
      user_admin->next = user_alice;
      user_alice->next = user_abdul;
34
      user_abdul ->next = NULL;
     return user_admin;
37
38 }
40 void print_users(user_t* users) {
      printf("--- USERS ---\n");
      size_t count = 0;
      while (users != NULL) {
          printf(" %02ld. %s\n", ++count, users->name);
44
          users = users->next;
      }
      printf("\n");
48 }
50 user_t* getUser(user_t* user_list, char* name) {
      while (user_list != NULL) {
          if (strcmp(user_list->name, name) == 0) {
              return user_list;
          }
          user_list = user_list->next;
      }
     return NULL;
57
58 }
60 int main() {
     user_t* users = setup_users();
      printf("Welcome to BigBank Australia!\n");
63
     char username[BUFF_LEN];
65
      printf("Username: ");
      scanf("%255s", username);
67
```

```
user_t* user = getUser(users, username);
      if (user == NULL) {
          printf("User < %s > does not exist.\n", username);
          return 0;
      }
73
      char password[BUFF_LEN];
      printf("Password: ");
76
      scanf("%255s", password);
      if (strcmp(user->password, password) != 0) {
          printf("ERROR: incorrect password\n");
          return 0;
      }
81
      printf("Logged in as < %s >!\n", user->name);
83
      printf("\n");
84
      printf("Welcome, %s!\n", user->name);
      printf("Your balance: $%ld\n", user->balance);
87 }
```

A.7 deadStoreElimination.c

```
int deadStore(int i, int n) {
     int key = 0xabcd;
      // L(key) = high
     // do some work
     int result = 0:
      while (i > n) {
          result += key;
          i--;
     }
11
     // clear out our secret key
     key = 0;
13
     return i + n;
14
15 }
```

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
   deadStore(argc, 2);
}
```

A.8 pread.c

```
volatile int z;
volatile int x;
4// security policies
5 // {L(z)=true}
6 // \{L(x)=z \% 2 == 0\}
8// predicates on initial state
9 // {_P_0: r1 % 2 == 0}
10 // {_Gamma_0: r1 -> LOW, r2 -> LOW}
12 int main() {
     int r1 = 0;
     // {L(r2)=False}
     int r2 = 0;
      while(1) {
17
      do {
           // \{ \text{_invariant: r1 } \% \ 2 == 0 / \ \text{r1 } <= z \}
          // \{ Gamma: r1 \rightarrow LOW, r2 \rightarrow (r1 == z), z \rightarrow LOW \}
          do {
              // {_invariant: r1 <= z}
              // {_Gamma: r1 -> LOW}
               r1 = z;
24
           } while (r1 %2 != 0);
              r2 = x;
           } while (z != r1);
27
      return r2;
29
30 }
```

Appendix B

CompCert Annotated C Programs

B.1 comment.c

```
int main() {
   __builtin_ais_annot("%here Critical Comment");
   return 0;
4 }
```

B.2 variable.c

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    int a = -10;
    __builtin_ais_annot("%here %e1 = int", a);
    char b = 'b';
    __builtin_ais_annot("%here %e1 = char", b);
    unsigned int c = -b;
    __builtin_ais_annot("%here %e1 = unsigned int", c);
    short d = 0x1;
    __builtin_ais_annot("%here %e1 = short", d);
    long e = 4294967296;
    __builtin_ais_annot("%here %e1 = long", e);
    float x = 3.141592653589793;
    __builtin_ais_annot("%here %e1 = float", x);
    double y = x / 2.3784;
```

```
15    __builtin_ais_annot("%here %e1 = double", y);
16    return (int)(e / 32) + (int)a + (int)c + (int)d + (int) x + (int)
        y + argc;
17 }
```

B.3 volatile.c

```
volatile int x;

int main() {
    __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = false", x);
    return x + 1;

}
```

B.4 loop.c

```
2 int z;
3 int x;
5 int main() {
     // Security Policies
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = true", z);
     __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1)= %e2 %% 2 == 0", x, z);
     int r1 = 0;
     int r2 = 0;
     __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = false", r2);
12
     // Predicates on initial state
     __builtin_ais_annot("%here _P_0: %e1 %% 2 == 0", r1);
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here _Gamma_0: %e1 -> LOW, %e2 -> LOW", r1,
15
     r2);
     while(1) {
17
     do {
          __builtin_ais_annot("%here _invariant: %e1 %% 2 == 0 & %e1 <=
19
     %e2", r1, z);
```

```
__builtin_ais_annot("%here _Gamma: %e1 -> LOW, %e2 -> (%e1 ==
     %e3), %e3 -> LOW", r1, r2, z);
         do {
              __builtin_ais_annot("%here _invariant: %e1 <= %e2", r1, z);
22
              __builtin_ais_annot("%here _Gamma: %e1 -> LOW", r1);
              r1 = z;
24
          } while (r1 %2 != 0);
              r2 = x;
          } while (z != r1);
27
      }
     return r2;
29
30 }
```

B.5 rooster.c

```
int rooster;
2 int drake;
3 int goose;
5 int fun(int a, int b, int c) {
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here CRITICAL COMMENT");
      static int count = 0;
      int sum = a + b + c;
      if (sum < 0) {</pre>
          return sum;
      if (a < b && b < c) {</pre>
          while (a != b) {
               a++;
14
               count++;
               while (b != c) {
16
                   c--;
17
                   count++;
               }
19
          }
20
      }
      return count;
22
23 }
```

```
int main(void) {
   __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = medium", goose);
   __builtin_ais_annot("%here EXCEPTIONAL");

rooster = 1;
   drake = 5;

goose = 10;
   int result;
   result = fun(rooster,drake,goose);

return 0;

4}
```

B.6 password.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
2 #include <stdlib.h>
3 #include <string.h>
5 #define BUFF_LEN 256
7 typedef struct user_t user_t;
9 struct user_t {
   user_t* next;
     char name[BUFF_LEN];
    char password[BUFF_LEN];
                               //
                                           \{ L(password) =
    High }
     size_t balance;
14 }:
16 user_t* setup_users() {
     user_t* user_admin = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
     strcpy(user_admin->name, "admin");
     strcpy(user_admin->password, "4dm1n__4eva");
19
     __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = high", user_admin->password);
     user_admin->balance = 1000000;
21
22
     user_t* user_alice = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
```

```
strcpy(user_alice->name, "alice");
      strcpy(user_alice->password, "!alice12!_veuje@@hak");
25
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = high", user_alice->password);
      user_alice->balance = 783;
27
      user_t* user_abdul = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
29
      strcpy(user_abdul ->name, "abdul");
      strcpy(user_abdul->password, "passw0rd123");
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = high", user_abdul->password);
32
      user_abdul->balance = 2;
34
      user_admin->next = user_alice;
      user_alice->next = user_abdul;
      user_abdul ->next = NULL;
37
      return user_admin;
39
40 }
42 void print_users(user_t* users) {
      printf("--- USERS ---\n");
      size_t count = 0;
      while (users != NULL) {
          printf(" %02ld. %s\n", ++count, users->name);
          users = users->next;
      printf("\n");
49
50 }
52 user_t* getUser(user_t* user_list, char* name) {
      while (user_list != NULL) {
          if (strcmp(user_list->name, name) == 0) {
              return user_list;
          }
          user_list = user_list->next;
      return NULL;
59
60 }
62 int main() {
```

```
user_t* users = setup_users();
      printf("Welcome to BigBank Australia!\n");
66
      char username[BUFF_LEN];
     printf("Username: ");
68
      scanf("%255s", username);
     user_t* user = getUser(users, username);
71
     if (user == NULL) {
          printf("User < %s > does not exist.\n", username);
         return 0;
     }
     char password[BUFF_LEN];
     printf("Password: ");
      scanf("%255s", password);
     if (strcmp(user->password, password) != 0) {
          printf("ERROR: incorrect password\n");
         return 0;
     }
84
     printf("Logged in as < %s >!\n", user->name);
     printf("\n");
86
     printf("Welcome, %s!\n", user->name);
     printf("Your balance: $%ld\n", user->balance);
89 }
```

B.7 deadStoreElimination.c

```
int deadStore(int i, int n) {
   int key = 0xabcd;
   __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = high", key);

// do some work
   int result = 0;
   while (i > n) {
      result += key;
}
```

```
    i --;
    }

// clear out our secret key
key = 0;
return i + n;

}

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    deadStore(argc, 2);
}
```

B.8 pread.c

```
volatile int z;
volatile int x;
4 int main() {
     // Security Policies
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = true", z);
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = %e2 %% 2 == 0", x, z);
     int r1 = 0;
     int r2 = 0;
                           //
                                         {L(r2)=False}
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here L(%e1) = false", r2);
     // Predicates on initial state
13
      __builtin_ais_annot("%here _P_0: %e1 %% 2 == 0", r1);
     __builtin_ais_annot("%here _Gamma_0: %e1 -> LOW, %e2 -> LOW", r1,
     r2);
17
     while(1) {
19
              __builtin_ais_annot("%here _invariant: %e1 %% 2 == 0 & %e1
     <= %e2", r1, z);
              __builtin_ais_annot("%here _Gamma: %e1 -> LOW, %e2 -> (%e1
21
     == %e3), %e3 -> LOW", r1, r2, z);
```

```
do {
22
                  __builtin_ais_annot("%here _invariant: %e1 <= %e2",
23
     r1, z);
                  __builtin_ais_annot("%here _Gamma: %e1 -> LOW", r1);
24
                  r1 = z;
              } while (r1 %2 != 0);
26
                  r2 = x;
         } while (z != r1);
      }
29
     return r2;
30
31 }
```

Appendix C

CompCert Assembly Output

C.1 comment-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: comment.c -S -OO -o compCert/out/comment-OO.s
   .text
   .align 16
  .globl main
6 main:
  .cfi_startproc
  subq $8, %rsp
  .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
  .cfi_endproc
  .type main, Ofunction
.size main, . - main
```

C.2 comment-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
```

```
2 # Command line: comment.c -S -03 -o compCert/out/comment-03.s
   .text
  .align 16
   .globl main
6 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
15
  .type main, @function
.size main, . - main
```

C.3 variable-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: variable.c -S -00 -o compCert/out/variable-00.s
  .text
  .align 16
   .globl main
6 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   movl $-10, %esi
   mov1 $98, %ecx
13
   negl %ecx
   movl $1, %r8d
15
   movabsq $4294967296, %rax
   movsd .L100(%rip), %xmm1 # 3.14159265358979312
   cvtsd2ss %xmm1, %xmm3
18
cvtss2sd %xmm3, %xmm0
```

```
movsd .L101(%rip), %xmm2 # 2.3784000000000007
   divsd %xmm2, %xmm0
   cqto
   shrq $59, %rdx
23
   leaq 0(%rax, %rdx, 1), %rax
   sarq $5, %rax
25
   leal 0(%eax,%esi,1), %r9d
   leal 0(%r9d,%ecx,1), %r10d
   leal 0(%r10d,%r8d,1), %r8d
28
   cvttss2si %xmm3, %edx
   leal 0(%r8d,%edx,1), %r8d
30
   cvttsd2si %xmm0, %eax
   leal 0(%r8d, %eax, 1), %r11d
   leal 0(%r11d, %edi, 1), %eax
33
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
35
   .cfi_endproc
36
   .type main, @function
   .size main, . - main
   .section .rodata.cst8, "aM", @progbits,8
  .align 8
41 .L100: .quad 0x400921fb54442d18
42 .L101: .quad 0x400306f694467382
```

C.4 variable-O3.s

```
1 # File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: variable.c -S -03 -o compCert/out/variable-03.s
3    .text
4    .align 16
5    .globl main
6 main:
7    .cfi_startproc
8    subq $8, %rsp
9    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
10 leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
11 movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
12 leal 134217625(%edi), %eax
```

```
addq $8, %rsp

ret

cfi_endproc

type main, @function

size main, . - main
```

C.5 volatile-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
# Command line: volatile.c -S -00 -o compCert/out/volatile-00.s
  .comm x, 4, 4
  .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
7 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
11
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   movl x(\%rip), \%eax
   leal 1(%eax), %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
16
   ret
  .cfi_endproc
  .type main, @function
19 .size main, . - main
```

C.6 volatile-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: volatile.c -S -03 -o compCert/out/volatile-03.s
3    .comm x, 4, 4
4    .text
5    .align 16
6    .globl main
7 main:
8    .cfi_startproc
```

```
subq $8, %rsp
.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
movl x(%rip), %eax
leal 1(%eax), %eax
addq $8, %rsp
ret
.cfi_endproc
.type main, @function
.size main, . - main
```

C.7 loop-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: loop.c -S -00 -o compCert/out/loop-00.s
  .comm z, 4, 4
  .comm x, 4, 4
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
8 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
13
14 .L100:
   movl z(%rip), %edx
   movq %rdx, %rax
   testl %eax, %eax
   leal 1(%eax), %ecx
   cmovl %rcx, %rax
   sarl $1, %eax
20
   leal 0(,%eax,2), %esi
   movq %rdx, %rcx
   subl %esi, %ecx
23
testl %ecx, %ecx
```

```
jne .L100
movl z(%rip), %esi
jmp .L100
.cfi_endproc
.type main, @function
.size main, . - main
```

C.8 loop-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: loop.c -S -03 -o compCert/out/loop-03.s
   .comm z, 4, 4
  .comm x, 4, 4
   .text
   .align 16
  .globl main
8 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
14 .L100:
   movl z(%rip), %edx
   movq %rdx, %rax
   testl %eax, %eax
   leal 1(%eax), %ecx
   cmovl %rcx, %rax
   sarl $1, %eax
20
   leal 0(,%eax,2), %esi
   movq %rdx, %rcx
   subl %esi, %ecx
23
   testl %ecx, %ecx
   jne .L100
   movq %rdx, %rsi
   jmp .L100
   .cfi_endproc
28
29 .type main, @function
```

C.9 rooster-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: rooster.c -S -00 -o compCert/out/rooster-00.s
  .comm rooster, 4, 4
  .comm drake, 4, 4
  .comm goose, 4, 4
   .data
  .align 4
8 count:
   .long 0
   .type count, @object
   .size count, . - count
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl fun
15 fun:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
17
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   leal 0(%edi,%esi,1), %r8d
   leal 0(%r8d,%edx,1), %eax
   testl %eax, %eax
23
   jl .L100
   cmpl %esi, %edi
   jl .L101
   xorl %r8d, %r8d
   jmp .L102
29 .L101:
  cmpl %edx, %esi
  setl %r8b
   movzbl %r8b, %r8d
33 .L102:
34 cmpl $0, %r8d
```

```
35 je .L103
36 .L104:
   cmpl %esi, %edi
   je .L103
38
   leal 1(%edi), %edi
   movl count(%rip), %eax
40
   leal 1(%eax), %ecx
   movl %ecx, count(%rip)
43 .L105:
   cmpl %edx, %esi
   je .L104
45
   leal -1(%edx), %edx
46
   movl count(%rip), %r9d
   leal 1(%r9d), %r8d
   movl %r8d, count(%rip)
   jmp .L105
51 .L103:
   movl count(%rip), %eax
53 .L100:
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
56
   .type fun, @function
   .size fun, . - fun
58
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
62 main:
   .cfi_startproc
63
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
66
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   movl $1, %eax
68
   movl %eax, rooster(%rip)
   movl $5, %eax
   movl %eax, drake(%rip)
71
   movl $10, %eax
   movl %eax, goose(%rip)
73
```

```
movl rooster(%rip), %edi
movl drake(%rip), %esi
movl goose(%rip), %edx

call fun
xorl %eax, %eax
addq $8, %rsp

ret
cfi_endproc
type main, @function
size main, . - main
```

C.10 rooster-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
# Command line: rooster.c -S -O3 -o compCert/out/rooster-O3.s
  .comm rooster, 4, 4
.comm drake, 4, 4
  .comm goose, 4, 4
  .data
   .align 4
8 count:
   .long 0
  .type count, @object
   .size count, . - count
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl fun
15 fun:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   leal 0(%edi,%esi,1), %r9d
   leal 0(%r9d,%edx,1), %eax
   testl %eax, %eax
   jl .L100
24
cmpl %edx, %esi
```

```
setl %al
   movzbl %al, %eax
   xorl %r8d, %r8d
   cmpl %esi, %edi
29
   cmovge %r8, %rax
   cmpl $0, %eax
31
   je .L101
33 .L102:
   cmpl %esi, %edi
34
   je .L101
   leal 1(%edi), %edi
   movl count(%rip), %ecx
   leal 1(%ecx), %r8d
   movl %r8d, count(%rip)
40 .L103:
   cmpl %edx, %esi
   je .L102
   leal -1(\% edx), \% edx
   movl count(%rip), %r10d
44
   leal 1(%r10d), %r8d
   movl %r8d, count(%rip)
   jmp .L103
48 .L101:
   movl count(%rip), %eax
50 .L100:
   addq $8, %rsp
  ret
   .cfi_endproc
   .type fun, @function
54
   .size fun, . - fun
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
59 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
62
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
63
64 movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
```

```
movl $1, %eax
   movl %eax, rooster(%rip)
   movl $5, %eax
   movl %eax, drake(%rip)
68
   movl $10, %eax
   movl %eax, goose(%rip)
   movl $1, %edi
   movl $5, %esi
   movl $10, %edx
73
   call fun
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
  .type main, @function
so .size main, . - main
```

C.11 password-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: password.c -S -00 -o compCert/out/password-00.s
  .section .rodata
  .align 1
5 __stringlit_7:
   .ascii "--- USERS ---\012\000"
  .type __stringlit_7, @object
   .size __stringlit_7, . - __stringlit_7
  .section .rodata
   .align 1
11 __stringlit_6:
  .ascii "passw0rd123\000"
   .type __stringlit_6, @object
   .size __stringlit_6, . - __stringlit_6
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
17 __stringlit_4:
  .ascii "!alice12!_veuje@@hak\000"
.type __stringlit_4, @object
```

```
.size __stringlit_4, . - __stringlit_4
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
23 __stringlit_14:
   .ascii "Password: \000"
   .type __stringlit_14, @object
   .size __stringlit_14, . - __stringlit_14
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
29 __stringlit_18:
   .ascii "Your balance: $%ld\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_18, @object
   .size __stringlit_18, . - __stringlit_18
   .section .rodata
33
  .align 1
35 __stringlit_13:
   .ascii "User < %s > does not exist.\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_13, @object
   .size __stringlit_13, . - __stringlit_13
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
41 __stringlit_8:
   .ascii " %02ld. %s\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_8, @object
   .size __stringlit_8, . - __stringlit_8
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
47 __stringlit_1:
   .ascii "admin\000"
   .type __stringlit_1, @object
   .size __stringlit_1, . - __stringlit_1
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
53 __stringlit_2:
   .ascii "4dm1n__4eva\000"
   .type __stringlit_2, @object
   .size __stringlit_2, . - __stringlit_2
56
   .section .rodata
se .align 1
```

```
59 __stringlit_3:
   .ascii "alice\000"
   .type __stringlit_3, @object
   .size __stringlit_3, . - __stringlit_3
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
65 __stringlit_11:
   .ascii "Username: \000"
   .type __stringlit_11, @object
   .size __stringlit_11, . - __stringlit_11
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
70
71 __stringlit_5:
   .ascii "abdul\000"
   .type __stringlit_5, @object
   .size __stringlit_5, . - __stringlit_5
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
77 __stringlit_17:
   .ascii "Welcome, %s!\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_17, @object
   .size __stringlit_17, . - __stringlit_17
80
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
83 __stringlit_12:
   .ascii "%255s\000"
   .type __stringlit_12, @object
   .size __stringlit_12, . - __stringlit_12
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
89 __stringlit_9:
   .ascii "\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_9, @object
   .size __stringlit_9, . - __stringlit_9
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
95 __stringlit_15:
  .ascii "ERROR: incorrect password\012\000"
.type __stringlit_15, @object
```

```
.size __stringlit_15, . - __stringlit_15
    .section .rodata
99
    .align 1
101 __stringlit_10:
    .ascii "Welcome to BigBank Australia!\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_10, @object
103
    .size __stringlit_10, . - __stringlit_10
104
    .section .rodata
    .align 1
107 __stringlit_16:
    .ascii "Logged in as < %s >!\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_16, @object
109
    .size __stringlit_16, . - __stringlit_16
    .text
111
    .align 16
112
    .globl setup_users
114 setup_users:
    .cfi_startproc
    subq $40, %rsp
116
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 40
117
    leaq 48(%rsp), %rax
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
119
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
121
    movq %r12, 24(%rsp)
122
    movq $528, %rdi
    call malloc
124
    movq %rax, %rbp
125
    leaq 8(%rbp), %rdi
126
    leaq __stringlit_1(%rip), %rsi
127
    call strcpy
    leaq 264(%rbp), %rdi
129
    leaq __stringlit_2(%rip), %rsi
    call strcpy
131
    movq $1000000, %rax
132
    movq %rax, 520(%rbp)
    movq $528, %rdi
134
    call malloc
135
    movq %rax, %r12
136
```

```
leaq 8(%r12), %rdi
    leaq __stringlit_3(%rip), %rsi
138
    call strcpy
    leaq 264(%r12), %rdi
140
    leaq __stringlit_4(%rip), %rsi
    call strcpy
142
    movq $783, %rsi
143
    movq %rsi, 520(%r12)
    movq $528, %rdi
145
    call malloc
146
    movq %rax, %rbx
147
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
148
    leaq __stringlit_5(%rip), %rsi
    call strcpy
150
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
151
    leaq __stringlit_6(%rip), %rsi
152
    call strcpy
153
    movq $2, %r10
    movq %r10, 520(%rbx)
    movq %r12, 0(%rbp)
156
    movq %rbx, 0(%r12)
    xorq %r8, %r8
158
    movq %r8, 0(%rbx)
    movq %rbp, %rax
160
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
161
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
162
    movq 24(%rsp), %r12
163
    addq $40, %rsp
165
    .cfi_endproc
166
    .type setup_users, @function
    .size setup_users, . - setup_users
168
    .text
169
    .align 16
    .globl print_users
172 print_users:
   .cfi_startproc
173
   subq $24, %rsp
174
.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 24
```

```
leaq 32(%rsp), %rax
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
177
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
179
    movq %rdi, %rbx
    leaq __stringlit_7(%rip), %rdi
181
    movl $0, %eax
182
    call printf
    xorq %rbp, %rbp
184
185 .L100:
    cmpq $0, %rbx
    je .L101
187
    leaq 1(%rbp), %rbp
    leaq __stringlit_8(%rip), %rdi
189
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdx
190
    movq %rbp, %rsi
191
    movl $0, %eax
192
    call printf
    movq 0(%rbx), %rbx
194
    jmp .L100
195
196 .L101:
    leaq __stringlit_9(%rip), %rdi
197
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
199
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
200
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
201
    addq $24, %rsp
202
    ret
203
    .cfi_endproc
204
    .type print_users, @function
205
    .size print_users, . - print_users
    .text
207
    .align 16
208
    .globl getUser
210 getUser:
    .cfi_startproc
211
    subq $24, %rsp
212
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 24
213
214 leaq 32(%rsp), %rax
```

```
movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
215
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
216
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
    movq %rsi, %rbp
218
    movq %rdi, %rbx
220 .L102:
    cmpq $0, %rbx
221
    je .L103
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
223
    movq %rbp, %rsi
224
    call strcmp
225
    testl %eax, %eax
226
    je .L104
    movq 0(%rbx), %rbx
228
    jmp .L102
229
230 .L103:
    xorq %rbx, %rbx
232 .L104:
    movq %rbx, %rax
233
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
234
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
    addq $24, %rsp
236
    ret
237
    .cfi_endproc
238
    .type getUser, @function
239
    .size getUser, . - getUser
    .text
241
    .align 16
242
    .globl main
243
244 main:
    .cfi_startproc
245
    subq $536, %rsp
246
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 536
247
    leaq 544(%rsp), %rax
248
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
249
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
    call setup_users
251
    movq %rax, %rbx
252
    leaq __stringlit_10(%rip), %rdi
253
```

```
movl $0, %eax
254
    call printf
255
    leaq __stringlit_11(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
257
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_12(%rip), %rdi
259
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
260
    movl $0, %eax
    call __isoc99_scanf
262
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
263
    movq %rbx, %rdi
264
    call getUser
265
    movq %rax, %rbx
    cmpq $0, %rbx
267
    jne .L105
268
    leaq __stringlit_13(%rip), %rdi
269
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
270
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
272
    xorl %eax, %eax
273
    jmp .L106
275 .L105:
    leaq __stringlit_14(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
277
    call printf
278
    leaq __stringlit_12(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 272(%rsp), %rsi
280
    movl $0, %eax
    call __isoc99_scanf
282
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
283
    leaq 272(%rsp), %rsi
    call strcmp
285
    testl %eax, %eax
286
    je .L107
287
    leaq __stringlit_15(%rip), %rdi
288
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
290
    xorl %eax, %eax
291
   jmp .L106
292
```

```
293 .L107:
    leaq __stringlit_16(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rsi
    movl $0, %eax
296
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_9(%rip), %rdi
298
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_17(%rip), %rdi
301
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rsi
    movl $0, %eax
303
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_18(%rip), %rdi
    movq 520(%rbx), %rsi
306
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
    xorl %eax, %eax
309
310 .L106:
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
311
    addq $536, %rsp
312
    ret
   .cfi_endproc
314
   .type main, Ofunction
size main, . - main
```

C.12 password-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7

# Command line: password.c -S -03 -o compCert/out/password-03.s

.section .rodata

.align 1

._stringlit_7:

.ascii "--- USERS ---\012\000"

.type __stringlit_7, @object

.size __stringlit_7, . - __stringlit_7

.section .rodata

.align 1

__stringlit_6:
```

```
.ascii "passw0rd123\000"
   .type __stringlit_6, @object
13
   .size __stringlit_6, . - __stringlit_6
   .section .rodata
15
   .align 1
17 __stringlit_4:
   .ascii "!alice12!_veuje@@hak\000"
   .type __stringlit_4, @object
   .size __stringlit_4, . - __stringlit_4
20
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
23 __stringlit_14:
   .ascii "Password: \000"
   .type __stringlit_14, @object
   .size __stringlit_14, . - __stringlit_14
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
29 __stringlit_18:
   .ascii "Your balance: $%1d\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_18, @object
   .size __stringlit_18, . - __stringlit_18
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
35 __stringlit_13:
   .ascii "User < %s > does not exist.\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_13, @object
   .size __stringlit_13, . - __stringlit_13
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
41 __stringlit_8:
   .ascii " %02ld. %s\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_8, @object
   .size __stringlit_8, . - __stringlit_8
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
47 __stringlit_1:
   .ascii "admin\000"
   .type __stringlit_1, @object
.size __stringlit_1, . - __stringlit_1
```

```
.section .rodata
   .align 1
53 __stringlit_2:
   .ascii "4dm1n_4eva\\000"
54
   .type __stringlit_2, @object
   .size __stringlit_2, . - __stringlit_2
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
59 __stringlit_3:
   .ascii "alice\000"
   .type __stringlit_3, @object
   .size __stringlit_3, . - __stringlit_3
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
65 __stringlit_11:
   .ascii "Username: \000"
   .type __stringlit_11, @object
   .size __stringlit_11, . - __stringlit_11
   .section .rodata
  .align 1
71 __stringlit_5:
   .ascii "abdul\000"
   .type __stringlit_5, @object
   .size __stringlit_5, . - __stringlit_5
74
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
77 __stringlit_17:
   .ascii "Welcome, %s!\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_17, @object
   .size __stringlit_17, . - __stringlit_17
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
83 __stringlit_12:
   .ascii "%255s\000"
  .type __stringlit_12, @object
   .size __stringlit_12, . - __stringlit_12
   .section .rodata
  .align 1
89 __stringlit_9:
```

```
.ascii "\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_9, @object
    .size __stringlit_9, . - __stringlit_9
    .section .rodata
93
   .align 1
95 __stringlit_15:
    .ascii "ERROR: incorrect password\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_15, @object
    .size __stringlit_15, . - __stringlit_15
    .section .rodata
    .align 1
101 __stringlit_10:
    .ascii "Welcome to BigBank Australia!\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_10, @object
    .size __stringlit_10, . - __stringlit_10
    .section .rodata
    .align 1
106
107 __stringlit_16:
    .ascii "Logged in as < %s >!\012\000"
108
    .type __stringlit_16, @object
    .size __stringlit_16, . - __stringlit_16
    .text
111
    .align 16
    .globl setup_users
114 setup_users:
    .cfi_startproc
   subq $40, %rsp
116
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 40
    leaq 48(%rsp), %rax
118
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
119
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
121
    movq %r12, 24(%rsp)
    movq $528, %rdi
    call malloc
    movq %rax, %rbp
    leaq 8(%rbp), %rdi
126
    leaq __stringlit_1(%rip), %rsi
   call strcpy
128
```

```
leaq 264(%rbp), %rdi
    leaq __stringlit_2(%rip), %rsi
130
    call strcpy
    movq $1000000, %rax
    movq %rax, 520(%rbp)
    movq $528, %rdi
134
    call malloc
135
    movq %rax, %r12
    leaq 8(%r12), %rdi
137
    leaq __stringlit_3(%rip), %rsi
138
    call strcpy
139
    leaq 264(%r12), %rdi
140
    leaq __stringlit_4(%rip), %rsi
    call strcpy
142
    movq $783, %rsi
143
    movq %rsi, 520(%r12)
144
    movq $528, %rdi
145
    call malloc
    movq %rax, %rbx
147
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
148
    leaq __stringlit_5(%rip), %rsi
    call strcpy
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
    leaq __stringlit_6(%rip), %rsi
152
    call strcpy
153
    movq $2, %r10
154
    movq %r10, 520(%rbx)
    movq %r12, 0(%rbp)
    movq %rbx, 0(%r12)
157
    xorq %r8, %r8
158
    movq %r8, 0(%rbx)
    movq %rbp, %rax
160
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
161
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
162
    movq 24(%rsp), %r12
163
    addq $40, %rsp
164
    ret
165
    .cfi_endproc
166
.type setup_users, @function
```

```
.size setup_users, . - setup_users
    .text
169
    .align 16
    .globl print_users
172 print_users:
    .cfi_startproc
    subq $24, %rsp
174
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 24
    leaq 32(%rsp), %rax
176
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
177
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
178
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
179
    movq %rdi, %rbp
    leaq __stringlit_7(%rip), %rdi
181
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
183
    xorq %rbx, %rbx
184
185 .L100:
    cmpq $0, %rbp
186
    je .L101
187
    leaq 1(%rbx), %rbx
    leaq __stringlit_8(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 8(%rbp), %rdx
    movq %rbx, %rsi
191
    movl $0, %eax
192
    call printf
    movq 0(%rbp), %rbp
194
    jmp .L100
196 .L101:
    leaq __stringlit_9(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
199
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
200
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
201
    addq $24, %rsp
    ret
    .cfi_endproc
204
    .type print_users, @function
205
   .size print_users, . - print_users
206
```

```
.text
    .align 16
208
    .globl getUser
210 getUser:
    .cfi_startproc
211
    subq $24, %rsp
212
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 24
213
    leaq 32(%rsp), %rax
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
215
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
216
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
217
    movq %rsi, %rbp
218
    movq %rdi, %rbx
220 .L102:
    cmpq $0, %rbx
221
    je .L103
222
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
223
    movq %rbp, %rsi
    call strcmp
225
    testl %eax, %eax
226
    je .L104
    movq 0(%rbx), %rbx
228
    jmp .L102
230 .L103:
    xorq %rbx, %rbx
231
232 .L104:
    movq %rbx, %rax
233
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
235
    addq $24, %rsp
236
    ret
    .cfi_endproc
238
    .type getUser, @function
239
    .size getUser, . - getUser
240
    .text
241
    .align 16
242
243
    .globl main
244 main:
.cfi_startproc
```

```
subq $536, %rsp
246
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 536
247
    leaq 544(%rsp), %rax
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
249
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
    call setup_users
251
    movq %rax, %rbx
252
    leaq __stringlit_10(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
254
    call printf
255
    leaq __stringlit_11(%rip), %rdi
256
    movl $0, %eax
257
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_12(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
260
    movl $0, %eax
261
    call __isoc99_scanf
262
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
    movq %rbx, %rdi
264
    call getUser
265
    movq %rax, %rbx
    cmpq $0, %rbx
267
    jne .L105
    leaq __stringlit_13(%rip), %rdi
269
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
270
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
272
    xorl %eax, %eax
    jmp .L106
274
275 .L105:
    leaq __stringlit_14(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
277
    call printf
278
    leaq __stringlit_12(%rip), %rdi
279
    leaq 272(%rsp), %rsi
280
    movl $0, %eax
    call __isoc99_scanf
282
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
283
    leaq 272(%rsp), %rsi
284
```

```
call strcmp
    testl %eax, %eax
286
    je .L107
287
    leaq __stringlit_15(%rip), %rdi
288
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
290
    xorl %eax, %eax
291
    jmp .L106
293 .L107:
    leaq __stringlit_16(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rsi
295
    movl $0, %eax
296
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_9(%rip), %rdi
298
    movl $0, %eax
299
    call printf
300
    leaq __stringlit_17(%rip), %rdi
301
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rsi
    movl $0, %eax
303
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_18(%rip), %rdi
305
    movq 520(%rbx), %rsi
306
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
308
    xorl %eax, %eax
309
310 .L106:
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
311
    addq $536, %rsp
312
313
    .cfi_endproc
314
    .type main, Ofunction
   .size main, . - main
316
```

C.13 deadStoreElimination-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7

2 # Command line: deadStoreElimination.c -S -00 -o

compCert/out/deadStoreElimination-00.s
```

```
3 .text
4 .align 16
    .globl deadStore
6 deadStore:
   .cfi_startproc
  subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
12 .L100:
   cmpl %esi, %edi
14 jle .L101
  leal -1(%edi), %edi
   jmp .L100
17 .L101:
   leal 0(%edi,%esi,1), %eax
  addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
21
   .type deadStore, @function
   .size deadStore, . - deadStore
   .text
24
   .align 16
   .globl main
26
27 main:
   .cfi_startproc
  subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
31
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   movl $2, %esi
   call deadStore
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
36
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
   .type main, Ofunction
39
  .size main, . - main
```

C.14 deadStoreElimination-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: deadStoreElimination.c -S -O3 -o
    compCert/out/deadStoreElimination-03.s
  .text
  .align 16
   .globl deadStore
6 deadStore:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
  leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
12 .L100:
   cmpl %esi, %edi
14 jle .L101
  leal -1(%edi), %edi
   jmp .L100
17 .L101:
   leal 0(%edi,%esi,1), %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
  .type deadStore, @function
   .size deadStore, . - deadStore
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
27 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   movl $2, %esi
33
   call deadStore
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
```

```
37  ret
38  .cfi_endproc
39  .type main, @function
40  .size main, . - main
```

C.15 pread-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
# Command line: pread.c -S -00 -o compCert/out/pread-00.s
  .comm z, 4, 4
  .comm x, 4, 4
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
8 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
14 .L100:
   movl z(%rip), %edx
   movq %rdx, %rsi
   movq %rsi, %rax
17
   testl %eax, %eax
   leal 1(%eax), %ecx
   cmovl %rcx, %rax
   sarl $1, %eax
   leal 0(,%eax,2), %edi
22
   subl %edi, %esi
   testl %esi, %esi
   jne .L100
   movl x(%rip), %esi
   movl z(%rip), %esi
27
   jmp .L100
   .cfi_endproc
29
   .type main, @function
30
  .size main, . - main
```

C.16 pread-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: pread.c -S -03 -o compCert/out/pread-03.s
  .comm z, 4, 4
  .comm x, 4, 4
  .text
  .align 16
   .globl main
8 main:
   .cfi_startproc
10 subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
14 .L100:
   movl z(%rip), %edx
  movq %rdx, %rsi
   movq %rsi, %rax
   testl %eax, %eax
   leal 1(%eax), %ecx
  cmovl %rcx, %rax
   sarl $1, %eax
   leal 0(,%eax,2), %edi
   subl %edi, %esi
   testl %esi, %esi
   jne .L100
   movl x(%rip), %esi
   movl z(%rip), %esi
   jmp .L100
   .cfi_endproc
   .type main, @function
  .size main, . - main
```

Appendix D

CompCert Annotated Assembly Output

D.1 comment-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: comment.c -S -00 -o annotated/comment-00.s
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
6 main:
  .cfi_startproc
  subq $8, %rsp
  .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
  leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
12 .L100:
  xorl %eax, %eax
  addq $8, %rsp
   ret
  .cfi_endproc
.type main, @function
   .size main, . - main
  .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
```

```
.ascii "# file:comment.c line:2 function:main\n"
.byte 7,8
.quad .L100
.ascii " Critical Comment\n"
```

D.2 comment-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: comment.c -S -O3 -o annotated/comment-O3.s
  .text
  .align 16
   .globl main
6 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
  .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
12 .L100:
  xorl %eax, %eax
  addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
   .type main, Ofunction
   .size main, . - main
   .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
   .ascii "# file:comment.c line:2 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L100
  .ascii " Critical Comment\n"
```

D.3 variable-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7

# Command line: variable.c -S -00

text

align 16

glob1 main
```

```
6 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
11
   movl $-10, %esi
13 .L100:
   movl $98, %ecx
15 .L101:
16 negl %ecx
17 .L102:
movl $1, %r10d
19 .L103:
   movabsq $4294967296, %rax
21 .L104:
   movsd .L105(%rip), %xmm1 # 3.14159265358979312
   cvtsd2ss %xmm1, %xmm3
   cvtss2sd %xmm3, %xmm0
24
   movsd .L106(%rip), %xmm2 # 2.3784000000000007
   divsd %xmm2, %xmm0
   cqto
   shrq $59, %rdx
   leaq 0(%rax, %rdx, 1), %rax
29
   sarq $5, %rax
   leal 0(%eax, %esi, 1), %r9d
   leal 0(%r9d,%ecx,1), %r8d
   leal 0(%r8d,%r10d,1), %r10d
   cvttss2si %xmm3, %edx
34
   leal 0(%r10d, %edx, 1), %r11d
   cvttsd2si %xmm0, %r8d
   leal 0(%r11d,%r8d,1), %ecx
   leal 0(%ecx, %edi, 1), %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
39
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
   .type main, Ofunction
42
   .size main, . - main
43
.section .rodata.cst8, "aM", @progbits,8
```

```
45 .align 8
46 .L105: .quad 0x400921fb54442d18
47 .L106: .quad 0x400306f694467382
    .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:3 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L100
   .ascii " reg(\"rsi\") = int\n"
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:5 function:main\n"
53
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L101
55
   .ascii " reg(\"rcx\") = char\n"
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:7 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
58
   .quad .L102
   .ascii " reg(\"rcx\") = unsigned int\n"
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:9 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L103
63
   .ascii " reg(\"r10\") = short\"
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:11 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L104
  .ascii " reg(\"rax\") = long\n"
```

D.4 variable-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7

# Command line: variable.c -S -O3

.text

align 16

globl main

main:

cfi_startproc

subq $8, %rsp

cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8

leaq 16(%rsp), %rax

movq %rax, O(%rsp)
```

```
12 .L100:
13 .L101:
14 .L102:
15 .L103:
16 .L104:
17 leal 134217625(%edi), %eax
  addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
20
   .type main, @function
   .size main, . - main
   .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:3 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
25
   .quad .L100
   .ascii " -10 = int n"
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:5 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L101
   .ascii " 98 = char n"
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:7 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L102
   .ascii " -98 = unsigned int\n"
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:9 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L103
   .ascii " 1 = short n"
   .ascii "# file:variable.c line:11 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L104
.ascii " 4294967296 = long \n"
```

D.5 volatile-O0.s

```
volatile.c:4: error: access to volatile variable 'x' for parameter '%e1' is not supported in ais annotations

1 error detected.
```

D.6 volatile-O3.s

```
volatile.c:4: error: access to volatile variable 'x' for parameter
'%e1' is not supported in ais annotations
2 1 error detected.
```

D.7 loop-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: loop.c -S -00 -o annotated/loop-00.s
  .comm z, 4, 4
  .comm x, 4, 4
  .text
  .align 16
7 .globl main
8 main:
   .cfi_startproc
10 subq $8, %rsp
  .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
12 leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
  movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
14 .L100:
15 .L101:
16 xorl %edx, %edx
xorl %edi, %edi
18 .L102:
19 .L103:
20 .L104:
21 nop
22 .L105:
23 .L106:
24 .L107:
25 nop
26 .L108:
27 .L109:
28 .L110:
movl z(%rip), %edx
movq %rdx, %rax
```

```
testl %eax, %eax
   leal 1(%eax), %ecx
   cmovl %rcx, %rax
   sarl $1, %eax
34
   leal 0(,%eax,2), %edi
   movq %rdx, %rcx
36
   subl %edi, %ecx
   testl %ecx, %ecx
   jne .L108
39
   movl x(%rip), %edi
   movl z(%rip), %esi
41
   jmp .L105
42
   .cfi_endproc
   .type main, Ofunction
44
   .size main, . - main
   .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
46
   .ascii "# file:loop.c line:7 function:main\n"
47
   .byte 7,8
    .quad .L100
49
   .ascii " L(mem("
   .byte 7,8
   .quad z
52
   .ascii ", 4)) = true\n"
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:8 function:main\n"
54
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L101
   .ascii " L(mem("
   .byte 7,8
    .quad x
59
   .ascii ", 4))= mem("
   .byte 7,8
   .quad z
62
   .ascii ", 4) \% 2 == 0 \n"
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:11 function:main\n"
64
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L102
   .ascii " L(reg(\"rdi\"))= false\n"
67
   .ascii "# file:loop.c line:14 function:main\n"
69 .byte 7,8
```

```
.quad .L103
    .ascii " _{P_0}: reg(\"rdx\") % 2 == 0 n"
71
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:15 function:main\n"
    .byte 7,8
73
    .quad .L104
    .ascii " _Gamma_0: reg(\"rdx\") -> LOW, reg(\"rdi\") -> LOW\n"
75
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:19 function:main\n"
    .byte 7,8
    .quad .L106
    .ascii " _invariant: reg(\"rdx\") % 2 == 0 & reg(\"rdx\") <= mem("
    .byte 7,8
80
    .quad z
81
    .ascii ", 4)\n"
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:20 function:main\n"
83
    .byte 7,8
    .quad .L107
85
    .ascii " _Gamma: reg(\"rdx\") -> LOW, reg(\"rdi\") -> (reg(\"rdx\")
    == mem("
    .byte 7,8
    .quad z
    .ascii ", 4)), mem("
    .byte 7,8
    .quad z
    .ascii ", 4) -> LOW\n"
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:22 function:main\n"
    .byte 7,8
    .quad .L109
    .ascii " _invariant: reg(\"rdx\") <= mem("
    .byte 7,8
    .quad z
    .ascii ", 4)\n"
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:23 function:main\n"
100
    .byte 7,8
101
    .quad .L110
.ascii " _Gamma: reg(\"rdx\") -> LOW\n"
```

D.8 loop-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: loop.c -S -03 -o annotated/loop-03.s
   .comm z, 4, 4
  .comm x, 4, 4
  .text
  .align 16
   .globl main
8 main:
   .cfi_startproc
  subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
12 leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
  movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
14 .L100:
15 .L101:
xorl %edx, %edx
xorl %edi, %edi
18 .L102:
19 .L103:
20 .L104:
21 nop
22 .L105:
23 .L106:
24 .L107:
25 nop
26 .L108:
27 .L109:
28 .L110:
   movl z(%rip), %edx
29
   movq %rdx, %rax
   testl %eax, %eax
   leal 1(%eax), %ecx
   cmovl %rcx, %rax
   sarl $1, %eax
   leal 0(,%eax,2), %edi
   movq %rdx, %rcx
   subl %edi, %ecx
37
   testl %ecx, %ecx
39 jne .L108
```

```
movl x(%rip), %edi
   movq %rdx, %rsi
   jmp .L105
   .cfi_endproc
43
   .type main, Ofunction
   .size main, . - main
45
   .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
   .ascii "# file:loop.c line:7 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
48
   .quad .L100
   .ascii " L(mem("
   .byte 7,8
   .quad z
    .ascii ", 4)) = true\n"
53
   .ascii "# file:loop.c line:8 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
55
   .quad .L101
56
   .ascii " L(mem("
   .byte 7,8
58
   .quad x
   .ascii ", 4))= mem("
   .byte 7,8
   .quad z
    .ascii ", 4) \% 2 == 0 \n"
63
   .ascii "# file:loop.c line:11 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L102
66
   .ascii " L(0) = false n"
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:14 function:main\n"
68
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L103
   .ascii " _{P_0}: 0 % 2 == 0 n"
   .ascii "# file:loop.c line:15 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
73
   .quad .L104
   .ascii " _Gamma_0: 0 -> LOW, 0 -> LOW\n"
   .ascii "# file:loop.c line:19 function:main\n"
76
   .byte 7,8
78 .quad .L106
```

```
.ascii " _invariant: reg(\"rdx\") % 2 == 0 & reg(\"rdx\") <= mem("
    .byte 7,8
80
    .quad z
    .ascii ", 4)\n"
82
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:20 function:main\n"
    .byte 7,8
84
    .quad .L107
85
    .ascii " _Gamma: reg(\"rdx\") -> LOW, reg(\"rdi\") -> (reg(\"rdx\")
    == mem("
   .byte 7,8
    .quad z
    .ascii ", 4)), mem("
   .byte 7,8
    .quad z
91
   .ascii ", 4) -> LOW\n"
    .ascii "# file:loop.c line:22 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
    .quad .L109
    .ascii " _invariant: reg(\"rdx\") <= mem("</pre>
   .byte 7,8
   .quad z
   .ascii ", 4)\n"
   .ascii "# file:loop.c line:23 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L110
  .ascii " _Gamma: reg(\"rdx\") -> LOW\n"
```

D.9 rooster-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7

# Command line: rooster.c -S -00 -o annotated/rooster-00.s

.comm rooster, 4, 4

.comm drake, 4, 4

.comm goose, 4, 4

.data

.align 4

count:

.long 0
```

```
.type count, @object
   .size count, . - count
11
   .text
   .align 16
13
   .globl fun
15 fun:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
21 .L100:
   leal 0(%edi,%esi,1), %r8d
   leal 0(%r8d,%edx,1), %eax
   testl %eax, %eax
   jl .L101
25
   cmpl %esi, %edi
   jl .L102
   xorl %r8d, %r8d
   jmp .L103
30 .L102:
   cmpl %edx, %esi
  setl %r8b
   movzbl %r8b, %r8d
33
34 .L103:
   cmpl $0, %r8d
  je .L104
37 .L105:
   cmpl %esi, %edi
   je .L104
   leal 1(%edi), %edi
   movl count(%rip), %eax
   leal 1(%eax), %ecx
   movl %ecx, count(%rip)
44 .L106:
   cmpl %edx, %esi
  je .L105
46
   leal -1(\% edx), \% edx
47
movl count(%rip), %r9d
```

```
leal 1(%r9d), %r8d
   movl %r8d, count(%rip)
   jmp .L106
52 .L104:
   movl
        count(%rip), %eax
54 .L101:
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
57
   .type fun, @function
   .size fun, . - fun
   .text
60
   .align 16
   .globl main
62
63 main:
   .cfi_startproc
  subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
69 .L107:
70 .L108:
   movl $1, %eax
   movl %eax, rooster(%rip)
   movl $5, %eax
   movl %eax, drake(%rip)
   movl $10, %eax
   movl %eax, goose(%rip)
   movl rooster(%rip), %edi
77
   movl drake(%rip), %esi
   movl goose(%rip), %edx
   call fun
80
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
82
   ret
83
   .cfi_endproc
   .type main, Ofunction
85
   .size main, . - main
86
section "__compcert_ais_annotations","",@note
```

```
.ascii "# file:rooster.c line:6 function:fun\n"
    .byte 7,8
89
    .quad .L100
    .ascii " CRITICAL COMMENT\n"
91
    .ascii "# file:rooster.c line:26 function:main\n"
    .byte 7,8
93
    .quad .L107
    .ascii " L(mem("
    .byte 7,8
96
    .quad goose
    .ascii ", 4)) = medium \n"
    .ascii "# file:rooster.c line:27 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
    .quad .L108
.ascii " EXCEPTIONAL \n"
```

D.10 rooster-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: rooster.c -S -03 -o annotated/rooster-03.s
3 .comm rooster, 4, 4
  .comm drake, 4, 4
  .comm goose, 4, 4
  .data
  .align 4
8 count:
   .long 0
  .type count, @object
   .size count, . - count
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl fun
15 fun:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
  .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
  leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
19
20 movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
```

```
21 .L100:
   leal 0(%edi,%esi,1), %r9d
   leal 0(%r9d,%edx,1), %eax
   testl %eax, %eax
24
   jl .L101
   cmpl %edx, %esi
26
   setl %al
   movzbl %al, %eax
   xorl %r8d, %r8d
29
   cmpl %esi, %edi
   cmovge %r8, %rax
31
   cmpl $0, %eax
   je .L102
34 .L103:
   cmpl %esi, %edi
   je .L102
   leal 1(%edi), %edi
   movl count(%rip), %ecx
   leal 1(%ecx), %r8d
39
   movl %r8d, count(%rip)
41 .L104:
   cmpl %edx, %esi
   je .L103
   leal -1(\% edx), \% edx
44
   movl count(%rip), %r10d
   leal 1(%r10d), %r8d
   movl %r8d, count(%rip)
47
   jmp .L104
49 .L102:
   movl count(%rip), %eax
51 .L101:
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
54
   .type fun, @function
   .size fun, . - fun
   .text
57
   .align 16
.globl main
```

```
60 main:
   .cfi_startproc
  subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
63
  leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
  movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
66 .L105:
67 .L106:
   movl $1, %eax
   movl %eax, rooster(%rip)
   movl $5, %eax
   movl %eax, drake(%rip)
   movl $10, %eax
   movl %eax, goose(%rip)
73
   movl $1, %edi
   movl $5, %esi
75
   movl $10, %edx
76
   call fun
   xorl %eax, %eax
78
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
81
   .type main, @function
   .size main, . - main
83
   .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
   .ascii "# file:rooster.c line:6 function:fun\n"
   .byte 7,8
86
   .quad .L100
    .ascii " CRITICAL COMMENT\n"
88
   .ascii "# file:rooster.c line:26 function:main\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L105
91
   .ascii " L(mem("
   .byte 7,8
93
   .quad goose
   .ascii ", 4)) = medium \n"
   .ascii "# file:rooster.c line:27 function:main\n"
96
   .byte 7,8
98 .quad .L106
```

D.11 password-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
2 # Command line: password.c -S -00 -o annotated/password-00.s
   .section .rodata
  .align 1
5 __stringlit_7:
   .ascii "--- USERS ---\012\000"
  .type __stringlit_7, @object
   .size __stringlit_7, . - __stringlit_7
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
11 __stringlit_6:
  .ascii "passw0rd123\000"
   .type __stringlit_6, @object
   .size __stringlit_6, . - __stringlit_6
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
17 __stringlit_4:
   .ascii "!alice12!_veuje@@hak\000"
   .type __stringlit_4, @object
   .size __stringlit_4, . - __stringlit_4
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
23 __stringlit_14:
   .ascii "Password: \000"
   .type __stringlit_14, @object
   .size __stringlit_14, . - __stringlit_14
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
29 __stringlit_18:
   .ascii "Your balance: $%ld\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_18, @object
   .size __stringlit_18, . - __stringlit_18
   .section .rodata
34 .align 1
```

```
35 __stringlit_13:
    .ascii "User < %s > does not exist.\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_13, @object
   .size __stringlit_13, . - __stringlit_13
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
41 __stringlit_8:
   .ascii " %021d. %s\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_8, @object
   .size __stringlit_8, . - __stringlit_8
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
46
47 __stringlit_1:
   .ascii "admin\000"
   .type __stringlit_1, @object
   .size __stringlit_1, . - __stringlit_1
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
53 __stringlit_2:
   .ascii "4dm1n__4eva\000"
   .type __stringlit_2, @object
   .size __stringlit_2, . - __stringlit_2
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
59 __stringlit_3:
   .ascii "alice\000"
   .type __stringlit_3, @object
   .size __stringlit_3, . - __stringlit_3
   .section .rodata
  .align 1
65 __stringlit_11:
   .ascii "Username: \000"
   .type __stringlit_11, @object
   .size __stringlit_11, . - __stringlit_11
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
71 __stringlit_5:
  .ascii "abdul\000"
.type __stringlit_5, @object
```

```
.size __stringlit_5, . - __stringlit_5
    .section .rodata
75
    .align 1
77 __stringlit_17:
    .ascii "Welcome, %s!\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_17, @object
    .size __stringlit_17, . - __stringlit_17
    .section .rodata
    .align 1
82
83 __stringlit_12:
    .ascii "%255s\000"
    .type __stringlit_12, @object
    .size __stringlit_12, . - __stringlit_12
    .section .rodata
   .align 1
89 __stringlit_9:
    .ascii "\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_9, @object
    .size __stringlit_9, . - __stringlit_9
92
   .section .rodata
    .align 1
95 __stringlit_15:
    .ascii "ERROR: incorrect password\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_15, @object
    .size __stringlit_15, . - __stringlit_15
    .section .rodata
    .align 1
100
101 __stringlit_10:
    .ascii "Welcome to BigBank Australia!\012\000"
102
   .type __stringlit_10, @object
103
   .size __stringlit_10, . - __stringlit_10
    .section .rodata
105
   .align 1
106
107 __stringlit_16:
   .ascii "Logged in as < %s >!\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_16, @object
   .size __stringlit_16, . - __stringlit_16
110
    .text
111
112 .align 16
```

```
.globl setup_users
114 setup_users:
    .cfi_startproc
    subq $40, %rsp
116
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 40
117
    leaq 48(%rsp), %rax
118
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
119
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
121
    movq %r12, 24(%rsp)
122
    movq $528, %rdi
123
    call malloc
124
    movq %rax, %rbp
    leaq 8(%rbp), %rdi
126
    leaq __stringlit_1(%rip), %rsi
127
    call strcpy
128
    leaq 264(%rbp), %rdi
         __stringlit_2(%rip), %rsi
    leaq
    call
         strcpy
131
132 .L100:
    movq $1000000, %r10
    movq %r10, 520(%rbp)
134
    movq $528, %rdi
    call malloc
136
    movq %rax, %r12
137
    leaq 8(%r12), %rdi
    leaq __stringlit_3(%rip), %rsi
139
    call strcpy
140
    leaq 264(%r12), %rdi
141
    leaq __stringlit_4(%rip), %rsi
142
    call
         strcpy
144 .L101:
    movq $783, %r9
145
    movq %r9, 520(%r12)
    movq $528, %rdi
147
    call malloc
    movq %rax, %rbx
149
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
150
    leaq __stringlit_5(%rip), %rsi
151
```

```
call strcpy
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
153
    leaq __stringlit_6(%rip), %rsi
    call
         strcpy
156 .L102:
    movq $2, %r11
157
    movq %r11, 520(%rbx)
158
    movq %r12, 0(%rbp)
    movq %rbx, 0(%r12)
160
    xorq %r8, %r8
161
    movq %r8, 0(%rbx)
162
    movq %rbp, %rax
163
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
165
    movq 24(%rsp), %r12
    addq $40, %rsp
167
    ret
168
    .cfi_endproc
    .type setup_users, @function
170
    .size setup_users, . - setup_users
171
    .text
    .align 16
173
    .globl print_users
175 print_users:
    .cfi_startproc
176
    subq $24, %rsp
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 24
178
    leaq 32(%rsp), %rax
179
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
180
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
181
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
    movq %rdi, %rbx
183
    leaq __stringlit_7(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
186
    xorq %rbp, %rbp
188 .L103:
    cmpq $0, %rbx
je .L104
```

```
leaq 1(%rbp), %rbp
    leaq __stringlit_8(%rip), %rdi
192
    leaq 8(\%rbx), \%rdx
    movq %rbp, %rsi
194
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
196
    movq 0(%rbx), %rbx
197
    jmp .L103
199 .L104:
    leaq __stringlit_9(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
201
    call printf
202
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
204
    addq $24, %rsp
205
    ret
206
    .cfi_endproc
207
    .type print_users, @function
    .size print_users, . - print_users
209
    .text
210
    .align 16
    .globl getUser
212
213 getUser:
    .cfi_startproc
214
    subq $24, %rsp
215
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset
    leaq 32(%rsp), %rax
217
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
218
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
219
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
220
    movq %rsi, %rbp
    movq %rdi, %rbx
222
223 .L105:
    cmpq $0, %rbx
224
    je .L106
225
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
    movq %rbp, %rsi
227
    call strcmp
228
   testl %eax, %eax
229
```

```
je .L107
    movq 0(%rbx), %rbx
    jmp .L105
233 .L106:
    xorq %rbx, %rbx
235 .L107:
    movq %rbx, %rax
236
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
238
    addq $24, %rsp
239
    ret
240
    .cfi_endproc
241
    .type getUser, @function
    .size getUser, . - getUser
243
    .text
244
    .align 16
245
    .globl main
246
247 main:
    .cfi_startproc
248
    subq $536, %rsp
249
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 536
    leaq 544(%rsp), %rax
251
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
253
    call setup_users
254
    movq %rax, %rbx
    leaq __stringlit_10(%rip), %rdi
256
    movl $0, %eax
257
    call printf
258
    leaq __stringlit_11(%rip), %rdi
259
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
261
         __stringlit_12(%rip), %rdi
    leaq
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
263
    movl $0, %eax
264
    call __isoc99_scanf
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
266
    movq %rbx, %rdi
267
    call getUser
268
```

```
movq %rax, %rbx
269
    cmpq $0, %rbx
270
    jne .L108
    leaq __stringlit_13(%rip), %rdi
272
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
    movl $0, %eax
274
    call printf
275
    xorl %eax, %eax
    jmp .L109
277
278 .L108:
    leaq __stringlit_14(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
280
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_12(%rip), %rdi
282
    leaq 272(%rsp), %rsi
283
    movl $0, %eax
284
    call __isoc99_scanf
285
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
    leaq 272(%rsp), %rsi
287
    call strcmp
288
    testl %eax, %eax
    je .L110
290
    leaq __stringlit_15(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
292
    call printf
293
    xorl %eax, %eax
    jmp .L109
295
296 .L110:
    leaq __stringlit_16(%rip), %rdi
297
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rsi
298
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
300
    leaq __stringlit_9(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
303
    leaq __stringlit_17(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rsi
305
    movl $0, %eax
306
   call printf
307
```

```
leaq __stringlit_18(%rip), %rdi
    movq 520(%rbx), %rsi
309
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
311
    xorl %eax, %eax
313 .L109:
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
314
    addq $536, %rsp
    ret
316
    .cfi_endproc
317
    .type main, @function
318
    .size main, . - main
319
    .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
    .ascii "# file:password.c line:20 function:setup_users\n"
321
    .byte 7,8
322
    .quad .L100
323
    .ascii " L((reg(\"rbp\") + 264)) = high\n"
324
    .ascii "# file:password.c line:26 function:setup_users\n"
    .byte 7,8
326
    .quad .L101
327
    .ascii " L((reg(\"r12\") + 264)) = high\n"
    .ascii "# file:password.c line:32 function:setup_users\n"
329
    .byte 7,8
    .quad .L102
   .ascii " L((reg(\"rbx\") + 264)) = high\n"
```

D.12 password-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7

# Command line: password.c -S -03 -o annotated/password-03.s

.section .rodata

.align 1

__stringlit_7:
.ascii "--- USERS ---\012\000"

.type __stringlit_7, @object

.size __stringlit_7, . - __stringlit_7

.section .rodata

.align 1
```

```
11 __stringlit_6:
   .ascii "passw0rd123\000"
   .type __stringlit_6, @object
   .size __stringlit_6, . - __stringlit_6
14
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
17 __stringlit_4:
   .ascii "!alice12!_veuje@@hak\000"
   .type __stringlit_4, @object
   .size __stringlit_4, . - __stringlit_4
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
23 __stringlit_14:
   .ascii "Password: \000"
   .type __stringlit_14, @object
   .size __stringlit_14, . - __stringlit_14
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
29 __stringlit_18:
   .ascii "Your balance: $%ld\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_18, @object
   .size __stringlit_18, . - __stringlit_18
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
34
35 __stringlit_13:
   .ascii "User < %s > does not exist.\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_13, @object
   .size __stringlit_13, . - __stringlit_13
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
41 __stringlit_8:
   .ascii " %02ld. %s\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_8, @object
   .size __stringlit_8, . - __stringlit_8
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
47 __stringlit_1:
  .ascii "admin\000"
.type __stringlit_1, @object
```

```
.size __stringlit_1, . - __stringlit_1
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
53 __stringlit_2:
   .ascii "4dm1n__4eva\000"
   .type __stringlit_2, @object
   .size __stringlit_2, . - __stringlit_2
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
59 __stringlit_3:
   .ascii "alice\000"
   .type __stringlit_3, @object
   .size __stringlit_3, . - __stringlit_3
   .section .rodata
63
  .align 1
65 __stringlit_11:
   .ascii "Username: \000"
   .type __stringlit_11, @object
   .size __stringlit_11, . - __stringlit_11
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
71 __stringlit_5:
   .ascii "abdul\000"
   .type __stringlit_5, @object
   .size __stringlit_5, . - __stringlit_5
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
77 __stringlit_17:
   .ascii "Welcome, %s!\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_17, @object
   .size __stringlit_17, . - __stringlit_17
   .section .rodata
   .align 1
83 __stringlit_12:
   .ascii "%255s\000"
   .type __stringlit_12, @object
  .size __stringlit_12, . - __stringlit_12
86
   .section .rodata
87
88 .align 1
```

```
89 __stringlit_9:
    .ascii "\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_9, @object
    .size __stringlit_9, . - __stringlit_9
92
    .section .rodata
    .align 1
95 __stringlit_15:
    .ascii "ERROR: incorrect password\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_15, @object
    .size __stringlit_15, . - __stringlit_15
    .section .rodata
    .align 1
100
101 __stringlit_10:
    .ascii "Welcome to BigBank Australia!\012\000"
   .type __stringlit_10, @object
    .size __stringlit_10, . - __stringlit_10
104
    .section .rodata
105
    .align 1
107 __stringlit_16:
    .ascii "Logged in as < %s >!\012\000"
    .type __stringlit_16, @object
    .size __stringlit_16, . - __stringlit_16
110
    .text
    .align 16
112
    .globl setup_users
114 setup_users:
    .cfi_startproc
115
   subq $40, %rsp
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 40
117
    leaq 48(%rsp), %rax
118
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
120
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
    movq %r12, 24(%rsp)
    movq $528, %rdi
123
    call malloc
    movq %rax, %rbp
125
    leaq 8(%rbp), %rdi
126
    leaq __stringlit_1(%rip), %rsi
127
```

```
call strcpy
    leaq 264(%rbp), %rdi
129
         __stringlit_2(%rip), %rsi
    leaq
    call
         strcpy
131
132 .L100:
    movq $1000000, %r10
    movq %r10, 520(%rbp)
134
    movq $528, %rdi
    call malloc
136
    movq %rax, %r12
137
    leaq 8(%r12), %rdi
138
    leaq __stringlit_3(%rip), %rsi
139
    call strcpy
    leaq 264(%r12), %rdi
141
    leaq __stringlit_4(%rip), %rsi
142
    call
         strcpy
144 .L101:
    movq $783, %r9
    movq %r9, 520(%r12)
146
    movq $528, %rdi
147
    call malloc
    movq %rax, %rbx
149
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
    leaq __stringlit_5(%rip), %rsi
151
    call strcpy
152
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
    leaq __stringlit_6(%rip), %rsi
154
    call
         strcpy
156 .L102:
    movq $2, %r11
157
    movq %r11, 520(%rbx)
    movq %r12, O(%rbp)
    movq %rbx, O(%r12)
160
    xorq %r8, %r8
161
    movq %r8, 0(%rbx)
162
    movq %rbp, %rax
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
164
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
    movq 24(%rsp), %r12
166
```

```
addq $40, %rsp
167
    ret
168
    .cfi_endproc
    .type setup_users, @function
170
    .size setup_users, . - setup_users
    .text
172
    .align 16
173
    .globl print_users
175 print_users:
    .cfi_startproc
    subq $24, %rsp
177
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 24
178
    leaq 32(%rsp), %rax
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
180
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
181
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
182
    movq %rdi, %rbp
183
    leaq __stringlit_7(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
185
    call printf
    xorq %rbx, %rbx
188 .L103:
    cmpq $0, %rbp
    je .L104
190
    leaq 1(%rbx), %rbx
191
    leaq __stringlit_8(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 8(%rbp), %rdx
193
    movq %rbx, %rsi
    movl $0, %eax
195
    call printf
196
    movq 0(%rbp), %rbp
    jmp .L103
198
199 .L104:
    leaq __stringlit_9(%rip), %rdi
200
    movl $0, %eax
201
    call printf
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
203
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
204
    addq $24, %rsp
205
```

```
ret
    .cfi_endproc
207
    .type print_users, @function
    .size print_users, . - print_users
209
    .text
210
    .align 16
211
    .globl getUser
212
213 getUser:
214
    .cfi_startproc
    subq $24, %rsp
215
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset
216
    leaq 32(%rsp), %rax
217
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
219
    movq %rbp, 16(%rsp)
220
    movq %rsi, %rbp
221
    movq %rdi, %rbx
222
223 .L105:
    cmpq $0, %rbx
224
    je .L106
225
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
    movq %rbp, %rsi
227
    call strcmp
    testl %eax, %eax
229
    je .L107
230
    movq 0(%rbx), %rbx
    jmp .L105
232
233 .L106:
    xorq %rbx, %rbx
234
235 .L107:
    movq %rbx, %rax
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
237
    movq 16(%rsp), %rbp
238
    addq $24, %rsp
    ret
240
    .cfi_endproc
241
    .type getUser, @function
242
    .size getUser, . - getUser
243
   .text
244
```

```
.align 16
    .globl main
246
247 main:
    .cfi_startproc
248
    subq $536, %rsp
    .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset
                              536
250
    leaq 544(%rsp), %rax
251
    movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
    movq %rbx, 8(%rsp)
253
    call setup_users
254
    movq %rax, %rbx
255
    leaq __stringlit_10(%rip), %rdi
256
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
258
    leaq __stringlit_11(%rip), %rdi
259
    movl $0, %eax
260
    call printf
261
          __stringlit_12(%rip), %rdi
    leaq
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
263
    movl $0, %eax
264
    call __isoc99_scanf
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
266
    movq %rbx, %rdi
    call getUser
268
    movq %rax, %rbx
269
    cmpq $0, %rbx
270
    jne .L108
271
    leaq __stringlit_13(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 16(%rsp), %rsi
273
    movl $0, %eax
274
    call printf
    xorl %eax, %eax
276
    jmp .L109
277
278 .L108:
    leaq __stringlit_14(%rip), %rdi
279
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
281
    leaq __stringlit_12(%rip), %rdi
282
    leaq 272(%rsp), %rsi
283
```

```
movl $0, %eax
    call __isoc99_scanf
285
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
    leaq 272(%rsp), %rsi
287
    call strcmp
    testl %eax, %eax
289
    je .L110
    leaq __stringlit_15(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
292
    call printf
    xorl %eax, %eax
294
    jmp .L109
295
296 .L110:
    leaq __stringlit_16(%rip), %rdi
297
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rsi
298
    movl $0, %eax
299
    call printf
300
    leaq __stringlit_9(%rip), %rdi
    movl $0, %eax
302
    call printf
    leaq __stringlit_17(%rip), %rdi
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rsi
305
    movl $0, %eax
    call printf
307
    leaq __stringlit_18(%rip), %rdi
308
    movq 520(%rbx), %rsi
    movl $0, %eax
310
    call printf
    xorl %eax, %eax
312
313 .L109:
    movq 8(%rsp), %rbx
    addq $536, %rsp
315
    ret
316
    .cfi_endproc
317
    .type main, @function
318
    .size main, . - main
    .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
320
    .ascii "# file:password.c line:20 function:setup_users\n"
321
   .byte 7,8
322
```

```
.quad .L100
.ascii " L((reg(\"rbp\") + 264)) = high\n"
.ascii "# file:password.c line:26 function:setup_users\n"
.byte 7,8
.quad .L101
.ascii " L((reg(\"r12\") + 264)) = high\n"
.ascii "# file:password.c line:32 function:setup_users\n"
.byte 7,8
.quad .L102
.ascii " L((reg(\"rbx\") + 264)) = high\n"
```

D.13 deadStoreElimination-O0.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7
# Command line: deadStoreElimination.c -S -00 -o
     annotated/deadStoreElimination-00.s
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl deadStore
6 deadStore:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   movl $43981, %ecx
13 .L100:
  nop
15 .L101:
   cmpl %esi, %edi
  jle .L102
  leal -1(%edi), %edi
   jmp .L101
20 .L102:
   leal 0(%edi,%esi,1), %eax
  addq $8, %rsp
   ret
23
24 .cfi_endproc
```

```
.type deadStore, @function
   .size deadStore, . - deadStore
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
30 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
33
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
   movl $2, %esi
   call deadStore
   xorl %eax, %eax
38
   addq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_endproc
41
   .type main, Ofunction
   .size main, . - main
43
   .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","",@note
   .ascii "# file:deadStoreElimination.c line:3 function:deadStore\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L100
  .ascii " L(reg(\rcx\")) = high\n"
```

D.14 deadStoreElimination-O3.s

```
# File generated by CompCert 3.7

# Command line: deadStoreElimination.c -S -03 -o
          annotated/deadStoreElimination-03.s

.text

.align 16
.globl deadStore

deadStore:

.cfi_startproc

subq $8, %rsp

.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8

leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
```

```
movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
12 .L100:
13 nop
14 .L101:
  cmpl %esi, %edi
16 jle .L102
17 leal -1(%edi), %edi
  jmp .L101
19 .L102:
   leal 0(%edi,%esi,1), %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
22
   .cfi_endproc
   .type deadStore, @function
24
   .size deadStore, . - deadStore
   .text
   .align 16
   .globl main
29 main:
   .cfi_startproc
   subq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
   leaq 16(%rsp), %rax
   movq %rax, 0(%rsp)
34
   movl $2, %esi
   call deadStore
   xorl %eax, %eax
   addq $8, %rsp
   ret
   .cfi_endproc
   .type main, Ofunction
   .size main, . - main
42
   .section "__compcert_ais_annotations","", @note
43
   .ascii "# file:deadStoreElimination.c line:3 function:deadStore\n"
   .byte 7,8
   .quad .L100
   .ascii " L(43981) = high n"
47
```

D.15 pread-O0.s

```
ipread.c:6: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e1'
    is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:7: error: access to volatile variable 'x' for parameter '%e1'
    is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:7: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
    is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:20: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
    is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:21: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e3'
    is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:21: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e3'
    is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:23: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
    is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:23: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
    is not supported in ais annotations
```

D.16 pread-O3.s

```
ipread.c:6: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e1'
   is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:7: error: access to volatile variable 'x' for parameter '%e1'
   is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:7: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
   is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:20: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
   is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:21: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e3'
   is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:21: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e3'
   is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:23: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
   is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:23: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
   is not supported in ais annotations
pread.c:23: error: access to volatile variable 'z' for parameter '%e2'
   is not supported in ais annotations
```

Appendix E

Inline Assembly Annotated C Programs

E.1 comment.c

```
int main() {
    asm("# CRITICAL COMMENT");
    return 0;
4 }
```

E.2 variable.c

```
int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
    // a = int
    // b = char
    // c = unsigned int
    // d = short
    // e = long
    // x = float
    // y = double
    int a = -10;
    asm("# annotation: %0 = int" : : "X"(a));
    char b = 'b';
    asm("# annotation: %0 = char" : : "X"(b));
```

```
unsigned int c = -b;
      asm("# annotation: %0 = unsigned int" : : "X"(c));
14
     short d = 0x1;
     asm("# annotation: %0 = short" : : "X"(d));
     long e = 4294967296;
     asm("# annotation: %0 = long" : : "X"(e));
18
     float x = 3.141592653589793;
19
     asm("# annotation: %0 = float" : : "X"(x));
     double y = x / 2.3784;
    asm("# annotation: %0 = double" : : "X"(y));
    return (int)(e / 32) + (int)a + (int)c + (int)d + (int) x + (int)
    y + argc;
24 }
```

E.3 volatile.c

```
volatile int x;

int main() {
    asm("# annotation: %0 = High" : : "X"(x));
    return x + 1;

}
```

E.4 loop.c

```
int z;
int x;

4 // security policies
5 // {L(z)=true}
6 // {L(x)=z % 2 == 0}

7

8 // predicates on initial state
9 // {_P_0: r1 % 2 == 0}
10 // {_Gamma_0: r1 -> LOW, r2 -> LOW}

11
12 int main() {
13  int r1 = 0;
```

```
// \{L(r2) = False\}
      int r2 = 0;
      while(1) {
17
      do {
          // {_invariant: r1 % 2 == 0 /\ r1 <= z}
19
           // \{ Gamma: r1 \rightarrow LOW, r2 \rightarrow (r1 == z), z \rightarrow LOW \}
          do {
               // {_invariant: r1 <= z}
22
               // {_Gamma: r1 -> LOW}
               r1 = z;
           } while (r1 %2 != 0);
               r2 = x;
           } while (z != r1);
27
      }
      return r2;
29
30 }
```

E.5 rooster.c

```
int rooster;
2 int drake;
3 // MEDIUM
4 int goose;
6 int fun(int a, int b, int c) {
     // CRITICAL COMMENT
     static int count = 0;
     int sum = a + b + c;
     if (sum < 0) {</pre>
         return sum;
11
     }
12
     if (a < b && b < c) {</pre>
         while (a != b) {
14
              a++;
              count++;
16
              while (b != c) {
17
                   c--;
```

```
count++;
19
               }
          }
22
      return count;
24 }
25
26 int main(void) {
      // EXCEPTIONAL
     rooster = 1;
     drake = 5;
      goose = 10;
30
     int result;
      result = fun(rooster, drake, goose);
      return 0;
33
34 }
```

E.6 password.c

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

#define BUFF_LEN 256

#typedef struct user_t user_t;

#struct user_t {

| user_t* next;
| char name[BUFF_LEN];
| // L(password) = High
| char password[BUFF_LEN];

#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdlib.h

#include <stdlib.
```

```
strcpy(user_admin->password, "4dm1n__4eva");
      user_admin->balance = 1000000;
      user_t* user_alice = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
23
      strcpy(user_alice->name, "alice");
      strcpy(user_alice->password, "!alice12!_veuje@@hak");
25
      user_alice->balance = 783;
      user_t* user_abdul = malloc(sizeof(user_t));
28
      strcpy(user_abdul->name, "abdul");
      strcpy(user_abdul ->password, "passw0rd123");
30
      user_abdul->balance = 2;
      user_admin->next = user_alice;
33
      user_alice->next = user_abdul;
      user_abdul ->next = NULL;
35
     return user_admin;
38 }
40 void print_users(user_t* users) {
      printf("--- USERS ---\n");
      size_t count = 0;
      while (users != NULL) {
          printf(" %02ld. %s\n", ++count, users->name);
          users = users->next;
46
     printf("\n");
48 }
50 user_t* getUser(user_t* user_list, char* name) {
      while (user_list != NULL) {
          if (strcmp(user_list->name, name) == 0) {
              return user_list;
          }
          user_list = user_list->next;
      }
56
     return NULL;
58 }
```

```
60 int main() {
      user_t* users = setup_users();
62
      printf("Welcome to BigBank Australia!\n");
64
      char username[BUFF_LEN];
      printf("Username: ");
      scanf("%255s", username);
67
      user_t* user = getUser(users, username);
69
      if (user == NULL) {
          printf("User < %s > does not exist.\n", username);
          return 0;
72
      }
74
      char password[BUFF_LEN];
75
      printf("Password: ");
      scanf("%255s", password);
77
      if (strcmp(user->password, password) != 0) {
          printf("ERROR: incorrect password\n");
          return 0;
80
      }
82
      printf("Logged in as < %s >!\n", user->name);
      printf("\n");
84
      printf("Welcome, %s!\n", user->name);
85
      printf("Your balance: $%ld\n", user->balance);
87 }
```

E.7 deadStoreElimination.c

```
int deadStore(int i, int n) {
   int key = 0xabcd;
   // L(key) = high

// do some work
   int result = 0;
```

```
while (i > n) {
    result += key;
    i--;
}

// clear out our secret key
key = 0;
return i + n;

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    deadStore(argc, 2);
}
```

E.8 pread.c

```
volatile int z;
volatile int x;
4 // security policies
5 // {L(z)=true}
_{6} // {L(x)=z % 2 == 0}
8 // predicates on initial state
9 // {_P_0: r1 % 2 == 0}
10 // {_Gamma_0: r1 -> LOW, r2 -> LOW}
12 int main() {
   int r1 = 0;
     // {L(r2)=False}
     int r2 = 0;
     while(1) {
         // {_invariant: r1 % 2 == 0 /\ r1 <= z}
         // {_Gamma: r1 -> LOW, r2 -> (r1 == z), z -> LOW}
         do {
21
         // {_invariant: r1 <= z}
```

```
// {_Gamma: r1 -> LOW}

r1 = z;

while (r1 %2 != 0);

r2 = x;

while (z != r1);

return r2;
```

Appendix F

Inline Assembly Annotated Assembly Output

F.1 comment-O0.s

```
.text
.file "comment.c"
3 .globl main
                                 # -- Begin function main
   .p2align 4, 0x90
5 .type main, @function
6 main:
                                       # @main
   .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
9 pushq %rbp
  .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
.cfi_offset %rbp, -16
movq %rsp, %rbp
  .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
  movl \$0, -4(\%rbp)
  #APP
   # CRITICAL COMMENT
17 #NO_APP
  xorl %eax, %eax
popq %rbp
```

```
cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
retq
Lfunc_end0:
    .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
    .cfi_endproc
    # -- End function
    .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
    .section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
    .addrsig
```

F.2 comment-O3.s

```
.text
  .file "comment.c"
3 .globl main
                                  # -- Begin function main
  .p2align 4, 0x90
  .type main, @function
6 main:
                                         # @main
  .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
9 #APP
# CRITICAL COMMENT
  #NO_APP
xorl %eax, %eax
13 retq
14 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                         # -- End function
  .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
   .section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
20 .addrsig
```

F.3 variable-O0.s

```
.text
.file "variable.c"
.section .rodata.cst8,"aM",@progbits,8
```

```
4 .p2align 3
                        # -- Begin function main
5 .LCPI0_0:
   .quad 4612538099476886402 # double 2.378400000000001
   .section .rodata.cst4, "aM", @progbits,4
  .p2align 2
9 .LCPIO_1:
   .long 1078530011
                                 # float 3.14159274
   .text
   .globl main
13 .p2align 4, 0x90
.type main, @function
15 main:
                                         # @main
  .cfi_startproc
17 # %bb.0:
   pushq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
   movq %rsp, %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
22
   mov1 \$0, -4(\%rbp)
   movl %edi, -8(%rbp)
   movq %rsi, -16(%rbp)
   movl $-10, -20(%rbp)
   movl -20(\%rbp), \%eax
27
   #APP
   # annotation: %eax = int
   #NO_APP
30
   movb $98, -21(%rbp)
   movb -21(\%rbp), %cl
32
   #APP
   # annotation: %cl = char
   #NO_APP
35
   xorl %eax, %eax
   movsbl -21(\%rbp), \%edx
   subl %edx, %eax
   mov1 \%eax, -28(\%rbp)
   movl -28(\%rbp), \%eax
40
   #APP
41
# annotation: %eax = unsigned int
```

```
#NO_APP
   movw $1, -30(%rbp)
   movw -30(%rbp), %r8w
   #APP
46
   # annotation: %r8w = short
   #NO_APP
48
   movabsq $4294967296, %rsi
                                 # imm = 0x100000000
49
   movq %rsi, -40(%rbp)
   movq -40(%rbp), %rsi
51
   #APP
   # annotation: %rsi = long
53
   #NO_APP
54
   movss .LCPIO_1(%rip), %xmm0 # xmm0 = mem[0],zero,zero,zero
   movss %xmm0, -44(%rbp)
56
   movss -44(%rbp), %xmm0
                                 # xmm0 = mem[0],zero,zero,zero
   #APP
   # annotation: %xmm0 = float
   #NO_APP
   movsd .LCPI0_0(%rip), %xmm0 # xmm0 = mem[0],zero
61
   movss -44(%rbp), %xmm1
                                 # xmm1 = mem[0],zero,zero,zero
   cvtss2sd %xmm1, %xmm1
   divsd %xmm0, %xmm1
64
   movsd %xmm1, -56(%rbp)
   movsd -56(%rbp), %xmm0 # xmm0 = mem[0], zero
66
   #APP
   # annotation: %xmm0 = double
   #NO_APP
   movq -40(\%rbp), \%rax
   cqto
71
   mov1 $32, %esi
   idivq %rsi
                                          # kill: def $eax killed $eax
74
   killed $rax
   addl -20(%rbp), %eax
   addl -28(\%rbp), \%eax
   movswl -30(%rbp), %edi
   addl %edi, %eax
78
   cvttss2si -44(%rbp), %edi
80 addl %edi, %eax
```

```
cvttsd2si -56(%rbp), %edi
addl %edi, %eax
addl -8(%rbp), %eax

popq %rbp
cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8

retq
Lfunc_end0:
size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
cfi_endproc

# -- End function

ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"

section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
addrsig
```

F.4 variable-O3.s

```
1 .text
.file "variable.c"
  .section .rodata.cst4, "aM", @progbits,4
  .p2align 2
                           # -- Begin function main
5 .LCPI0_0:
6 .long 1078530011
                                # float 3.14159274
  .section .rodata.cst8, "aM", @progbits,8
  .p2align 3
9 .LCPI0_1:
  .quad 4608627556095693531 # double 1.3208849398808329
   .text
12 .globl main
.p2align 4, 0x90
.type main, @function
15 main:
                                         # @main
.cfi_startproc
17 # %bb.0:
                                        # kill: def $edi killed $edi
    def $rdi
19 #APP
_{20} # annotation: $-10 = int
21 #NO_APP
```

```
#APP
   \# annotation: $98 = char
   #NO_APP
   #APP
25
   # annotation: $-98 = unsigned int
   #APP
   # annotation: $1 = short
   #NO_APP
30
   #APP
   # annotation: $4294967296 = long
   #NO_APP
   movss .LCPIO_0(%rip), %xmm0 # xmm0 = mem[0],zero,zero,zero
   # annotation: %xmm0 = float
   #NO_APP
   movsd .LCPI0_1(%rip), %xmm0 # xmm0 = mem[0],zero
   #APP
   # annotation: %xmm0 = double
   #NO_APP
   leal 134217625(%rdi), %eax
   retq
44 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                          # -- End function
   .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
   .section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
50 .addrsig
```

F.5 volatile-O0.s

```
1 .text
2 .file "volatile.c"
3 .globl main # -- Begin function main
4 .p2align 4, 0x90
5 .type main, @function
6 main: # @main
```

```
7 .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
   pushq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
   movq %rsp, %rbp
12
   .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
   mov1 \$0, -4(\%rbp)
   movl x, %eax
15
   #APP
   # annotation: %eax = High
   #NO_APP
   movl x, %eax
   addl $1, %eax
20
   popq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
   retq
23
24 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                          # -- End function
   .type x,@object
                                 # @x
   .comm x, 4, 4
    .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
   .section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
    .addrsig
  .addrsig_sym x
```

F.6 volatile-O3.s

```
1 .text
2 .file "volatile.c"
3 .globl main  # -- Begin function main
4 .p2align 4, 0x90
5 .type main,@function
6 main:  # @main
7 .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
```

```
movl x(%rip), %eax
   #APP
   # annotation: %eax = High
   #NO_APP
   movl x(%rip), %eax
   addl $1, %eax
   retq
16 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                          # -- End function
   .type x,@object
                                 # 0x
   .comm x, 4, 4
   .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
   .section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
   .addrsig
  .addrsig_sym x
```

F.7 loop-O0.s

```
.text
  .file "loop.c"
  .globl main
                                   # -- Begin function main
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type main, @function
6 main:
                                         # @main
7 .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
  pushq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
  .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
   movq %rsp, %rbp
  .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
  movl \$0, -4(\%rbp)
  movl $0, -8(%rbp)
   movl $0, -12(%rbp)
17 .LBB0_1:
                                         # =>This Loop Header: Depth=1
                                         # Child Loop BBO_2 Depth 2
```

```
Child Loop BBO_3 Depth
     3
   jmp .LBB0_2
21 .LBB0_2:
                                          # Parent Loop BB0_1 Depth=1
                                          # => This Loop Header: Depth=2
                                                  Child Loop BB0_3 Depth
     3
   jmp .LBB0_3
                                              Parent Loop BBO_1 Depth=1
25 .LBB0_3:
                                                Parent Loop BBO_2 Depth=2
                                                 This Inner Loop
    Header: Depth=3
   movl z, %eax
   mov1 \%eax, -8(\%rbp)
30 # %bb.4:
                                            in Loop: Header=BB0_3
    Depth=3
  movl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
   cltd
   movl $2, %ecx
  idivl %ecx
   cmpl $0, %edx
   jne .LBB0_3
37 # %bb.5:
                                          # in Loop: Header=BB0_2
    Depth=2
  movl x, %eax
   movl \%eax, -12(\%rbp)
40 # %bb.6:
                                            in Loop: Header=BB0_2
    Depth=2
  movl z, %eax
  cmpl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
   jne .LBB0_2
44 # %bb.7:
                                            in Loop: Header=BB0_1
    Depth=1
   jmp .LBB0_1
46 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                          # -- End function
49
50 .type z,@object
                                  # @z
```

```
comm z,4,4

type x,@object # @x

comm x,4,4

ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"

section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits

addrsig

addrsig_sym z

addrsig_sym x
```

F.8 loop-O3.s

```
ı .text
2 .file "loop.c"
3 .globl main
                                   # -- Begin function main
  .p2align 4, 0x90
5 .type main, @function
                                         # @main
6 main:
7 .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
9 testb $1, z(%rip)
jne .LBB0_2
  .p2align 4, 0x90
12 .LBB0_1:
                                         # =>This Inner Loop Header:
   Depth=1
13 jmp .LBB0_1
   .p2align 4, 0x90
15 .LBB0_2:
                                         # =>This Inner Loop Header:
    Depth=1
  jmp .LBB0_2
17 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                         # -- End function
   .type z,@object
                                 # @z
   .comm z,4,4
   .type x,@object
                                 # @x
   .comm x,4,4
24
.ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
```

```
.section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
.addrsig
```

F.9 rooster-O0.s

```
.text
   .file "rooster.c"
   .globl fun
                                     # -- Begin function fun
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type fun, @function
6 fun:
                                           # @fun
    .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
   pushq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
   movq %rsp, %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
   movl \%edi, -8(\%rbp)
14
   movl %esi, -12(%rbp)
   movl \%edx, -16(\%rbp)
   movl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
   addl -12(%rbp), %eax
   addl -16(%rbp), %eax
   movl \%eax, -20(\%rbp)
   cmpl $0, -20(\%rbp)
   jge .LBB0_2
22
23 # %bb.1:
   movl -20(\%rbp), \%eax
   mov1 \%eax, -4(\%rbp)
   jmp .LBB0_12
27 .LBB0_2:
  movl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
  cmpl -12(\%rbp), \%eax
   jge .LBB0_11
31 # %bb.3:
   movl -12(\%rbp), \%eax
32
cmpl -16(%rbp), %eax
```

```
35 # %bb.4:
  jmp .LBB0_5
37 .LBB0_5:
                                         # =>This Loop Header: Depth=1
                                         # Child Loop BBO_7 Depth 2
   movl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
  cmpl -12(\%rbp), \%eax
   je .LBB0_10
42 # %bb.6:
                                         # in Loop: Header=BB0_5
   Depth=1
  movl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
   addl $1, %eax
   movl \%eax, -8(\%rbp)
   movl fun.count, %eax
   addl $1, %eax
   movl %eax, fun.count
49 .LBB0_7:
                                         # Parent Loop BB0_5 Depth=1
                                         # => This Inner Loop Header:
    Depth=2
  movl -12(\%rbp), \%eax
   cmpl -16(\%rbp), \%eax
je .LBB0_9
54 # %bb.8:
                                         # in Loop: Header=BB0_7
    Depth=2
   movl -16(\%rbp), \%eax
   addl $-1, %eax
   movl \%eax, -16(\%rbp)
   movl fun.count, %eax
   addl $1, %eax
59
   movl %eax, fun.count
   jmp .LBB0_7
62 .LBB0_9:
                                          in Loop: Header=BB0_5
    Depth=1
   jmp .LBB0_5
64 .LBB0_10:
   jmp .LBB0_11
66 .LBB0_11:
movl fun.count, %eax
movl \%eax, -4(\%rbp)
```

```
69 .LBB0_12:
    movl -4(\%rbp), \%eax
    popq %rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
72
    retq
74 .Lfunc_end0:
    .size fun, .Lfunc_end0-fun
    .cfi_endproc
                                            # -- End function
77
    .globl main
                                      # -- Begin function main
    .p2align 4, 0x90
    .type main, @function
81 main:
                                            # @main
    .cfi_startproc
82
83 # %bb.0:
    pushq %rbp
84
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
    .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
    movq %rsp, %rbp
87
    .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
    subq $16, %rsp
    movl \$0, -4(\%rbp)
90
    movl $1, rooster
    movl $5, drake
92
    movl $10, goose
    movl rooster, %edi
    movl drake, %esi
95
    movl goose, %edx
    callq fun
97
    xorl %ecx, %ecx
    mov1 \%eax, -8(\%rbp)
    movl %ecx, %eax
100
    addq $16, %rsp
101
    popq %rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
    retq
105 .Lfunc_end1:
    .size main, .Lfunc_end1-main
.cfi_endproc
```

```
# -- End function
    .type fun.count,@object
                                   # @fun.count
109
    .local fun.count
    .comm fun.count,4,4
111
    .type rooster,@object
                                  # @rooster
    .comm rooster,4,4
113
    .type drake,@object
                                  # @drake
114
    .comm drake,4,4
    .type goose,@object
                                  # @goose
116
    .comm goose,4,4
117
    .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
    .section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
119
    .addrsig
    .addrsig_sym fun
121
   .addrsig_sym fun.count
122
    .addrsig_sym rooster
    .addrsig_sym drake
124
   .addrsig_sym goose
```

F.10 rooster-O3.s

```
ı .text
2 .file "rooster.c"
3 .globl fun
                                  # -- Begin function fun
   .p2align 4, 0x90
5 .type fun, @function
6 fun:
                                         # @fun
7 .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
                                         # kill: def $edx killed $edx
   def $rdx
                                         # kill: def $esi killed $esi
   def $rsi
                                         # kill: def $edi killed $edi
   def $rdi
  leal (%rsi,%rdi), %eax
   addl %edx, %eax
14 js .LBB0_9
```

```
15 # %bb.1:
   movl fun.count(%rip), %eax
  cmpl %esi, %edi
   jge .LBB0_9
19 # %bb.2:
   cmpl %edx, %esi
jge .LBB0_9
22 # %bb.3:
   leal 1(%rdi), %ecx
23
  cmpl %esi, %ecx
  jne .LBB0_5
26 # %bb.4:
  subl %esi, %eax
  addl %edx, %eax
  addl $1, %eax
   jmp .LBB0_8
31 .LBB0_5:
  addl $-1, %esi
   .p2align 4, 0x90
34 .LBB0_6:
                                         # =>This Inner Loop Header:
    Depth=1
  addl $-1, %esi
  cmpl %esi, %edi
   jne .LBB0_6
38 # %bb.7:
   addl %edx, %eax
subl %esi, %eax
41 .LBB0_8:
   movl %eax, fun.count(%rip)
43 .LBB0_9:
                                         # kill: def $eax killed $eax
    killed $rax
   retq
46 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size fun, .Lfunc_end0-fun
   .cfi_endproc
                                         # -- End function
49
                                   # -- Begin function main
   .globl main
50
.p2align 4, 0x90
```

```
.type main, @function
                                         # @main
53 main:
   .cfi_startproc
55 # %bb.0:
   movl $1, rooster(%rip)
   movl $5, drake(%rip)
   movl $10, goose(%rip)
   addl $9, fun.count(%rip)
   xorl %eax, %eax
   retq
62 .Lfunc_end1:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end1-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                         # -- End function
   .type fun.count,@object # @fun.count
   .local fun.count
   .comm fun.count,4,4
   .type rooster,@object
                                # @rooster
   .comm rooster,4,4
                                 # @drake
   .type drake,@object
   .comm drake,4,4
   .type goose,@object
                                # @goose
   .comm goose,4,4
   .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
   .section ".note.GNU-stack","", @progbits
77 .addrsig
```

F.11 password-O0.s

```
.cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
    .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
11
   movq %rsp, %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
13
   subq $80, %rsp
   mov1 $528, %edi
                                  # imm = 0x210
15
   callq malloc
   movq %rax, -8(%rbp)
   movq -8(%rbp), %rax
18
   addq $8, %rax
   movl $.L.str, %esi
20
   movq %rax, %rdi
   callq strcpy
   movq -8(\%rbp), \%rcx
23
   addq $264, %rcx
                                  # imm = 0x108
   movl $.L.str.1, %esi
25
   movq %rcx, %rdi
   movq %rax, -32(%rbp)
                                 # 8-byte Spill
   callq strcpy
28
   movq -8(%rbp), %rcx
   movq $1000000, 520(%rcx)
                                 # imm = 0xF4240
30
   movl $528, %edi
                                 # imm = 0x210
31
   movq %rax, -40(%rbp)
                                  # 8-byte Spill
   callq malloc
33
   movq %rax, -16(%rbp)
   movq -16(%rbp), %rax
35
   addq $8, %rax
36
   movl $.L.str.2, %esi
   movq %rax, %rdi
38
   callq strcpy
39
   movq -16(\%rbp), %rcx
40
   addq $264, %rcx
                                  # imm = 0x108
41
   movl $.L.str.3, %esi
   movq %rcx, %rdi
43
   movq %rax, -48(%rbp)
                                 # 8-byte Spill
44
   callq strcpy
   movq -16(%rbp), %rcx
46
   movq $783, 520(%rcx)
                                  # imm = 0x30F
   mov1 $528, %edi
                                  # imm = 0x210
48
```

```
movq %rax, -56(%rbp)
                                 # 8-byte Spill
   callq malloc
   movq %rax, -24(%rbp)
   movq -24(%rbp), %rax
52
   addq $8, %rax
   movl $.L.str.4, %esi
54
   movq %rax, %rdi
   callq strcpy
   movq -24(\%rbp), \%rcx
57
   addq $264, %rcx
                                  # imm = 0x108
   movl $.L.str.5, %esi
59
   movq %rcx, %rdi
   movq %rax, -64(%rbp)
                                 # 8-byte Spill
   callq strcpy
62
   movq -24(\%rbp), \%rcx
   movq $2, 520(%rcx)
64
   movq -16(%rbp), %rcx
   movq -8(\%rbp), \%rdx
   movq %rcx, (%rdx)
67
   movq -24(%rbp), %rcx
   movq -16(%rbp), %rdx
   movq %rcx, (%rdx)
70
   movq -24(\%rbp), %rcx
   movq $0, (%rcx)
72
   movq -8(\%rbp), \%rcx
   movq %rax, -72(%rbp)
                                 # 8-byte Spill
74
   movq %rcx, %rax
   addq $80, %rsp
   popq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
   retq
80 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size setup_users, .Lfunc_end0-setup_users
   .cfi_endproc
82
                                          # -- End function
83
   .globl print_users
                                    # -- Begin function print_users
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type print_users,@function
87 print_users:
                                          # @print_users
```

```
.cfi_startproc
89 # %bb.0:
    pushq %rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
91
    .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
    movq %rsp, %rbp
93
    .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
    subq $16, %rsp
    movq %rdi, -8(%rbp)
96
    movabsq $.L.str.6, %rdi
    movb $0, %al
    callq printf
99
    movq $0, -16(%rbp)
101 .LBB1_1:
                                            # =>This Inner Loop Header:
    Depth=1
    cmpq $0, -8(\%rbp)
    je .LBB1_3
103
104 # %bb.2:
                                               in Loop: Header=BB1_1
     Depth=1
    movq -16(%rbp), %rax
105
    addq $1, %rax
    movq %rax, -16(%rbp)
107
    movq -8(\%rbp), %rcx
    addq $8, %rcx
109
    movabsq $.L.str.7, %rdi
110
    movq %rax, %rsi
    movq %rcx, %rdx
112
    movb $0, %al
113
    callq printf
114
    movq -8(\%rbp), %rcx
115
    movq (%rcx), %rcx
    movq %rcx, -8(%rbp)
117
    jmp .LBB1_1
119 .LBB1_3:
    movabsq $.L.str.8, %rdi
    movb $0, %al
121
   callq printf
122
    addq $16, %rsp
123
popq %rbp
```

```
.cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
    retq
126
127 .Lfunc_end1:
    .size print_users, .Lfunc_end1-print_users
    .cfi_endproc
                                             # -- End function
130
    .globl getUser
                                      # -- Begin function getUser
131
    .p2align 4, 0x90
    .type getUser,@function
134 getUser:
                                             # @getUser
    .cfi_startproc
136 # %bb.0:
    pushq %rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
139
    movq %rsp, %rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
141
    subq $32, %rsp
    movq %rdi, -16(%rbp)
143
    movq %rsi, -24(%rbp)
144
145 .LBB2_1:
                                             # =>This Inner Loop Header:
     Depth=1
    cmpq $0, -16(%rbp)
    je .LBB2_5
148 # %bb.2:
                                                in Loop: Header=BB2_1
    Depth=1
    movq -16(\%rbp), \%rax
149
    addq $8, %rax
150
    movq -24(%rbp), %rsi
151
    movq %rax, %rdi
152
    callq strcmp
    cmpl $0, %eax
154
    jne .LBB2_4
155
156 # %bb.3:
    movq -16(\%rbp), \%rax
157
    movq %rax, -8(%rbp)
    jmp .LBB2_6
159
160 .LBB2_4:
                                               in Loop: Header=BB2_1
     Depth=1
```

```
movq -16(\%rbp), \%rax
161
    movq (%rax), %rax
162
    movq %rax, -16(%rbp)
    jmp .LBB2_1
164
165 .LBB2_5:
    movq \$0, -8(\%rbp)
167 .LBB2_6:
    movq -8(%rbp), %rax
    addq $32, %rsp
169
    popq %rbp
170
    .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
171
    retq
172
173 .Lfunc_end2:
    .size getUser, .Lfunc_end2-getUser
174
    .cfi_endproc
175
                                              # -- End function
176
    .globl main
                                       # -- Begin function main
177
    .p2align 4, 0x90
    .type main, @function
179
180 main:
                                              # @main
    .cfi_startproc
182 # %bb.0:
    pushq %rbp
183
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
184
    .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
185
    movq %rsp, %rbp
    .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
187
    subq $576, %rsp
                                    # imm = 0x240
    mov1 \$0, -4(\%rbp)
189
    callq setup_users
190
    movq %rax, -16(%rbp)
    movabsq $.L.str.9, %rdi
192
    movb $0, %al
193
    callq printf
194
    movabsq $.L.str.10, %rdi
195
    movl %eax, -548(%rbp)
                                # 4-byte Spill
    movb $0, %al
197
    callq printf
198
    leaq -272(%rbp), %rsi
199
```

```
movabsq $.L.str.11, %rdi
    movl %eax, -552(%rbp)
                                   # 4-byte Spill
201
    movb $0, %al
    callq __isoc99_scanf
203
    leaq -272(%rbp), %rsi
    movq -16(%rbp), %rdi
205
    movl \%eax, -556(\%rbp)
                                   # 4-byte Spill
206
    callq getUser
    movq %rax, -280(%rbp)
208
    cmpq $0, -280(\%rbp)
    jne .LBB3_2
210
211 # %bb.1:
    leaq -272(%rbp), %rsi
    movabsq $.L.str.12, %rdi
213
    movb $0, %al
214
    callq printf
215
    mov1 \$0, -4(\%rbp)
216
    jmp .LBB3_5
218 .LBB3_2:
    movabsq $.L.str.13, %rdi
219
    movb $0, %al
    callq printf
221
    leaq -544(%rbp), %rsi
    movabsq $.L.str.11, %rdi
223
    movl %eax, -560(%rbp)
                                   # 4-byte Spill
224
    movb $0, %al
    callq __isoc99_scanf
226
    leaq -544(%rbp), %rsi
    movq -280(%rbp), %rcx
228
    addq $264, %rcx
                                    # imm = 0x108
229
    movq %rcx, %rdi
    movl %eax, -564(%rbp)
                                   # 4-byte Spill
231
    callq strcmp
232
    cmpl $0, %eax
    je .LBB3_4
234
235 # %bb.3:
    movabsq $.L.str.14, %rdi
236
    movb $0, %al
237
238 callq printf
```

```
movl \$0, -4(\%rbp)
    jmp .LBB3_5
240
241 .LBB3_4:
    movq -280(%rbp), %rax
242
    addq $8, %rax
    movabsq $.L.str.15, %rdi
244
    movq %rax, %rsi
245
    movb $0, %al
    callq printf
247
    movabsq $.L.str.8, %rdi
248
    movl %eax, -568(%rbp)
                            # 4-byte Spill
249
    movb $0, %al
250
    callq printf
    movq -280(%rbp), %rcx
252
    addq $8, %rcx
253
    movabsq $.L.str.16, %rdi
254
    movq %rcx, %rsi
255
    movl %eax, -572(%rbp) # 4-byte Spill
    movb $0, %al
257
    callq printf
258
    movq -280(%rbp), %rcx
    movq 520(%rcx), %rsi
260
    movabsq $.L.str.17, %rdi
    movl %eax, -576(%rbp)
                                  # 4-byte Spill
262
    movb $0, %al
263
    callq printf
265 .LBB3_5:
    movl -4(\%rbp), \%eax
    addq $576, %rsp
                                  # imm = 0x240
267
    popq %rbp
268
    .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
    retq
270
271 .Lfunc_end3:
    .size main, .Lfunc_end3-main
    .cfi_endproc
273
                                            # -- End function
    .type .L.str,@object
                                   # @.str
275
   .section .rodata.str1.1, "aMS", @progbits,1
277 .L.str:
```

```
.asciz "admin"
   .size .L.str, 6
279
                               # @.str.1
   .type .L.str.1,@object
281
282 .L.str.1:
   .asciz "4dm1n__4eva"
   .size .L.str.1, 12
   .type .L.str.2,@object # @.str.2
287 .L.str.2:
   .asciz "alice"
   .size .L.str.2, 6
289
   .type .L.str.3,@object # @.str.3
292 .L.str.3:
   .asciz "!alice12!_veuje@@hak"
  .size .L.str.3, 21
294
   .type .L.str.4,@object # @.str.4
297 .L.str.4:
   .asciz "abdul"
   .size .L.str.4, 6
299
   .type .L.str.5,@object # @.str.5
302 .L.str.5:
   .asciz "passw0rd123"
  .size .L.str.5, 12
304
   .type .L.str.6,@object # @.str.6
307 .L.str.6:
   .asciz "--- USERS ---\n"
   .size .L.str.6, 15
309
310
   .type .L.str.7,@object # @.str.7
312 .L.str.7:
   .asciz " %021d. %s\n"
  .size .L.str.7, 12
314
315
.type .L.str.8,@object # @.str.8
```

```
317 .L.str.8:
    .asciz "\n"
   .size .L.str.8, 2
320
   .type .L.str.9,@object # @.str.9
322 .L.str.9:
    .asciz "Welcome to BigBank Australia!\n"
   .size .L.str.9, 31
325
   .type .L.str.10,@object # @.str.10
327 .L.str.10:
   .asciz "Username: "
   .size .L.str.10, 11
330
   .type .L.str.11,@object
                            # @.str.11
331
332 .L.str.11:
   .asciz "%255s"
   .size .L.str.11, 6
335
   .type .L.str.12,@object # @.str.12
337 .L.str.12:
    .asciz "User < %s > does not exist.\n"
   .size .L.str.12, 29
340
   .type .L.str.13,@object # @.str.13
341
342 .L.str.13:
   .asciz "Password: "
   .size .L.str.13, 11
344
   .type .L.str.14,@object # @.str.14
347 .L.str.14:
   .asciz "ERROR: incorrect password\n"
   .size .L.str.14, 27
349
   .type .L.str.15,@object # @.str.15
351
352 .L.str.15:
   .asciz "Logged in as < %s >!\n"
   .size .L.str.15, 22
355
```

```
.type .L.str.16,@object
                            # @.str.16
357 .L.str.16:
    .asciz "Welcome, %s!\n"
    .size .L.str.16, 14
359
    .type .L.str.17,@object # @.str.17
361
362 .L.str.17:
    .asciz "Your balance: $%ld\n"
    .size .L.str.17, 20
364
    .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
    .section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
    .addrsig
    .addrsig_sym setup_users
    .addrsig_sym malloc
    .addrsig_sym strcpy
    .addrsig_sym printf
372
    .addrsig_sym getUser
    .addrsig_sym strcmp
374
.addrsig_sym __isoc99_scanf
```

F.12 password-O3.s

```
.text
   .file "password.c"
  .globl setup_users
                         # -- Begin function setup_users
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type setup_users,@function
6 setup_users:
                                        # @setup_users
   .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
  pushq %r14
  .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   pushq %rbx
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
  pushq %rax
  .cfi_def_cfa_offset 32
.cfi_offset %rbx, -24
```

```
.cfi_offset %r14, -16
   movl $528, %edi
                                 # imm = 0x210
17
   callq malloc
   movq %rax, %r14
19
   movl $1768776801, 8(%rax) # imm = 0x696D6461
   movw $110, 12(%rax)
21
   movabsq \$3773839939640058932, \%rax # imm = 0x345F5F6E316D6434
   movq %rax, 264(%r14)
   movl $6387301, 272(%r14)
                                # imm = 0x617665
24
   movq $1000000, 520(%r14)
                                # imm = 0xF4240
   movl $528, %edi
                                 # imm = 0x210
26
   callq malloc
   movq %rax, %rbx
   movl $1667853409, 8(%rax) # imm = 0x63696C61
29
   movw $101, 12(%rax)
   movabsq $30224922890495338, %rax # imm = 0x6B61684040656A
31
   movq %rax, 277(%rbx)
32
   movups .L.str.3(%rip), %xmm0
   movups %xmm0, 264(%rbx)
34
   movq $783, 520(%rbx)
                                # imm = 0x30F
   movl $528, %edi
                                 # imm = 0x210
   callq malloc
   movl $1969513057, 8(%rax) # imm = 0x75646261
   movw $108, 12(\%rax)
39
   movabsq $7237900840733991280, %rcx # imm = 0x6472307773736170
   movq %rcx, 264(%rax)
41
   movl $3355185, 272(%rax)
                                # imm = 0x333231
42
   movq $2, 520(%rax)
   movq %rbx, (%r14)
44
   movq %rax, (%rbx)
   movq $0, (%rax)
   movq %r14, %rax
47
   addq $8, %rsp
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
49
   popq %rbx
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   popq %r14
52
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 8
54 retq
```

```
55 .Lfunc_end0:
    .size setup_users, .Lfunc_end0-setup_users
   .cfi_endproc
                                           # -- End function
58
   .globl print_users
                                    # -- Begin function print_users
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type print_users,@function
62 print_users:
                                          # @print_users
    .cfi_startproc
64 # %bb.0:
   pushq %r14
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   pushq %rbx
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
   pushq %rax
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 32
   .cfi_offset %rbx, -24
   .cfi_offset %r14, -16
   movq %rdi, %r14
73
   movl $.Lstr, %edi
   callq puts
   testq %r14, %r14
   je .LBB1_3
78 # %bb.1:
   movl $1, %ebx
   .p2align 4, 0x90
81 .LBB1_2:
                                          # =>This Inner Loop Header:
    Depth=1
   leaq 8(\%r14), \%rdx
   movl $.L.str.7, %edi
   movq %rbx, %rsi
   xorl %eax, %eax
   callq printf
   movq (%r14), %r14
   addq $1, %rbx
   testq %r14, %r14
   jne .LBB1_2
91 .LBB1_3:
92 movl $10, %edi
```

```
addq $8, %rsp
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
    popq %rbx
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
96
    popq %r14
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 8
                                 # TAILCALL
    jmp putchar
100 .Lfunc_end1:
    .size print_users, .Lfunc_end1-print_users
    .cfi_endproc
102
                                            # -- End function
103
    .globl getUser
                                      # -- Begin function getUser
104
    .p2align 4, 0x90
    .type getUser,@function
107 getUser:
                                            # @getUser
    .cfi_startproc
109 # %bb.0:
    pushq %r14
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
111
    pushq %rbx
112
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
    pushq %rax
114
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 32
    .cfi_offset %rbx, -24
116
    .cfi_offset %r14, -16
117
    testq %rdi, %rdi
    je .LBB2_4
119
120 # %bb.1:
    movq %rsi, %r14
121
    movq %rdi, %rbx
122
    .p2align 4, 0x90
124 .LBB2_2:
                                            # =>This Inner Loop Header:
     Depth=1
    leaq 8(%rbx), %rdi
    movq %r14, %rsi
    callq strcmp
    testl %eax, %eax
128
    je .LBB2_5
129
130 # %bb.3:
                                            # in Loop: Header=BB2_2
```

```
Depth=1
    movq (%rbx), %rbx
131
    testq %rbx, %rbx
    jne .LBB2_2
133
134 .LBB2_4:
    xorl %ebx, %ebx
136 .LBB2_5:
    movq %rbx, %rax
    addq $8, %rsp
138
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
    popq %rbx
140
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
141
    popq %r14
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 8
143
144
    retq
145 .Lfunc_end2:
    .size getUser, .Lfunc_end2-getUser
    .cfi_endproc
                                             # -- End function
148
    .globl main
                                       # -- Begin function main
149
    .p2align 4, 0x90
    .type main, @function
152 main:
                                             # @main
     .cfi_startproc
153
154 # %bb.0:
    pushq %r15
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
156
    pushq %r14
157
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
158
    pushq %rbx
159
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 32
    subq $512, %rsp
                                     # imm = 0x200
161
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 544
162
    .cfi_offset %rbx, -32
    .cfi_offset %r14, -24
164
    .cfi_offset %r15, -16
165
    movl $528, %edi
                                     # imm = 0x210
166
    callq malloc
167
    movq %rax, %rbx
168
```

```
movl $1768776801, 8(%rax) # imm = 0x696D6461
    movw $110, 12(%rax)
170
    movabsq \$3773839939640058932, \%rax # imm = 0x345F5F6E316D6434
    movq %rax, 264(%rbx)
172
    movl $6387301, 272(%rbx)
                                   # imm = 0x617665
    movq $1000000, 520(%rbx)
                                  # imm = 0xF4240
174
    movl $528, %edi
                                   # imm = 0x210
175
    callq malloc
    movq %rax, %r14
177
    movl $1667853409, 8(%rax) # imm = 0x63696C61
178
    movw $101, 12(%rax)
179
    movabsq \$30224922890495338, \%rax # imm = 0x6B61684040656A
180
    movq %rax, 277(%r14)
    movups .L.str.3(%rip), %xmm0
182
    movups %xmm0, 264(%r14)
183
    movq $783, 520(%r14)
                                  # imm = 0x30F
184
    mov1 $528, %edi
                                   # imm = 0x210
185
    callq malloc
    movl $1969513057, 8(%rax) # imm = 0x75646261
187
    movw $108, 12(%rax)
188
    movabsq $7237900840733991280, %rcx # imm = 0x6472307773736170
    movq %rcx, 264(%rax)
190
    movl $3355185, 272(%rax) # imm = 0x333231
    movq $2, 520(%rax)
192
    movq %r14, (%rbx)
193
    movq %rax, (%r14)
    movq $0, (%rax)
195
    movl $.Lstr.18, %edi
    callq puts
197
    movl $.L.str.10, %edi
198
    xorl %eax, %eax
    callq printf
200
    movq %rsp, %rsi
201
    movl $.L.str.11, %edi
    xorl %eax, %eax
203
    callq __isoc99_scanf
    testq %rbx, %rbx
205
   je .LBB3_4
206
207 # %bb.1:
```

```
movq %rsp, %r15
    .p2align 4, 0x90
210 .LBB3_2:
                                            # =>This Inner Loop Header:
     Depth=1
    leaq 8(%rbx), %r14
    movq %r14, %rdi
212
    movq %r15, %rsi
213
    callq strcmp
    testl %eax, %eax
215
   je .LBB3_5
216
217 # %bb.3:
                                              in Loop: Header=BB3_2
    Depth=1
   movq (%rbx), %rbx
   testq %rbx, %rbx
219
   jne .LBB3_2
220
221 .LBB3_4:
    movq %rsp, %rsi
    movl $.L.str.12, %edi
224 .LBB3_8:
   xorl %eax, %eax
225
   callq printf
    jmp .LBB3_9
227
228 .LBB3_5:
    movl $.L.str.13, %edi
229
    xorl %eax, %eax
230
    callq printf
    leaq 256(%rsp), %r15
232
    movl $.L.str.11, %edi
233
    movq %r15, %rsi
234
    xorl %eax, %eax
235
    callq __isoc99_scanf
    leaq 264(%rbx), %rdi
237
    movq %r15, %rsi
238
    callq strcmp
    testl %eax, %eax
    je .LBB3_7
241
242 # %bb.6:
    movl $.Lstr.19, %edi
243
244 callq puts
```

```
245 .LBB3_9:
    xorl %eax, %eax
    addq $512, %rsp
                                   # imm = 0x200
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 32
248
    popq %rbx
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 24
250
    popq %r14
251
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
    popq %r15
253
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 8
254
    retq
255
256 .LBB3_7:
    .cfi_def_cfa_offset 544
    movl $.L.str.15, %edi
258
    movq %r14, %rsi
259
    xorl %eax, %eax
260
    callq printf
261
    movl $10, %edi
    callq putchar
263
    movl $.L.str.16, %edi
264
    movq %r14, %rsi
    xorl %eax, %eax
266
    callq printf
    movq 520(%rbx), %rsi
268
    movl $.L.str.17, %edi
    jmp .LBB3_8
271 .Lfunc_end3:
    .size main, .Lfunc_end3-main
    .cfi_endproc
273
                                            # -- End function
274
    .type .L.str,@object
                                    # @.str
    .section .rodata.str1.1,"aMS",@progbits,1
276
277 .L.str:
    .asciz "admin"
    .size .L.str, 6
279
    .type .L.str.1,@object
                                   # @.str.1
281
282 .L.str.1:
.asciz "4dm1n__4eva"
```

```
.size .L.str.1, 12
285
   .type .L.str.2,@object # @.str.2
287 .L.str.2:
   .asciz "alice"
   .size .L.str.2, 6
290
   .type .L.str.3,@object # @.str.3
292 .L.str.3:
   .asciz "!alice12!_veuje@@hak"
   .size .L.str.3, 21
295
   .type .L.str.4,@object # @.str.4
297 .L.str.4:
   .asciz "abdul"
   .size .L.str.4, 6
300
   .type .L.str.5,@object # @.str.5
302 .L.str.5:
   .asciz "passw0rd123"
   .size .L.str.5, 12
305
   .type .L.str.7,@object # @.str.7
307 .L.str.7:
   .asciz " %021d. %s\n"
   .size .L.str.7, 12
310
   .type .L.str.10,@object # @.str.10
312 .L.str.10:
   .asciz "Username: "
   .size .L.str.10, 11
315
  .type .L.str.11,@object # @.str.11
317 .L.str.11:
   .asciz "%255s"
   .size .L.str.11, 6
320
321 .type .L.str.12,@object # @.str.12
322 .L.str.12:
```

```
.asciz "User < %s > does not exist.\n"
   .size .L.str.12, 29
324
   .type .L.str.13,@object # @.str.13
327 .L.str.13:
   .asciz "Password: "
   .size .L.str.13, 11
   .type .L.str.15,@object # @.str.15
331
332 .L.str.15:
   .asciz "Logged in as < %s >!\n"
   .size .L.str.15, 22
334
   .type .L.str.16,@object # @.str.16
337 .L.str.16:
   .asciz "Welcome, %s!\n"
   .size .L.str.16, 14
339
   .type .L.str.17,@object # @.str.17
342 .L.str.17:
   .asciz "Your balance: $%ld\n"
344 .size .L.str.17, 20
   .type .Lstr,@object
                               # @str
347 .Lstr:
   .asciz "--- USERS ---"
   .size .Lstr, 14
349
   .type .Lstr.18,@object # @str.18
352 .Lstr.18:
   .asciz "Welcome to BigBank Australia!"
   .size .Lstr.18, 30
354
355
   .type .Lstr.19,@object # @str.19
357 .Lstr.19:
   .asciz "ERROR: incorrect password"
   .size .Lstr.19, 26
359
360
.ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
```

```
.section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
.addrsig
```

F.13 deadStoreElimination-O0.s

```
.text
   .file "deadStoreElimination.c"
   .globl deadStore
                                    # -- Begin function deadStore
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type deadStore, @function
6 deadStore:
                                          # @deadStore
   .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
   pushq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
   movq %rsp, %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
   movl %edi, -4(%rbp)
   movl %esi, -8(%rbp)
   movl $43981, -12(%rbp)
                            # imm = OxABCD
   movl \$0, -16(\%rbp)
18 .LBB0_1:
                                          # =>This Inner Loop Header:
    Depth=1
  movl -4(\%rbp), \%eax
   cmpl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
   jle .LBB0_3
22 # %bb.2:
                                            in Loop: Header=BB0_1
    Depth=1
  movl -12(\%rbp), \%eax
   addl -16(\%rbp), \%eax
   movl \%eax, -16(\%rbp)
   movl -4(\%rbp), \%eax
   addl $-1, %eax
   mov1 \%eax, -4(\%rbp)
   jmp .LBB0_1
30 .LBB0_3:
31 movl $0, -12(%rbp)
```

```
movl -4(\%rbp), \%eax
   addl -8(%rbp), %eax
   popq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
35
   retq
37 .Lfunc_end0:
    .size deadStore, .Lfunc_endO-deadStore
   .cfi_endproc
                                           # -- End function
40
   .globl main
                                    # -- Begin function main
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type main, @function
44 main:
                                           # @main
    .cfi_startproc
46 # %bb.0:
   pushq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
   .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
   movq %rsp, %rbp
50
   .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
   subq $32, %rsp
   movl %edi, -4(%rbp)
   movq %rsi, -16(%rbp)
   movl -4(%rbp), %edi
55
   movl $2, %esi
   callq deadStore
   xorl %ecx, %ecx
   movl \%eax, -20(\%rbp)
                                 # 4-byte Spill
   movl %ecx, %eax
60
   addq $32, %rsp
   popq %rbp
62
   .cfi_def_cfa %rsp, 8
   retq
65 .Lfunc_end1:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end1-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                           # -- End function
68
   .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
69
  .section ".note.GNU-stack","", @progbits
```

```
.addrsig
.addrsig_sym deadStore
```

F.14 deadStoreElimination-O3.s

```
.text
  .file "deadStoreElimination.c"
   .globl deadStore
                                    # -- Begin function deadStore
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type deadStore, @function
6 deadStore:
                                          # @deadStore
  .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
                                          # kill: def $esi killed $esi
     def $rsi
                                          # kill: def $edi killed $edi
    def $rdi
  cmpl %edi, %esi
  cmovlel %esi, %edi
  leal (%rdi,%rsi), %eax
   retq
.Lfunc_end0:
   .size deadStore, .Lfunc_end0-deadStore
   .cfi_endproc
                                          # -- End function
   .globl main
                                   # -- Begin function main
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type main, @function
22 main:
                                          # @main
   .cfi_startproc
24 # %bb.0:
   xorl %eax, %eax
  retq
27 .Lfunc_end1:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end1-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                          # -- End function
30
.ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 "
```

```
.section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
.addrsig
```

F.15 pread-O0.s

```
.text
  .file "pread.c"
   .globl main
                                    # -- Begin function main
   .p2align 4, 0x90
   .type main, @function
6 main:
                                           # @main
   .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
   pushq %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_offset 16
  .cfi_offset %rbp, -16
   movq %rsp, %rbp
   .cfi_def_cfa_register %rbp
   mov1 \$0, -4(\%rbp)
   mov1 \$0, -8(\%rbp)
   movl $0, -12(%rbp)
17 .LBB0_1:
                                           # =>This Loop Header: Depth=1
                                                 Child Loop BBO_2 Depth 2
                                                   Child Loop BBO_3 Depth
     3
   jmp .LBB0_2
21 .LBB0_2:
                                            Parent Loop BBO_1 Depth=1
                                           # => This Loop Header: Depth=2
                                                   Child Loop BBO_3 Depth
     3
   jmp .LBB0_3
                                              Parent Loop BBO_1 Depth=1
25 .LBB0_3:
                                                 Parent Loop BBO_2 Depth=2
                                           # => This Inner Loop
    Header: Depth=3
   movl z, %eax
   mov1 \%eax, -8(\%rbp)
30 # %bb.4:
                                           # in Loop: Header=BB0_3
```

```
Depth=3
   movl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
   cltd
   movl $2, %ecx
33
  idivl %ecx
   cmpl $0, %edx
  jne .LBB0_3
37 # %bb.5:
                                          # in Loop: Header=BB0_2
    Depth=2
  movl x, %eax
  movl \%eax, -12(\%rbp)
40 # %bb.6:
                                         # in Loop: Header=BB0_2
    Depth=2
  movl z, %eax
cmpl -8(\%rbp), \%eax
jne .LBB0_2
44 # %bb.7:
                                         # in Loop: Header=BB0_1
    Depth=1
  jmp .LBB0_1
46 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
   .cfi_endproc
                                         # -- End function
   .type z,@object
                                 # @z
50
   .comm z, 4, 4
   .type x,@object
                                 # @x
   .comm x,4,4
   .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
   .section ".note.GNU-stack","", @progbits
   .addrsig
    .addrsig_sym z
  .addrsig_sym x
```

F.16 pread-O3.s

```
.text
.file "pread.c"
.globl main # -- Begin function main
```

```
p2align 4, 0x90
5 .type main, @function
6 main:
                                        # @main
7 .cfi_startproc
8 # %bb.0:
p .p2align 4, 0x90
10 .LBB0_1:
                                        # =>This Inner Loop Header:
    Depth=1
movl z(%rip), %eax
12 testb $1, %al
jne .LBB0_1
14 # %bb.2:
                                        # in Loop: Header=BB0_1
   Depth=1
movl x(%rip), %eax
movl z(%rip), %eax
17 jmp .LBB0_1
18 .Lfunc_end0:
   .size main, .Lfunc_end0-main
   .cfi_endproc
20
                                       # -- End function
   .type z,@object
                                # @z
  .comm z,4,4
23
                                # @x
   .type x,@object
   .comm x, 4, 4
25
   .ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1"
   .section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
   .addrsig
   .addrsig_sym z
30 .addrsig_sym x
```