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Adds `armis-cli install claude` which downloads the Armis AppSec MCP plugin from https://github.com/silk-security/armis-appsec-mcp and installs it into the user's Claude Code environment. The command: - Downloads the latest tarball from GitHub - Extracts to ~/.claude/plugins/cache/ - Creates a Python venv and installs dependencies - Registers the plugin marketplace and enables it - Preserves existing .env credentials on reinstall Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Use filepath.Clean and filepath.IsAbs instead of substring check, plus the existing destDir prefix validation as defense-in-depth. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
![github-advanced-security[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/57789?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
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| Severity | Count |
|---|---|
| 🟠 HIGH | 2 |
Total: 2
View all 2 findings
🟠 HIGH (2)
CWE-426_armis-cli_38295677_internal/install/claude.go_451_3_451_149 - Software and Data Integrity Failures (CWE-426
Location: internal/install/claude.go:451
Untrusted Search Path): The installer needs a Python interpreter to create a virtual environment. It looks for the interpreter by searching the system's PATH for the names "python3" or "python". An attacker who can control the PATH (for example, by setting the PATH variable before running the installer) could place a malicious program named "python3" or "python" earlier in the search order. The code would then pick up that malicious program, think it is a valid Python interpreter, and run it. The check that the found program is an absolute path and that it reports a recent Python version does not stop a crafted malicious program from passing those checks. Because the installer runs the chosen program with the exec.Command call, the attacker’s code would be executed with the same privileges as the installer. No additional validation of the PATH or the interpreter location is performed, so the risky operation is exposed to user‑controlled input. Adding a safe, fixed path to a trusted Python binary or validating that the interpreter comes from a trusted location would mitigate this issue.
CWEs: CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
CWE-426_armis-cli_38295677_internal/install/claude.go_318_2_318_114 - Software and Data Integrity Failures (CWE-426
Location: internal/install/claude.go:318
Untrusted Search Path): The installer needs a Python interpreter to create a virtual environment. It looks for the interpreter by searching the system's PATH, which can be changed by anyone who can influence the environment. If an attacker places a malicious program named "python" earlier in the PATH, the installer will run that program instead of a legitimate Python interpreter. The code does not check the origin or integrity of the found executable, so the attacker‑controlled program could run arbitrary commands on the machine. Because the installer is run from a command‑line tool that a user can invoke, this risk is directly reachable from outside the program. No extra checks or validation are performed before the interpreter is executed, making the problem real and exploitable.
CWEs: CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
shb7628
changed the title
…ve to ArmisSecurity org Fetch latest release from GitHub Releases API instead of pulling the main branch tarball. Track and display the installed plugin version. Add --version flag to check the installed version. Move repo reference from silk-security to ArmisSecurity. Add CWE-770 entry count limit to tar extraction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolve Python path symlinks and validate absolute path to mitigate untrusted search path. Handle error returns from flag parsing and os.UserHomeDir. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Test Coverage Reporttotal: (statements) 79.1% Coverage by function |
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| venvDir := filepath.Join(pluginDir, ".venv") | ||
| venvCmd := exec.Command(python, "-m", "venv", venvDir) //nolint:gosec // python validated by findPython allowlist |
| if err != nil || !filepath.IsAbs(resolved) { | ||
| continue | ||
| } | ||
| out, err := exec.Command(resolved, "-c", "import sys; print(sys.version_info >= (3, 11))").Output() //nolint:gosec // resolved path validated above |
shb7628
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Summary
Details
New files:
internal/cmd/install.go— parentinstallcommandinternal/cmd/install_claude.gointernal/install/claude.go— download, extract, register, enable logicinternal/install/claude_test.go— 10 tests covering registration, settings preservation, error casesTest plan
go build ./...compiles cleanlygo vet ./...passesgo test -v ./internal/install/...— 10/10 tests passarmis-cli install claudeand verify plugin appears in Claude Code🤖 Generated with Claude Code