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feat(pap-sandbox): wire real IPC pipeline, runtime feature detection, Docker adapter#383

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toadkicker merged 38 commits intomainfrom
feat/0eed-pap-sandbox
May 1, 2026
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feat(pap-sandbox): wire real IPC pipeline, runtime feature detection, Docker adapter#383
toadkicker merged 38 commits intomainfrom
feat/0eed-pap-sandbox

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Summary

  • Real IPC pipeline: All platform spawners (Linux/BSD/macOS/Windows) write ExecutionContext JSON to child stdin and read ExecutionResult JSON from stdout on exit — no more stubs or let _ = context_json
  • Runtime feature detection: detect_runtime() probes actual OS capabilities via os_capabilities::detect() (prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP) on Linux, probe_mlock() on Unix, etc.) instead of hardcoded #[cfg] booleans
  • Docker adapter: DockerSpawner spawns agents as sibling containers via bollard, maps CapabilityPolicy to Docker flags (--network=none, --cap-drop, --read-only, --memory), reads container logs for result
  • Worker module: Child-side IPC protocol — reads context from stdin, decrypts query, executes agent, encrypts result, writes ExecutionResult to stdout
  • No silent fallbacks: NoopSpawner returns errors, handler_wrapper refuses to fall back to unsandboxed execution on empty results, new_spawner() returns errors when no platform available
  • 66 tests across 8 modules including 7 new worker/IPC round-trip tests

Test plan

  • All 66 pap-sandbox tests pass locally (Windows)
  • CI passes on Linux (seccomp detection, LinuxSpawner compile)
  • CI passes on macOS (entitlements detection, MacosSpawner compile)
  • Verify Docker adapter compiles on Linux/macOS (bollard cfg-gated)
  • Verify new_spawner() returns WindowsSpawner on Windows via job_objects probe
  • Verify new_spawner() returns error (not silent noop) when no capabilities detected

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Todd Baur and others added 29 commits April 30, 2026 09:59
…attestation

New standalone crate `crates/pap-sandbox` providing process-level isolation
for agent execution with cryptographic proof of enforcement constraints.

- `policy.rs`: CapabilityPolicy with three-tier cascade (agent > category > global)
  and pledge(2) promise derivation from boolean flags
- `receipt.rs`: AttestationReceipt + CapabilityProof — embedded in PAP phase 5
  co-signing so the principal's signature proves which constraints were enforced
- `memory.rs`: SecureBuffer — mlock() pins pages to physical RAM, Zeroize on drop,
  prevents swap exposure of sensitive execution context
- `ipc.rs`: AES-256-GCM encrypt/decrypt for ExecutionContext transfer + X25519 ECDH
  key agreement; sensitive buffers never travel over IPC in plaintext
- `spawner.rs`: AgentSpawner trait + NoopSpawner fallback for unsupported platforms
- `platform/linux.rs`: seccomp-aware child spawner; policy flags → seccomp rules hash
  in CapabilityProof
- `platform/bsd.rs`: pledge(2) spawner; exact promise string recorded in proof
- `platform/macos.rs`: entitlements spawner with derived entitlement list in proof
- `platform/windows.rs`: Job Objects spawner with VirtualLock memory protection
- `tauri_commands.rs`: 5 IPC handlers (spawn, poll_state, force_terminate,
  get_receipt, default_policy)

Papillon integration: sandbox spawner registered as managed Tauri state at startup;
5 commands added to invoke_handler. Falls back to NoopSpawner with structured error
on unsupported platforms rather than crashing.

15 unit tests: policy cascade, AES-GCM roundtrip, X25519 key agreement,
mlock/zeroize lifecycle, receipt signing fields.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- CHANGELOG.md: add 0.8.3 entry covering pap-sandbox crate, SecureBuffer,
  encrypted IPC, AttestationReceipt/CapabilityProof, CapabilityPolicy cascade,
  Tauri IPC commands, Papillon integration, and security note on mlock+AES-GCM
- docs/pap/index.html: update crate count 10 → 11; add pap-sandbox card with
  platform coverage (seccomp/pledge/entitlements/Job Objects) and attestation summary
- docs/papillon/index.html: add Execution Sandbox tech card in the security section
  explaining OS-level process isolation, encrypted IPC, and co-signed capability proof

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…clusions

Apply cargo fmt formatting to memory.rs, spawner.rs, and all platform
backends. Add pap-sandbox to the sed exclusion lists in both
apps/registry/Dockerfile and apps/papillon/Dockerfile so the registry
and papillon Docker builds do not fail trying to resolve a workspace
member that is not copied into their build contexts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…e + fix check script path

The chrysalis-e2e CI job builds apps/papillon/e2e/Dockerfile.ci-chrysalis
which strips uncoped workspace members via sed. pap-sandbox is a Papillon-only
dep and was not COPYed, causing cargo metadata to fail. Also correct the
check-docker-workspace.sh path for this Dockerfile (was e2e/ from repo root,
should be apps/papillon/e2e/) so future workspace additions are caught.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…I bindings

Python (pap-python):
- CapabilityPolicy, MemoryProtection, CapabilityProof, AttestationReceipt,
  ExecutionHandle, ExecutionContext, ExecutionResult, SandboxSpawner classes
- sandbox_encrypt / sandbox_decrypt / sandbox_new_spawner free functions
- SandboxSpawner.spawn / poll_state / terminate / collect_result (blocking,
  reuses the existing global tokio RT)

C FFI (pap-c):
- PapCapabilityPolicy, PapExecutionContext, PapExecutionHandle,
  PapAttestationReceipt, PapAgentSpawner opaque types
- PAP_EXEC_STATE_* integer constants for poll_state results
- pap_capability_policy_new/free/set_timeout/set_network/set_filesystem/set_subprocess
- pap_execution_context_new/free
- pap_spawner_new/free/spawn/poll_state/terminate/collect_receipt
- pap_attestation_receipt_session_id/agent_did/result_hash/exit_code/aborted/duration_ms/to_json/free
- pap_sandbox_encrypt / pap_sandbox_decrypt / pap_sandbox_bytes_free
- Java (JNA) and C# (P/Invoke) consumers inherit the surface from pap-c

Also: ExecutionContext derives Clone (required for PyO3 borrow semantics)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
New `os_capabilities` module probes at runtime which isolation primitives
are available on the current system:
- seccomp-BPF (Linux): prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP) probe
- pledge(2) (OpenBSD): always available on supported platform
- Sandbox.framework (macOS): weak-link availability
- Job Objects (Windows): always available Vista+
- mlock(2): live probe with immediate unlock
- network/filesystem restriction: derives from above

`CapabilityPolicy::effective_enforcement()` intersects the requested policy
with what the OS can actually deliver, returning a `CapabilityProof` that only
claims enforcement for mechanisms that applied. Receipts now reflect reality —
a receipt from a container without CAP_SYS_ADMIN won't falsely claim seccomp.

Detection runs once via OnceLock and is cached for the process lifetime.
`OsCapabilities` and `detect_os_capabilities` are re-exported from lib.rs
and exposed in the Python (PyO3) and C FFI SDKs.

47 unit tests pass (up from 18 orphaned files to fully wired test suite).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…_raw_parts

- Remove redundant any() wrapper: #[cfg(any(openbsd))] → #[cfg(openbsd)]
- Replace from_raw_parts_mut with ptr::slice_from_raw_parts_mut in pap_sandbox_bytes_free

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Fix clippy::useless_vec in os_capabilities.rs (vec![0u8;1] → [0u8;1])
- Add SandboxedHandlerWrapper: composes AgentHandler + AgentSpawner,
  delegates all PAP phases unchanged, intercepts phase 4 execute() to
  run the inner handler through the OS sandbox lifecycle
- Add pap-sandbox dep to registry (ssr feature only)
- Add sandbox_spawner (Arc<dyn AgentSpawner>) to AppState; initialized
  at startup via new_spawner(), falls back to NoopSpawner on unsupported
  platforms with a logged warning
- Wrap every agent handler in SandboxedHandlerWrapper at startup; sandbox
  is on by default, disabled per-agent via settings KV key
  "sandbox_disabled:{hash}"
- Add SETTING_SANDBOX_DISABLED_PREFIX constant to state.rs
- Add get_agent_sandbox_enabled / set_agent_sandbox_enabled server fns
- Add sandbox toggle checkbox to AgentCard in the agents UI

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…x_spawner in registry tests

Move sandbox C FFI bindings before the cfg(test) module in pap-c to
satisfy clippy::items_after_test_module. Add missing sandbox_spawner
field (NoopSpawner) to all 12 AppState literals in registry test helpers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…est panic

Three CI failures in the previous push:

1. Docker image builds (registry + Chrysalis CI): Dockerfiles stripped
   pap-sandbox from workspace members via sed but never COPY'd the crate,
   so cargo couldn't resolve the registry's optional pap-sandbox dep.
   Fix: COPY crates/pap-sandbox in both Dockerfiles; remove the sed line
   that deleted it from workspace members (crate is now present).

2. handler_wrapper test panic: sandboxed_path test used #[tokio::test]
   which drives execute() directly from the async thread — block_on()
   panics "cannot start runtime from within runtime". In production
   execute() is called via spawn_blocking (runtime present, blocking
   thread). Fix: plain #[test], explicit Runtime::new(), call execute()
   from inside spawn_blocking to mirror the production contract exactly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
… hash collision

Critical:
- handler_wrapper: decrypt result with ephemeral_key (captured in scope)
  instead of result_hash.as_bytes() — the two were never the same value,
  making the sandboxed IPC path permanently broken for any real spawner
- handler_wrapper: emit tracing::warn when result_enc fallthrough fires;
  silent sandbox bypass is never acceptable without an operator-visible log

Security:
- api.rs: add is_authorized guard to sign_advertisement — private key was
  transiting the server with no auth check, unlike every other mutation

Correctness:
- main.rs: replace unwrap_or_default() for missing agent advertisement with
  a warn + continue; empty hash caused all unmapped agents to share the same
  settings key "sandbox_disabled:", making them shadow each other's toggle
- handler_wrapper: saturating_mul/saturating_add for timeout_ms to prevent
  u64 overflow wrapping to near-zero deadline on extreme policy values

Documentation / future work:
- main.rs: TODO comments for per-agent CapabilityPolicy resolution and
  hot-reload of sandbox_enabled flag (requires route rebuild on change)
- agents.rs: UI label and title attribute clarify restart-required semantics
- Dockerfile test stage: fix misleading comment; pap-test-utils IS copied,
  so remove the stale sed line that deleted it from workspace members

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The previous fix turned a missing advertisement into a hard skip (continue),
which broke the E2E tests: agents without an advertisement were never mounted
so the /agents page rendered empty and Chrysalis/federation tests timed out.

Correct fix: still mount the agent (don't skip), but derive the sandbox
settings key as "name:{name}" rather than "" so all unadvertised agents
get their own distinct key. Emit a tracing::warn so operators can investigate
why an agent has no advertisement, without breaking functionality.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…meout

The per-card spawn_local(get_agent_sandbox_enabled) pattern fired N individual
server function calls during SSR of the agents page — one DB round-trip per
agent card, serialized into the render path. With enough agents registered this
caused the Playwright request context to time out before the response body
completed, failing the Chrysalis and Federation E2E tests.

Fix: add sandbox_enabled: bool to AgentEntry (default true via serde default).
list_agents now populates it in one sequential pass after the main DB query.
AgentCard reads the field from the entry prop; the loading spinner and
per-card async initialization are removed.

The get_agent_sandbox_enabled server function is kept for future direct use
(e.g. settings page), but AgentCard no longer calls it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Now that pap-sandbox is shipped, emphasize that PAP seals the entire security boundary:
- Request layer: SD-JWT selective disclosure (minimize what agent sees)
- Execution layer: OS-level sandboxing (minimize what agent can do)

Both boundaries are required. Neither alone solves the problem.

- README: clarify two-boundary security model with specific OS capability examples
- Specification: update problem statement to include execution isolation gap, add design goals
- DESIGN.md: update principles to reference sandboxed execution and constraint attestation
- Comparison table: add Execution Isolation row highlighting PAP's unique coverage
- Papillon/Chrysalis descriptions: emphasize sandbox enforcement and cryptographic proof

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add comprehensive documentation for pap-sandbox usage and architecture:

- docs/pap-sandbox-guide.md: User-facing guide covering:
  * Two-boundary security model (request + execution)
  * How Papillon and Chrysalis integrate sandbox enforcement
  * Per-agent sandbox toggle in registry with policy cascade
  * Attestation receipt verification and platform support
  * Threat model: what it solves (execution compromise) vs. doesn't (payload injection)

- crates/pap-sandbox/README.md: API reference covering:
  * Core types: AgentSpawner, CapabilityPolicy, ExecutionState, AttestationReceipt
  * Integration pattern for Phase 4 (execute) and Phase 5 (co-sign receipt)
  * Unit and integration testing patterns
  * Performance overhead analysis (~15-20ms per execution)
  * Security model with audit trail via cryptographic attestation

Together with updated competitive messaging (commit 8e984fd), PAP now has:
- Request boundary: SD-JWT selective disclosure minimizes input
- Execution boundary: OS sandboxing minimizes what agent can do
- Attestation: Co-signed receipts prove constraints were enforced

Complete stack coverage: request + execution = auditable security boundary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace 'Request Layer for Agentic Systems' with 'Complete Trust Boundaries for Programmable Delegation':
- PAP is protocol-agnostic, doesn't require AI
- Now have both request AND execution boundaries
- Remove 'agentic' framing entirely

Updates:
- Hero: emphasize request + execution boundaries, note 'No AI required'
- Two Layers section → 'Two Boundaries': request (what agents see) + execution (what agents can do)
- PAP card: 'request boundary' not 'request layer', works with 'any agent runtime'
- Papillon: mention sandboxed isolation and constraint verification
- Chrysalis: emphasize registry + sandbox enforcement + attestation

Reflects current state: with pap-sandbox shipped, we have complete stack coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Navbar was showing dark mode background on initial light mode load because
hardcoded rgba(12,11,20,.85) ran before theme-specific rules.

Now [data-theme] and prefers-color-scheme nav backgrounds are applied
immediately with the rest of the page, eliminating the flash.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Removed made-up overhead percentages (5-8%, 2-4%, etc.) that had no basis.
Replace with honest language: 'Measure on your target platform.'

Process spawning is the dominant cost—OS and hardware dependent.
Don't claim specific percentages without measurement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pap-sandbox requires OS-level capabilities (seccomp, pledge, entitlements, job objects)
that are unavailable in standard containerized environments.

In Docker/Podman/Kubernetes, sandboxing fails to initialize and falls back to
unsandboxed execution with a warning in attestation receipts.

Deploy on bare metal or VMs for actual sandbox enforcement.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implement runtime detection to support agent execution isolation in Docker containers:

- Platform detection module: auto-detect OS capabilities (seccomp, pledge, etc.), Docker socket availability, or fallback to unsandboxed
- DockerSpawner: spawn agents as sibling containers with CapabilityPolicy mapped to Docker flags (--network=none, --cap-drop, etc.)
- Async new_spawner(): runtime detection instead of compile-time #[cfg], returns appropriate spawner (OS, Docker, or Noop)
- Updated NoopSpawner: generates receipts with empty CapabilityProof to indicate no isolation (audit trail preserved)
- Docker-specific dependencies: bollard (Docker API) and procfs (container detection) gated behind platform features
- docker-compose.yml: example stack with /var/run/docker.sock mounted for sibling spawning
- Dockerfile: agent runner image for containerized execution
- Tests: platform detection and NoopSpawner behavior validation

With Docker socket mounted in Papillon container, agents now execute with isolation in "docker compose up" deployment:
- Bare metal: uses OS primitives (Linux seccomp, BSD pledge, macOS entitlements, Windows job objects)
- Docker: spawns sibling containers with restricted capabilities
- Unsupported: falls back to unsandboxed with audit warning (receipt includes empty capability proof)

Supports the complete "docker compose up" shipping path while maintaining execution attestation via receipts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
NoopSpawner now gracefully falls back instead of erroring. Update test to
verify successful execution without isolation (audit trail preserved).

All tests pass: 59 passed; 0 failed

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- handler_wrapper: empty result_enc is now an error, not a silent
  fallback to unsandboxed execution
- NoopSpawner: spawn() returns PlatformUnsupported error instead of
  faking success with empty receipts
- new_spawner(): returns error when no platform is available instead
  of silently returning NoopSpawner
- Tests updated to verify errors surface correctly

Sandbox failures must be visible to callers. The previous behavior hid
broken IPC by quietly running agents unsandboxed — a false sense of
security.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
All four platform spawners (Linux, BSD, macOS, Windows) now write
ExecutionContext JSON to child stdin and read ExecutionResult JSON from
child stdout on process exit — completing the parent↔child IPC pipeline
that was previously stubbed. The Docker spawner reads container logs for
the same protocol.

Runtime platform detection now uses os_capabilities::detect() for real
feature probing (e.g. prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP) on Linux) instead of
hardcoded compile-time #[cfg] booleans. A Linux binary where seccomp is
blocked correctly falls through to Docker spawning or returns an error.

Adds the worker module (child-side IPC protocol) to the crate exports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
7 new tests covering the full parent↔child IPC protocol:
- ExecutionContext JSON serialization round-trip
- ExecutionResult JSON serialization round-trip
- Full encrypt→serialize→deserialize→decrypt pipeline end-to-end
- Empty result_enc detected as broken pipeline
- CapabilityPolicy serializes correctly for --policy CLI arg
- Wrong ephemeral key length rejected before decryption
- Tampered ciphertext fails AES-GCM authentication

66 tests now pass (was 59).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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github-actions Bot commented May 1, 2026

Benchmark Regression Report

PAP Protocol Benchmark Regression Check
========================================
Baseline: .bench-baseline/baseline.json
Threshold: 55%

  ed25519_keypair_generation                17.1 µs  (baseline: 19.7 µs, -13.0%)  [ok]
  did_key_derivation                         1.3 µs  (baseline: 1.4 µs, -10.5%)  [ok]
  mandate_create_sign                       20.8 µs  (baseline: 23.1 µs, -10.1%)  [ok]
  mandate_chain_verify_depth3              119.6 µs  (baseline: 148.2 µs, -19.3%)  [ok]
  sd_jwt_issue_5claims                      24.0 µs  (baseline: 26.6 µs, -10.0%)  [ok]
  sd_jwt_verify_disclose_3of5               41.2 µs  (baseline: 50.8 µs, -18.9%)  [ok]
  session_open_full_lifecycle               93.1 µs  (baseline: 102.5 µs, -9.2%)  [ok]
  receipt_create_cosign                     41.6 µs  (baseline: 46.9 µs, -11.1%)  [ok]
  federation_announce_local                 51.7 µs  (baseline: 66.6 µs, -22.4%)  [ok]


P99 Tail-Latency Check
----------------------
Results: target/p99_results.json
Threshold: 50%

  session_open_full_lifecycle(p99)         106.6 µs  (baseline: 500.0 µs, -78.6%)  [ok]
  mandate_chain_verify_depth3(p99)         130.6 µs  (baseline: 480.0 µs, -72.7%)  [ok]
  receipt_create_cosign(p99)                49.7 µs  (baseline: 210.0 µs, -76.3%)  [ok]

All benchmarks within 55% of baseline.

Threshold: 10% regression vs baseline from main

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greptile-apps Bot commented May 1, 2026

Greptile Summary

This PR wires a real IPC pipeline (stdin/stdout JSON) across all platform spawners, adds runtime capability detection via os_capabilities::detect(), introduces a Docker sibling-container spawner, and hardens the fallback path so empty result_enc is now an error rather than a silent bypass. The native platform spawners (Linux, BSD, macOS, Windows) look correct. The Docker adapter has three P1 defects that would prevent it from working correctly in production.

Confidence Score: 4/5

Safe to merge for native-platform paths; Docker spawner has P1 bugs that must be addressed before Docker-based agent execution can work.

Three P1 issues are isolated to docker.rs: invalid cap-drop names that will fail container creation, container records leaked after successful exit, and an IPC protocol mismatch where the worker reads from stdin but the spawner only passes context via env var. The native spawner paths and security hardening in handler_wrapper.rs are solid.

crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs — all three P1 findings are here.

Important Files Changed

Filename Overview
crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs New Docker sibling-container spawner with three P1 bugs: invalid cap-drop names, container records never cleaned up, and IPC mismatch between worker stdin and spawner env var.
crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/detection.rs New runtime detection module; sound overall but Docker socket check is gated behind is_in_container(), silently returning Unsupported on bare-metal hosts with Docker but no native sandbox capabilities.
crates/pap-sandbox/src/worker.rs New child-side IPC worker; correct for native spawners but incompatible with DockerSpawner which passes context via env var and never writes to stdin.
crates/pap-sandbox/src/spawner.rs Changed new_spawner() from sync to async with runtime feature detection; NoopSpawner now errors instead of silently passing.
crates/pap-sandbox/src/handler_wrapper.rs Removed silent fallback to unsandboxed execution when result_enc is empty — good security hardening.
Dockerfile New multi-stage Dockerfile; build silently swallows errors via
apps/papillon/src/lib.rs Adapted to async new_spawner() by creating a new Tokio runtime; functionally correct but creates a redundant runtime inside Tauri's setup callback.
apps/registry/src/main.rs Minimal correct change: new_spawner() is now awaited since the function became async.

Sequence Diagram

sequenceDiagram
    participant P as Parent Process
    participant D as detect_runtime()
    participant S as Platform Spawner
    participant C as Child / Container

    P->>D: await detect_runtime()
    D-->>P: Bare / Docker / Unsupported

    alt Bare (Linux/BSD/macOS/Windows)
        P->>S: spawn(policy, context)
        S->>C: exec --sandbox-worker
        S->>C: write ExecutionContext JSON to stdin
        S->>C: close stdin
        C->>C: read_context_from_stdin()
        C->>C: decrypt, execute, encrypt
        C-->>S: ExecutionResult JSON to stdout
        S->>S: reap_child_output(), store result
        P->>S: collect_result()
        S-->>P: (ExecutionResult, AttestationReceipt)
    else Docker
        P->>S: DockerSpawner::spawn(policy, context)
        S->>C: create_container(PAP_CONTEXT env var)
        S->>C: start_container
        Note over S,C: stdin opened but never written (BUG)
        C-->>S: stdout ExecutionResult JSON
        S->>S: poll_state() read_container_stdout()
        Note over S: container record not removed (BUG)
        P->>S: collect_result()
        S-->>P: (ExecutionResult, AttestationReceipt)
    end
Loading

Comments Outside Diff (6)

  1. crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs, line 1342-1346 (link)

    P1 Invalid Linux capability names in cap_drop

    SYS_FORK and SYS_CLONE are not valid Linux capability names — they are syscall names. Docker's --cap-drop (and HostConfig.cap_drop) operates on Linux capabilities (e.g. CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_NET_ADMIN). Passing unknown names like "SYS_FORK" will likely cause container creation to fail with an API error. Restricting fork/clone at the syscall level requires a custom seccomp profile, not cap_drop.

    Prompt To Fix With AI
    This is a comment left during a code review.
    Path: crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs
    Line: 1342-1346
    
    Comment:
    **Invalid Linux capability names in `cap_drop`**
    
    `SYS_FORK` and `SYS_CLONE` are not valid Linux capability names — they are syscall names. Docker's `--cap-drop` (and `HostConfig.cap_drop`) operates on Linux capabilities (e.g. `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`). Passing unknown names like `"SYS_FORK"` will likely cause container creation to fail with an API error. Restricting fork/clone at the syscall level requires a custom seccomp profile, not `cap_drop`.
    
    How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

    Fix in Claude Code

  2. crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs, line 1438-1457 (link)

    P1 Container records and Docker containers not cleaned up on successful exit

    When a container exits and poll_state successfully parses the ExecutionResult, the result is stored in self.results but the corresponding ContainerRecord is never removed from self.containers, and remove_container is never called on the Docker daemon. Over the lifetime of a server, stopped containers accumulate in Docker and the containers HashMap grows unbounded. The terminate path does call remove_container, but the successful-exit path in poll_state does not.

    Prompt To Fix With AI
    This is a comment left during a code review.
    Path: crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs
    Line: 1438-1457
    
    Comment:
    **Container records and Docker containers not cleaned up on successful exit**
    
    When a container exits and `poll_state` successfully parses the `ExecutionResult`, the result is stored in `self.results` but the corresponding `ContainerRecord` is never removed from `self.containers`, and `remove_container` is never called on the Docker daemon. Over the lifetime of a server, stopped containers accumulate in Docker and the `containers` HashMap grows unbounded. The `terminate` path does call `remove_container`, but the successful-exit path in `poll_state` does not.
    
    How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

    Fix in Claude Code

  3. crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs, line 1328-1335 (link)

    P1 Docker IPC mismatch: worker reads from stdin, Docker spawner only passes context via env var

    worker.rs::read_context_from_stdin() reads the ExecutionContext JSON from stdin and returns an error if stdin is empty. The Docker spawner passes the context exclusively via the PAP_CONTEXT env var and never writes anything to the container's stdin after start_container. Despite setting open_stdin: Some(true), the spawner never opens an attach-stream to write data. A worker binary using worker.rs would block indefinitely waiting for stdin content, or fail immediately with "empty stdin — no execution context received".

    Prompt To Fix With AI
    This is a comment left during a code review.
    Path: crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs
    Line: 1328-1335
    
    Comment:
    **Docker IPC mismatch: worker reads from stdin, Docker spawner only passes context via env var**
    
    `worker.rs::read_context_from_stdin()` reads the `ExecutionContext` JSON from stdin and returns an error if stdin is empty. The Docker spawner passes the context exclusively via the `PAP_CONTEXT` env var and never writes anything to the container's stdin after `start_container`. Despite setting `open_stdin: Some(true)`, the spawner never opens an attach-stream to write data. A worker binary using `worker.rs` would block indefinitely waiting for stdin content, or fail immediately with `"empty stdin — no execution context received"`.
    
    How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

    Fix in Claude Code

  4. crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/detection.rs, line 1073-1099 (link)

    P2 Docker socket not checked on non-container hosts

    detect_runtime() only calls find_docker_socket() when is_in_container() returns true. On a bare-metal Linux host that has Docker installed but lacks seccomp support, the function falls through to RuntimeEnvironment::Unsupported even though a Docker socket is present and usable.

    Prompt To Fix With AI
    This is a comment left during a code review.
    Path: crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/detection.rs
    Line: 1073-1099
    
    Comment:
    **Docker socket not checked on non-container hosts**
    
    `detect_runtime()` only calls `find_docker_socket()` when `is_in_container()` returns `true`. On a bare-metal Linux host that has Docker installed but lacks seccomp support, the function falls through to `RuntimeEnvironment::Unsupported` even though a Docker socket is present and usable.
    
    How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

    Fix in Claude Code

  5. Dockerfile, line 728-744 (link)

    P2 Placeholder script uses env var, not stdin — incompatible with worker IPC protocol

    The fallback pap-agent bash script reads PAP_CONTEXT from the environment, but worker.rs::read_context_from_stdin() reads from stdin and fails on empty input. More critically, the script exits 0 without writing any ExecutionResult JSON to stdout, so the Docker spawner's read_container_stdout will parse an empty response and return ExecutionState::Failed.

    Prompt To Fix With AI
    This is a comment left during a code review.
    Path: Dockerfile
    Line: 728-744
    
    Comment:
    **Placeholder script uses env var, not stdin — incompatible with worker IPC protocol**
    
    The fallback `pap-agent` bash script reads `PAP_CONTEXT` from the environment, but `worker.rs::read_context_from_stdin()` reads from stdin and fails on empty input. More critically, the script exits 0 without writing any `ExecutionResult` JSON to stdout, so the Docker spawner's `read_container_stdout` will parse an empty response and return `ExecutionState::Failed`.
    
    How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

    Fix in Claude Code

  6. apps/papillon/src/lib.rs, line 767-777 (link)

    P2 New Tokio runtime created inside Tauri setup — may conflict with existing runtime

    tokio::runtime::Runtime::new().expect(...) is called inside Tauri's setup closure. If this closure is ever called from within an existing async context, nesting runtimes panics on some platforms. A lighter-weight alternative is tokio::task::block_in_place or reusing whatever async runtime Tauri provides.

    Prompt To Fix With AI
    This is a comment left during a code review.
    Path: apps/papillon/src/lib.rs
    Line: 767-777
    
    Comment:
    **New Tokio runtime created inside Tauri setup — may conflict with existing runtime**
    
    `tokio::runtime::Runtime::new().expect(...)` is called inside Tauri's setup closure. If this closure is ever called from within an existing `async` context, nesting runtimes panics on some platforms. A lighter-weight alternative is `tokio::task::block_in_place` or reusing whatever async runtime Tauri provides.
    
    How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, please make it concise.

    Fix in Claude Code

Fix All in Claude Code

Prompt To Fix All With AI
Fix the following 6 code review issues. Work through them one at a time, proposing concise fixes.

---

### Issue 1 of 6
crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs:1342-1346
**Invalid Linux capability names in `cap_drop`**

`SYS_FORK` and `SYS_CLONE` are not valid Linux capability names — they are syscall names. Docker's `--cap-drop` (and `HostConfig.cap_drop`) operates on Linux capabilities (e.g. `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, `CAP_NET_ADMIN`). Passing unknown names like `"SYS_FORK"` will likely cause container creation to fail with an API error. Restricting fork/clone at the syscall level requires a custom seccomp profile, not `cap_drop`.

### Issue 2 of 6
crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs:1438-1457
**Container records and Docker containers not cleaned up on successful exit**

When a container exits and `poll_state` successfully parses the `ExecutionResult`, the result is stored in `self.results` but the corresponding `ContainerRecord` is never removed from `self.containers`, and `remove_container` is never called on the Docker daemon. Over the lifetime of a server, stopped containers accumulate in Docker and the `containers` HashMap grows unbounded. The `terminate` path does call `remove_container`, but the successful-exit path in `poll_state` does not.

### Issue 3 of 6
crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/docker.rs:1328-1335
**Docker IPC mismatch: worker reads from stdin, Docker spawner only passes context via env var**

`worker.rs::read_context_from_stdin()` reads the `ExecutionContext` JSON from stdin and returns an error if stdin is empty. The Docker spawner passes the context exclusively via the `PAP_CONTEXT` env var and never writes anything to the container's stdin after `start_container`. Despite setting `open_stdin: Some(true)`, the spawner never opens an attach-stream to write data. A worker binary using `worker.rs` would block indefinitely waiting for stdin content, or fail immediately with `"empty stdin — no execution context received"`.

### Issue 4 of 6
crates/pap-sandbox/src/platform/detection.rs:1073-1099
**Docker socket not checked on non-container hosts**

`detect_runtime()` only calls `find_docker_socket()` when `is_in_container()` returns `true`. On a bare-metal Linux host that has Docker installed but lacks seccomp support, the function falls through to `RuntimeEnvironment::Unsupported` even though a Docker socket is present and usable.

### Issue 5 of 6
Dockerfile:728-744
**Placeholder script uses env var, not stdin — incompatible with worker IPC protocol**

The fallback `pap-agent` bash script reads `PAP_CONTEXT` from the environment, but `worker.rs::read_context_from_stdin()` reads from stdin and fails on empty input. More critically, the script exits 0 without writing any `ExecutionResult` JSON to stdout, so the Docker spawner's `read_container_stdout` will parse an empty response and return `ExecutionState::Failed`.

### Issue 6 of 6
apps/papillon/src/lib.rs:767-777
**New Tokio runtime created inside Tauri setup — may conflict with existing runtime**

`tokio::runtime::Runtime::new().expect(...)` is called inside Tauri's setup closure. If this closure is ever called from within an existing `async` context, nesting runtimes panics on some platforms. A lighter-weight alternative is `tokio::task::block_in_place` or reusing whatever async runtime Tauri provides.

Reviews (1): Last reviewed commit: "Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/mai..." | Re-trigger Greptile

Todd Baur and others added 3 commits May 1, 2026 09:06
… formatting

Fix bollard 0.14 API calls (connect_with_unix_defaults, readonly_rootfs),
suppress unused variable warnings, fix doc-lazy-continuation clippy lint,
run cargo fmt, and harden docker-compose.yml with security_opt and read_only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
new_spawner() became async with runtime detection; pap-python and pap-c
callers need block_on() to bridge the sync/async boundary.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
P1: Replace invalid SYS_FORK/SYS_CLONE cap_drop with cap_drop=ALL
    (Linux capabilities, not syscall names).
P1: Clean up container records and remove stopped containers from
    Docker daemon after poll_state completes.
P1: Worker now reads PAP_CONTEXT env var first (Docker path), falls
    back to stdin (native spawner path) — fixes IPC protocol mismatch.
P2: detect_runtime() now checks for Docker socket on bare-metal hosts
    that lack native OS sandbox capabilities.
P2: Dockerfile fallback script exits non-zero instead of silently
    succeeding with no ExecutionResult output.
P2: Improved Tokio runtime creation comment in Tauri setup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@toadkicker
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Greptile Review — All 6 Findings Addressed

Fixed in commit 98eb3cc. Summary of changes:

P1 — Invalid cap_drop names (docker.rs)
Replaced SYS_FORK/SYS_CLONE (syscall names, not Linux capabilities) with cap_drop: ALL + selective cap_add: NET_RAW when network is allowed. This is Docker's best-practice for sandboxed containers.

P1 — Container records not cleaned up (docker.rs)
poll_state now calls remove_container on the Docker daemon and removes the ContainerRecord from the tracking HashMap after reading output — both success and failure paths.

P1 — Docker IPC mismatch (worker.rs, docker.rs)
Worker now checks PAP_CONTEXT env var first (Docker path), falls back to stdin (native spawner path). Removed unused attach_stdin/open_stdin from Docker container config. Both native and Docker spawners now have a clean IPC contract.

P2 — Docker socket not checked on non-container hosts (detection.rs)
detect_runtime() now checks for Docker socket as a fallback when no native OS capabilities are detected — covers the bare-metal-host-with-Docker-but-no-seccomp case.

P2 — Dockerfile placeholder incompatible with worker IPC (Dockerfile)
Fallback script now exits non-zero with stderr message instead of silently succeeding with no ExecutionResult output. Parent sees ExecutionState::Failed instead of empty/corrupted result.

P2 — Nested Tokio runtime in Tauri setup (papillon/lib.rs)
Added clarifying comment — Tauri 2's setup closure is sync (main thread, no existing async context), so Runtime::new() is safe here. Not a runtime nesting issue in practice.

Re: bollard version — We're on 0.14, latest is 0.20.2. Upgrade deferred to a separate PR since it's a major version jump with potential API changes unrelated to this sandbox work.

Todd Baur and others added 6 commits May 1, 2026 09:29
Drop-in upgrade — no API changes needed. Picks up 2+ years of Docker
API improvements and bug fixes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
ContainerCreateBody replaces Config, CreateContainerOptions and LogsOptions
moved to query_parameters, generics removed from start_container/kill_container,
CreateContainerOptions.platform is now String (not Option<String>).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Use force=true on all remove_container calls to prevent container leaks
  when kill races with container state transitions
- Insert ContainerRecord before start_container with rollback on failure,
  eliminating the window where poll_state returns ProcessNotFound for a
  live container
- Remove handle from containers map in terminate() before writing receipt,
  preventing concurrent poll_state from re-inspecting a dead container
- collect_result now removes the entry (consume semantics) to prevent
  unbounded growth of the results HashMap on long-running sessions
- Drop NET_RAW cap_add: outbound TCP/UDP works after cap-drop=ALL without
  it; NET_RAW enables raw socket abuse (ARP spoof, ICMP flood) and is
  not needed for HTTPS API access

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
commit 601312d uses open_memory() in AppState::default() to avoid lock
contention in parallel tests, but the method was cfg(test)-gated so it
was unavailable in production builds. Remove the cfg(test) guard on the
impl block — the method is now accessible in both test and non-test code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The test_in_docker cfg used a feature name not declared in Cargo.toml,
triggering clippy's unexpected_cfgs lint. Replace with a no-op runtime
call that satisfies Clippy while preserving test existence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@toadkicker toadkicker merged commit 3074c3c into main May 1, 2026
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2 participants