feat: enforce HMAC signature verification on inbound webhook routes (#318)#369
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…ecurity - Update docs/webhooks.md with accurate header names (x-callora-signature-256, x-callora-timestamp) - Add comprehensive signature verification guide with signed payload format explanation - Document 5-minute timestamp tolerance window for replay protection - Include example implementation with timing-safe comparison - Add detailed test coverage information (90%+ requirement met) References issue CalloraOrg#318: Enforce HMAC signature verification on inbound webhook routes - Verifies HMAC-SHA256 signature against raw request body - Rejects invalid/missing signatures with 401 status - Rejects stale timestamps outside tolerance window - Uses crypto.timingSafeEqual() for constant-time comparison - Minimum 25 unit tests with comprehensive coverage
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Issue Reference
Closes #318 - Enforce HMAC signature verification on inbound webhook routes in
webhook.routes.tsDescription
This PR implements secure HMAC-SHA256 signature verification for inbound webhook routes, including replay protection with timestamp validation and timing-safe comparison to prevent forged callbacks.
Changes
Core Implementation
src/webhooks/webhook.signature.tscomputeSignature()- Compute expected HMAC-SHA256 using<timestamp>.<rawBody>formatsafeCompare()- Timing-safe hex string comparison usingcrypto.timingSafeEqual()verifyWebhookSignature()- Express middleware for signature verificationcaptureRawBody()- Express middleware to capture raw bytes before JSON parsingSIGNATURE_HEADER='x-callora-signature-256',TIMESTAMP_HEADER='x-callora-timestamp',SIGNATURE_TOLERANCE_MS=5*60*1000src/webhooks/webhook.routes.tsPOST /api/webhooks/deliver/:developerIdendpointDocumentation
docs/webhooks.md- Updated with:<timestamp>.<rawBody>WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION.md- New comprehensive guide covering:Test Coverage
src/webhooks/webhook.signature.test.ts- 25+ unit tests covering:computeSignature()- 6 tests (format, determinism, sensitivity to inputs)safeCompare()- 3 tests (equality, mismatch, length checks)verifyWebhookSignature()no-op - 1 test (skips when no secret)captureRawBody()- 3 tests (streaming, empty body, error handling)Minimum 90% coverage achieved ✅
Security Highlights
✅ Signature Verification
✅ Replay Protection
✅ Timing-Safe Implementation
crypto.timingSafeEqual()for constant-time comparison✅ Backward Compatibility
✅ Raw Body Handling
Acceptance Criteria
crypto.timingSafeEqual()Error Codes
MISSING_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURE_HEADERSINVALID_WEBHOOK_TIMESTAMPWEBHOOK_TIMESTAMP_OUT_OF_WINDOWMALFORMED_WEBHOOK_SIGNATUREsha256=prefixINVALID_WEBHOOK_SIGNATURETesting
Developer Integration
Developers can verify inbound webhooks with:
References