Administrivia

• Lab 2 due right now

- Free extension to midnight for being here
- Put /* Attended-Lecture */ at top of reliable.c

Midterm exam one week from today

- Open Book, Open notes, no electronic devices allowed
- Feel free to print out and bring lecture slides

• SCPD students:

- Email cs144-staff@scs.stanford.edu with your exam monitor information
- Please ensure the email subject is "exam monitor"

• Any other students with special exam needs

- Please email cs144-staff to make arrangements

Outline


- DNS architecture
- DNS protocol and resource records (RRs)
- Record types: A, NS, glue, MX, SOA, CNAME
- Reverse lookup
- Load balancing
- DNS security

Parsing a URL

http://cs144.scs.stanford.edu/labs/sc.html



Motivation



- Users can't remember IP addresses
 - Need to map symbolic names (www.stanford.edu) → IP addr
- Implemented by library functions & servers
 - getaddrinfo () talks to server over UDP
- Actually, more generally, need to map symbolic names to values

hosts.txt system

- Originally, hosts were listed in a file, hosts.txt
 - Email global network administrator when you add a host
 - Administrator mails out new hosts.txt file every few days

• Would be completely impractical today

- hosts.txt today would be huge (gigabytes)
- What if two people wanted to add same name?
- Who is authorized to change address of a name?
- People need to change name mappings more often than every few days (e.g., Dynamic IP addresses)

Goals of DNS

• Scalability

- Must handle huge number of records
- Potentially *exponential* in name size—because custom software may synthesize names on-the-fly

Distributed control

- Let people control their own names

• Fault-tolerance

- Old software assumed hosts.txt always there
- Bad potential failure modes when name lookups fail
- Minimize lookup failures in the face of other network problems

The good news

Properties that make DNS goals easier to achieve:

1. Read-only or read-mostly database

- People typically look up hostnames much more often than they are updated


2. Loose consistency

- When adding a machine, may be okay if info takes minutes or hours to propagate

• These suggest approach w. aggressive caching

- Once you have looked up hostname, remember result
- Don't need to look it up again in near future

Domain Name System (DNS)



Break namespace into a bunch of zones

- . ("root"), edu., stanford.edu., cs.stanford.edu.,...
- Zones separately administered \Longrightarrow delegation
- Parent zones tell you how to find servers for dubdomains.


Each zone served from several replicated servers

Root servers



- Root (and TLD) servers must be widely replicated
 - For some, use various tricks like IP anycast

DNS software architecture



- Two types of query
 - Recursive
 - Non-Recursive
- Apps make recursive queries to local DNS server (1)
- Local server queries remote servers non-recursively (2, 4, 6)
 - Aggressively caches result
 - E.g., only contact root on first query ending .umass.edu

DNS protocol

- TCP/UDP port 53
- Most traffic uses UDP
 - Lightweight protocol has 512 byte UDP message limit
 - retry w. TCP if UDP fails (e.g., reply truncated)
- TCP requires message boundaries
 - Prefix all messages w. 16-bit length
- Bit in query determines if query is recursive

Resource records

• All DNS info represented as resource records (RR):

name [TTL] [class] type rdata

- name domain name (e.g., www.stanford.edu.)
- TTL time to live in seconds
- *class* for extensibility, usually IN (1) "Internet"
- type type of the record
- *rdata* resource data dependent on the *type*

• Two important DNS RR types:

- A Internet address (IPv4)
- NS name server

• Example resource records (dig stanford.edu):

```
stanford.edu. 3600 IN A 171.67.216.4
stanford.edu. 3600 IN A 171.67.216.7
stanford.edu. 6171 IN NS Argus.stanford.edu.
```

Some implementation details

How does local name server know root servers?

- Need to configure name server with *root cache* file
- Contains root name servers and their addresses

```
. 3600000 NS A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. 3600000 A 198.41.0.4
. 3600000 NS B.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
B.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. 3600000 A 128.9.0.107
...
```

How do you get addresses of other name servers

- To lookup names ending .stanford.edu., ask Argus.stanford.edu.
- Chicken and egg problem: How to get Argus.stanford.edu.'s address?
- Solution: glue records A records in parent zone
- Name servers for edu. have A record of Argus.stanford.edu.

Glue Record Example

• Look up www.scs.stanford.edu assuming no cache

```
dig +norec www.scs.stanford.edu @a.root-servers.net
dig +norec www.scs.stanford.edu @a.gtld-servers.net
dig +norec www.scs.stanford.edu @argus.stanford.edu
dig +norec www.scs.stanford.edu @mission.scs.stanford.edu
```


- Get intermediary results for .edu, stanford.edu, scs.stanford.edu, and www.scs.stanford.edu
- Where are the glue records?

Structure of a DNS message [RFC 1035]

Same message format for queries and replies

- Query has zero RRs in Answer/Authority/Additional sections
- Reply includes question, plus has RRs
- Authority allows for delegation
- Additional for glue + other RRs client might need

Header format



- QR 0=query, 1=response
- RCODE error code
- AA=authoritative answer, TC=truncated,
 RD=recursion desired, RA=recursion available

Encoding of RRs

+	0	1	2	3	4	5 +	6	7	8	9	1 0	1	1 2	1 3	1 4	1 5
. 1 / / 1 .	 / NAME															
+	TYPE															+
1	CLASS															
	TTL															
+	+++++++++++++															
/	++++++++++ ' RDATA / '														/	

Encoding of domain names

A DNS name consists of a series of labels

- www.stanford.edu. has 3 labels: www, stanford, and edu
- Labels can contain letters, digits, and "-", but should not start or end with "-"
- Maximum length 63 characters
- Encoded as length byte followed by label
- Last label always empty label

• Names are case insensitive

- But server must preserve case of question in replies
- Example: request www.sTANford.EDu, look at authority

Name compression



- Observation: many common suffixes in DNS messages
 - Particularly because of case preservation rule
- Allow pointer labels to re-use suffixes
 - Recal label starts with length byte (0-63)
 - If value $\geq 0xc0$ (192), subtract 0xc000 from first two bytes, and treat as pointer into message

Secondary servers

- Availability requires geographically disperate replicas
 - E.g., I ask MIT to serve scs.stanford.edu
- Typical setup: One master many slave servers
- How often to sync up servers? Trade-off
 - All the time \Longrightarrow high overhead
 - Rarely \Longrightarrow stale data
- Put trade-off under domain owner's control
 - Fields in SOA record control secondary's behavior
 - Primary can change SOA without asking human operator of secondary
 - Primary can also give secondary a hint to check freshness

Other Records

• Start of Authority (SOA) record

- States administrative information for a zone
- dig stanford.edu soa
- dig sing.stanford.edu ns
- Tells you how long you can cache negative results

• Mail Exchange (MX) record

- For historical reasons, mail does not have to use A records directly
- Example: ping scs.stanford.edu
- No such host, but you can still mail CS144 staff there

CNAME records

• CNAME record specifies an alias:

name [TTL] [IN] CNAME canonical-name

- As if any RR's associated w. canonical-name also for name
- Can look up with AI_CANONNAME flag to getaddrinfo

• Examples, to save typing:

```
wb.scs.stanford.edu. CNAME williamsburg-bridge.scs.stanford.edu. mb.scs.stanford.edu. CNAME manhattan-bridge.scs.stanford.edu.
```

• CNAME precludes any other RRs for name

- E.g., might want: david.com CNAME david.stanford.edu
- Illegal, because david.com would need NS records

• Note answer section can have CNAME for query name + other RR(s) for *canonical-name*

- But don't point MXes to CNAMEs, as no A recs in additional section (try bad-mx.scs.stanford.edu.)

Reverse Lookups

- Remember traceroute...
- Traceroute can learn names of hosts through reverse lookup
- 128.30.2.121 \rightarrow 121.2.30.128.in-addr.arpa
- PTR record points to canonical name
- Example: tinyos.stanford.edu → sing.stanford.edu
 - → 65.76.67.171.in-addr.arpa ptr

Mapping addresses to names

• PTR records specify names

name [TTL] [IN] PTR "ptrdname"

- name somehow encode address...how?
- ptrdname domain name for this address
- IPv4 addrs stored under in-addr.arpa domain
 - Reverse name, append in-addr.arpa
 - To look up $171.66.3.9 \rightarrow 9.3.66.171.in$ -addr.arpa.
 - Why reversed? Delegation!
- IPv6 under ip6.arpa
 - Historical note: ARPA funded original Internet

Using DNS for load-balancing

- Can have multiple RR of most types for one name
 - Required for NS records (for availability)
 - Useful for A records
 - (Not legal for CNAME records)
- Servers rotate order in which records returned
 - getaddrinfo returns a linked list of addrinfo structures
 - Most apps just use first address returned
 - Even if your name server caches results, clients will be spread amonst servers
- Example: dig cnn.com multiple times

SRV records

Service location records

_service._proto.name [...] SRV prio weight port target

- _service E.g., _sfs for NYU's SFS file system
- _proto _tcp or _udp
- name domain name record applies to
- prio as with MX records, lower # → higher priority
- weight within priority, affects randomization of order
- port TCP or UDP port number (particularly useful for SIP)
- target Server name, for which client needs A record
- Like a generalization of MX records for arbitrary services

DNS redirection for content distribution

• Play with akamai and www.microsoft.com

Classless in-addr delegation

- How to delegate on non-byte boundary?
- Solution: Use CNAME records
 - So-called *classless* in-addr delegation

• Example:

```
1.3.66.171.in-addr.arpa. CNAME 1.ptr.your-domain.com.
```

3.3.66.171.in-addr.arpa. CNAME 3.ptr.your-domain.com.

^{2.3.66.171.}in-addr.arpa. CNAME 2.ptr.your-domain.com.

DNS exploits

- July 29, 2008, Bruce Schheier: "Despite the best efforts of the security community, the details of a critical internet vulnerability discovered by Dan Kaminsky about six months ago have leaked."
- One of the basic problems: DNS caching
 - If you can poison the cache, the damage stays
 - Who knows how far it spreads...

DNS exploit example


- Alice wants to look up www.google.com
- Bob the attacker knows
- Bob knows source address/port, destination address/port
- Bob generates a spoof response: www.google.com is www.evil.com
- Challenge: Bob has to guess Query ID
- If Bob guesses, RR can stay in Alice's cache a long time

Exploit Example

Bob



Exploit Example




Countermeasures

- Choose good QIDs (used to be incremented, now randomly generated), 16 bits
- Randomize source port, 16 bits
- Some protection, but only makes it take longer, networks are faster each day

Another exploit

- DNS clients used to trust all responses
- Problem: glue records and helpful A records
 - Ask NS of evil.com for www.evil.com
 - Says www.evil.com is a CNAME for www.google.com
 - Provides A record for www.google.com

Exploit Example



It gets worse

- Glue records can overwrite standard A records
- Even if you have a good A record for www.amazon.com, it's overwritten
- E.g., Server wants name of my IP address
 - Looks up 66.66.66.in-addr.arpa
- I say nameserver for 66.66.66.66.in-addr.arpa is www.amazon.com
 - Include glue A record for www.amazon.com in my reply

Solution 1

- Only use glue records for duration of query
 - Cache only end-to-end traversal of pointers, not intermediate steps
- In CNAME example www.evil.com will point to evil server
 - www.amazon.com will not point to evil server
- In in-addr.arpa example, can lie about hostname
 - But I can lie anyway
 - Have to check reverse lookup result by doing forward lookup

Example

www.evil.com www.amazon.com 66.66.66

Solution 2: bailiwick checking

- Only pay attention to answers for the domain you've asked
- Response from evil.com can't tell you the A record for google.com
- Ask google.com for www.google.com
- Opponent can still race, but at least it's not deterministic

Recent Kaminsky exploit

- Make winning the race easier
- Brute force attack
- Force Alice to look up AAAA.google.com, AAAB.google.com, etc.
- Forge CNAME responses for each lookup, inserting A record for www.google.com
- Circumvents bailiwick checking

Solution: signatures

- Signature: cryptographic way to prove a party is who they say they are (more later in quarter)
- Requires a chain of trust
- Whom do you trust to sign DNS?

DNS Overview

- Distributed system for mapping names to values (e.g., IP addresses)
- Read-dominated workload allows caching
- Name structure allows distribution, independent administration
- Caching means bad data can stay a long time
- Standard protocol does not authenticate response is from server: DNSSec does