Unlock How It Works

How the unlock works

What this page covers. The complete mechanism, end to end, in the order it happens at boot, with the reason each step exists. A competent engineer should be able to read this page and understand the whole design without opening the source. Register-by-register detail lives in Register reference; the Falcon internals live in Falcon and Booter; the payload construction lives in The ROP chain.

The one-sentence version: the driver enlarges the GSP signature buffer to 0x0000f800, fills it with a crafted Falcon ROP payload, re-runs NVIDIA's own signed SEC2 Booter Load once per privilege level mask to gain an arbitrary BAR0 write at Heavy-Secure privilege, opens four PLMs, writes four plain host registers, restores the real signature, and then lets GSP boot normally with the new geometry patched into the static info it reports.

Why it has to work this way

Three measured constraints force the whole design. Every one of them was discovered the hard way.

1. The memory geometry does not survive a reset, but the compute unlock does. Measured across a function-level reset:

Register	Survives FLR?
`SS0 0x0082381c`	Yes
`SS1 0x00823820`	Yes
`FEAT_OVR_PLM 0x00823804`	Yes (always-on island)
`CFG1 0x009a0204`	No, reverts to `0x02449000`
Per-FBPA CFG1, CSTATUS	No
`LMR 0x00100ce0`	No, reverts to the stock value
FB-geometry PLMs	No, they re-lock
AON LMR shadow `0x001180f0`	No, reverts
SEC2 reset-PLM taint	Cleared by FLR (`0x8f` becomes `0xff`)

FEAT_OVR_PLM is the only PLM in a 26-register survey marked always-on. This asymmetry is the single reason the compute unlock shipped weeks before the memory unlock, and the reason the memory unlock cannot use the old compute recipe of "fire, FLR, then write from the host".

2. There is no always-on shadow for framebuffer geometry. Hours were spent sweeping for one, because SS0 had a findable AON shadow and a published paper described the concept. With all six FB-geometry PLMs plus FUSE_SS_PLM open, CFG1, CSTATUS and LMR still revert on FLR and are never cold-boot persistent. A dedicated FLR-survival mapping run concluded that no PLM moves FBPA configuration into the always-on domain. The geometry therefore has to be re-applied on every module load.

3. A stock driver re-locks what a driverless tool opens. Writing 0x009A0204, 0x0082381C and 0x00823804 from the host with no driver loaded works, the writes visibly land, and then loading the stock driver reads 0x00823804 back as 0xffffff8f with the throttle dividers restored to 5. That failure is exactly what the in-driver approach exists to solve.

Add one more ordering constraint: GSP-RM treats the LMR as the master during its own boot. With CFG1 set to the 40 GB tier but LMR left at the stock 0x288, GSP-RM reverted per-FBPA CSTATUS_RAMAMOUNT from 0x800 back to 0x200 during kgspBootstrap. So the geometry has to be in place before the real Booter Load launches GSP-RM, not after.

The conclusion the maintainers arrived at: do all of it inside _kgspBootGspRm, between the point where the driver has a signature buffer it controls and the point where the genuine Booter Load runs.

Step 0: where the unlock sits in the GA100 boot chain

Power on
  └─ GFW / DEVINIT        signed firmware from flash; reads the RAMCFG strap,
                          latches the L2 address map. No RM yet. Always locked.
  └─ CPU-side RM (nvidia.ko)
       ├─ kgspPopulateWprMeta      reads hardware geometry / LMR into WprMeta.fbSize,
       │                           decides WPR2 placement
       ├─ kgspPrepareForBootstrap  runs FWSEC / FRTS (the VBIOS devinit)
       └─ kgspBootstrap            ◀── THE UNLOCK RUNS HERE, inside _kgspBootGspRm
            └─ SEC2 Booter Load    signed Falcon ucode; carves WPR2, launches GSP-RM
  └─ GSP-RM                        closed RISC-V firmware, runs on the GPU

Because a cold boot always runs the signed DevInit with the locked CMP strap table, first enumeration always shows stock capacity, stock Gen1 link and the throttle in place. A plain rmmod / modprobe does not re-run DevInit (no PERST asserted), which is why the geometry written by a previous load survives a driver reload but not a reset.

Step 1: the driver loads and detects the device ID

Patch 0001 adds a gate helper to src/nvidia/src/kernel/gpu/gsp/kernel_gsp.c:

#define SEC2_POSTBL_TIMING_CMP_170HX_8GB_PCI_DEVICE_ID   0x20C2
#define SEC2_POSTBL_TIMING_CMP_170HX_10GB_PCI_DEVICE_ID  0x2082

static NvBool _kgspSec2PostblTimingEnabled(OBJGPU *pGpu)
{
    NvU32 devId = pGpu->idInfo.PCIDeviceID >> 16;
    return (devId == SEC2_POSTBL_TIMING_CMP_170HX_8GB_PCI_DEVICE_ID ||
            devId == SEC2_POSTBL_TIMING_CMP_170HX_10GB_PCI_DEVICE_ID);
}

Why the shift. pGpu->idInfo.PCIDeviceID packs vendor and device; the device half is the upper 16 bits. Every unlock site in patches 0001 through 0005 tests it the same way. Patch 0006 is the one exception, comparing the raw nv->pci_info.device_id because it runs at PCI probe in kernel-open/nvidia/nv.c, before OBJGPU exists.

Why a runtime gate rather than a build-time one. Both geometry profiles are compiled into the same module:

if (devId == 0x20C2) { cfg1Value = 0x02779000U; lmrValue = 0x0000020BU; }
else                 { cfg1Value = 0x02669000U; lmrValue = 0x0000028AU; }

driver/build.sh still contains an inline Python step that used to rewrite these constants, but on master it detects that both geometries are already present and exits with runtime device-id geometry (profile metadata=<label>) without editing anything. A mis-detected --profile therefore writes wrong metadata but cannot produce wrong geometry.

Any other GA100 SKU, including 10de:20b0, boots the completely stock path even with the patched modules installed.

Step 2: the signature buffer is enlarged to `0xf800`

_kgspCreateSignatureMemdesc normally allocates NV_ALIGN_UP(pGspFw->signatureSize, 256) bytes, which on this platform is 4096. When the device gate is true it instead allocates SEC2_POSTBL_TIMING_SIGNATURE_SIZE = 0x0000f800ULL (63,488 bytes) in ADDR_SYSMEM, 256-byte aligned. Before overwriting anything the real signature bytes are copied aside into two new KernelGsp fields:

NvU8 *pStockSignatureData;
NvU64 stockSignatureSize;

logged as SEC2_DEBUG: saved stock signature (4096 bytes).

Why 0xf800 exactly. This is the whole exploit. The bug is an unbounded DMA in the Booter's LS-signature verification: booterVerifyLsSignatures_TU10X at IMEM 0x29C4 calls booterIssueDma_HAL with the DMEM destination fixed and the transfer length taken straight from sizeOfSignature in WprMeta, with no bounds check. The DMA destination is DMEM 0x0800, and Falcon DMEM is 64 KB. So:

0x0800 (DMA base) + 0xF800 (length) = 0x10000 (end of DMEM)

The payload maps 1:1 onto DMEM 0x0800..0xFFFF, which is everything the Booter uses at runtime, including its stack, its saved return addresses, and the stack-canary global. Choosing exactly 0xf800 makes the last payload byte land on the last DMEM byte. (The arithmetic is self-confirming: the payload writes its fake canary at offset 0x5b40, and 0x5b40 + 0x800 = 0x6340, the independently disassembled canary global address.)

Why this is ROP and not code execution. Falcon keeps instructions in IMEM and data in DMEM. The overflow reaches DMEM only. It gives control of the return addresses on the Falcon call stack, so the attack must be built from gadgets already present in the signed booter image.

What the buffer does not contain. An early belief, from the firmware-splice era, was that the buffer had to begin with the real, valid signature, because zero-padding the whole 0xF800 region made the stock booter bail with mailbox 0x31. The shipping payload does not preserve it: _kgspSec2PostblTimingFillPayload() writes 0x000004a7 over every dword from offset 0 upward and never copies signature bytes back in. The saved stock bytes live only in pStockSignatureData until step 7 puts them back. Mailbox 0x31 is also what a successful payload pass reports, so on its own it is not a signature-validity verdict.

_kgspCreateSignatureMemdesc also tries os_open_and_read_file() on /lib/firmware/nvidia/ga100/gsp/dmem.bin and, on failure, logs SEC2_DEBUG: <path> not found (0x59), using built-in payload. Status 0x59 is benign and expected.

!!! note "Superseded" dmem.bin is effectively vestigial on the released path. It is a leftover from the 580-era workflow that spliced the payload into the .fwsignature_ga100 section of a firmware file on disk. In the shipping flow, no Booter Load runs between that file read and the first kgspSec2PostblTimingRefillPayload() call, which rewrites the entire buffer with the built-in template. Dropping a file there has no effect.

Step 3: the payload is written

_kgspSec2PostblTimingFillPayload(buffer, writeAddr, writeValue) first fills every dword of the buffer with SEC2_POSTBL_TIMING_FILL_DWORD = 0x000004a7, then overwrites these slots. The DMEM column is simply payload offset plus 0x800:

Payload offset	DMEM	Value	Role
all	`0x0800`-`0xFFFF`	`0x000004a7`	fill dword
`0x1100`	`0x1900`	`0x00000007`	`f100_field_save_restore` gate; leaves the SEC2 reset PLM at `0xff`
`0x5b40`	`0x6340`	`0xc0deca7e`	fake canary written into the guard global
`0xf754`	`0xFF54`	writeValue	value argument
`0xf758`	`0xFF58`	`0xc0deca7e`	saved-canary slot
`0xf75c`	`0xFF5C`	`0x00000cbd`
`0xf76c`	`0xFF6C`	writeAddr	address argument
`0xf774`	`0xFF74`	`0x00001fbd`
`0xf780`	`0xFF80`	`0x00000000`
`0xf788`	`0xFF88`	`0x000010aa`	BAR0-master write gadget
`0xf78c`	`0xFF8C`	`0x0000815a`
`0xf790`	`0xFF90`	`0x00008e18`
`0xf794`	`0xFF94`	`0xc0deca7e`	saved-canary slot
`0xf798`	`0xFF98`	`0x0000815a`
`0xf79c`	`0xFF9C`	`0x00000000`
`0xf7a0`	`0xFFA0`	`0xc0deca7e`	saved-canary slot
`0xf7a4`	`0xFFA4`	`0x00001fbd`
`0xf7b0`	`0xFFB0`	`0x0000ffbc`
`0xf7b8`	`0xFFB8`	`0x0000582d`
`0xf7c4`	`0xFFC4`	`0xc0deca7e`	saved-canary slot
`0xf7c8`	`0xFFC8`	`0x00000cbd`
`0xf7d8`	`0xFFD8`	`0x00000003`
`0xf7e0`	`0xFFE0`	`0x00001fbd`
`0xf7f4`	`0xFFF4`	`0x00000ccb`	see the open problem below
`0xf7f8`	`0xFFF8`	`0x00007f2f`	outermost slot

This block is byte-identical in master and in all twelve archived branches. The magic 0xc0deca7e occurs exactly five times in every copy.

Why the fake canary. The booter generates a fresh random stack canary every boot and holds it in a global at DMEM 0x6340. Every protected function copies it to the boundary of its stack frame and re-compares on exit; a mismatch calls panic(). Because the value is regenerated per boot it cannot be guessed offline. The payload does not need to guess it: it overwrites the global with 0xc0deca7e and writes the same constant into every reconstructed canary slot, so every epilogue compare passes and the unwind proceeds silently.

Why 0x000010aa. That is reg_write_indirect, the booter's own arbitrary BAR0 write routine. It is byte-for-byte the same code as NVIDIA's _acrlibBar0RegWrite_TU10X, and it drives an indirect, mutex-gated mailbox in Falcon CSB space:

I[0x1c100] = target PRI address
I[0x1c200] = data
I[0x1c000] = 0x800000f2   (write; 0x800000f1 is read)

The booter uses this same path for its own work, which is how the primitive was identified. That one gadget is the entire privilege escalation: it executes at LEVEL2 inside a genuine, signed, already-verified HS image.

Why only one register write per fire. The chain has to reconstruct the booter's stack frames on its way out, and each write costs a 0x18-byte frame. Independent implementations put the hard ceiling between two and six writes per firing, and the driverless engine refuses to build a payload outside one to two writes. The shipping driver does one write per fire and simply re-fires, which is simpler and has no budget risk.

Step 4: Booter Load is executed to gain the write primitive

For each pass the driver calls:

kgspExecuteBooterLoad_HAL(pGpu, pKernelGsp,
    memdescGetPhysAddr(pKernelGsp->pWprMetaDescriptor, AT_GPU, 0));

kgspExecuteBooterLoad_TU102 performs a kflcnReset(SEC2) before every run, so SEC2 accumulates no state across passes. The Booter loads, passes the RSA-3072 boot ROM check on its own image (which is untouched and genuine), decrypts itself into HS mode, begins verifying the LS signature, DMAs 0xf800 bytes into DMEM, and unwinds through the injected return addresses instead of its own.

!!! warning "The reported status is always a failure and that is expected" Every payload pass logs s_executeBooterUcode_TU102: Booter failed with non-zero error code: 0x31 and kgspExecuteBooterLoad_TU102: failed to execute Booter Load: 0xffff, and the register writes still land. The seccode leaves an error code in mailbox0 after every run, and mailbox0 != 0 makes the HAL return NV_ERR_GENERIC (0xffff). Register readback is the only valid success criterion, and it is exactly the criterion the shipping loop uses. Do not read status=0xffff as a problem.

A Booter pass costs about 180 ms.

Step 5: the four PLMs are opened in sequence

A privilege level mask is a per-register-block gate: it decides which privilege levels may read or write the registers it covers. At PL0 (an ordinary host BAR0 write from the kernel driver) the target registers are simply not writable, and, importantly, the failure is silent. An early pipeline logged Write failed - wrote 0x2779000, read 0x2449000 three times with no error signalled anywhere.

The shipping plmTable[] has exactly four entries, opened in this order:

Index	Name	Address	Value written	Why it is needed
0	WPR_CFG	`0x001fa7cc`	`0xfffff0ff`	Gates the WPR configuration block the booter validates and the driver manipulates
1	FBPA	`0x009a0148`	`0xffffffff`	Gates the FBPA aperture, including `CFG1 0x009a0204`. Also the built-in fallback payload target
2	WPR	`0x001fa7c4`	`0xffffffff`	Gates the WPR region registers
3	FEAT	`0x00823804`	`0xffffffff`	`FEAT_OVR_PLM`. Gates the feature-override block, i.e. SS0 and SS1

!!! warning "WPR_CFG opens to 0xfffff0ff, not 0xffffffff" Both the distribution README and docs/ARCHITECTURE.md say every PLM should read 0xffffffff. The code writes and verifies 0xfffff0ff for entry 0. Treat 0xfffff0ff as canonical: it is what the shipping loop both writes and checks against.

Each entry gets up to two attempts. The attempt loop is:

for each plmTable entry:
    for attempt in 1..2:
        GPU_REG_WR32(0x001fa824, wpr2Lo)      # re-arm WPR2 low
        GPU_REG_WR32(0x001fa828, wpr2Hi)      # re-arm WPR2 high
        kgspSec2PostblTimingRefillPayload(addr, value)
        kgspExecuteBooterLoad_HAL(...)         # returns 0xffff; ignored
        if GPU_REG_RD32(addr) == value: break  # readback is the verdict
restore wpr2Lo / wpr2Hi one final time

Why WPR2 has to be re-armed before every single attempt. WPR2 is controlled by ADDR_LO 0x001fa824 and ADDR_HI 0x001fa828. kgspIsWpr2Up() returns false when HI is zero. Each Booter Load pass carves WPR2 and leaves it up; a second Booter Load would then abort with "WPR2 already up". Saving the pre-loop values and rewriting them before each attempt puts the registers back into the state the driver and the booter both expect. The same problem is why patch 0001 downgrades the fatal path in _kgspBootGspRm:

/* stock */
NV_PRINTF(LEVEL_ERROR, "unexpected WPR2 already up, cannot proceed with booting GSP\n");
return NV_ERR_INVALID_STATE;

/* patched */
NV_PRINTF(LEVEL_WARNING, "WPR2 already up before GSP boot; continuing for recovery\n");

Execution then falls straight through to kgspPopulateWprMeta_HAL.

Why FEAT_OVR_PLM can be opened at all. The gate chain is FUSE_QUADRO_WR_SEC (0x0082038c) = 1 permits 0x00823804 to be opened; opening 0x00823804 permits PL0 host writes to SS0/SS1; the feature-override registers outrank the fuses. And the whole chain exists only because the master kill fuse OPT_FEATURE_FUSES_OVERRIDE_DISABLE at 0x008203f0 reads 0x00000000 on the 170HX. Had it been blown, no software path would exist at any privilege level. The PLM itself is not PL0-writable: it must be opened from a Falcon in HS mode, "if this was not so, any Nvidia card could be unlocked without any exploit".

The shipping tree writes nothing to 0x008200fc (FUSE_SS_PLM, called OPT_PLM in the branch source). An earlier consolidated recipe called for opening it; it was already observed reading 0xffffffff on stock cards, so opening it was unnecessary. The Gen2-family branches do add it, as one of five extra entries taking the table from four to nine.

Step 6: the compute and geometry registers are written

With the PLMs open, the escalation is over. Four plain host writes land the entire unlock, with no exploit involved:

GPU_REG_WR32(pGpu, 0x0082381cU, 0x88888888U);   /* SS0 */
GPU_REG_WR32(pGpu, 0x00823820U, 0x00000008U);   /* SS1 */
GPU_REG_WR32(pGpu, 0x009a0204U, cfg1Value);     /* FBPA CFG1 broadcast */
GPU_REG_WR32(pGpu, 0x00100ce0U, lmrValue);      /* MMU local memory range */

followed by a readback logged as SEC2_DEBUG: POST-WRITE SS0=... SS1=... CFG1=... LMR=... (devId=0x%x).

SS0 and SS1: the compute unthrottle

0x0082381c is NV_FUSE_FEATURE_OVERRIDE_SM_SPEED_SELECT, holding eight 4-bit fields for IMLA0-3, FMLA16, FMLA32, FFMA and DP. 0x00823820 is ..._SM_SPEED_SELECT_1, holding the ninth field for IMLA4. Each nibble reads as [enable | 3-bit speed]: 0x8 sets bit 3 (override enable) with the speed field at 0 (full rate). So 0x88888888 means "override enabled, full rate" on all eight SS0 units and 0x00000008 does the same for IMLA4 alone.

Why both. Writing only one is not enough; this was emphasised independently in-channel and is reflected in every shipping write pair.

Why this works while the fuses stay blown. The throttle is OTP-fused per arithmetic unit: FUSE_SS_FFMA, FUSE_SS_FMLA16/32 and FUSE_SS_IMLA0-4 all read 0x5 (divide-by-32) on the 170HX and 0x0 on every A100, A10, A5000, A6000 and Drive A100 probed. After a successful unlock those fuse shadows still read 0x5. The effective rate is arbitrated from a writable override that supersedes the fuse, not from the fuse directly. The confirmation is FEAT_READOUT_1 at 0x00823818, the read-only effective speed select for all nine units, dropping from 0x016db6ed to 0x00000000.

CFG1 and LMR: the geometry

0x009a0204 is the FBPA CFG1 broadcast register. Its tier byte at bits [23:16] encodes addressing depth per memory partition: 0x44 stock (12 row bits, 512 MiB per FBPA), 0x66 (14 row bits, 2048 MiB), 0x77 (15 row bits, 4096 MiB). Total capacity is addressing depth times the fuse-determined active-FBPA count, which CFG1 does not touch. Both shipping values are literally the stock CFG1 words of real A100 parts: 0x02779000 is what an A100 PCIe 80 GB reads, 0x02669000 is what an A100 PCIe 40 GB and SXM4 40 GB read. The unlock restores genuine A100 geometry rather than inventing constants.

0x00100ce0 is the MMU local memory range. It encodes total framebuffer size as:

size_MiB = MAG[9:4] << SCALE[3:0]

Value	Decode	Meaning
`0x00000208`	32 << 8	8192 MiB (stock, 8 GB card)
`0x00000288`	40 << 8	10240 MiB (stock, 10 GB card)
`0x0000020B`	32 << 11	65536 MiB (8 GB card unlocked)
`0x0000028A`	40 << 10	40960 MiB (10 GB card unlocked)
`0x0000028B`	40 << 11	81920 MiB (the 80 GB attempt)

MAG is constant per SKU and equals twice the active-FBPA count. SCALE is what the unlock changes.

!!! warning "0x40A and 0x50A are refuted, not observed" Both circulated as candidate encodings. (0x40A >> 4) & 0x3F = 0 and (0x50A >> 4) & 0x3F = 0x10, so neither decodes under a 6-bit MAG field, and a 2026-07-11 attempt at 0x40A on a 10 GB card moved neither register. The exact width of the LOWER_MAG field (6 bits at [9:4] versus 7 at [10:4]) has never been read out of dev_fb.h and remains the last open detail here.

Why the LMR is a hard prerequisite, not an optimisation. A controlled three-way comparison on hardware: no memory writes gives CPU-RM failure 0x24 at kbusVerifyBar2; a 40 GB CFG1 strap with the stock 10 GB LMR still gives 0x24; strap plus matched LMR reaches 0x25 (StateLoad). There is no configuration that reaches StateLoad without the LMR. And per the GSP-RM behaviour noted above, an incoherent CFG1/LMR pair gets reverted during kgspBootstrap.

Why one broadcast write is enough. 0x009A0000-0x009A3FFF is the broadcast FBPA aperture; the 24 per-instance mirrors sit at 0x00900204 + n*0x4000. The shipping driver writes no per-FBPA register and produces a working card, because devinit runs afterwards and propagates the value. In a driverless runtime context with no devinit, the broadcast alone does not move CSTATUS and all per-FBPA instances must be written by hand. Whether the propagation is a PRI priv-ring hardware mechanism has never been directly instrumented.

Step 7: the stock signature is rebuilt

kgspSec2PostblTimingRebuildStockSignature() frees and destroys the 0xf800 payload memdesc, allocates a new one of NV_ALIGN_UP(stockSignatureSize, 256) with MEMDESC_FLAGS_ALLOC_IN_UNPROTECTED_MEMORY, copies pStockSignatureData back into it, and re-points pWprMeta->sysmemAddrOfSignature and pWprMeta->sizeOfSignature at the new descriptor. If it fails, _kgspBootGspRm returns that status and the boot aborts.

Why. The next Booter Load is the real one: the one that must carve WPR2 correctly, pass its own signature verification, and launch GSP-RM. If the oversized payload buffer were still attached, that run would overflow DMEM again and GSP would never start. Restoring the genuine 4096-byte signature and its true length hands the Booter exactly what a stock driver would.

Why the geometry change does not invalidate the signature. The stock AES-MAC covers the static GSP firmware image at rest, not runtime WPR metadata and not hardware geometry. WPR metadata is computed by the driver at runtime. An earlier claim to the contrary was explicitly retracted, and the shipping save / inject / restore flow is the empirical proof.

This step also explains a real-world trap: if the machine previously ran the firmware-patching predecessor, gsp_tu10x.bin on disk must be restored to stock first. Otherwise the driver saves the exploit payload as the "stock" signature at step 2, and the clean GSP-RM boot then DMAs the wrong ROP chain. The success line to look for is SEC2_DEBUG: saved stock signature (4096 bytes).

Step 8: WPR metadata is recomputed

kgspPopulateWprMeta_HAL() is called a second time, after the geometry writes and the signature rebuild. The first call ran in the stock position and computed WPR2 placement from the old, small framebuffer. The second call recomputes it against the geometry that is now live, logging:

SEC2_DEBUG: WPR meta updated fbSize=0x0000001000000000 wprStart=... wprEnd=... heapOffset=... heapSize=...

Without it, the driver's WPR2 placement and the booter's carve would disagree, which is exactly the class of failure (0x55, 0x65) that consumed days of debugging before the design settled.

Step 9: GSP boots normally

The genuine Booter Load now runs unmodified. Patch 0002 adds the confirming readback:

SEC2_DEBUG: normal BooterLoad status=0x0
SEC2_DEBUG: POST-BooterLoad verify PLM=0xffffffff SS0=0x88888888 SS1=0x00000008 CFG1=0x02779000 LMR=0x0000020b

That second line, printed only when the status is NV_OK, is the definitive proof the unlock survived the real GSP boot. It is also the single line to ask for when triaging a report. Patch 0002 additionally converts four fatal assertions in kgspBootstrap_TU102 into logged status checks, so a transient failure produces diagnostics rather than a dead adapter.

Step 10: GSP static info is patched so the new capacity is advertised

Opening the geometry registers changes what the hardware decodes. It does not change what GSP-RM reports back to the driver. Patch 0001 therefore rewrites the static config info after kgspInitRm receives it, gated on the same two device IDs:

pGSCI->fb_length is set to targetFbBytes: 0x0000001000000000 (64 GiB) for 0x20C2, 0x0000000A00000000 (40 GiB) for 0x2082.
If the last FB region's limit is below targetFbBytes - 1, that region is widened: limit = targetFbBytes - 1, reserved = limit - base + 1, supportCompressed = NV_TRUE, supportISO = NV_TRUE, performance = 20.

Logged as SEC2_DEBUG: static-info BEFORE / AFTER. Without this the driver would not report the widened size at all.

Step 11: making the extra capacity actually allocatable

Four more patches close the gap between "the region exists" and "CUDA can use it".

Patch 0003, late PMA extension. memmgrSec2DebugLateExtendHighPmaRegion() runs from a hook in osinit.c after heap creation. It picks the highest FB region that is bRsvdRegion && !bInternalHeap && limit >= 8 GiB, registers [max(base, 8 GiB), limit] with pmaRegisterRegion, and then either splits the candidate into a new public FB_REGION_DESCRIPTOR from 8 GiB upward or un-reserves it in place, followed by memmgrRegenerateFbRegionPriority. It returns NV_ERR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES if a split is needed and numFBRegions >= MAX_FB_REGIONS. Logged as SEC2_DEBUG: late PMA extension status=0x0.

Note that stockFbBytes = 0x200000000ULL (8 GiB) is hardcoded as the split point for both profiles, including the 10 GB card whose true stock size is 0x280000000. The same constant is declared and never used in patch 0001.

Patch 0004, PRAMIN clamp. A single ten-line hunk in kern_bus_gm107.c. After the stock offsetBar0 = (Ram.fbAddrSpaceSizeMb << 20) - DRF_SIZE(NV_PRAMIN); it adds: if the device ID matches and Ram.fbAddrSpaceSizeMb > 0x2000, recompute as (0x2000ULL << 20) - DRF_SIZE(NV_PRAMIN). Why: the PRAMIN window offset is derived from the framebuffer size. Computed from 65536 MB it lands outside reachable BAR0 space. Clamping it back to the stock 8 GiB address space keeps the aperture usable.

Patch 0005, copy-engine scrub workarounds. Two hunks. In mem_mgr_tu102.c the scrubber PTE-kind helper returns NV_MMU_PTE_KIND_GENERIC_MEMORY early for the two device IDs instead of NV_MMU_PTE_KIND_GENERIC_MEMORY_COMPRESSIBLE_DISABLE_PLC. In mem_scrub.c the memmgrUseVasForCeMemoryOps() guard gains a device-ID exclusion so DRF_DEF(0050, _CEUTILS_FLAGS, _VIRTUAL_MODE, _TRUE) is never set and the scrubber runs in physical mode.

Patch 0006, persistent software state. Nine lines in kernel-open/nvidia/nv.c at PCI probe setting nv->flags |= NV_FLAG_PERSISTENT_SW_STATE for either device ID. The flag already exists for SR-IOV virtual functions and is repurposed so RM does not tear down software state when the last client closes. This is effectively built-in persistence mode, and it is why the shipping design needs no systemd daemon. (remove.sh still cleans up a legacy cmpunlocker.service and a watchdog.py that the current installer never creates: vestiges of the abandoned watchdog design.)

The whole sequence on a clock

Timeline from a complete 8 GB dmesg capture, driver load to usable card:

Time	Event
11.13 s	Stock signature saved
11.32 s	PLM[0] WPR_CFG opened
11.50 s	PLM[1] FBPA opened
11.68 s	PLM[2] WPR opened
11.86 s	PLM[3] FEAT opened
11.86 s	POST-WRITE (SS0, SS1, CFG1, LMR) and WPR-meta update
12.07 s	Normal BooterLoad `status=0x0`
12.07 s	POST-BooterLoad verify: `PLM=0xffffffff SS0=0x88888888 SS1=0x00000008 CFG1=0x02779000 LMR=0x0000020b`
12.64 s	Heap creation
12.72 s	Late PMA extension `status=0x0`

About one second of wall clock, four Booter passes at roughly 180 ms each.

Everything the unlock does is visible with:

sudo dmesg | grep SEC2_DEBUG

The SEC2_DEBUG_PRI_* register names, the kgspSec2PostblTiming* function names and the SEC2_DEBUG: prefix appear nowhere in the stock 610.43.03 source. "PostBL Timing" is an invented feature name, read by two independent reviews as deliberate camouflage of exploit code as a manufacturing or debug feature.

What survives afterwards

Event	Compute unlock	Memory geometry
Driver unload / reload, no reset	Survives	Survives (registers still read the unlocked values)
FLR (`echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/<bdf>/reset`)	Survives	Lost
Power cycle / cold boot	Lost	Lost

Because nothing is persistent across a cold boot, the whole sequence re-runs on every module load. That is not a limitation of the implementation; it is the direct consequence of there being no always-on shadow for framebuffer geometry.

Where PCIe Gen2 slots into this narrative

!!! warning "Experimental, branch only" 0007-pcie-gen2.patch injects its entire register block into kernel_gsp.c at @@ -4942,6 +4942,260 @@, immediately after the devId print and immediately before the call to kgspSec2PostblTimingRebuildStockSignature(). It therefore runs inside exactly the window described in steps 5 and 6, while the PLMs are still open and the crafted signature payload still provides the arbitrary BAR0 write primitive. It pushes a 23-entry xp3gTable plus two further registers through the Booter (25 Booter-routed writes), then does plain host BAR0 writes, then leaves the actual link retrain to patch 0008 or to userspace. Full detail on PCIe Gen2.

Open problems in the mechanism itself

!!! question "Open problem" Does the chain actually execute 0x0ccb? A hard constraint was recorded that no ROP exit path may route through regtable_rw_indexed (0x0ccb), because the 0xF800 payload linearly smashes the descriptor tables it indexes at DMEM 0x2383 and 0x8e08, and a 2026-07-06 isolation matrix showed every write-carrying rejoin chain dying there. Yet the shipping payload places 0x00000ccb at DMEM 0xFFF4 and works. The next step is to single-step or emulate the unwind from 0xFF54 and record whether 0xFFF4 is ever popped into PC or is only a live-through saved slot in the outermost frame.

!!! question "Open problem" Does 0x00000007 at payload offset 0x1100 do anything beyond the reset PLM? Its main role is settled: DMEM 0x1900 is the f100_field_save_restore slot reached from IMEM 0x1d3b, and the 0x7 is what makes the exit through secure_teardown leave the SEC2 reset PLM at 0xff instead of the usual 0x8f taint. Whether it has any further effect has never been established.

!!! question "Open problem" Is 0x008200FC writable, and what does it read on a cold card? One sweep reported 0xffffffff, another 0x000003FF. The nine-PLM Gen2 branch attempt returned status=0xffff with no readback recorded.

More at Open questions and the Status board. For what was tried and failed on the way here, see Dead ends.

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Appendix

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Unlock How It Works

How the unlock works

Why it has to work this way

Step 0: where the unlock sits in the GA100 boot chain

Step 1: the driver loads and detects the device ID

Step 2: the signature buffer is enlarged to 0xf800

Step 3: the payload is written

Step 4: Booter Load is executed to gain the write primitive

Step 5: the four PLMs are opened in sequence

Step 6: the compute and geometry registers are written

SS0 and SS1: the compute unthrottle

CFG1 and LMR: the geometry

Step 7: the stock signature is rebuilt

Step 8: WPR metadata is recomputed

Step 9: GSP boots normally

Step 10: GSP static info is patched so the new capacity is advertised

Step 11: making the extra capacity actually allocatable

The whole sequence on a clock

What survives afterwards

Where PCIe Gen2 slots into this narrative

Open problems in the mechanism itself

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Step 2: the signature buffer is enlarged to `0xf800`