fix(ci): resolve new zizmor findings#217
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zizmor v1.25.0 flags direct use of ${{ inputs.* }} in run: blocks
as template-injection risks. Move all input references to env: blocks
and reference them as shell variables instead.
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zizmor v1.25.0 (bumped by Dependabot) now flags
${{ inputs.* }}expressions used directly inrun:blocks of composite actions as template-injection risks (attacker-controllable code expansion).Fix: Move all
${{ inputs.* }}references inaction.ymltoenv:blocks and reference them as shell variables (${VAR}) in therun:scripts. This is the standard mitigation — environment variables are not subject to expression-context injection.Affected lines: 46, 52, 55-59, 61-64, 73-74, 80 (17 findings total, all resolved).