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Security: DailybotHQ/deepworkplan-skill

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

This is the official DeepWorkPlan agent skill pack, maintained by the team at Dailybot. Source of truth: https://github.com/DailybotHQ/deepworkplan-skill. Reports against this repo reach the Dailybot security team directly.

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in the DeepWorkPlan skill pack, please report it privately rather than opening a public issue.

Email: security@dailybot.com

Include in your report:

  • A description of the issue and the impact you observed
  • Steps to reproduce (a minimal proof of concept is ideal)
  • The version of the skill pack (version field in skills/deepworkplan/SKILL.md)
  • Your name or handle if you would like credit in the release notes

We acknowledge reports within 3 business days and aim to issue a fix or a mitigation within 30 days for valid findings, depending on severity.

Supported Versions

The skill auto-releases from main; the latest tagged vX.Y.Z release is the only supported version. Security fixes ship as a new release rather than backports.

Version Supported
Latest 2.x release
Anything older ❌ — upgrade to the latest release

In Scope

  • Code in this repository under skills/, setup.sh, and scripts/
  • The behavior of the bundled skills/deepworkplan/shared/context.sh
  • The repo-mutation behavior of deepworkplan-onboard (the files it writes)
  • Any silent file write or persistent change made by the skill

Out of Scope

  • Third-party agent harnesses (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, etc.) — report upstream
  • Issues caused by user-modified copies of the skill that drift from this repo
  • The skills.sh / OpenClaw distribution platforms themselves — report to those projects

Threat Model (Markdown-first skill)

DeepWorkPlan is a Markdown-first skill. It has no CLI, no HTTP API, no auth flow, and makes no network callsshared/context.sh reads local git metadata and environment variables only and emits a single-line JSON blob; no telemetry leaves the machine. The skill's only security-relevant action is that it mutates the user's repository:

  • deepworkplan-onboard generates or reconciles AGENTS.md, docs/, per-module docs, .agents/, and the .claude → .agents symlink.
  • The plan flows (create, execute, refine, resume) write plan artifacts under the gitignored .dwp/ directory.
  • The opt-in devcontainer addon writes devcontainer/compose files when explicitly invoked.

Consent and dry-run posture

The onboarding and addon flows are designed to propose before they write:

  • Consent before mutation. The onboard flow surfaces the planned files and changes for the developer to review before writing, and reconciles existing setups (it does not clobber an existing AGENTS.md, devcontainer, or docs/ layout — it merges/extends).
  • Opt-in addons. Addons (e.g. the devcontainer addon) are never applied automatically; they are layered only when the developer requests them.
  • Bounded output. Plan artifacts are confined to .dwp/ (gitignored by default), so running a plan does not pollute committed source.
  • No network, no secrets. The skill never reads secrets, environment variables beyond the documented agent-detection / DWP_* overrides, or source file contents for transmission — there is nowhere to transmit to.

Non-blocking failure mode

When a control or detection step is uncertain (e.g. context.sh cannot find a git root), the skill falls back to a safe default ($PWD as repo root, .dwp/ under it) and continues with the developer's primary task. It never blocks work to satisfy a check.

Discovery Boundary (defense in depth)

Anything outside skills/deepworkplan/ — this file, README.md, .github/, scripts/, tests/, docs/, and the contributor AGENTS.md / CLAUDE.md — is repo-development infrastructure that is never installed on a user's machine. The runtime artifact's surface is bounded to one directory, which keeps the auditable footprint small.

Coordinated Disclosure

We follow standard coordinated disclosure: please give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before publishing details. We will credit reporters in the CHANGELOG and the GitHub release notes once a fix is shipped, unless you ask to remain anonymous.

There aren't any published security advisories