

# Incompleteness and Intensionality via Universal Property of Arithmetic

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# Introduction

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## “Violations” of (GII)

Identify a theory as a set of axioms. To formalise PA in itself, we need a formula  $\text{ax}(x)$  to enumerate all PA axioms.

### Example ([Feferman, 1960])

There is a formula  $\text{ax}(x)$  representing the PA axioms,

$$\begin{cases} \varphi \in \text{PA} & \text{PA} \vdash \text{ax}(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \\ \varphi \notin \text{PA} & \text{PA} \vdash \neg \text{ax}(\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner) \end{cases}$$

However, with respect to which,

$$\text{PA} \vdash \text{Con}_{\text{ax}} := \neg \exists x. \text{Prf}_{\text{ax}}(x, \ulcorner \perp \urcorner).$$

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# A Mathematical Perspective

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Externally equivalent notions might be internally different in PA, because weaker meta-theories identify less notions.

Central Question for Intensional Aspects of (GII)

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One way to do this: via **universal properties**.

# Universal Property of Arithmetic

Very briefly, categorical logic is the following equivalence,

$$\mathcal{C}[-] : \{F\text{-Theories}\} / \text{equiv.} \simeq \{F\text{-Categories}\}$$

Examples of  $F$ : Coherent, Heyting, Boolean, ...

- $\mathcal{C}[T]$  is the category of  $T$ -classes.
- Formalising mathematics in  $T \simeq$  working internally in  $\mathcal{C}[T]$ .

## Theorem

$\mathcal{C}[\text{PA}]$  is the *initial* Boolean cat. with parametrised NNO.

Similar results for CA, the  $\Sigma_1$ -fragment of  $I\Sigma_1$  w.r.t. coherent cat., and for HA w.r.t. Heyting cat.; cf. [Ye, 2023].



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# Abstract Categorical Framework

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# The Set Up of Categorical Incompleteness

Let  $\mathcal{L}$  be some family of left exact cat. (specified algebraically):

- Suppose  $\mathcal{C}$  is the initial object in  $\mathcal{L}$ ;
- And  $\mathbb{C}$  is the initial object in  $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{C}}$ .

The coding functor is induced by initiality of  $\mathcal{C}$ ,

$$\ulcorner - \urcorner : \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \text{Ext}(\mathbb{C}) := \mathcal{C}(1, \mathbb{C}) \in \mathcal{L}.$$

Provability is formalised via internal global section,

$$\Gamma : \text{Ext}(\mathbb{C}) \rightarrow \mathcal{C}, \quad \alpha \mapsto \begin{array}{ccc} \Gamma(\alpha) & \xrightarrow{\quad} & \mathbb{C}_1 \\ \downarrow & \ulcorner & \downarrow \langle s, t \rangle \\ 1 & \xrightarrow{\langle \ulcorner \Gamma, \alpha \rangle} & \mathbb{C}_0 \times \mathbb{C}_0 \end{array}$$

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# The Constructive Case

We say  $\mathcal{L}$  is constructive if  $\mathcal{L}$  is closed under Artin glueing.

## Theorem

*If  $\mathcal{L}$  is constructive, then  $\Box$  satisfies the following conditions:*

(P)  $\Box$  is a pointed functor  $\eta : 1_{\mathcal{C}} \Rightarrow \Box$ ;

(L) *It has the Löb's property:  $\Box 1 = 1$  is the initial  $\Box$ -algebra,*

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \Box 1 & \overset{\Box \omega}{\dashrightarrow} & \Box \varphi \\ \downarrow & & \downarrow \\ 1 & \overset{\omega! \exists}{\dashrightarrow} & \varphi \end{array}$$



## The Constructive Case

- The above structure only requires  $\mathbb{C} \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{C}}$ .
- Joyal studied list pretopoi (cf. [van Dijk and Oldenziel, 2020]). The proof uses initiality of  $\mathcal{C}$ , e.g.  $1$  is projective.
- However, there are much more general proofs which works with any  $(\mathcal{C}, \mathbb{C}, 1 \Rightarrow \square)$ ; see [Ramesh, 2023].

## Theorem (Non-Constructive Case [Feferman, 1960])

*Let  $\mathcal{C}[\text{PA}]_{\Sigma}$  be the smallest coherent full subcategory containing the PNNO. If  $\mathbb{C} \in \mathcal{C}[\text{PA}]_{\Sigma}$ , then (GII) holds.*

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## For HA

The existence of  $1 \Rightarrow \Box$  for HA is surprising:

- The usual formalisation of HA does not seem to satisfy (P).
- There are stronger axiomatisations that does [Visser, 1982].
- What is the “correct” provability logic of HA?

## For PA

Löb's theorem for PA seems to suggest  $(\mathcal{C}[\text{PA}], \Box)$  also satisfies (L).  
Is there is nice categorical proof of this?

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