Release v1.1.1: Stack Allocation Math Refactoring for Low-Address Pointer Underflow Security

This release introduces a critical security and robustness update for bare-metal systems, refactoring the mathematical condition of the boundary check to prevent pointer underflow.

Security & Robustness (Low-Address Architectures)

• Pointer Underflow Prevention: Solved a potential pointer underflow vulnerability inside estack_alloc_aligned occurring on microcontrollers and raw hardware platforms where RAM is mapped close to the bottom of the address space (e.g., base addresses near 0x0).
• Modular Math Resolution: Refactored the single boundary check to use safe size-based offsets (new_right_offset + metadata_overhead > capacity) instead of comparing raw pointer addresses. Exploited the natural wrapping behaviors of C unsigned modular arithmetic, allowing aligned_ptr to wrap safely and cancel out during the final offset calculation, maintaining the single flat check with zero extra branch penalties.

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Complex inside. Simple outside.