feat(authz): server-side @owner injection and audit-column auto-fill#63
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The Cedar @owner policy decides per-record access by comparing resource.<owner_field> == principal.id, but the create_entity handler never populated the owner field server-side. A client POSTing {"created_by": "user:victim"} would plant a row under the victim's id — impersonation, denial of access to the actual creator, or both. Strip-on- update was likewise missing: a passing record-level can_modify check could be followed by a write that quietly transferred ownership. This change: - inject_owner_on_create force-sets the @owner field to the principal's id (stripped to match Cedar's principal.id attribute shape) on every create. Any client-supplied value is overwritten. - strip_owner_on_update drops the @owner field from any PUT/PATCH body so ownership is immutable post-create. - inject_audit_columns_on_create / _on_update auto-fill conventional created_by / updated_by / created_at / updated_at columns when the schema declares them. Closes the WebhookSubscription.created_by drift reported in the audit and gives every operator schema a free, spoof-proof audit trail without per-handler wiring. Wired into routes/entities.rs at create_entity (owner + create audit columns), update_entity (strip owner + update audit columns), and patch_entity (same as update). 11 new unit tests cover the helpers plus the impersonation regression specifically. Third of four PRs from the production-audit gap review. D (Cedar engine audit emission) is next.
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May 26, 2026
Release rolling up the production-audit gap PRs (#61, #62, #63, #64). BREAKING (pre-1.0 minor): schema-forge-backend 0.11 → 0.12 AuthStore trait gains required `record_login(username, at)` method. Downstream impls must add it. schema-forge-acton 0.30 → 0.31 DynAuthStore trait gains required `record_login` shim. `access::filter_entity_fields` now returns `Vec<String>` (dropped field names) instead of `()`. Callers binding the return value must update.
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Summary
owner_write/owner_restrictpolicies decide per-record access by comparingresource.<owner_field> == principal.id, butcreate_entitynever populated the owner field server-side. A caller posting{"created_by": "user:victim"}would plant a row under the victim's id.inject_owner_on_createforce-sets@ownerto the principal id (stripped to match Cedar'sprincipal.idattribute shape) and overwrites any client value.strip_owner_on_updatedrops the@ownerfield from PUT / PATCH bodies so ownership is immutable post-create. Without this, a passingcan_modifycheck could be followed by a write that quietly handed the record to another user.inject_audit_columns_on_create/_on_updatefillcreated_by/created_at/updated_by/updated_atwhen the schema declares them. Closes theWebhookSubscription.created_bydrift from the audit report and gives every operator schema a free, spoof-proof audit trail without per-handler wiring.Third of four PRs from the production-audit gap review. Follows #61 / #62. PR-D (Cedar engine deny audit) is up next.
Test plan
cargo nextest run --workspace --features schema-forge-acton/surrealdb— 1680 passedcargo clippy --workspace --features schema-forge-acton/surrealdb --all-targets— cleaninject_owner_on_create_*(4),strip_owner_on_update_*(2),inject_audit_columns_*(4), incl. the spoof regression