Question: signed receipts for selected nanobot tool / automation / handoff events?

[cullenmeyers]

Hi — I found nanobot while looking at self-hosted agent runtimes where tool calls, MCP actions, automations, subagent results, memory-backed outputs, or chat-app handoffs may need evidence that survives outside the original runtime.

I’m building BoundaryAttest, a small open-source project for portable signed receipts around selected claims, actions, artifacts, or handoffs that cross trust boundaries:

https://github.com/cullenmeyers/BoundaryAttest

The idea is not to replace nanobot’s local session history, Dream memory, WebUI activity, tool logs, MCP integrations, model routing, chat-app records, gateway logs, or normal runtime state. The receipt only proves a narrow claim:

a specific signer signed a specific claim, and the signed claim has not been altered.

nanobot seemed relevant because it can run as a WebUI, terminal agent, chat-app bot, or long-running gateway; use tools such as files, shell, web search, web fetch, MCP, cron, image generation, and subagents; keep long-term memory; run scheduled automations; and expose a Python SDK / OpenAI-compatible API.

A receipt could potentially bind selected boundary events like:

• nanobot session/topic ID;
• workspace reference;
• model/provider reference;
• tool or MCP server reference;
• tool-call input/output digest;
• subagent result hash;
• automation / cron run reference;
• memory or source references used;
• generated artifact or answer hash;
• chat-app handoff reference, such as Slack, Discord, Telegram, WeChat, email, or Mattermost;
• OpenAI-compatible API request/result reference;
• status, such as tool-called, automated, completed, failed, exported, or handed off;
• timestamp/event ID;
• signer/public key ID.

The strongest use case would be when a nanobot tool result, automation outcome, subagent result, generated artifact, API response, chat-app action summary, or exported run summary is handed to another agent, user, reviewer, downstream system, support/debugging process, or future audit trail.

BoundaryAttest would not prove the answer was correct, the tool was safe, the automation was wise, the memory was accurate, the user intended the action, or the runtime was uncompromised. It would only prove that a specific claim about a selected nanobot artifact/action/handoff was signed and has not been altered after export.

Does this kind of portable signed receipt fit any workflow you imagine for nanobot, especially around MCP/tool actions, scheduled automations, subagent results, chat-app handoffs, API responses, exported artifacts, or debugging/audit summaries? Or are nanobot’s current session history, memory, WebUI activity, chat-app records, and gateway logs enough for the current scope?

No pressure if it is not relevant — I’m mainly trying to learn where signed receipts are actually useful around self-hosted agent runtimes.