Replies: 1 comment
-
|
Thanks for working through this, Abraham — appreciate the detailed pass. We're wiring these into the DIN P3 specs now. |
Beta Was this translation helpful? Give feedback.
0 replies
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Uh oh!
There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.
-
We're pushing to close the P3 mechanism designs (tracking issue #36), and slashing has three economic decisions that shape the protocol beyond one contract. Design context: MECHANISM_DESIGN §4, implementation issue #38.
cc @abrahamnash — points 1 and 4 in particular touch white-paper semantics, and we'd value your read before we freeze the spec.
1. Where does slashed stake go?
Options: (a) burn, (b) treasury, (c) redistribute to honest validators of the same GI, (d) split. Today slashed tokens strand inside the stake contract — an accidental burn.
Current recommendation: 50% burn / 50% treasury. Burning is a deflationary sink and avoids validators profiting from peers being slashed (which encourages false disputes); the treasury half funds dispute adjudication. Reporters get only a fixed dispute bounty, never a share of the slash.
2. Partial-slash fraction and the score-deviation threshold
Today a missed audit vote slashes a flat
minStake()— it fully unstakes a floor-staked validator for one liveness fault, which over-punishes. Proposal: partial slash = DAO-settable fraction of min stake (25–50%), full slash reserved for provable malice and recidivism. The S3 score-deviation threshold needs empirical data from BlockFLow scoring validation (P3-SCR) first — plan is a wide threshold in warning-only "shadow mode" for the first weeks of DevNet 2.0, then tighten.3. Dispute bond size and window length
Any staked validator can open a dispute by posting a bond (forfeited if frivolous, returned + treasury-funded bounty if upheld), triggering re-evaluation by a fresh subgroup. What bond size deters spam without pricing out small validators, and is a window of ~1 GI enough?
4. White-paper alignment: delegator penalties and permanent removal
White paper §8.1 specifies that delegators to a slashed validator lose a percentage of their stake, and that slashed validators are permanently removed (must re-register a new identity). DevNet has no delegation yet (parked to P5+), and our current design jails/blacklists rather than forcing identity re-registration. Do we treat the §8.1 semantics as binding for 2.0, or as the eventual target once delegation lands?
Beta Was this translation helpful? Give feedback.
All reactions