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* Fix command injection in `public/api/terminal.php` (`isAllowedCommand`) by rejecting shell metacharacters `;&|\`$<>` and newlines. * Record learning in `.jules/sentinel.md`.
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Command Injection in terminal API execution.
isAllowedCommandpreviously checked if a command string started with a permitted prefix (e.g.npm), but an attacker could append a chained payload (e.g.npm run; rm -rf /) which was passed directly toproc_open.π― Impact: Attackers could execute arbitrary system shell commands leading to total system compromise.
π§ Fix: Added a robust validation check using
preg_matchto prevent the use of shell chaining operators and metacharacters (;,&,|,`,$,<,>,\n).β Verification: Ran
php tests/SecurityTest.phpandphp -l public/api/terminal.php. Also verified no state files are accidentally included in the PR.PR created automatically by Jules for task 2938634573487380212 started by @LebToki